This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world’s books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book’s long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ **Make non-commercial use of the files** We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ **Refrain from automated querying** Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google’s system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ **Maintain attribution** The Google “watermark” you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ **Keep it legal** Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can’t offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book’s appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world’s books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at [http://books.google.com/](http://books.google.com/)
POSITIVE POLITY
SYSTEM
OF
POSITIVE POLITY

BY
AUGUSTE COMTE
AUTHOR OF 'SYSTEM OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY'

FOURTH VOLUME
CONTAINING THE
THEORY OF THE FUTURE OF MAN

WITH AN APPENDIX
consisting of
EARLY ESSAYS ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1877

All rights reserved
REPUBLIC OF THE WEST.

Order and Progress—Live for others.
Live without concealment.

SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY,
OR
TREATISE ON SOCIOLOGY,

Instituting the Religion of HUMANITY;

BY AUGUSTE COMTE,
Author of 'System of Positive Philosophy.'

The principle, Love;
The basis, Order,
The end, Progress.

FOURTH AND LAST VOLUME,

Containing THE SYNTHETICAL PRESENTATION OF THE FUTURE OF MAN.

This concluding volume ends with a GENERAL APPENDIX which reproduces all the Early Essays of the author on Social Philosophy.

PARIS
CARILIAN-GOEURY AND VOR DALMONT
&c. &c.
AUGUST 1854.
Sixty-sixth year of the great revolution.
NOTICE.

This volume was published by the Author in August 1854.

All the 'Positive Polity' has been translated by Richard Congreve.

The General Appendix, published by the Author in 1854, which contains all the Early Essays of the author on Social Philosophy, has been translated by Henry Dix Hutton.

The Marginal Notes and the Table of Contents have been added by the Translators, aided, so far as the first part of the volume is concerned, by Samuel Lobb.

The Index is the work of Frederic Harrison.
PREFACE

to

THE FOURTH VOLUME.

This concluding volume, as its predecessor, has occupied in the writing six months of uninterrupted work (January 29—July 25, 1854).

The material difficulties in the way of its publication have been met by one of my best disciples, nobly following the generous initiative of patronage taken in regard to the first volume. As a consequence of the general industrial pressure due to the Russian war, my printer felt bound in prudence, though with unimpaired confidence, not to advance the money required for printing the present volume till the cost of the preceding had been fully covered. That volume, however, had been too recently published for its sale to be sufficient to meet this fair condition, rendered imperative by the force of circumstances; I was obliged, therefore, to apply directly for exceptional aid. Once aware of the need, M. Audiffrent lost no time in completely meeting it, so that the printing of the present volume has proceeded so rapidly that it will appear a few weeks after its writing. At first my young patron’s touching modesty led him to forbid my giving his conduct the publicity it deserves; ultimately, however, by appealing to Positivist principles, I obtained the proper authorisation. The first and last volumes, then, of my principal work must be honourably connected with the names of Messrs. Lonchampt and Audiffrent, without ever forgetting the generous anony-
mous supporters who, in 1848, enabled me to publish separately the General View. This list of efforts should hand down to memory also two similar offers made me during the other phases of my long work, rendered unnecessary though they were by the confidence of M. Thunot.

Thus, beyond my hopes, I see realised the legitimate consequences of the resolution, which I adopted and proclaimed in 1850, to devote, viz., for the future the returns of all my writings to meeting the cost of printing, taking nothing for personal use. Such anticipation of the habits of the future may not have determined the noble advances I have mentioned above, but without it I could not have accepted them, uniting as it does my patrons with the worthy printer whose confidence in me is the main basis on which I rest for the free expression of my thoughts.

Again, this same rule led me finally to a modification of my refusal (see the 1st Circular), a refusal warranted by my principles, to accept a proposal made to me, as admirable as it was exceptional. That Circular adequately expresses the value I justly attach to the unparalleled condensation of my fundamental work, the Positive Philosophy, by Miss Martineau. So settled is my opinion on this point that, in the last revision of the Positivist Library given in this volume, I have definitively substituted her work for the original, the study of the original for the future being suited only to the theorician properly so-called. Without further insisting on this final estimate, which merely gives my sanction to the general judgment, I must explain my view of the proposal to which the publication alluded to gave rise last year. The prevailing literary morality is such as to enhance the merit of the scrupulous delicacy which decided my noble colleague to assign me the third of the net profits of the work; its printing expenses had been advanced by a liberal patron; of the remaining two-thirds she gave one to the publisher, the other she kept for herself.

At first I felt bound to decline the proposal, as, in its original shape, involving a breach of my practice of renouncing
all profit for myself from my books. In the end, however, I was able, without infringing this obligation, to meet the cordial wish of Miss Martineau, by devoting the money she offered to the more rapid clearance of the cost of printing the treatise now concluded. My rule thus gains in completeness, as all my books are brought, as it were, into one common interest, a condition indispensably required and acted on by me already, instinctively, in reference to the volumes of the present work.

Over and above its direct object, this explanation, as those which have gone before it, is calculated to illustrate the character of the synthesis which presents itself to-day, claiming the general direction of this world. In it the conduct of true Positivists contrasts, as markedly as their belief contrasts, with that of the ill-regulated milieu, the government of which devolves on them—its spiritual government in the first instance, then its temporal—as the issue of the whole course of man's destiny. For completeness' sake, I must include a reference to the posthumous patronage of Wallace and of Lombe, with which my readers and those of Miss Martineau must be familiar, as also to the protection which M. Vieillard, to his honour, procures for the doctrine judged by him the only one capable of saving the West.

The mental indiscipline now prevalent precludes the hope that this volume will be always read in its due order, after a sufficient study of those which precede it. In itself more attractive and more directly practical in bearing, it will bring me fresh readers, several of whom will perhaps begin with the last chapter, where religion passes into politics. But it is also the most systematic; and so its study will lead to the speedy recognition, not merely of the inseparability of its five chapters in themselves, but also of their regular connection with the whole of my stational and dynamical theories; it will therefore revive rather than lessen the attention paid to the other three volumes. I am even inclined to believe that there are students of ability waiting (I should do so in their place) for the com-
pletion of a construction which is indivisible before they betake themselves to its full examination under all its aspects. They were warned of what was coming by the separate publication in 1848 of the General View. Be this as it may, I do not regret the pressure which obliged me to publish each volume separately, and I count on the speedy correction of the imperfect or hasty judgments which must often have resulted from an undisciplined eagerness.

As to the style and composition of the work, I must here add for completeness something to the explanations on the point given in the preface to the first volume. The adverse criticisms called forth by the *Positive Philosophy*, as a literary production, had been anticipated by myself; I was quite aware of its defects, though I have never felt otherwise than glad that I overcame my scruples on the subject, on grounds the justice of which is now indisputable. But, as the necessity for haste was past, I exerted myself when entering on the present work, to improve the expression, still adhering, however, to my practice of re-writing nothing. As yet the most fastidious judges have been satisfied with the increasing success attained by this care, and I hope that the last volume will strengthen them in their judgment. The literateur has only to clothe the thoughts of others, he may concentrate his faculties therefore on perfecting his language. He naturally is led by this habit to judge too harshly the writer who, compelled to work out new conceptions in the old language, can hardly avoid defects in composition, as he balances between diffuseness and obscurity. Deeper meditation, and such requires a first expression as its condition, connects the particular creations of the writer with their germs in the thought of mankind as represented in its language; then the defects drop off of themselves, not to speak of more preparation on the part of the public.

To turn to the best account my literary effort, it is desirable to state clearly the several rules which in the course of it I have imposed on myself, principally in the second half of my religious construction, and most especially in the con-
cluding volume. To avoid too long sentences I have never let any exceed two manuscript or five printed lines. The eye and the mind require pauses; this is secured by making seven sentences the maximum of a paragraph, nor are these paragraph determined simply by typographical considerations. Prose cannot, it is true, aspire to the musical perfection of poetry, yet I have exerted myself to approach it by not allowing myself any hiatus between even two sentences or two paragraphs. Further, I have avoided the repetition of any word whatever, not merely in the same sentence but even in two consecutive sentences though in different paragraphs; allowing always for the auxiliary monosyllables.

Whilst practising these self-imposed obligations, I have always felt the importance of applying in all cases Descartes' rule scrupulously to observe the institutions we create, which he rightly likens to laws of nature, however indifferent they may seem at first sight. The discipline to which we thus submit is as wholesome for the intellect as for the heart, and rests upon a true knowledge of the constitution of man, in regard to which improvement depends principally on submission. The literary value of this discipline is fully seen in the superiority of poetic diction, though more fettered than common language. When habit made the new yoke easy I found it a constant source of unlooked-for improvements, not merely in style, but even in thought. Literary defects are easiest to discover and most open to modification, to correct them then is a greater victory over the natural inertia of our intelligence, and in correcting them we are led to perfect our conceptions as we reflect on their expression.

Taking the volume as a whole, the religious construction has become at once more systematic, more moral, and more practical, by definitively placing the worship before the doctrine. I regret that this correction is subsequent to the composition of the Positivist Catechism, as it would have increased the

1 This correction has been introduced in the second French Edition and in the English Translation.—Ed.
efficiency of that work. Without waiting, however, for a second edition, the improvement may be effected by dividing into two the long conversation on the doctrinal system as a whole. The first half, bearing directly on the theory of the Great Being, should for the future form a separate chapter and follow on the Introduction. Then we may pass at once to the study of the worship, and after it to that of the doctrine, the general conversation on which will thus be limited to its second half, the half which alone relates to the encyclopedic constitution.

This breaking up of a long chapter allows the adoption of the definitive arrangement, the transposition being easy and involving no change in the exposition as it exists. I take the opportunity to urge the readers of my Catechism to divide similarly the last chapter, studying the past, first in its stages of Fetishism and Theocracy, which were common to all nations, then in the threefold transition which is peculiar to the West. By these two changes the small work, which is the organ of propagation, should for the future be considered as consisting of thirteen chapters instead of eleven.

So much is sufficient for the explanations peculiar to the concluding volume; I pass to those required by my former prefaces. Not tying myself to chronological order, I take the second volume first. It leads to remarks which, besides their intrinsic importance, tend to systematise and complete the general freedom which I have been impelled to assert to the full in all my prefaces.

First, I should state that my third attempt to found the Occidental Review has proved a total failure. By making it a Quarterly, by renouncing all claim to any payment, either as director or as contributor, I had, in 1852, reduced the cost as much as possible. Notwithstanding, the money required was not forthcoming, either as a collective effort or from individual patronage. No one disputed the utility of the undertaking, philosophically or politically; this fresh failure, therefore, has led me to abandon the plan for ever, even were some honourable patron to remove all financial difficulties. The select public
which I address felt more clearly than I did that there was a particular incongruity between the proposal and the general tendency of a doctrine, which by its natural action involves the suppression of journalism.

The obligation to speak at a given time and within given bounds becomes, it is true, less objectionable in proportion as the interval is longer, and yet a periodical judgment can never be applicable when that which is judged, the spectacle of human events, is intermittent. Closing as it does the spiritual interregnum, Positive religion will naturally put an end to the power which, owing to that interregnum, the literates of the West have occupied. Hence the priesthood of Humanity should deny itself all share in an institution which it will shortly have to condemn as radically anarchical. The worship and its teaching give it opportunities, even now, as much as in the normal state, for its oral instruction on the events of the day. Beyond general treatises, either original or for didactic purposes—the work of propagation, and the application, so far as they are in writing, require only small works upon particular points, and to make them periodical would be an uncalled-for incumbrance. Thus was I led to see that the failure, after three attempts, of a project which was not based on rational grounds, so far from indicating an unwise indifference, was due to the secret consciousness that it was intrinsically incompatible with the spirit and object of Positivism. I determined, therefore, to recall the efforts of all, and the sacrifices those efforts involved, to the extension of the sacerdotal fund, the centre for the future for all expenses whatsoever attendant on the installation of the universal religion.

To give its true character to my abandonment of all periodical publications, I confront it with my anticipation of a serious struggle now imminent, in which it would seem that the priesthood which is to regenerate the race needs the instrument I reject.

The growth of Positivism was long hampered, especially in France, by a concerted silence, which still continues in Ger-
many. Since it has overcome this compression, as a consequence of its progress the opposition of the metaphysicians and litera-
teurs has undergone a transformation. They are incapable, for they have no convictions of their own, of resisting the impulse towards regeneration; they therefore try to break its force by an attack on my religious construction in the name of its philo-
sophical basis—not able to see or not willing to own that my synthesis is one and indivisible. The very men who long dis-
puted the possibility of giving philosophy a positive character are now doing all in their power to show that the fusion (shown to be possible) cannot proceed farther so as to embrace religion. The opposition seems the more serious that it has its main source in the very quarter, in England that is, where as yet my labours have had the best reception.

But Positivism will overcome the active with more ease than the passive resistance, and that without feeling in the one case more than in the other the want of a periodical organ. No discussion is needed to prove that religion equally with philo-
sophy, and on the basis of philosophy, can take a Positive char-
acter, now that the reconstruction implied in both cases is an accomplished fact. All that is necessary is that Positivism—abandon, and that especially in England, the attempt to convert the class which supports the periodical press either by its contri-
butions or as its readers. Apart from a class which is tran-
sitional and radically hostile to the separation of the two powers, the Religion of Humanity will rally the nobler minds, whom the constant sense of the paramount importance of social objects has not hitherto led to action, solely from the absence of a guiding doctrine. The Positive system may become com-
plete, be condensed, and draw out its conclusions, without any opposition from the men of action; so far from it, they are waiting for it thus to qualify itself to direct the necessary close of a revolution which the lettered class everywhere tends to prolong indefinitely. It was amongst the active class that the term Positive religion originated, my own habitual use of it being subsequent to my seeing it adopted spontaneously by
eminent proletaries. Addressing directly its true supporters, Positivism will let the partisans of the Parliamentary system and of organised hypocrisy continue their futile attacks, never allowing them to disturb its normal course.

As I have definitely abandoned all periodical publications I am led to reduce to system the freedom I had adopted in my prefaces, and to avail myself of it, as to communications which can find no other fitting place. These prefaces are as free as any journal or review from any tie of method, and so give me the opportunity of fully explaining to my readers such points in reference to my whole labours as cannot be embodied in the works themselves. So, for the future, this is the plan I adopt for occasional communications; I combine the resources offered me by my prefaces with those afforded by my circulars and my lectures and shall thus be independent of any periodical organ.

Availing myself of this freedom, I insert in this place an important announcement, and then proceed to complete the explanations required by my former prefaces. There will always be an interval of a year between each of the three treatises promised in this volume, a year of rest taken not so much to repair my strength as to refresh my conceptions. During each of these intervals, a course of lectures will take the place of a published volume, the said course never to be repeated.

In accordance with this rule, I shall devote my period of rest in 1855 to the construction of the Concrete Philosophy of history, by a full exposition of the dynamical part of the Con-spectus of Sociolatry given in this volume (page 141). Prior to such exposition of the main constituent of the second philosophy, there will come a summary of the first philosophy, and consequent on such exposition, an aperçu of the third, the whole forming an Esthetic Course of Positive Philosophy. It will consist of forty-three lectures, of two to three hours each, three days in the week (Tuesdays, Fridays, and Sundays), at noon precisely, from Sunday, April 15, to Sunday, July 22, 1854.

I may now proceed with the explanations required by the
prefaces of the three preceding volumes, either as corrections or completion.

Those relating to the first two volumes bear more particularly on two judgments which have come into closer and closer connection, though without fusion; I allude to my estimate of the advance of Positivism and the extension of the sacerdotal functions. Bringing them at once under view, I must here dispel illusions as to the centres of Positivist action which I involuntarily spread on the faith of incorrect reports. It will be seen that there was never any question as to the Paris centre; there I could, by direct contact, judge of the completeness and firm cohesion of men's convictions. That centre alone, offers already but the beginning, it is true, but all turn on that beginning, of the true regeneration, a regeneration full as social in character as it is intellectual, both seemingly co-operating. Diderot and Condorcet could not have hoped that, within a century from the Encyclopædia, the successor would be uniting noble couples in the engagement of eternal widowhood, and would be consecrating to Humanist children wholly detached from God. Obscure and limited such results may be, their bearing is incontestable, complete as they are by the higher moral tone of the families regenerated. They are an announcement, that the capital of the human race will at no distant period belong to the Positivists, when liberty in spiritual matters shall allow of their practising their public worship as freely as their private prayers or their domestic sacraments.

Out of Paris, the supreme centre, the Religion of Humanism at the present time has but two other nuclei of a satisfactory kind; one, in Holland, is essentially practical in its character; the other, in Ireland, is mainly theoretical. This latter, though of more recent formation, already shows itself worthy of the completeness and coherence of its conviction with it passing into the religion. Everywhere has as yet only isolated adherents, even among Anglo-Saxon race, in England or America, where there
the greatest aptitude for association, and the freest access for our propaganda. With the exception of some individual conversions, as rare as they are valuable, the Religion of Humanity has not yet reached the southern constituents of the West, and yet it is with them that it will ultimately attain its greatest popularity. In the provinces of France, it has but three secondary centres; contrary to my hopes, these remain purely in the nascent state, and have no importance as yet save what attaches to their respective heads.

The extension of the sacerdotal fund, set forth in the Fifth Circular, is a measure of the growth of Positivism. With the exception of the centre and the two nuclei, that fund is principally drawn from individual subscriptions, and there are but few of them as yet in the British public, though Positivism is widely known. Its English adherents are too abstract, and are content to propagate the new philosophy without helping its founder to meet the privations he suffers from an infamous act of spoliation. Their indifference is thrown into stronger light by the conduct of the noble opponents who, in the midst of the most anarchical of Western nations, feel it a social obligation to assist anyone who worthily devotes himself to the task of spiritual reorganisation. In spite of this honourable exception, the security due to the continuous increase of the sacerdotal fund is owing to its coming mainly from complete Positivists, now that the revolutionists have fortunately given me up.

Their conduct in this respect reminds me of the confirmation given by two characteristic facts to the anticipations, as stated in the preface to the third volume, of the growing hostility of the party towards me. The aversion which Positivism excites in the minds of the German or British metaphysicians may vent itself in discussions, because they consider themselves competent to discuss the new synthesis. But the revolutionary party in France, too conscious of its incompetence for such an effort, can gratify its hatred only by calumnies, the object being to lead the people to turn away from me without extermination. They have spoken of my address to the Czar as a
dedication of the third volume; forgetting that the whole work was from the very beginning placed under a patronage which excludes any other homage. The same party again I have been responsible for the hypothesis—I have no language to express it—which assigns misconduct on my part as the ground of my persecution at the École Polytechnique; degraded, in its own way, as the body which robbed me is, it would not venture on such a calumny from fear of its easy refutation.

Such are the arms to which, in its struggle with the religion of order and progress, is reduced the most noxious and the most belated of existing parties. It alone denies the need of spiritual reconstruction, which it feels itself incapable of giving, it bends its efforts to concentrate the aspirations of the people on the direct attainment of material reforms, and these reforms are principally destructive. Unacquainted with the more important advances made in the nineteenth century, it would solve the difficulties of the West with the religion of Voltaire, the philosophy of Condillac, the moral system of Helvetius and the political theory of Rousseau, rejecting Hume, Diderot, and Condorcet.

Little ground is there for surprise if, with the exceptions of younger minds, estimable though mistaken, all men of any value are more and more abandoning a party which is under a radical misconception as to the work to be done. I am glad to say here that, after the hesitation mentioned in the preface to Volume II, M. Étet seems to be definitively under the influence of the tendencies to synthesis and sympathy which originally led him to Positivism. At a time when everyone oscillates as rebels, there is a special ground for excuse in the case of artists more impulsive and less fettered than the theoricians and practicians.

Such is a sufficient explanation of the points peculiar to the preface. I must use it to discharge an extraordinary obligation imposed on me by the manifesto annexed to its predecessor. The books intended to be sent were not sent, no answer whatever having been received to the note which I mentioned.
asking for the proper authorisation. However, this act of
rudeness from a ruler absorbed in the Greek Empire does not
interfere with the communication; it may be considered to have
taken place now that my third volume is published.

I feel no regret at having taken the Czar Nicholas as a type
of the conservative, who being empirical might become system-
atic. The judgment may be too favourable of him; if so, it
may suit his successor, adapted as it is to the position which
they fill. My choice of such a mode for bringing under the
notice of eminent practicians a complete summary of Posi-
tivism, shows how completely I have risen above revolutionary
prejudices and habits. So far as the anarchists are concerned,
the Russian war has only enabled them to give free scope to the
dislike they feel for a manifesto calculated to facilitate the
propagation of the regenerative doctrine. Be this as it may, the
letter was a real event, which in its historical character I shall
be bound always to respect, even if ultimately obliged entirely to
alter my judgment of the present Emperor of Russia.

But blameable as his foreign policy is at present, it may not
cancel as yet the honourable efforts of a quarter of a century to
better the internal condition of his immense empire. The
favourable character of my original opinion warrants me in
warning the Czar that, by persistence in his error, he will annul
in the judgment of posterity the claims accumulated by a long
career. This is the danger to which all practicians are exposed,
from their services being transitory in nature and limited in
extent, and therefore seldom of such value as not to be effaced
by really grave misconduct. Intellectual results, as of wider
range and greater permanence, alone ensure a distinction which
no subsequent degeneracy of their authors can effect. There-
fore it is that the practician can rarely be judged in his life-
time, whereas the theorician need not wait for death to bring
him an indestructible glory, supposing his work admits of an
adequate judgment.

Were the conduct of Russia an aberration of the nation, I
should not be justified in attempting here to set it right. But
in spite of appearances, I persist in believing that, as indicated
in my previous preface, the error is the error of the individual,
and lies in his not withstanding the foolish and guilty impulses
of his misguided advisers. As a consequence of the disastrous
policy originated by a misdirected energy, the Czars live in the
midst of German adventurers; and it is these adventurers alone
who are urging the Russian nation to attempt a conquest, the
great object of which is to secure for themselves in the south
more advantageous grants than their northern domains. The
suggestions of these adventurers, having no root in the popular
feeling, might at any time cease under an Emperor of energy
prior to their occasioning struggles with other nations such as
those by which they have been hitherto kept down. We must
hope, then, that wise remonstrances will determine the Czar
Nicholas to desist from an encroachment at variance with his
own tendencies, and more unwise than at any former time.

One conclusive comparison ought to suffice to enlighten the
Czar on the danger of his attitude, which is in direct opposition
with the whole current of ideas prevalent in this century. The
heir of the dictator who disturbed all Europe for the gratifi-
cation of his misguided ambition formally acknowledges that the
age of conquests is closed for ever. Whereas the successor of
the autocrat who broke by a noble effort the yoke which had
become intolerable, is, by his years by an act of usurpa-
tion analogous to that against which he fought in his youth.
Retrograde abroad, the latter tends to be retrograde at home;
whilst the former, by regenerating his foreign, will be shortly led
to modify his home, policy. Forty years ago, the West coalesced
against the compression exercised by the French nation; it is
now rallying under its leadership to check the encroachments of
a power which at that time directed the Holy Alliance, the
avowed object of which was to found universal peace.

The whole past of Russia should show the Czar the radical
flaw in his present aberration, and at the same time calm the
Western nations as to its real danger. Whilst yet heathen, the
Eastern Scandinavians attempted the conquest of the Greek
Empire, and were repulsed by its unaided forces. By embracing Byzantine Christianity, they signified their acceptance of the law of permanence in regard to their settlement, just as their Western brothers did by the adoption of Catholicism. By such acceptance they devoted themselves essentially to peaceful activity, and they lost at once their enthusiasm and their discipline under the influence of an abortive monotheism. Whilst Catholicism and Islam sanctioned, the first, the separation, the second, the fusion of the two powers, Byzantinism never reached any social result, in consequence of the radical contradiction between its dogma and its regime.

To place in its true light the Russian disturbance, we must explain how it runs directly counter to the whole course of the international policy, which since the close of the Middle Ages more and more secures the status quo. The judicious efforts of modern diplomacy have regulated the relations of the different nations as far as they could, considering the decay of the Western priesthood. Uninterrupted by the great struggles of Europe, the influence of diplomacy has always strengthened the dispositions and habits of peace by insisting upon a mutual respect for the actual situation, whatever it was. With a sound instinct, it refers to the Peace of Westphalia, as the decisive era from which dates the salutary power which is vested in it, till such time as the spiritual power of Positivism shall have definitively reorganised the West. It was in truth a noble triumph, the division then effected of the West between Catholicism and Protestantism, by the prevention or repression of all attempts to secure by arms the supremacy of any one of the beliefs which arose out of the spontaneous decomposition of the medieval defensive Monotheism.

These various faiths have been a constant source of division not only for nations, but for towns and even families, yet the diplomats have everywhere attained this result: that the powers have renounced, as a point of their external policy, all attempts to restore unity, its re-establishment being left solely to religious efforts. A line of action such as this, grounded on
the natural growth of scepticism, has induced a general sense of the necessity of looking for spiritual agreement to a doctrine which should rise above all the discordant creeds. No government, Catholic or Protestant, has since that epoch tried to conquer, in a spirit of proselytism, without being at once driven by a league of all the states to abandon so unwise an attempt.

Two centuries before the Peace of Westphalia, a still more capital division had in the natural course of events received a tacit sanction on analogous grounds. The philosophy of history, throwing light on the period anterior to the action of diplomacy, parallels the division of the Roman world between Catholicism and Islam, with that of the West between Popery and Protestantism. Once the Crusaders had definitively secured the Western nations from a Mussulman invasion, their natural dispositions towards the Turks and Greeks had free play; they could allow the social antecedents of the two, as a whole, greater weight than the influences of theological belief. The Crusades had completely satisfied the Latins that the Byzantines were incompetent to the task of self-guidance; through them it became clear that the Mussulmans were qualified to be the successors of the Romans in governing a population which could never accept discipline. Vain were the entreaties of the Greeks for half a century, the West respected the mission of Islam; the declamations of the poets, constant as they were, never prevented the formation of alliances between two regimes, each equally suited to its peculiar circumstances, and the inference from such alliances was unmistakable.

The indication is sufficient. It shows to what an extent the Russian action disturbs the existing order, when, in the name of a faith which is everywhere extinct, it would set aside the compromise on which rests the whole of Western policy since the close of the Middle Ages. Supposing Austria or Prussia to wish to force on one another Catholicism or Protestantism, on the ground of German unity, the Czar, if need
were, would assist France and England in enforcing respect for the existing religious status quo. Can he hope to be allowed to perpetrate a more serious infraction of that status, disputing the definitive settlement of four centuries? It was from classical sentiment rather than theological affinity that the Western powers decided to destroy the Turkish navy in order to aid the Greek insurrection. The error they then committed they are now repairing, by respecting the general current of modern traditions, with no prejudice to their appealing earnestly to the sense of justice inherent in the Monotheism of the dominant race.

I may hope then that an attempt, in which no success is possible, will shortly be abandoned with dignity, avoiding further waste of valuable resources—resources which Humanity enjoins on all to employ in bettering our condition and raising our nature. If this is the event, the Russian incident will have brought out, undesignedly, the definitive predominance of the habits of peace, and the unanimity of the Western world in its wish to preserve undisturbed the unparalleled harmony of forty years (dating from 1815). Ill-considered aims apart, the priesthood of Humanity relies on the wisdom of the diplomats to take measures, that a war, undertaken in a holy spirit against war, do not degenerate and violently disturb in some quarter or other the political or religious status quo. It hopes that the Western governments will feel how important it is not to interfere with the natural break-up of a factitious aggregation. No one of those governments has its hands sufficiently clean in relation to other nations to be justified in taking the initiative in rectifications, such as will come at no distant period, in obedience to the sociological law of the gradual disintegration of the great states. If their action be so limited, the episode will have illustrated the fraternity which underlies all Western differences, for it displays the heir of the man who wished at any cost to destroy the English constituent of the West nobly presiding over the alliance between France and England to secure the peace of the world. In this way we gain a sense of
the soundness of the Positivist anticipation that the army will be transformed into a constabulary, for the military power in this case accepts as an honour a task which has exclusive refer-
ence to the police of Europe.

On the other supposition, that from a foolish obstinacy the struggle is embittered and prolonged, it would throughout Europe lead to consequences ultimately favourable to the intellectual and social regeneration of the race. If, the regular
armies proving inadequate, the nations of the West had actively
to interfere, no power but the Religion of Humanity could unite
them against barbarians invoking God. Already, as it is, the
colalition of Protestants and Catholics, to preserve the Mussul-
man from the Byzantine invasion, clearly proves that, in spite
of some ignoble mummeries, the West is acting on purely
human motives, leaving the theological to the more belated
nations. Scepticism and hypocrisy are powerless for any great
or durable inspiration; therefore if the struggle were to assume
its largest dimensions, its direct tendency would be to divide
the world between the theological belief with its sanction of
war and the Positivist with its systematic organisation of
peace. The constructive would soon show the destructive
element what a power there lies in industrial existence to secure
superiority in war, supposing an exceptional case in which it
were necessary thus to divert industry from its true purpose.
But I need not discuss further a possibility which has no prob-
bability in its favour, since the official beliefs are as really
worked out with the invader as they are with the protector;
enthusiasm at the present time being only possible in defence
of our native land. The affair must remain one of everyday
character, nor will it leave any other trace than the final ex-
tinction of the Russian prestige, the only plausible motive for
maintaining armies in the West.

It is in connection with my last preface that I here intro-
duce these summary remarks on an episodic event, availing
myself of it to show the competence of a systematic policy to
form a sound judgment on the most unforeseen cases. The
only other correction needed in my manifesto is to place in a better light the contrast between the attitude assumed by the rulers of the East and the governments of the West respectively. The Eastern rulers may be progressive in their internal policy, but their tendency to be retrograde in their external, shows that such merit as they have is solely due to the fact that they preside over nations as yet preserved from the revolutionary spirit. Once let the remarkable sect, which for the last half century has been decomposing Byzantium, make a decided progress, and the internal policy of the Czars will be more oppressive than their external, unless they have been adequately regenerated by Positivism. I must express my regret, then, that in my manifesto I spoke of the Western statesmen as inferior to the Eastern, not taking sufficiently into account the anarchical tendencies which compel them in internal matters to give a retrograde character to their scepticism, whilst it is free from it in external. There is little ground either for anticipating, that any Czar will duly understand the vantage ground his position gives him to illustrate and to perfect himself by offering Positivism a protection such as that which the great Frederic was wise enough to grant to Encyclopaedism. The partial sympathies which for thirty years I have not unfrequently awakened in Western statesmen leave me the ulterior hope of shortly meeting with an adequate appreciation on their part; an appreciation rendered possible only by the treatise lately finished.

Auguste Comte.

(10 Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.)

Paris, 15 Dante, 66 (Sunday, July 30, 1854).
PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND VOLUME.

The general preface which stands at the beginning of the preceding volume required several explanations to complete it. In placing those explanations in the preface to the second volume, I add no remarks peculiar to it, only making a special claim for a deep and sustained attention commensurate with the importance and the difficulty of the subject. If the transitional character of the time in which we live makes it impossible for most of my readers to bring to the study of sociology a sufficient encyclopedic preparation, nothing can absolve them from the duty of approaching it with those dispositions and habits which are recognised as necessary for the study of the less complex sciences. Such as do not offer these conditions, would do well to abstain from speculations which, as a consequence of their eminence, must gradually be confined to some few intellects who will afterwards make known their principal results. This recommendation applies particularly to the present volume, entirely devoted to the most abstract theories of the most difficult science.

Notwithstanding that, in order to diminish the material difficulties that beset me, I both publish and sell the four volumes of this treatise separately, they are so closely connected that they can never be rightly studied or appreciated apart. It is literally impossible that anyone should master the present volume who had not first familiarised himself with the essential notions of the preceding one. Nor can the conceptions I here state be fully understood until their historical development and their practical destination have been successively explained by the two later volumes.

All the explanations of this supplementary preface concern two subjects, henceforth inseparable, my personal position and my social mission. Both are made clear by the three1 special communications

1 The circular is suppressed, which is a fourth in the original.
which I shall add by way of appendix to this preface, but which will require some previous remarks bearing on this twofold subject.

Since the publication of my first volume, the spoliation begun when, two years ago, my principal office, at the École Polytechnique, was taken from me, has been finally accomplished by my exclusion from the subordinate post I had continued to hold. This consummation of my ruin officially, foreseen and foretold by me from the beginning of my persecution, is, as was its first step, the work of the implacable hatred which my philosophic works excite in the so-called scientific mind, allowing for changes of persons and coteries. Government has never taken any active part in it, save when an energetic minister, (M. le Marchal Soult), exerted himself nobly though unsuccessfully to protect me against a misinterpreted legal form. But the cowardice of my academic persecutors has ever led them to shelter themselves from public blame under the official responsibility of a power which, by our pedantocratic prejudices, is obliged, however unwillingly, to act as a passive instrument in their hands. In order the better to prevent or to remove any unjust judgment, it is my duty to state here, that this last iniquity was specially due to the persistent manœuvres of the worthy couple of Algebraists with respect to whom my previous preface guards against any involuntary misapprehension. Nevertheless, their vile intrigues would not have succeeded, without the decisive aid which they found ready to their hand in the ignoble spite of a famous dealer in subjective planets, who is invested, in our anarchical situation, with a fatal influence in the École Polytechnique. In this utterly degenerate school, where the pupils themselves have fallen, morally as well as intellectually, to the level of their teachers, the practical functionaries alone, military or administrative, are now worthy of esteem. From them, notwithstanding frequent individual changes, I have always met with honourable though unavailing courtesy, a fair sample of the constant disposition of the power they represent. Immediately after this last blow, the present noble head of the administration expressly signified to me this precious sympathy in a letter which I shall always preserve as an invaluable piece of evidence. But in this miserable institution, all the practical authorities are more than ever oppressed by the pedants who govern them, the only change in their tyrants being the substitution for the rude empiricism of so-called engineers the narrow mysticism of algebraists.

This complete ruin, after nineteen years of irreproachable service, stones at last for the grave imprudence which I committed when I placed my material existence at the mercy of my natural enemies. Until that period, my independent private teaching of the mathematical sciences, had procured me a sufficient though precarious livelihood, practically out of the reach of academic influences. Following a too worldly advice, I abandoned, in 1832, this independent profession for a public office,
though I had already foreseen the internal struggles to which it would expose me. Those whose blind affection induced me thus fatally to yield, must have regretted since that the inflexibility with which I am reproached did not then assert itself. However, this early fault being now involuntarily repaired, it should prevent me from seeking even from accepting any other official situation, in which I must always be exposed to the similar animosities which must be aroused by the spiritual discipline which my doctrines tend to establish.

But the works I have accomplished during this long period give me now a right to demand openly of the public of the West some material protection, sufficient to enable me to complete the great construction, in the first place philosophical, afterwards religious, to which my life has been constantly devoted. Since this last spoliating, I rejoice in having no other shelter against poverty than the noble annual subscription originally set on foot as a temporary aid. Although hitherto inadequate, I doubt not that, in becoming henceforward perpetual, it will reach the requisite sum. In this conviction, I have not hesitated to stamp with the gratuitous character, normally belonging to them, all my services. At first confined to my popular teaching, I next extended it to my philosophical compositions, and I shall now make it embrace the quarterly contributions to be announced in this preface. The founder of a new spiritual power should offer, at the risk of some temporary embarrassments, a decisive example of the only mode of material existence consistent with the true dignity of the priestly office. Until the progress of the positive religion has led the munificence of the public to guarantee the existence of the priests of Humanity, without prejudice to their social independence, they ought always to live by the free contributions of their adherents, as was long the case with the priests of God. The blind hatred of my wretched enemies has gradually driven me to this completely normal position, which, without some such action, had never perhaps become sufficiently decisive to enable me to make the most perfect use of the ten years of full cerebral vigour which I may yet consecrate to the real Great Being.

This final situation is so consonant to my nature and my office that, of short date though it is, it has already become profoundly familiar to me, owing to its favourable daily influence. The present volume, notwithstanding the great difficulties peculiar to it, has just been written, without hurry or fatigue, in the first third of the present year, excepting only the opening chapter, composed in January 1851, and read, in February, to the Positivist Society. I feel myself thus able to write a volume each year, in the interval between two of my weekly courses of lectures, since my position secures me at last, at the age of fifty, such a complete freedom of time and strength, as till now, I have never enjoyed. If then, as I am inwardly persuaded, the Western public does not forsake me, I may venture to guarantee the
worthy execution of the four great works which I promised when termining, ten years ago, my fundamental work, and this without trenching on the period of rest which ought to separate each of them. Even before proceeding to the third volume of the present treatise, I count on publishing at the close of the year, an exceptional composition, calculated to facilitate the systematic propaganda of the Religion of Humanity,—the Positivist Catechism. This secondary work I had not thought to accomplish till after the termination of the last volume. But whilst writing the present one, I felt that, when it should be finished, I should be able to realise this episode, urgently called for by the gravity of the Western situation. This earlier execution of so necessary a work is specially due to the decisive maturity which the final religion attains in this volume, a maturity surpassing the hopes I formed during my oral elaboration.

To attain the full security which is my just due, it was necessary to ensure the immediate publication of all my writings. Now since, in accordance with my principles, I have renounced all so-called literary property, this last guarantee has followed as a natural fruit of the emotions excited in those around me by my exclusive devotion of myself, without any reward, to my fundamental office. The preface to the preceding volume announced the generous resolution with which a noble disciple (M. Lonchamp) had come forward to remove the material obstacles which, for a whole year, retarded the publication of that volume. I must here complete my announcement by chronicling the scrupulous fulfilment of that loyal engagement, even beyond any ordinary expectation, so that the printing expenses of the first volume are all paid, though its sale has up to this time produced scarcely one third of the amount. At a time when right-minded practical men are at once so precious and so rare, the Western public will rejoice that this noble young man, whose exceptional modesty has enabled him to overcome the theoretic temptations incident to a brilliant youth, wisely chooses an industrial career whence may arise a distinguished Positivist patronage.

Although his decisive intervention seemed limited to the preceding volume, it has led to an equivalent security for the three others, un-hoped for by me, and, as a consequence, doubtless, for all my future works. Scarcely was this example known, when the second volume became the object of a similar offer from the noble adherents to whom I was indebted, in 1848, for the printing of the first edition of the 'General View.' Another generous proposition was recently made to me in regard to the same volume. But I publish it now without aid from either of these sources, which may thus be reserved for ulterior difficulties. For my honourable publisher (M. Thunot), though well aware of my personal poverty, has, unsought, offered me his valuable co-operation, without requiring any other guarantee than my scrupu-
lous resolution to apply all the proceeds of the sale of my books to the simple payment of their expenses. His printing office, admirably directed by a soldier returning to the peaceful citizen life, has just accomplished this work with an unexampled promptitude and correctness, which deserve my special acknowledgments here.

As will be seen from this twofold explanation of my personal position, to which correspond the two first parts of the following appendix, I may hope that the trials which await my future life will never affect my fundamental office. At the same time, the progress of Positivism of late increases my confidence in the efficacy of all my efforts.

Among the signs of this progress subsequent to the preceding volume, I must first note with gratitude a valuable result, arrived at by comparing its actual total with the decisive dedication, which five years before, was the secret germ of it. All synthetic minds now feel, as do all sympathetic hearts, that in this exceptional outpouring of emotion were contained all the essential elements of that vast moral and religious development which Positivism has subsequently acquired and which is its most marked feature. This characteristic manifestation has already given me a foretaste of incomparable satisfaction, by eliciting from both sexes sympathies of the highest order for my sainted patroness, whose individual claims to public veneration will soon be pronounced superior to those of the gentle Beatrice.

The first volume, whilst establishing the previously contested fitness of Positivism for its most decisive destination, has equally refuted the superficial charge to which the publication of the ‘General View’ separately gave colour, that I had given up intellectual progress. Brilliant additions to theory, especially in Biology, have proved that the increasingly sympathetic spirit of Positivism reacts favourably upon its synthetic development, conformably to the sound theory of the brain. The fresh steps in all the sciences accomplished in the present volume will henceforth silence this frivolous objection, except in critics, who, as being incompetent or hostile, shall never engage my attention.

At the same time, the natural development of the Western situation has led to fuller manifestations of the characteristic aptitude of the Positive religion to meet the requirements, hitherto irreconcilable, of order and progress. Last summer I knew of the existence, and since then I have had full information, of the valuable Positivist centres which have arisen amongst eminent American conservatives, especially at Philadelphia and New York. A situation unlike any other forbids in America all political recourse to the various forms of material repression, and even to theological influences, the principal organs of which are necessarily the directors of the metaphysical agitation. Thus pre-

1 See note at p. xxix.
served from the double illusion which vitiates our official routine, our American brethren have appreciated more justly the real character of the Western anarchy, more dangerous with them than in Europe, despite appearances to the contrary. Consequently they have earlier felt how impossible it is to overcome the communistic tendencies which are the natural outcome of all our social impulses except by the free rise of Positivism, the only doctrine universally capable of procuring a reasonable satisfaction for the various instincts of regeneration. This sole issue of our perilous transition is already rightly conceived by the noble American citizens, who more and more earnestly invoke the Positive religion in the name of an order profoundly undermined whilst they accept beforehand the proper moral discipline which it imposes on the rich.

The tendency of this vast appendage of the West towards Positivism may be specially verified in the loyal reception the new religion has there met with even from its declared adversaries. One of the principal quarterly reviews has published, in the January and April numbers of the present year, a valuable appreciation of my fundamental work by a worthy antagonist. The generous tone of his articles, whilst he freely expresses his dissent, contrasts favourably with that of our psychologists, or ideologists, and even with the coldness towards myself of my too purely theoretic adherents. Such treatment led me shortly to take a step foreign to my habits, in order to obtain the avowed contributions of such opponents to the voluntary subscription which is as yet insufficient for my material support. I am the more glad that I wrote the letter which I subjoin, that it has recently brought me an admirable reply, in the handwriting of my noble critic, who, though himself straitened in means, generously takes part in this voluntary patronage, which he qualifies as a social duty.

But the progress of Positivism simultaneously in the other camp of the West is no less decisive. Of this our recent success amongst the proletaries of Lyons may give the measure. Specially guarded from all anti-domestic theories by the peculiar imperfections of its industrial constitution, this noble and unhappy population had spontaneously imbibed from its family-life a strong predisposition to Positivism. The communistic agitation has only prepared it more thoroughly for those social questions which the universal religion alone can solve. Hence a few eminent apostles have been enough to develop in that city, in less than a year, under the fair protection of the temporal authorities, a Positivist nucleus of the greater value that it will soon become the centre of a vast propaganda in the South of Europe.

This recent quickening into life in two quarters of the religion destined finally to reconcile order and progress, is powerfully aided by the irrevocable step just made in our republican situation. From its futile parliamentary commencement, fit only for the English transition,
THE SECOND VOLUME.

our republic passes by its own impetus to the dictatorial phase, the only one really suited to France, though equally suitable to the other Catholic populations, as may be seen in Spanish America. The approaching resumption of my annual lectures has given me an opportunity of specially appreciating this promising modification, and the new strength it gives to Positivism. I have already treated of this twofold subject in a decisive letter, fully sanctioned by my civic patron, a letter which forms the second part of the appendix to this preface. It might have served me all further explanations on this subject, but for the serious anxiety since occasioned by the deplorable fatuity of an individual.

Our profoundly negative state leaves a certain scope to any bold initiative, whether in the direction of anarchy or retrogression, on the part of a man rightly placed for it. But the various perturbations which seem possible and even imminent, never occur to their full extent, at least not in the most important cases. Although the living no longer acknowledge the yoke of the dead, they are none the less bound by it, and it is our preservative against the greatest dangers, though it fails to preserve us as completely from the fears which they arouse. A future conceived so vaguely can only inspire with sufficient confidence those intellects whose genius for systematization has enabled them to invest it for themselves with a more definite character by the help of a sound appreciation of the past, the modern past above all. From the very birth of the republic, I proclaimed it to be irrevocable, though subject to frequent modifications politically, and yet that it would long appear precarious, until a common doctrine should give unity to our action. This security may be compared to that which relates to the peace of the West, which, notwithstanding its unexampled duration, never preserves our empirical confidence from the disquiet arising from the least shock, though the event always proves the alarm groundless. So also we shall see the waves break and disperse which threaten our republican situation. For the whole of the French past rejects royalty as much as war. Henceforward, true citizens have no more cause to fear a monarchical retrogression than a parliamentary anarchy. These two opposite forms of constitutional government are equally effete in the present day. The republican situation has become the primary condition of material order, by the fact of its being the only form of government which admits of an energetic dictatorship.

However I deplore the temporary checks upon discussion in France, our deliverance from the anarchical bondage of the arrogant and intriguing talkers who disturbed our meditations is a profound relief to me, as great as, though more unhoped for than, that when the incubus of monarchy was shaken off in 1848. The two burdens are in my opinion equally things of the past. A strong personal aberration, to which our lack of social faith seems to leave free play, could only bring about the realisation, more or less speedy, of the eventuality
I allude to in the beginning of my manifesto. Still, though a civic foresight must not overlook this possibility, we must avoid such preoccupation with it as would destroy the vigour of those decisive meditations on the true order of the West which the republic under a dictator everywhere inspires. The natural play of official checks, at home or abroad, will perhaps stifle these mad tendencies before they give rise to any serious disturbance. True it is that a state of chronic insurrection of country against town, which is already beginning, will characterise in most countries the last phase of the Western anarchy, as I predicted at the close of my philosophical treatise. But in our case we may avoid this special development of a very modifiable destiny, if the Parisian proletariat, the spontaneous director of the great movement, will timely act upon the valuable lesson their own political anxieties may already teach them. For those anxieties make evident the profoundly retrograde character of the negative metaphysics to which, discredited though they be, they are still in bondage. The revolt of the living against the dead is now leading the West to throw into the scale of the most coarse and effete influences, from which we can only escape by again, and voluntarily, ranging ourselves under the banner of the past. Thus the fundamental condition of true social progress consists at this time in the complete rejection by the central population of all the outcome of revolutionary ideas, whether doctrines or men, as henceforth equally retrograde and anarchical. When it shall have made order certain by passing from negativism to Positivism, following the noble example already given by some eminent workmen of Paris and Lyons, it will have earned the right to forbid its republic, the only real basis in the West for the necessary armistice between the poor and the rich, from being put to the vote. But then, I dare assert, in the name of the past and the future of which I am as yet sole interpreter, no dictator will retain a trace of monarchical tendency. For in the clear light of a most synthetic office, the fear of anarchy alone could prevent a dictator from discerning that the republican situation is as indispensable to real power as to true glory. In the statesman who has just happily delivered us from the parliamentary regime, it would be an especially glaring and dangerous inconsistency, were he, to gratify a childish vanity, to endeavour to re-establish a constitutional monarchy.

This short notice naturally leads me to the final announcement which forms the special object of the last part of the subjoined appendix. In fact, the foundation of the Revue Occidentale will dispense me, I hope, from the necessity of using the opportunities my prefaces or my lectures afford me to give the public various incidental explanations, which would be better placed elsewhere.

The great importance, intellectual and social, and the general accordence with my principal elaboration, of this periodical form of
teaching, made me desirous, so early as 1845, of establishing it. But its utility was not felt widely enough for me to obtain the funds requisite for the five years’ unfettered trial I then judged indispensable. The republican situation permitting me, in 1848, to reduce this trial period to three years, the same difficulty beset me. But the dictatorial phase calling up more serious dispositions and making the urgent need of a sound direction of the judgment of the West more evident, I feel it my duty to make one more attempt, limiting myself to quarterly issues. This last change, with my own renunciation of all payment, reduces as much as possible the cost of such an undertaking. If then it is still unseconded I shall think no more of it, though I shall continue to hold myself ready to direct it when its conditions shall be fulfilled, and even myself to furnish a fifth or a fourth of each number.

Though I have sufficiently explained the distinction and character of the three parts of my appendix, I must not close this preface without a pleasing personal detail, the importance of which will soon be felt by all complete, that is to say, religious Positivists.

The ‘General View’ and the whole of the present treatise manifest equally the profoundly artistic tendency of Positivism and the great assistance its establishment must even now receive from those brilliant functions which best represent human nature in its unity. Still I have never concealed the fact that this inevitable sympathy must develop itself later than the valuable aid coming first from the instinct of the people and afterwards from the feeling of women. Nevertheless, the systematic reason which is to guide the West has obtained earlier than I had hoped this complementary sanction, by the decisive adherence of an eminent artist, M. A. Etex, predisposed to Positivism by a nature of remarkably synthetic power.

Auguste Comte.
(10 Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.)

Paris, 11 Cesar, 64:
(Sunday, May 2, 1852.)
TO

DR. J. M'CLINTOCK,

EDITOR OF 'THE METHODIST REVIEW,' NEW YORK.

Paris: 7 Homer, 64.
(Wednesday, 4 February, 1852.)

SIR,

I have just read in the number of your 'Methodist Review' for January 1852, received last Thursday, an appreciation of my fundamental work by an eminent adversary, a conscientious appreciation, notwithstanding some involuntary mistakes, numerous but fortunately secondary and therefore such as may be duly corrected later. This noble treatment, to which the French press has but too little accustomed me, induces me now to extend to such opponents the recent personal appeal to the public of the West, which, I may mention, is the complement of that of 1848, honourably mentioned in this remarkable article. Were I acquainted with the anonymous author, I should be glad to send it direct to him, with the expression of my sincere gratitude. But I hope, Sir, that you will be so good as to act as the medium between us, and to accept also for yourself one of the two accompanying copies of my circular. I congratulate myself, then, on this rare and pleasing infringement of the successful cerebral regime which, for several years, makes me systematically abstain from all papers and reviews whatever, in order to concentrate my habitual reading on the true and ways fresh masterpieces of Western poetry, ancient and modern.

Public morality now requires that this despairing cry of unmerited stress should clearly resound across the Atlantic, the better to characterize both the persistent lukewarmness of my friends or partizans, and the ignoble bitterness of my persecutors of the Academy. And respective of our common Occidentality, I cannot consider myself personally as a stranger in a republic to which, in 1816, I was on the point of emigrating at the opening of my philosophical career, under the honourable patronage of the kind General Bernard, and, indirectly, of the noble President Monroe. Putting that aside, this communication will make clearly known the deplorable extremity to which he who, latter founding Positive philosophy, is now constructing on this solid basis, and that beyond the promises quoted by my loyal adversary, the Religion of Humanity, is reduced, in the very scene of his long life of social devotion.
Of all the clergies sprung from the decomposition, first spontaneous and then systematic, of Western Monotheism, that of the United States appears to me, upon the whole, the only one which now possesses a true spiritual power, that is to say, an authority at once intellectual and moral, always resting on the free assent of a public emancipated from all outward constraint. If it is socially not more efficacious in the work of modern reorganisation, I impute this failure neither to the ministers themselves nor to the population, but chiefly to the irrevocable weakness of a religion incapable by its very nature of really embracing the great whole of the existence it ought to systematize, even though limiting its sphere to the individual life, essentially inseparable from collective life. Endowed with equal advantages, I dare affirm that Positivism would ere this have secured the whole of the West against anarchy and retrogression, judging from the results which I have obtained, in the centre of the agitation, by means, of the smallness of which the present communication may give you a precise idea.

No American would have imagined that, at the present period of my life, it would be impossible, after three years' efforts, to place at my disposal the moderate sum of 7,000 francs a year, 2,000 francs of which, as every one here knows, I scrupulously set apart for the payment of an annuity which I regard as incumbent on me. I do not hesitate loyally to invoke the aid of generous adversaries, who will perhaps make up for the culpable torpor into which, with some admirable exceptions, French, Scotch and Dutch, my so-called disciples, almost throughout the European West, continue sunk, especially those of France and England. If the members of the American West should shame, by a striking contrast, the anarchical conduct of those of Europe, I should doubly rejoice, first, for the good use of the ten years of full vigour of brain I can still devote to Humanity, and further for the practical consecration of universal Morals, which I have always aspired to place on a solid basis by the foundation of a new spiritual power, the worthy heir of the admirable Catholicity peculiar to the Middle Ages.

In order, Sir, to reassure you as to the unbroken continuity of peaceful activity which such a situation would seem to threaten, I should be glad to send you, as well as my noble anonymous adversary, the first volume, published in July 1851, of my second great work, specially promised when I concluded the first, ten years ago. This system of Positive Politics will consist, according to that first and accurate announcement, of four volumes. Of these I am now writing the second, which will probably appear next July, and the two others at the same season of the next two years. If you will be so good as to enlighten me on material arrangements, of which I am strangely ignorant, by informing me how I may best send you all these volumes, you shall shortly receive the two copies above mentioned, of the first
volume already known to some Americans. And you may accept this little philosophic present, as a small mark of my esteem, without scruple, for I am myself the publisher of my book, and may therefore distribute all the copies of it at my pleasure. Meanwhile, I add to my circular the Cerebral Table, which sums up my positive theory of human nature, the most available result of this new volume. I send also the philosophical programme of the systematic course of lectures I have been delivering for three years past, to a voluntary audience of both sexes, with the honourable authorisation of the only government which has hitherto fully respected my just spiritual independence, the laborious and tardy conquest of my indefatigable devotion. You may thus, as a philosopher, obtain a consoling verification of the power of modern civilisation entirely to transform the persecuting instinct itself: henceforth it is reduced to attacks on property, life and even liberty having escaped its range.

In consequence of this long and scrupulous career, more homogenous perhaps than any other known to us, I have acquired a fixed habit of living entirely as in the eye of the world, according to the true republican principle. Therefore, Sir, if you think it would be of use to make this circular and even the present letter known, I leave to your friendly judgment the degree of publicity to be given them, provided the text be strictly reproduced without curtailment. Nevertheless, I desire that you will be so good as to consult first, on this point, the eminent citizen of Philadelphia, who has now become my chief temporal patron, without ceasing to be my noble spiritual client, Mr. Horace Binney-Wallace, too well-known to need any further address.

Health and fraternity.

Auguste Comte.

(10 Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.)
Sir,

When in the month of October last, I gave the last lecture of my *Philosophical course on the general history of Humanity*, which I have been delivering, for three years past, under your civic patronage, I gave notice that I would deliver the first lecture of the fourth course on the same subject, on the first Sunday of April next, according to my yearly custom. But before talking with you on this subject, I think fit to send you some written explanations, as to the new character it is my wish to give to the whole of this fourth course; one better adapted to the altered situation of our Republic. You may regard this letter as a previous summary of the political exposition which will form the first part of my opening lecture; in the portion of it which relates to morals I shall then describe the final regime as directed by the Religion of Humanity; whilst in its philosophical conclusion I shall indicate the spirit and the plan of the great historical construction upon which this final regime is based.

Our last crisis has, it seems to me, carried the French Republic for ever beyond the parliamentary period, suitable only to a negative revolution, into the dictatorial period, the only one in harmony with the positive revolution, from which, as a consequence of the decisive alliance of order and progress, the gradual termination of the disorder of the West will issue. Even should the abuse of the dictatorial power be such as to compel, before the time fixed, a change of its principal organ, this sad necessity would not really reestablish the power of any assembly, except perhaps for the short period required for the exceptional advent of a fresh dictator.

The theory of history of which I am the originator, makes it evident that through the whole of the French past the tendency has ever been to the predominance of the central power. This normal disposition would never have been interrupted, had that power not at length assumed a retrograde character, in the second half of the reign of Louis XIV. Hence ensued, a century later, the complete abolition of French royalty; and from that, in turn, the temporary ascendancy of the only assembly which was destined to be ever really popular amongst
us. Even its sway was owing to its wise subordination to the energetic committee which formed itself within its bosom to direct the heroic defence of our Republic. The need of a true dictatorship to take the place of royalty was soon felt, so fruitless was the anarchy which our first trial of the constitutional regime was encouraging. Unfortunately this indispensable dictatorship soon took a profoundly retrograde direction, combining the servitude of France with the oppression of Europe. It was solely as a recoil from this deplorable policy that French opinion tolerated subsequently the only serious trial which could be made amongst us of a regime peculiar to the English situation. So ill did it meet our wants, that, despite the blessings of peace throughout the West, its official existence for one generation was more fatal to us than the tyranny of the empire; perverting as it did the intellect by accustoming it to constitutional sophisms, corrupting the heart by venal or anarchical habits, and degrading the character by a growing familiarity with parliamentary tactics.

In consequence of the fatal absence of any real social doctrine, this disastrous regime continued to prevail, under other forms, after the republican outbreak of 1848. This fresh situation, which was of itself the guarantee of progress, and concentrated all serious anxiety upon order, under both aspects required the normal preponderance of the central power. But on the contrary, it was the opinion of the day that the elimination of a futile royalty ought to lead to the complete triumph of its antagonist. All those who had taken an active share in the constitutional regime, whether in the government, the opposition, or the conspiracies of the time, ought, four years ago, to have been banished from political life for ever as unable or unworthy to guide our Republic. But by a blind enthusiasm, to these very men was confided the working of a constitution which was the incarnation of parliamentary omnipotence. Universal suffrage extended to the proletariat even those intellectual and moral ravages which had hitherto been confined to the upper and middle classes. The central power, instead of regaining its due preponderance, was thus deprived of the prestige of inviolability and of perpetuity, and yet remained the constitutional shadow over which these attributes had previously thrown a veil of illusion.

Reduced to this extremity, this indispensable power has fortunately now asserted itself and risen with energy against an intolerable situation, as disastrous for us as it was degrading. The popular instinct has allowed the anarchical regime to fall without lifting a hand in its defence. The feeling is growing in France that constitutional forms are only reconcilable with a so-called monarchy; and that a dictatorship is what our Republic is calculated for and demands. And the wisest of the ten constitutions proclaimed since 1789 has moreover placed on a regular footing our present republican dictatorship, in such
a way that it can be peacefully modified to meet the real wants of society, and by the light of normal theory.

This new phase of politics allows us at length to devote our energies to the working out of an universal reorganisation. Previously, the only question actively fermenting in the public mind was that of progress isolated from that of order, its very root intellectually as well as morally. Such a thesis, as irrational as it is immoral, could only be entertained by talkers, repelling alike thinkers and the men of action. An inane form of metaphysics, feeling itself incapable of dealing seriously with the immense question of order, had actually attempted to stifle it, by giving a legal support backed by material force to the revolutionary dogmas which any really organic doctrine must begin by excluding. But this question of order, which can never be dissociated from that of progress, having in the republican situation at length asserted itself—and no other situation allows and calls for its complete solution—nothing can henceforth arrest its growing preponderance, if there do but exist in our social environment the doctrine really able to direct such an elaboration. Now you, Sir, know better than anyone, how truly this competence is possessed by the positive philosophy I have constructed.

When, ten years ago, I concluded my fundamental work, I therein laid down all the essential bases of a really historical policy, in which the conception of the future rested at last on the appreciation of the past, in accordance with a sound theory of the whole of the human movement. But this policy could not be taken into account by practical men until it bore so definite a shape as to be applicable to the present Western transition, so as to preside over that indispensable intercalation between the preparatory and the definitive stages of Humanity. Such was the principal object of the public course of lectures I gave in 1847, and which your feeling as a citizen induced you to honour with your constant presence. This complementary process was then accomplished as fully as was possible, under the conditions of the monarchical situation; with an application even then of my fundamental motto, Order and Progress. The republican outbreak having, the following year, scattered the mists of official falsehood, I was at once enabled to work out, and even to make public, this new policy, openly destined henceforth to direct the Western movement by setting aside for ever all other doctrines theological or metaphysical, as both anarchical and retrograde. A great advance, both as to development and propaganda, characterised the annual course, the permission to deliver which you so kindly procured from me from the only government which has hitherto freely respected my just spiritual independence, the long and laborious conquest of a devoted life.

But this public exposition and this direct propaganda naturally presented two distinct phases. In breaking up the different existing
parties in order to absorb them into the true constructive party, Positivism ought equally to attract all those respectable conservatives who are not essentially retrograde, and all those honest revolutionists who are not radically anarchical. But these conversions cannot be simultaneous in the two classes as a rule. It is the instinct of conservatives in general to reject any great innovation, lest they in their inorganic state should chance to give in their adhesion to any of those really dangerous doctrines which now abound. And yet a thorough reorganisation requires the renunciation of all those ancient doctrines which, whether by their weakness, or by their violence, have been the cause of the existing anarchy. Thus the regenerating philosophy is absolutely obliged to address itself first to the revolutionary party, who alone as yet have shown that they are not averse even to a radical change of opinion, if only the metaphysical prejudices peculiar to them can be overcome. It is therefore to them that I have principally directed my action during the three years which have just ended, in a situation too very stimulating to the activity, too often ill-regulated, of such minds.

You are already aware of the signal successes which the Positive school, small though it yet is, has achieved in this part of the social camp. Still I think it advisable to state here the decisive result which marks these successes, and proves that this first operation has been effectually carried out, and that the efforts I am now about to make in the oppo-

camp are opportune.

In the fundamental discourse in which, in 1848, I gave the 'General View' of Positivism as presented in my course of lectures of 1847, I reduced the difference between the new school and all other reforming sects to the order in which each separately conceived and treated the two great questions of the West, the regeneration of education and the systematisation of labour. Positivists are the only men of the time who, putting the spiritual problem before the temporal investigation, would make an intellectual and moral renovation the basis of industrial reorganisation. All other reformers, despite their innumerable diver-
gencies, agree in reversing this order, and would proceed to the tem-
poral reorganisation of society, without any previous discipline of opinions and customs. It would be superfluous to insist further to you on the glaring opposition of principle and of conduct which such a transposition involves. In referring to it here, my object is to give a standard by which to measure the value of true conversions from the revolutionary party, which to be complete must not stop short of this difficult inversion of the point of view. Now this change has actually been made by some eminent workmen capable of spreading it by their unaided exertions, and so setting me free henceforth from this duty. In fact you rightly appreciated, in our pleasant interview of November 28, 1851, the admirable resolution of the ci-devant communists of Lyons recently converted to Positivism. In answer to the metaphysical
sophisms of two representatives on their anarchical tour, they solemnly declared that the moral regeneration of the people must precede their material enfranchisement.

Such a success allows, and even obliges the sound philosophy and the true religion to devote their chief social efforts henceforth to sincere conservatives. The two may now be able so to overcome their instinctive repugnance; since crucial experiences have demonstrated the inherent power of Positivism thoroughly to discipline the most ardent revolutionists, by obtaining from them the acceptance of order in the name of progress. I must then, henceforth, specially develop the second part of my social mission and obtain the free acceptance of progress in the name of order, by making it my chief care to remove the misgivings of the conservative party. Such will be the characteristic feature of my next course, in a situation which at length ensures the question of order its normal preponderance. At a time when progress consists especially in construction, I may hope to secure a satisfactory appreciation of it as but the necessary development of order.

Whatever academic talkers may say, this immense question is undoubtedly both stated and conceived in too narrow a sense by those honourable practical men who alone treat it seriously. Nevertheless, it ought to be easy for me to succeed in showing how wide a field it embraces, as a consequence of its eminently synthetic nature. Having been able so far to overcome revolutionary prejudices as to convince them of the close connection in which, through intellectual progress, material and moral progress are held, I shall still more easily demonstrate the similar connection that exists between the three corresponding manifestations of human order. All who are sincerely bent on preserving material order in the midst of our intellectual and moral disorder, are already feeling that their task will soon become impossible, if the spiritual reorganisation be not steadily pursued. This conviction even leads them in their want of systematic guidance to invoke as a social influence, the Roman Catholic religion, the only quarter from which they see any hopes of the discipline they require. But this cry of despair disjoined from any sincere belief does not prevent a secret feeling of the radical powerlessness of a doctrine which, since the close of the Middle Ages, has allowed the break-up of opinions and habits, and has not even been able to avoid compromising all that it seeks to protect.

Experience, private and public, shows us with increasing clearness that the state of revolt in which our modern intellect exists can only be ended by a completely positive philosophy, the only power competent in the present day to establish fixed and common convictions based upon real demonstrations, and finally to substitute the peaceful determination of duties for the stormy discussion of rights. Positivists seek, even more zealously than Catholics, to set aside for ever all metaphysical influences, which only lead to endless oscillations. Our
aim is, like theirs, to bring back the West to a universal religion, thoroughly competent to guide and unite both our intellects and hearts, and salving which our modern anarchy will find no issue. Demanding free scope for their doctrine, with the profound veneration which its ancient benefits excite in us, we ask an equal freedom for our own, but without expecting from them an equal justice. When these demands are granted, it will be for the practical men, in public and in private life, to make a wise choice between the two religions, a choice determined by their social efficacy, weighed by reason and observation.

I may therefore expect that Government will not cease to afford my gratuitous apostolate those facilities which all thinkers now deserve who respect and support material order, the only essential object of official superintendence. No majority of votes can invest the republican power with the right of prescribing or proscribing opinions with regard to which its constituents are yet more incompetent than itself. Its proper function in these questions is to put down all really anarchical teaching. But in an atmosphere wholly free from fanaticalism, a system which consolidates the various essential bases of society will always have the respect of the temporal power, notwithstanding that it find on the earth the fulcrum which heaven no longer affords. Rather should the crisis, which has now brought into just preponderance the question of order and the central power, give additional security to my independence as a philosopher, for it manifests yet more strongly the opportuneness of the doctrine best adapted to develop in our age the respect for order and for the concentration of power.

Giving its sanction to the authorities who chance to be in power, in the name of the past and of the future, it alone can assure them sincere veneration, never to be won by a simply material government, which secures obedience by brute force, and neither appeals to reason nor inspires love.

You, Sir, who for thirty years, have been carefully watching my career as a philosopher, know that, thirty years ago, I had adopted as the immediate and avowed aim of my life a satisfactory reconstruction of the spiritual power, admirably shadowed forth in the Middle Ages. This power, being the only one which acts directly on the will, can alone consecrate all others, whilst its true organs, though isolated and poor, can, in their own sphere, rise superior to the forces whether of numbers or of wealth, because they alone represent Humanity in its fulness. But the final reconstruction of the spiritual power, though it required a single brain, consisted necessarily of two distinct parts, answering to the two aspects, the one intellectual, the other moral, of the Western disorder, as to the two elements, faith and love, of the religion which will heal that disorder. The sentiments, despite their increasing perversion, are yet the sole supports of our existing society: they are essentially only troubled through the medium of the dis-
turbance of our ideas. Thus, the disease being primarily and chiefly intellectual, my first step was, of necessity, to construct, upon the scientific bases which the modern evolution has laid down, a philosophy able to restore to the West a body of systematic convictions, by substituting, and that in the positive order, a large consideration of the whole for a minute attention to its parts. Such was, as you know, the special aim, and, I venture to add, the actual result, of the fundamental work which I completed ten years since. All its vital principles are now adopted by the real thinkers of the West in a degree far beyond that anticipated by my early hopes.

But, though the greatest difficulty was thus overcome, this effort was but a simple preliminary to the real purpose I had constantly had in view. The next step was to prove that the new philosophy, which directly reorganised modern thought, could completely carry out its normal functions by becoming the foundation of the only religion capable of reorganising also our feelings, the supreme motor-power in human life. In a word, to the career of Aristotle that of St. Paul must succeed, or the incomparable mission I had at the outset ventured to assign myself would utterly fail.

True it is that my construction of social science established a powerful discipline of the intellect by showing what was the mental training and what the scientific acquirements, indispensable for any sound sociological elaboration, and thus showing such an elaboration to be, in all reason, on the score of proved incompetence, beyond the scope of those who at present busy themselves with it. The practical instincts also found their sphere limited; for social phenomena, though the most modifiable of all, are by their nature shown to be subject to invariable laws, upon which the artificial order must always be based; since the future we would prepare is the essential result of a past we cannot alter. Nevertheless these two steps towards the discipline indispensable for all organisation could not have been realised in practice unless the moral excellence of Positivism could rise to the level of its intellectual excellence. For retrograde and anarchical conceptions are still in apparent possession of the domain of morality, whence their metaphysical theology seemed likely indefinitely to exclude a science which, taking its rise in the simplest ideas, appeared for a long while unable to deal with the noblest sentiments.

Nothing then could absolve me from the duty of devoting the second period of my career to setting forth Positivism as a really complete doctrine, as religious as it was philosophic in spirit, as able to touch the heart as to direct the intellect. This decisive work was fully characterised by my course of lectures of 1847, in which I directly adopted the whole Catholic programme of the Middle Ages, and proved that the positive basis was better suited to it than any theological basis. But all those who know the first volume, published in July 1851, of
my System of Positive Polity, are now aware that this fundamental course was itself the fruit of the exceptional Dedication which I wrote for my own use in 1846, led thereto by an incomparable private affection.

It is only in this last stage that Positivism, becoming before all things moral and religious, could directly pursue its social destination, by leaving the region of philosophy to seek a home with the proletariat and with women. In so doing, it instituted an increasing rivalry with Catholicism in the reconstruction of the Western order, and it is this which gives a really capital importance to the gratuitous oral teaching which you have so nobly protected hitherto.

But this very object imposes upon me at this time a fresh care that I may preserve from any encroachment of the temporal power the spiritual independence I have honourably gained. As a consequence of the decisive guarantees I have more and more given to public tranquility, it is for me alone to decide, now as formerly, what I shall say and what I shall not say. For the government, while sanctioning those teachings which it considers inoffensive as regards material order and favourable to the reestablishment of moral order, is in general exempt from all special responsibility for any of my opinions. If the last crisis were to induce it to interfere with an exposition of which it is incapable of seeing the philosophic and religious bearing, it would be my duty rather to observe perfect silence provisionally, than to accept a partial liberty, which would weaken my spiritual influence more than it could further my present propaganda. But the happy experience of the three previous years ought to relieve me from any such fear now, however necessary it was that I should explain myself on the point in this place, to avoid all misunderstanding.

Far from fearing that this fourth course will have more obstacles to encounter than the preceding ones, I hope, that by gaining the serious attention of true conservatives, it will put a timely end to those general restrictions which the present dictatorship has thought fit to impose temporarily, in the interests of order, on the normal liberty of exposition, or at least of discussion. This measure is in fact only justified by the special danger to which the various subversive utopias of the day expose us, because their sophisms, though the public in a vague way instinctively shrink from them, find as yet no official doctrine to refute them. But this impotence of all theological or metaphysical philosophy is now at length fully compensated by the organic power of Positive philosophy. If statesmen will but smooth the way for the working of this healing doctrine, they may cease to trouble themselves about errors which a thorough discussion alone can remove.

That I may make quite clear what is the spiritual independence which is indispensable to my mission, I must, Sir, in the last place mention to you the personal attitude definitively befitting my spiritual
office, in order to offer, to government as to the public, a satisfactory guarantee of my exclusive devotion to the priesthood of Humanity.

At our last interview, you, with generous solicitude, were good enough to ask me how you could assist in remedying the loss I had sustained by the disgraceful withdrawal of my post at the Polytechnic, just then completed by the unworthy coteries of that institution. I now solemnly reply that the only means is to make known amongst conservatives as opportunity shall serve, in order that they may join in it, that noble public subscription which was exceptionally opened, three years ago, in order to neutralize that legal robbery, so as to allow me to complete undisturbed my great construction.

Hitherto chiefly derived from revolutionary sources, this voluntary annual subsidy still fell far short of the minimum originally named as indispensable. But since the recent spread of Positivism to the United States of America, it has been shown by some eminent examples that genuine conservatives may yet take part in it. For in the most anarchical of the Western populations, the Positive religion is invoked, in the interests of order above all, by statesmen who are, by the impossibility of calling any armed forces to their aid, preserved from all serious illusions as to the true nature of the modern disorder. This disposition, though by the nature of things it has first shown itself in America, will soon spread to our own statesmen in proportion as the situation brings into stronger relief the character of our social malady, and the inadequacy of the actual remedies. If then it is your judgment, Sir, that the services I have already rendered to the great cause of Western order merit such a recompense, I venture to ask you openly to urge, as far as you can, sincere and enlightened conservatives to join in a subscription which will for the rest of my life be my sole resource materially. The most distinguished contributors may with propriety add their sums to the smallest mite of the proletariat. For in both classes alike I shall only see spiritual clients who have become my temporal patrons.

The new strength which my various works will bring to the side of order might, indeed, determine the government to offer me some equivalent for that privation of my office at the Polytechnic which a defect in the law compelled it under our different changes of regime to see me suffer. But even in this case, I have made up my mind never to accept any kind of annuity, or official post, even though scientific.

In their blind hostility, my contemptible enemies of the Academy have step by step driven me to the mode of existence in most perfect harmony with my principal mission, the various services attached to which must always be gratuitous. The founder of the Religion of Humanity ought evidently to be supported by the voluntary yearly offerings of all his sincere adherents. In the first place, this normal
procedure is the most conducive to the good use of the few years of full vigour of brain that I can yet devote to my fundamental office. But it must also add another guarantee to that complete independence socially which my destination demands. In a time when the principal disturbance arises from the political ambition of theorists, erroneously so-called, both governments and peoples have a claim to be secured by the personal position of the new spiritual chief against his temptations to usurpations and to concessions. It is, then, my duty, though at the cost of some material difficulties, scrupulously to preserve the normal attitude in which I find myself. Should I abandon it, it would be impossible for me to obtain the complete moral ascendancy indispensable to the worthy fulfilment of that great enterprise which has been, as you know, from my youth upwards, the systematic destination of my whole life.

When, Sir, you shall have sufficiently studied this necessary explanation, I hope you will have the goodness to give me as early an appointment as possible, that we may discuss the resumption of my annual course. If you should judge it useful to communicate my letter to any one, you are at liberty to do so. I myself intend to add it, as it stands, to the preface of the volume I hope to publish in July, the second volume of my System of Positive Polity.

Health and Fraternity.

Auguste Comte.

(10, Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.)
THE OCCIDENTAL REVIEW;

or,

Continuous application of Positivism to the natural course of human events, contemplated both in the past and in the future, with a view to the systematic appreciation of the intellectual and social movement of the five advanced populations, the French, the Italian, the Spanish, the German and the Britannic, which constitute, since the time of Charlemagne, the great Western Republic. A quarterly publication (at the beginning of each season) founded and directed by Auguste Comte, author of the System of Positive Philosophy, and of the System of Positive Polity.

Paris. The first number of the Occidental Review will appear at the beginning of next winter, if the following project can be carried out in time.

Positivist Subscription in order to found the Occidental Review.

1. M. Auguste Comte, founder of the Occidental Review, is sole director and proprietor of it. His office, whether as director or editor, is strictly gratuitous.

2. When the Review shall be sufficiently established, M. Comte will choose a successor in the event of his death, and this successor shall, in his turn, make a similar choice, and so on as long as the function shall continue.

3. In order to secure a fair development for this philosophico-social experiment, M. Comte asks for an annual sum of 10,000 francs (400l.) for three years, to be repaid in the manner hereafter indicated.

4. This grant is to consist of 100 subscriptions, each of which obliges its signatory to furnish 100 francs (4l.) at the beginning of each of the three trial years.

5. A single individual may take any number of these subscriptions. Several individuals may unite to take a single subscription, but under one name.

6. All the subscriptions are strictly personal, none are transferable without the special consent of M. Comte.

7. Each subscription secures a copy of the Review, even after the whole sum is paid off.

8. Each subscription is for a yearly volume, consisting of four
PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME.

quarterly numbers. It costs 10 francs (8s.) for all those parts of the West to which there are satisfactory means of sending books.

9. Each number may be procured, for the sum of 3 francs for the public, and 2 francs for booksellers, on applying to the Director of the Review (10 rue Monsieur-le-Prince, Paris).

10. At the end of each year, one-half the profits of the undertaking is to be devoted to extending it, whether by a larger issue, an increase of remuneration to the contributors, or if possible, by making the publication monthly.

11. The remaining half of the profits is to repay, in an order to be ascertained each time by lot, the original subscriptions, with the interest consequent on their direction.

12. This interest is to be at a rate fixed at first by each subscriber, but never to exceed 7 per cent. per annum.

13. At the close of every year's operations, each subscriber shall receive from the Director of the Review, a complete printed statement of the position of the undertaking.

14. Each quarterly number contains 10 printed sheets 8vo. uniform in type with the System of Positive Polity (32 lines of 50 letters each to the page).

15. One thousand copies shall be printed at first, including those subscribed for.

16. Every number shall contain 5 articles at least, 7 at most, always relating to the intellectual or social condition of the West, but general principles will only be introduced so far as their special and opportune application requires.

17. The remuneration of the contributors is paid provisionally at 100 francs the sheet for beginners, 150 francs for those who have had experience, and 200 francs for writers of recognised ability.

18. Although the articles are published in French, they may be written in any other of the five Western languages, the Editor making himself responsible for their translation.

19. No article shall appear without the real and full signature of its author.

General estimate of the quarterly expenses.

Average payments to the contributors to each number . 1,400 francs.
Expenses of publication (at 25 francs the composition of each sheet, 45 francs the printing of 1,000 copies of it, and 50 francs for postage) . . . . 1,100 francs.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

(10, Rue Monsieur-le-Prince.)

Paris, 8 Archimedes, 64 (Thursday, April 1, 1852).

END OF PREFACE.
CONTENTS
OF
THE FOURTH VOLUME.

SYNTHETICAL PRESENTATION OF THE FUTURE OF MAN.

General Introduction .......................... 1

CHAPTER I.

FUNDAMENTAL THEORY OF THE GREAT BEING; WHENCE A CONSPICUOUS
OF THE RELIGION OF THE RACE AND OF ITS EXISTENCE IN THE
NORMAL STATE.

I. SPECIAL INTRODUCTION ......................... 8-27
II. SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION OF HUMANITY AS THE GREAT BEING 27-85

The priesthood of Humanity may now embrace the future as well as the
past, becoming prophet as well as judge...

Its threefold social function, Counsel, Consecration, Discipline ....... 8
Test of its competence ................................ 8
Difficulty of reconciling order and progress shown historically ... 8
Oscillation between the two, the apparent result ....................... 9
The remedy to be found in the true picture of the Future ............ 10
Affinity of Positivism for the previous regimes ....................... 10
All their programmes subordinate to that of the Theocracy .......... 11
Completeness the test of true discipline ................................ 11
Priesthoods of China and India .................................. 11
The formula of Theocracy adopted by Sociocracy ...................... 11
Affinity of Positivism with the three partial transitions ......... 12
The Greek ............................................. 12
The Roman .......................................... 13
The Medieval ....................................... 13
Its affinity with the modern revolution ................................ 14
The Fetishist period reserved .................................... 14
Result of the five comparisons .................................... 15
The fusion of the future with the past guarantees stability and offers guidance ..... 15
The neglect of this method explains the impotence of modern Utopias 15
Properties of the Positive Religion (1) Prevision 16
Prevision most applicable to human phenomena 17
The true synthesis now established 17
(2), Innateness of altruism 17
Its necessity if we would construct a systematic morality 18
Statically and dynamically 18
The two attributes henceforth inseparable 19
Previous recognition of the two in Fetishism, Polytheism, and Monotheism 20
The hostility of Monotheism confined to its decline 21
Formation under the old regime of the habits and principle adapted to our maturity 21
The Habits 21
The Principle 22
The Family, the Country, Humanity 22
The West intercalated 23
The determination of the future depends on the explanation of the past 23
Systematic explanation of Humanity 24
Humanity real and useful 24
Reality 24
Utility 25
Successive germs of the conception 26
The three preliminary opera of Pascal, Leibnitz, and Condorcet 27
Definition of Humanity. Theory 27
(I.) Constitution of Humanity. Distinction between elements and agents 27
The elements subordinate to the whole 28
Humanity alone not indistinct nor arbitrary 28
Humanity indivisible 29
Subject to the law of growth and improvement, to be judged therefore in its adult state 29
The ministers of Humanity 30
The problem is, how to combine concert with independence 30
The actual generation dependent on the past and the future 31
Continuity in the Family 31
Continuity as limited to the past and present 31
The Dead. The subjective existence 31
The Dead represent Humanity 32
Superiority of the subjective life 32
Necessity of the objective 32
Incorporation of the animals into Humanity 33
(II.) Situation of Humanity 33
Her ultimate dependence on the human order 33
Dependent also on the external 34
As Humanity is dependent, so are her individual servants 34
This dependence the source of her greatness 34
(III.) Destination of Humanity. Sphere of her action the Human order 35
This most applicable to the Future, but true of the Past 35
This Theory the basis of the Positive Construction 36
Its synthetical power 36
Its future efficacy seen by the results already attained 36
Relations of Positive Religion with Fetishism and Theologism. The latter eliminated 37
THE FOURTH VOLUME

Fetichism incorporated
The fusion viewed intellectually, esthetically, morally
The two extreme ages of Humanity thus combined
No inconsistency in excluding Theologism
With the aid of Fetichism Positive Religion can construct the ultimate unity, abstract and concrete

ABSTRACT VIEW
Positivism combines all aspects of human existence
Awareness secures the supremacy of Love.
Realises all previous aspirations
(I.) Unity of Feeling
Diversity of the sympathetic instincts
Their training in the preparatory period
Their fate in modern times
They are the true domain of the Positive spirit
Chief attribute of human Unity: duty and happiness coincident
Feeling to be encouraged for its own sake
Living for others, others live for us
Subjective immortality the reward of a noble life
(II.) Intellectual Unity. (a) Art
More sympathetic and more synthetic than science
More closely connected with religion
Art is education equal to science, in real life superior
Testimony of the past
New instruments of poetry; subjective milieus
Space hitherto the only instance
The philosophy of art in relation to that of science
(III.) Science. All positive theories converge towards the science of man
The convergence as regards the development of the sympathetic instincts

Drama
Positivism offers science a better field and a better method
The aid images will bring to science
(III.) Unity of action. (a) Order
Easier to organise Industry than Intellect
Conservation and increase of the collective treasure of Humanity
The two require two distinct services
Government and obedience both regulated

Influence of the habitual consciousness of usefulness

(V.) Progress
Industry so constituted favours feeling and intellect

CONCLUSIONS VIEW
I. Constitution of the Sociocracy. II. Its separate elements
Principles on which we classify these elements
Women superior in sympathy

The distinction of the sexes answers to that between private and public life
Distinction between practitioners and theorists
Consequences of these distinctions
Distinction of the patriciate and proletariat
Function of the proletariat
The animal auxiliaries of Humanity
The character of the sociocratic elements
## CONTENTS OF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman’s independence</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of view as to the function of Reproduction</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis. The reproductive function exclusively female</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of woman’s independence</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result of education on woman</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value for her of the Encyclopedic training</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman offers less difficulty than the active class</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spiritual Power. Conditions of its independence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of the priesthood shown by comparing it with woman</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education the great function of the priesthood</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fusion of philosophy and poetry will aid in preserving the true priestly character</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The priesthood resumes the medical office</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An universal language required</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian is the fittest</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Practical classes. (1) The patriciate the basis of the City</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The patriciate the seat of human will</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will requires power</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hence the necessity of the concentration of wealth</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal conditions</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The patrician hierarchy</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four divisions. (1) Agriculturists. (2) Manufacturers. (3) Merchants. (4) Bankers</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) The Proletarists</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its homogeneity</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In it are developed the general features of Humanity</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means for a systematic direction of the power of numbers</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proletariat must restrain its personal instincts</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its external conditions</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER II.

**GENERAL VIEW OF THE AFFECTIVE LIFE, OR, DEFINITIVE SYNTHEMATIZATION OF THE POSITIVE SYSTEM OF WORSHIP.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change of order. The worship precedes the dogma</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for and against the previous arrangement</td>
<td>76-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The worship the expression of the synthetical state</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Again, the affinity between Fetishism and Positivism</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior synthetic power of the Religion of Humanity</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is worship</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominence of the Future characteristic of the normal state</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two arrangements of the doctrine</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the worship did not precede the doctrine, it would have to follow the regime</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination and nature of the worship. The sympathetic instincts its chief domain</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It exercises all man’s faculties</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is the synthetic idealisation of our existence</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of the effects of expression and action</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE FOURTH VOLUME.

fluence of the Positive worship (I) on altruism .......................... 83
(II) on egoism ........................................................................ 84
actual influence (I.) on Art .................................................... 84
the language of worship .......................................................... 85
science. (a) Method. (b) Doctrine .......................................... 86
influence on action, which it purifies .................................... 87
ship universal, but systematic only for the more leading phases of
an existence ............................................................................ 88
ed sign .................................................................................... 89
Theory of the subjective life ................................................... 89
ilation of other existences ....................................................... 90
of the beings incorporated necessarily extinct ...................... 90
lated existences ...................................................................... 91
ness of subjective existence .................................................... 91
the subjective life .................................................................. 92
endence of physical influences ............................................. 92
ity of the subjective state ........................................................ 93
on of the dead with the living more affective than intellectual ... 93
physical independence ........................................................... 94
ilation required ....................................................................... 95
Exposition of the Worship .................................................... 95–142
Madame de Vaux ................................................................. 95
ions of the worship: I. Personal ............................................. 96
her ....................................................................................... 96
and daughter ......................................................................... 97
al state of these three types ................................................... 98
y as to the past. Names .......................................................... 99
y as to the future ................................................................... 99
ortality extends to the types by whose aid it has been deserved ... 99
ortality of women ................................................................. 100
angels ..................................................................................... 100
and Mohammedan precedents ............................................. 101
Prayer. Definition of prayer ................................................. 101
s of the morning prayer ....................................................... 101
subjectivity in prayer ........................................................... 102
yer ....................................................................................... 102
ayer a work of art ................................................................. 102
and duration of daily prayers ............................................. 103
and annual worship ............................................................. 104
introduction for the sake of continuity .................................. 104
uspended ............................................................................... 104
emption of the death of those we invoke ............................. 105
s of the private culture. Moral ............................................. 105
intellect and the activity ........................................................ 106
C. Worship. Functions of the head of the family and the mother . 107
: worship consecrates the phases of family life ................. 107
confusion of the temporal and spiritual powers .................. 107
by Positivism ....................................................................... 108
hood must secure freedom ................................................... 109
sacraments; six for women ............................................... 109
ready administered ............................................................. 109
(I.) Presentation. Its ceremonial
(II.) Initiation
(III.) Admission
(IV.) Destination
(V.) Marriage
Monogamy the principal result of Western civilisation
Interval between the civil and the religious marriage
The vow of eternal widowhood
Dispensations
(VI.) Maturity
(VII.) Retirement
(VIII.) Transformation
(IX.) Incorporation
Special modifications of domestic relations
Adoption
Wherein lies the power of these sacraments
PUBLIC WORSHIP
The calendar. What is a date
The week
The month and the year
Lunar and solar years. Solar year adopted
Division of the year into thirteen months. Reasons
Apportionment of these months
The Positive era and the names of the months not fixed
Idealisation of the days of the week
Concrete nomenclature of the week
Abstract
Groups of years
Direct treatment of public worship
The Festival of Humanity
The other four festivals of the first month
The Festivals of the second month. Marriage
Those of the third, fourth and fifth months. The Parental, Filial, and
  Fraternal Relations
Those of the sixth month. Domesticity
The next three months dynamical
Additional Thursday commemoration
The commemoration as suitable for the future as for the present
The historical portion of the cultus definitive
The seventh month. Fetichism
Spontaneous Fetichism: (I.) Nomad: (II.) Sedentary
Systematic: (I.) Sacerdotal Astrology: Festival of the Sun
(II.) Military Astrology. Festival of Iron
The eighth month. Polytheism
(I.) The Thocracy. Caste
(II.) Intellectual Polytheism: (a) aesthetic, (b) scientific
(III.) Social Polytheism
The ninth month. Monotheism
(I.) Theocratic or Judaic
(II.) Catholic
The Virgin
(III.) Mohammedan. Lepanto
## THE FOURTH VOLUME.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER III.

**GENERAL VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL EXISTENCE OF MAN, RESTING ON THE RELATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE ORDER OF THE WORLD, OR DEFINITIVE SYSTEMATISATION OF THE POSITIVE DOCTRINE.**

The intellect must be exercised under the impulse of feeling .......................... 142
Disposition with which we enter on the study of the doctrine ..................... 142
Hypothesis as to the order of the world. Suppose it to cease ..................... 143
The hypothesis involves a contradiction even if limited to the physical laws .......... 144
Various stages of the Hypothesis ................................................. 144
The heart and intellect must concur for synthesis ................................ 145
So the worship sanctions the dogmatic system .................................... 145
The heart rules, the intellect advises .......................................... 146
Discipline of the intellect ....................................................... 146
Hitherto inopportune .............................................................. 147
The discipline of science in relation to the will ................................ 148
Public opinion ................................................................. 148
Hence a higher sacredness for science ........................................... 149
Even the lower sciences have a moral reaction ................................. 149
But this reaction most felt in the higher domains  
Relation of the dogma to the worship must dwell on here  
General nature of the doctrine. Science must be abstract  
Relations of theory and practice  
Abstraction sanctioned but with precautions  
Aids for abstraction in the subjective media  
The universal principles on which the doctrine rests  
The FIRST PHILOSOPHY  
The fifteen laws. I. Law of the simplest Hypothesis  
II. Law of Invariability  
III. Law of Modifiability  
The distinctness of these three renders an absolute synthesis impossible  
Second group. IV. Subordination of the subjective to the objective  
V. Relation of the image to the impression  
VI. One image must prevail  
VII. Law of intellectual progress  
VIII. Law of material progress  
IX. Law of moral progress  
Harmony of the second group  
Third group. Objective  
X. Law of persistence  
XI. Law of compatible action  
XII. Law of mutual action  
XIII. Subordination of motion to existence  
XIV. Law of classification  
XV. Law of continuity  
The Fifteen realise the wish of Bacon for a 'prima philosophia'  
The system brought to bear on the construction of the Positive Hierarchy of phenomena and conceptions  
Synthetic constitution of the Hierarchy  
All phenomena human  
Individual preparation needed to attain this synthesis  
The study of the higher will call for new researches in the lower sciences; in both cases the hierarchy useful  
The Positive scale appreciated (I.) scientifically (II.) logically  
The supremacy of morals  
The hierarchy valuable within the sphere of each science  
The concrete hierarchy  
Here again the hierarchical principle useful for subdivision  
The First Philosophy in its full sense  
Several arrangements of the analytical dogmatic system  
The seven arrangements  
Two binary (a) dogmatic. Cosmology. Sociology  
(b) historical, Natural and Moral Philosophy  
Two ternary (a) Material, Vital, Human order  
(b) Physical, Intellectual, Moral Laws  
Two quaternary (a) Cosmology, Biology, Sociology, Morals  
(b) Three couples with Morals as their crown  
One Quinary. Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Sociology, Morals  
Remainder of the chapter elaborates the hierarchy of the seven sciences  
Each essential step to be studied separately  
Invariability of laws an inductive principle
THE FOURTH VOLUME.

How invariability is made completely general .................................................. 169
Chance and Destiny ..................................................................................................... 169
Though necessary, the study of the seven sciences has its dangers ...................... 170
How they are to be averted (1) during the period of education ......................... 170
(2) during active life .................................................................................................. 170
Intellectual and physical laws the chief object of our abstract initiation .............. 171
Study of each science limited by the requirements of the next above it ............... 171
Such study sufficient for human life, allowing for incidental researches .......... 172
Tendency hitherto to accept such limitation ............................................................. 172
Positivism systematises this instinct. Difficulty and social remedy .................... 173
Constant tendency to specialisation both with theoreticians and practitioners .... 173
Synthetic discipline established under the invocation of Humanity ...................... 174
THE SEVEN PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISES required ................................................ 174
The sociological treatise may issue from Vols. II. and III. .................................... 175
Announcement of those on Mathematics and Morals ............................................. 175
Cosmology in especial requires the Subjective Synthesis .................................... 175
Purity of any objective synthesis sufficiently recognised to allow the human point of view to prevail ................................................................. 176
The Mathematical Synthesis in one volume ........................................................... 176
Its composition, title and object ................................................................................ 177
The higher logical processes, though not derived from Mathematics, may be illustrated by them ................................................................................................. 177
All the logical processes found in Mathematics ...................................................... 178
The Logic of Signs and Logic of Images, both developed there ............................. 178
The Logic of Feeling requisite .................................................................................. 179
Comte's task to introduce this; accomplished in Synthèse Subjective, Vol. I. ........ 179
(1) Moral reactions of mathematical studies ......................................................... 179
(2) Fusion of Fetishism with Positivism. Its results in these studies ................. 180
Subjective millenia .................................................................................................... 181
This final state of Mathematics heralded by the practice of the higher minds who have cultivated them simultaneously with the lower sciences ......................... 181
The principle of subjective generality will annul the opposition of the Algebraists ......................................................................................................................... 181
The simplicity of Mathematics adapts them for the systematisation of the Positive Logic .................................................................................................................. 182
Rightly placed they grow in dignity and originate an improvement in the art of thinking ..................................................................................................................... 182
A species of universal Algebra .................................................................................. 182
Completing human language .................................................................................... 183
Scientific influence of Mathematics thus renovated .............................................. 183
One volume sufficient ............................................................................................... 183
This appears impossible to most, till done ............................................................... 184
The second Volume. The Astronomical Synthesis .................................................. 184
Its composition similar to that of the rest ............................................................... 185
Logical aspects of Astronomy. It offers the best type of observation, the best model for hypotheses .......................................................... 185
It limits its predecessor most satisfactorily .............................................................. 185
Scientific aspects of Astronomy. It presents us with mathematical existence uncomplicated ................................................................................................................. 186
Relativity marked in Astronomy ............................................................................. 186
It shows that a subjective unity is alone possible .................................................... 186
Its bounds the solar system ...................................................................................... 186
The planets which influence the earth taken into account | 190
Fetichism and Positivism easily fused in Astronomy | 188
We may, with precautions, animate the heavenly bodies | 188
Normal destiny of celestial Mechanics philosophical | 189
Volumes III. and IV. of the Abstract Encyclopaedia reserved for Comte's suc-
cessors | 190
Volume III. Physics. Its constitution | 190
Volume IV. Chemistry. Its constitution | 190
Subjective milieu most effective in the Physico-Chemical couple | 191
Volume V. Biology, treated more fully | 191
Elimination of the theory of unity and the cerebral synthesis | 192
So reduced, Biology not treated disproportionately to Cosmology | 192
The introduction to the biological volume | 192
Biology but the preamble to the study of Humanity, hence its limits | 193
The seven chapters of the volume; I., II., Statical | 193
I. Anatomy. II. Taxonomy | 193
III., IV. Dynamical. III. Vegetal. IV. Animal Life | 194
V. Law of hereditary transmission | 194
VI. Relation of the organism to the environment | 194
VII. Vital modificability | 194
Synthetic conclusion. Logical appreciation of Treatise | 194
Scientific appreciation | 195
The conclusion a preparation for the treatise on Sociology | 196
Complementary remarks | 196
The Law of Ternary progression added in the first chapter | 196
The second chapter reduced to the organic series duly contracted | 197
Chapter III. The mode of instituting the theory of vegetal life | 197
Chapter IV. Biology irrational if we do not keep to the human point of view | 197
Chapter V. This is true of the seventh law of vitality | 198
Chapter VI. The subjective point of view to be adhered to in the theory of organic milieus | 198
Chapter VII. Aptitude for modification confined to assimilable substances | 198
Dissection, even of animals, forbidden the priest | 199
Distinction between the first five and the last two volumes of the Abstract Encyclopaedia | 200
The two binary divisions compared | 200
Considered with reference to subjective milieus | 201
Separation of Sociology and Morals. The first the subject of the sixth volume | 201
Religious introduction and synthetical conclusion of this volume | 201–2
The seven chapters of the Volume on Sociology | 202
The rest of this third chapter devoted to Morals, the seventh volume of the Abstract Encyclopaedia | 203
The 'System of Positive Morals' or 'Treatise of Universal Education' to occupy two volumes, the first abstract | 203
Religious introduction | 204
Supremacy of Morals asserted (a) logically, (b) scientifically | 204
The double relation—objective and subjective—most manifest in the two highest sciences | 205
Comte's share in the work of final systematisation | 205
The seven chapters of the Treatise on Morals | 205
THE FOURTH VOLUME.

Detail on the fourth chapter. The doctrine of vital harmony .................................................. 207
The main point to systematise the subjective theory of the brain ........................................ 207
Determination of the number of the senses. Eight senses ......................................................... 207
A cerebral ganglion admitted for each sense ............................................................................. 208
The ganglia of touch, musculature, sight and hearing ............................................................. 208
The motor functions. Innervation ............................................................................................... 208
Spinal cord .................................................................................................................................. 209
The relation of the principal region of the brain to the body .................................................... 209
Intimate connection of the vessels and nerves in the higher organisms .................................. 210
Further specification of the relation between the organic life and the brain ............................ 210
Limitation to the three instincts of conservation ....................................................................... 210
Distinction between the three cases .......................................................................................... 210
The nutritive apparatus directly connected only with the instinct of nutrition ....................... 211
We must not forget the other connections .................................................................................. 211
Three in number, they suffice to explain the reactions of the physical and moral constitution of man ........................................................................................................................................... 211
The Positive theory of Dreams ................................................................................................... 211
Sleep ........................................................................................................................................... 212
Connection of the vital harmony with the feminine Utopia ....................................................... 212
The nervous and vascular systems more developed in woman .............................................. 212
She is the best type of the relations between the brain and the body ...................................... 212
The synthetic conclusion of the volume on Morals .................................................................... 213
The regeneration of profane science (a) Logically ..................................................................... 213
This result expressed in the incorporation of Fetichism ............................................................. 213
(b) Scientifically .......................................................................................................................... 214
Morals derive their discipline from within .................................................................................. 214
There alone is the conception of the Universal order decisive and complete ......................... 215
Physical laws gain in rationality if combined with moral ........................................................... 215
THE THIRD PHILOSOPHY ........................................................................................................ 216
Connection of the Concrete with the Abstract Encyclopedia .................................................. 216
The idea of such connection traceable in the second volume of the System of Morals ........... 216
Education the first of the arts ........................................................................................................ 216
It is a transition to the other special arts, which require coordination .................................... 216
They do not admit coordination in detail .................................................................................... 217
'System of Positive Industry,' or Treatise of the aggregate influence of Humanity upon her Planet ............................................................................................................................................. 217
Object of this third Philosophy ..................................................................................................... 218
Full conception of the Positive Philosophy given by the chapter ................................................ 218

CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL VIEW OF MAN'S ACTIVE EXISTENCE,

OR

DEFINITIVE SYSTEMATISATION OF THE POSITIVE LIFE.

Object of the regime to combine sympathy with synthesis ....................................................... 219
Had we no bodily wants, the worship sufficient ...................................................................... 219
They necessitate a more complex religion .................................................................................. 219

VOL. IV.
CONTENTS OF

Still, even under these conditions, sympathetic unity is attainable
The régime more influential in this respect than the doctrine
Hence the doctrine must be subordinated to it
Action the best guarantee of unity
The theoretical power must systematise the régime
Hence the priesthood must be dwelt on
Two preliminary cautions, one as to the numbers given, the second as to the assumption made
Constitution of the priesthood. Its numbers limited
Requirements of each Positive school
Twenty thousand priests required for the West
One temple for ten thousand families
Mode of recruiting the Positive Clergy
Artistic and scientific pensioners
The High Priest of Humanity
His seven assistants
Ultimately forty-nine
The priestly dress reserved
Spiritual concentration
The dependence and ascendancy of the priesthood
The priests to derive no profit from their writings
Nor from their teaching
Teaching to be free outside their body
Educational function of the priesthood
The object of the Positive education
Complete preparatory period 28 years
Education proper limited to 21 years
Wider sense of the term
The period of PRIVATE EDUCATION (1-14)
The first seven years most decisive. Moral training. The worship of the mother
Training of the intelligence
The second seven years. Esthetic training
The universal language. Italian predominant
Moral training in second period
Intellectual
Polytheistic character of this period need not survive the first three centuries of the normal state
In both these periods some industrial training
The child to be taught that feelings are more important than acts
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION (14-21). Its general spirit
The supremacy of the heart
The worship therefore must institute the study of the doctrine
Each professor to teach the seven sciences in succession
The High Priest must watch against intellectualism
The noviciate moral rather than intellectual
Demonstration cultivated for submission
The noviciate must teach the Positivist to subordinate his individual to the collective intelligence
The course of instruction. The nineteen lectures on the First Philosophy
The seven years given to the abstract sciences. Number of lectures
The theoretic noviciate and industrial apprenticeship close together
Three years of travel
THE FOURTH VOLUME.

Effects of the public education .......................................................... 236
Reading discouraged as a habit. Useful reading ..................................... 236
The Positivist Library .............................................................................. 236
Harmony of the two great divisions of education proper ......................... 237
The importance of the last year ............................................................... 237
The two phases contrasted socially .......................................................... 238
Disposition developed by the Positive education ...................................... 238
Submission and retention of principles, not of their details ....................... 239
Systematisation of active life. Preliminary observations ......................... 239
Institution of a religious Utopia .............................................................. 239
A condensation necessary to a synthesis ............................................... 239
Precedent in the Eucharist ...................................................................... 240
Former Utopias. The transmutation of metals ....................................... 240
Biological Utopia as announced in 'Phil. Pos.' III. p. 432 ......................... 241
The theory of Utopias complementary to that of religion ......................... 241
Inductive considerations on the Utopia of the Virgin Mother ................. 242
Subjective considerations ..................................................................... 243
Its reaction on our advance in all directions (i.) Personal ......................... 243
(ii.) Domestic; (iii.) Civil ...................................................................... 244
Were this Utopia realised, others might follow ....................................... 245
Direct examination of the Positive Regime ............................................. 245
The functions of government. Participation of the two powers ................. 245
Positive Morality always social under all its forms ................................ 246
(i.) Personal morality. Physical injunctions .......................................... 246
Two aspects of personal existence (i.) Negative, (ii.) Positive .................. 247
For regulating Purity the personal instincts grouped in three couples ....... 248
(i.) Negative aspect. Apparent possibility of an egoistic synthesis ........... 248
Rejected on deeper examination ............................................................ 248
The part played by the instincts of self-preservation and benevolence repectively .............................................................. 249
1. The instinct of nutrition ..................................................................... 249
The two social grounds for the discipline of this instinct ......................... 250
No ascetic rules to be applied to it ......................................................... 250
2. Sexual instinct ................................................................................... 251
3. Instincts of destruction and construction .......................................... 252
4. Pride and Vanity ................................................................................ 252
Concluding remarks on the negative discipline ..................................... 253
(ii.) Positive aspect. Altruism the great regulator ................................ 253
(a) Personal existence considered in respect to feeling ......................... 253
Then to intelligence ............................................................................... 254
(b) Domestic existence .......................................................................... 254
Preamble. Two modes of the altruistic synthesis .................................... 254
Home, Greece, Catholicism, Modern Times ........................................... 255
Subordination of private to public life ..................................................... 256
Systematisation of the Family by the Country in the name of Humanity .... 256
Three groups in the normal Family ......................................................... 256
Seven members of the family in the proletariat ..................................... 257
The rich and the clergy need auxiliaries ................................................. 257
Jealousy of this institution overcome by Positive religion ....................... 257
The family thus consists of ten members for the clergy ......................... 257
Of thirteen for the patriciate .................................................................. 258
The domicile. That of the proletary requires seven rooms ...................... 258
CONTENTS OF

The Patricians will come to see their duty in this respect, the Plebeians their claims

House of the clergy and the patriciate

Coordination of the conceptions relating to the Family

The two statical conceptions of it as the basis of action, or the source of education, must be combined

Two corrections required in the religious theory of the family

The best conception of the two gained by distinguishing education from instruction

Veneration the principal object, here the mother's influence invaluable

Her intervention necessary after marriage

Importance of the elder couple

Theory of the mother completed in this chapter

Position of the head of the family in reference to the influence of women

The mother the image of the country

No evil to be feared from the wife and mother living together

The seven conditions required for the religious theory of the family

They are not to be made binding by law

Civil marriage. Not a mistaken concession to the temporal power

Useful in the appreciation of the relations of the two powers

Legal limits for the age of marriage

Legal measures as to wills and adoptions reserved

Theory of the family summed up in its normal relations

A constant progress traceable in its constitution

A sound Utopia should be an anticipation

(c) Civic existence. Preliminary processes

Decomposition of the great states of the West

Extent of the Positive Republics

Moral education requires an intermediate between the Family and Humanity

Patriotism political

This original limit first passed in consequence of the Roman conquest

No exact limit of the Positive nationalities

Political motive for decomposition

Division of the West into 70 republics, the world into 500

Numbers of the patriciate

Distribution of the proletariat

Ratio of the rural to the town proletariat

Distribution of the latter

The type of the average provincial capital

The size most suited to our modern wants

The patrician families are to the plebeian as 1 : 30

The capitalists to the workmen as 1 : 16

The civic regime as influenced by the private

Under the Religion of Humanity all individual conduct has a collective bearing

Our life as citizens influenced by our guardian angels

Most of all in the priesthood

The still greater influence of domestic upon public morality

The domestic aids the civic life by affecting scope for the action of the priesthood on the individual

The women, as the Roman matrons, must have the civic feelings

The relations of one family with others attach it to the city

Influence of salons
The organs of public opinion ........................................ 275
The salons of the priesthood ......................................... 275
Of the Bankers, of the Proletariate ............................... 276
Regulation of the growth of population required ............... 277
There are indications that Positive institutions will be equal to this difficult task ..................................................... 277
Indication as to (i.) Number, (ii.) Quality ......................... 278
In what consists the difficulty of the Problem ................... 278
Two general solutions offered by Positivism: (a) The Utopia 279
(b) Chaste marriage. This negative but useful ................... 279
Intervention of the priesthood in both cases ..................... 280
Direct treatment of public life. Its fundamental purpose .... 280
The military regime preserved the West from castes .......... 281
Distinction between employers and workmen ..................... 281
The bankers need the impulse of the Religion of Humanity .... 281
Industrialism most favourable to social life ...................... 281
Positivism favours in two ways the transformation of industry 282
The task requires the Religion of Humanity ....................... 282
Moral advance supreme ............................................. 282
Activity must become directly altruistic ......................... 283
Hitherto attempts to organise industry have been national .... 283
Socialist attempt ...................................................... 284
The supremacy of the proletariat of all nations substituted by it for the supremacy of one nation .................. 284
Human labour must keep Humanity in view, the future not the present 285
We must work consciously for posterity, not as hitherto, blindly 286
The aim of industrial activity ..................................... 286
The general conditions of industry, moral ....................... 287
Devotion and Veneration the two pillars of the social fabric . 287
How the regime encourages them .................................. 288
The patriciate has the function of will ............................ 288
The organisation of the true Providence mainly depends on the patriciate 288
Positivist estimate of the vices incident to wealth ............ 289
Avarice preferred to prodigality .................................. 289
Pride more excusable than vanity .................................. 290
Ambition to be checked in the proletariat ......................... 290
The patriciate as condensed as possible ......................... 290
Rule of inheritance .................................................. 291
Strikes ................................................................. 291
The priesthood appeals to conscience and public opinion .... 291
Final resource, excommunication ................................... 291
Power given by the Sacrament of Incorporation ................. 292
Precautions against the abuse of capital ......................... 293
Industrial chivalry ................................................... 293
Precautions against abuse on the part of the priesthood .... 294
Functions of the industrial classes. The directors ............ 294
Private maintenance .................................................. 295
Ownership of the domicile different in town and country .... 295
Beneficial effects of such ownership .............................. 296
Its religious effect ................................................... 296
Annual expenditure of each proletary family .................... 296
Wages ................................................................. 296
A fixed portion; a variable portion. Inequalities tend to disappear 297
CONTENTS

Wages intended for the maintenance of the proletariat, as the agents of Humanity... 298
Gratuitous character of human labour... 298
General level of wages, allowing for a difference in town and country... 299
Modern Utopias on wages a dim anticipation of the truth... 299
Possibility of the rate indicated... 299
Economy of the Positive System... 300
Public expenditure (I.) Temporal... 300
A central government indispensable... 300
The supreme Triumvirate... 301
The three Ministers of Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce... 301
Relations of the Triumvirate to the proletariat... 302
Gratuitous discharge of the functions of government... 302
Police and Civil Service... 303
(ii.) Spiritual Expenditure. The Sacerdotal Subsidy... 303
The total expenses of nutrition to be met by the patriciate... 303
The chief function of the banker... 304
The part of the proletariat in civic life... 304
Favourable situation of the proletariat morally... 305
Its great power to be felt rather than put forth... 305
General office of the proletariat... 306
The salons of the people... 306
Machinery and engineers... 307
Mendicants... 307
They are under the protection of the proletariat... 308
Beggars—passive proletaries... 308
Fraternity between the Engineers and other workmen... 308
Relations between States... 309
Monopoly prevented by the Country being subordinated to Humanity... 309
The priesthood will need in this the aid of the bankers and proletariat... 310
The peace of the world—how preserved... 310
Uniformity of legislation, of weights and measures... 310
Special industrial aptitudes of the several countries... 311
The relations of man with the animals... 311
Condition of his voluntary allies to be ameliorated... 311
Domesticated animals: (i) Those which serve for food... 312
(ii.) Those which give us active aid... 312
Animals not to be employed when inorganic forces will do... 312
All classes must cooperate in this amelioration... 313
The inorganic world not left out... 313
Materials, as well as products, are to be respected... 314

CHAPTER V.

PHILOSOPHICAL ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT, BY VIRTUE OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FUTURE WITH THE PAST;
WHENCE

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE LAST PHASE OF THE TRANSITION.

Object of the chapter, the acceptance of the formula of the Positive Religion... 315
Positivism has to regulate the present, and by overcoming anarchy will win assent... 316
THE FOURTH VOLUME.

Examination of the state of the West ........................................... 315
The preparatory evolution ......................................................... 316
The peoples which wait for its result ......................................... 317
Fetichism and Theocracy have become passive .............................. 317
Monotheism in its two forms has failed ...................................... 317
The West becomes the organ of renovation by virtue of its triple transition 317
Difficult of the final phase ....................................................... 318
The revolutionary tendency, once useful, is now noxious .............. 318
Thus the chief task is to regenerate the West .............................. 319
Discredit of the Revolutionary party .......................................... 319
Hence it is easy for Positivism to order the transition ............... 320
Appreciation of the revolutionary principle of private judgment ... 320
Its results .............................................................................. 320
The wide range of the anarchy .................................................... 321
Need of an universal doctrine ..................................................... 321
Feeling must be introduced as the complement of reason ............ 321
The feelings have been tampered with ....................................... 322
The two tasks of the Positive Religion: To make Generality prevail over
Speciality, Sociality over Personality .......................................... 323
The order of transition as regards the Western nations. Reasons ... 323
Paris will direct the final transition ............................................. 324
The determination of the transition in France to be followed by that which
concerns the others .................................................................. 324
The transition in France. Prefatory remarks ............................... 325
The same influences must preside over the introduction of the normal state
as rule when it is introduced ....................................................... 325
No violence to be used in establishing Positivism ....................... 325
Attitude of its priesthood ......................................................... 326
All existing authorities, if socially useful, to be sanctioned ........... 326
Special application of these dispositions to the opening of the transition 326
Two modes of cooperation ......................................................... 327
Conversion not necessary, but there must be a paramount will to modify 327
This condition to a certain extent satisfied in France ................. 328
Its power to modify without converting, a valuable privilege of Positivism 328
The two bases of the organic transition. The Dictatorship and Spiritual
Liberty ............................................................................. 329
Excuse for the non-recognition of this condition by the Dictator ...... 330
With Positivism the Dictatorship may feel secure ....................... 331
The Liberty opportune .............................................................. 331
Repression of it more adverse to order than to progress ............... 331
Its conditions ........................................................................ 331
No restrictions on the Press ....................................................... 332
Extinction of Journalism. Its substitute, the Placard .................... 332
Occasional pamphlets ................................................................ 333
Clubs. Their character ................................................................ 333
Suppression of the budgets of Theology, Metaphysics, and Science 333
How this measure should be carried out ..................................... 334
(i.) In regard to Theology. The opposition of Catholicism .......... 335
Attitude of Positivism to disestablished Catholicism ................. 335
Attitude of the dictatorial government to Catholicism ............... 336
Attitude towards the non-Catholic monotheists of the West ....... 336
(ii.) In regard to Metaphysics. Abolition of the University ....... 337
CONTENTS OF

Collages and Schools .................................................. 327
Primary instruction .................................................. 338
(iii.) In regard to Science. Its budget the most corrupting. 338
The Academy of Sciences ........................................... 339
Pensions to artists, savants, and learned men ................... 339
Abolition of copyright after restricting it to seven years .... 340
The author to have the control of his work ....................... 340
Object of the measures to purify the Dictatorship ............... 341
The dictatorial government freed from parliamentary forms .... 342
A purely financial assembly alone needed ......................... 343
The triennial election. Modifications of universal suffrage .... 343
This limitation of the dictatorship only provisional .......... 343
Formula of the first phase of the transition ...................... 343
Necessity of the adoption of the Positivist political formula: Order and Progress .................. 344
The formula of the bourgeoisie; Liberty and Order ............... 344
The Positivist formula satisfies all the conditions ............ 344
The act which inaugurates the transition. Return of Napoleon to St. Helena 345
The column in the Place Vendôme. Charlemagne ................ 346
Efforts of the priesthood to prepare the normal state by the glorification of the past ........................................... 346
The Positivist Calendar ................................................ 346
Three degrees in this concrete glorification of Humanity .... 346
Chronological order of the types .................................. 346
Names of the months ................................................... 346
The Positive era. Provisional era. 1789 .......................... 347
Definitive era, 1855 .................................................... 347
For intellectual purposes the monthly and weekly types suffice 347
For moral the daily types required ................................ 348
Supplementary names ................................................... 348
Insufficiency of the concrete worship .............................. 349
In the calendar theoretical and practical services prevail over moral ........................................... 349
The calendar purely provisional ...................................... 350
Two provisions required, (1) The days of the week are not consecrated to the fundamental ties ...................................... 351
(2) All reprobation is suppressed ................................. 351
The Positivist Library ................................................ 351
Provisionally it consists of 150 volumes ......................... 352
Later modifications of calendar and library ...................... 352
The two institutions imply the judgment of the dead ........... 353
The worship explained during the first phase .................... 354
Mixed marriages. Two conditions ................................... 354
(1) Conversion of the woman after marriage allowed, not of the man 354
(2) The woman must accept eternal widowhood .................. 355
In any case the mother has the education of the children .... 356
Public Worship. The Festival of Humanity ...................... 356
Festival of the Virgin Mother ....................................... 357
A final elucidation of the Utopia ................................... 357
Rise of the cult of the Virgin, and decline of the Eucharist .... 357
This indicates the tendency to the Positive Utopia ............... 358
Positivism realises the medieval Utopia by presenting the members of the human family as issuing from a spouseless mother 358
Connection of the phases of the transition .......................................................... 359
The intermediate phase more like the first ...................................................... 359
The final phase ................................................................................................. 360
The three briefly characterized ......................................................................... 360
Second Phase. Three measures necessary ......................................................... 360
(1) The army to become a constabulary or gendarmerie ................................. 361
The artillery and navy ..................................................................................... 361
This force sufficient for external order .............................................................. 361
Also for internal .............................................................................................. 362
Character of the force ...................................................................................... 362
The transformation not practicable till the second phase ................................. 363
(2) Abandonment of Algeria ........................................................................... 364
(3) Authorisation of Trades' Unions ................................................................. 365
Two institutions (a) political. Decentralisation .............................................. 365
France to be divided into seventeen states ...................................................... 365
Schedule of the seventeen intendancies ............................................................ 366
(6) Religious. The moral formula adopted: *Live for others* ......................... 366-7
Development of Positivism during second phase ............................................ 367
Establishment of abstract fêtes. Festival of Machines ..................................... 367
But the second phase mainly concerns the doctrine ...................................... 368
Causes leading to a regeneration of public instruction ................................. 368
Positive schools established by the government .............................................. 368
There must be no monopoly .......................................................................... 369
Experience of the Polytechnic School .............................................................. 369
Open competition for the public service so far as the lower grade is concerned 369
The services most in view are those of Justice, Diplomacy, Administration .... 370
The school of most value in medicine .............................................................. 371
Measures for regenerating the medical profession ......................................... 372
Hospitals ......................................................................................................... 372
Degrees abolished and all medical corporations, nurses included .................. 372
General organisation of the Positive Schools ................................................. 373
Open to all the Western nations ...................................................................... 373
All will be able to utilise their final certificate ................................................. 374
The languages to be learnt ............................................................................. 374
A school in each of the seventeen governments .............................................. 374
The course of study ....................................................................................... 375
The professors ................................................................................................. 376
The examinations, by whom conducted ........................................................... 376
Lessons in art .................................................................................................. 377
Instruction gratuitous, care most requisite in admission .................................. 377
Two successive tests, one of admissibility, one of admission .......................... 378
Cost of these schools ...................................................................................... 378
Special professional training .......................................................................... 379
The Hospitals may be utilised for clinical instruction ..................................... 379
Practical studies ............................................................................................. 380
The Hospital .................................................................................................. 380
The public health secure under the Director-General of the Positive Schools 380
Post-mortem examinations ............................................................................. 380
Superseded by a better education ................................................................... 381
The other careers. Special institutions ............................................................. 381
(a) Technical. Veterinary school ..................................................................... 381
Its regimen ....................................................................................................... 382
(b) Scientific. School of Philology
(c) Esthetic. The Theatre
Its constitution
The second phase is not, any more than the first, organic
The successive adoption of the two mottos offers a programme rather than a solution
Skepticism not constructive
General insufficiency of the two phases shown
The moral must precede the political renovation
Third Phase. The government becomes Positivist, the governed remaining sceptical
The systematic Triumvirate
It guarantees the government being purely practical
Mutual encroachments of the two powers ended by the division of the temporal
Such division a guarantee of peace in the West
The triumvirate secures the political ascendancy of Positivism
As also the independence of the priesthood
The dictator, provisionally, installs the triumvirate
The change effected by modifying the ministerial system
Necessity of a common doctrine as the basis of political unity
The ministers must not be too numerous
The three required, condensing the existing offices
The High Priest will suggest their names
The admission of a proleterian, the only glaring anomaly in the preparatory government
It will extinguish Demagogism, and tend to regenerate the patricians
Personal recommendation of fit men
Not possible all at once to discontinue election
Its mode
The offices to be held on good behaviour
Two amendments in the original plan with their origin
Not only the triumvirate, but all really political functionaries to be Positivists
Narrowest limits of this obligation to 29 Statesmen
Disgust at the existing scepticism
On the conversion of the statesmen the anomaly which exists as to the practical virtues will disappear
Three conclusive instances of success not depending on numbers
(1) The Economists; (2) The Encyclopedists; (3) The Republicans
Hence there is no fear as to the triumph of Positivism
General course of the triumvirate. (1) Its rule of conduct
The third motto: Live without concealment
Appreciation of its bearing
Applicable to the spiritual domain, its chief value is in the temporal
Its application in detail
(2) The triumvirate's chief measure. The Intendancies become Republics
A great triumph to effect this peaceably
Necessity of the change
The Catholicism of Paris
Paris must renounce temporal domination
American independence the beginning of the movement
Extension of the process from the Colonies to Europe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE FOURTH VOLUME.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Such extension dimly foreseen at the beginning of the French Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Intendancy &amp; Republic under Triumvirs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and religious course of the final phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political advance internally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extinction of the Bourgeoisie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Lawyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regeneration of the Positivist portion of the Bourgeoisie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of bequest. Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial endowments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External policy of the Triumvirate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of Corsica and the French Colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with nations external to the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious advance, internally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of government and property; (1) government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the servants of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Property, to be placed under the guardianship of Humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle with Communism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different in town and country. Urban communism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion of the abstract worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festivals of (1) the Press, (2) the Post, (3) the Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the seven transitional festivals four permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External influence of the religious policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution of chivalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provisional committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrast between the programme here given and the first sketch in 'General View'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification of the organic transition by other nations of the West, and its extension outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The seven decisive steps equally applicable to the whole West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due subordination to the central movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy. Its contribution; (1) general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Special. The Epic of Humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the poem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its influence on the universal language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy allowed the second place. Order of the others disputed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain. Her title to the third place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain ranks after France and Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Her special contribution. The Spanish Clergy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spanish Clergy alone capable of aiding Positivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The clergy in Spanish America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They will welcome the Positivist conception of marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organic transition easy in the Iberian colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England ranks above Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of the Positive Philosophy in England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special contribution of England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The British aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If competent it may hold its power without interruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous modifications of the British patriciate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will welcome Positivism when victorious over Communism in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS OF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But it must be on the alert or it will be superseded by the proletariat and some successor of Cromwell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its proper foreign policy. Gibraltar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different relations of North and South America to the Mother-country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The chief difficulty in North America the spiritual change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Anglo-Saxon element will need the exceptional intervention of the proletariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, connected with England through Holland and Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By itself Germany offers great difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition of the Metaphysicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This class in the several countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivism must appeal in Germany to the chiefs and the masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The oppression of Italy by Germany (1854)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritually, the greatest difficulty the worship of the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Calendar scantily welcomed in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eventually it will accept the concrete and has a special aptitude for the abstract worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A festival to mark the close of the transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of the greatest dead to Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The transition in the rest of the world; a generation sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivism addresses the leading minds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The one generation that is to see the conversion of the chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion of the people the work of a second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action of Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three phases of the general transition, as of the Western</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three steps in each phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The theory of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respective parts played by Islam and Roman Catholicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monotheism of Mohammed addressed the governors, that of St. Paul the governed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical relations of the two Monotheisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey. Its incorporation with the Western system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The general transition to begin with Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding remarks on the first monotheistic phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second phase. Regeneration of the Polytheists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A transitional doctrine required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indication of this doctrine; three goddesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This concentration sufficient to develop all the philosophical aptitude of theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This systematic Trinity easily superimposed on the various Polytheisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their classification (a) India. The Brahmins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivism will begin by putting an end to British domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thus the speculative race throughout subject to the new faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) China. The active race; Buddhism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In China Positivism seconded by the practical wants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete conversion of Polytheists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The affective race. The Fetishists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their conversion considered (1) Philosophically</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) Mentally (b) Morally .......................... 450
(II) Politically ........................................... 451
Classification of the Pethichists (a) Africa .................. 451
(c) The third term, Oceania, taken next to Africa .......... 452
(b) America .................................................. 453
Modern slavery and the slave trade ......................... 453
The American archipelago to be given up to the descendants of the American slaves ...................... 453
Conclusion ..................................................... 454

**GENERAL CONCLUSION OF THE FOURTH VOLUME** .................. 455-460
Object of the volume to establish the relative unity .......... 455
In the subjective appreciation of the volume lies its value ...... 455
On what the reality of the positive conception of the future depends ........................................... 456
Humanity thus directly connected with the universal order .... 456
The result intellectually and morally .......................... 457
These results in equal conformity with the principle and the purpose of the Relative Synthesis .................. 458
The volume summed up in the inversion of the doctrine and worship ........................................... 459

**CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE WORK** ................................. 460-472
Connection of the religious construction with Madame de Vaux ........................................... 460
Conception of his whole career .................................. 460
The two phases connected by the obligation to complete the Positive unity .................. 461
The extension of Positivism to Morals not a chance result ........................................... 461
Social destination necessary for the triumph of Positivism ........................................... 462
The conviction of this triumph announced in the Preface to the Catechism .................. 463
Positivism unites the best attributes of Catholicism and Islam ........................................... 463
Positivism prefers synthetic spiritualism to analytical materialism, retrogression to anarchy .......... 464
It will relieve the chiefs from a degrading compliance .......... 464
The political leaders, but also those of science and art .......... 464
In the troubled medium it offers a rallying point to all the higher natures .................. 464
The danger of presumption met by the religion .................. 465
To be confident, certain conditions must be fulfilled .......... 465
How Positivists may show the power of their faith .................. 466
1) In private life, 2) in public life .......................... 466
The 'Emancipated' ........................................... 466
The personal efforts of the Positivists to hold their ascendency .................. 467
Only the higher natures at present satisfy the requirements of the Positive faith .................. 468
The classes from which the directing body will be drawn .......... 469
Not from the literary class ..................................... 469
We must wait for true adherents .................................. 470
No successor as yet ........................................... 470
Announcement of future works ..................................... 471

**THE FINAL INVOCATION** ......................................... 472-481
Appendix, The Library ........................................... 483-486

**GENERAL TABLE OF SUBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY** .................. 486-489
GENERAL APPENDIX.

GENERAL APPENDIX TO THE SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY
CONTAINING ALL THE EARLY ESSAYS BY THE AUTHOR IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY...

SPECIAL PREFACE

FIRST PART.
(July 1810.)

SEPARATION OF OPINIONS FROM ASPIRATIONS.
Positive political science is needed
Opinions and Aspirations are distinguishable

SECOND PART.
(April 1820.)

A BRIEF ESTIMATE OF MODERN HISTORY.
Science and Industry are destined to replace Theology and War
Decline of the Medival and growth of the Modern social systems

FIRST SERIES.
First open struggle between the Old and New society in the sixteenth century
The Religious and Political revolutions gradually prepared
Growth of the Commons
Discovery of America, Invention of Printing, and Copernican Astronomy
The 18th century
General decline of the Ancient System

SECOND SERIES.
The new society based on Science and Industry
Influence of Savans, Artists and Artisans, spontaneous not systematic; social not political
Temporal progress of the new social system under the new Leaders
Spiritual progress of the new social system under the new Leaders
Progress of the People in reference to the Temporal Power
Progress of the People in reference to the Spiritual Power
Résumé of the Second Series
General Résumé of Both Series

THIRD PART.
(May 1822.)

PLAN OF THE SCIENTIFIC OPERATIONS NECESSARY FOR REORGANISING SOCIETY.

INTRODUCTION.
Our Social Anarchy and its sources
Plan of reorganisation misconceived by Rulers and the People
Errors of Rulers . . . . 528
Errors of the People . . . . 530
Liberty of Conscience and Sovereignty of the People . . . . 531
A Constructive Doctrine both necessary and opportune . . . . 533

GENERAL VIEW.

Constitutions do not supply Social Reorganisation . . . . 536
Theory and Practice must be separated . . . . 537
Plan of Social Reorganisation . . . . 539
Scientific men and Industrial chiefs represent the new Spiritual and Temporal organisation . . . . 542
Savants must render Politics scientific . . . . 547
Law of the Three States . . . . 547
Classification of the Sciences . . . . 549

FIRST SERIES OF WORKS.

The Creation of Social Science demands that Observation should preponderate over Imagination . . . . 551
Social organisation is determined by the state of Civilisation . . . . 554
The growth of Civilisation follows Laws . . . . 555
The science of Positive Politics is essential for Social Reorganisation . . . . 558
Scientific Prevision can avert or mitigate violent Revolution . . . . 560
The Method of the Science of Positive Politics . . . . 562
Conflict of Social Systems . . . . 563
Positive Polity must be based on Observation but propagated by the aid of Imagination . . . . 566
Review of the chief efforts to found Positive Polity . . . . 568
Montesquieu . . . . 568
Condorcet . . . . 570
Condorcet's Classification of Epochs erroneous . . . . 571
Law of the Three States . . . . 572
Mathematical attempts to found the science of Positive Polity—Condorcet . . . . 577
Physiology and the science of Positive Politics—Cabanis . . . . 581
Social Physics a science based on the direct observation of the collective development of mankind . . . . 585
Social Physics, like Physiology, must advance from the general to the particular . . . . 586

FOURTH PART.

(October 1825.)

PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SCIENCES AND SAVANTS.

The Law of the Three States . . . . 590
The Classification of the Sciences . . . . 597
Social Physics needed to complete the Scientific Series . . . . 598
Social Physics hitherto unattainable, but now inevitable . . . . 600
CONTENTS OF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Physics the indispensable remedy for our mental and moral Anarchy</th>
<th>605</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Political History of Savants harmonises with the Law of the Three States</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Theocracies</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome and Catholicism</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Middle Ages</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern History of Science and Savants</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive reorganisation of Savants</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIFTH PART.

(March 1826.)

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SPIRITUAL POWER.

Confusion of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers in Antiquity | 618 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separation of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers initiated in the Middle Ages</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Modern Revolution characterised by a rejection of the Division between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The decline of the Spiritual Power the cause of International Wars in Europe</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hence also flow disorders in the Internal Organisation of each People</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mental Anarchy</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Absence of Public Morality</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social Materialism</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bureaucracy and Corruption</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spiritual Reorganisation must adapt itself to Modern Society</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education the chief function of the Spiritual Power</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The moral union of Europe and Humanity the second office of the Spiritual Power</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spiritual Power must regulate Modern Industry, as based on the Division of Labour</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and European functions of the Spiritual Power</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Faith the true basis of Activity</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual Guidance needed for personal and social Morality</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual freedom resides in the application of ascertained principles</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spiritual Power needed for Direction as well as Repression</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International relations need the guidance of the Spiritual Power</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE SIXTH AND LAST PART.

(August 1828.)

EXAMINATION OF BROUSSAIS' TREATISE ON IrrITATION.

Physiology has only lately become a Positive Science | 645 |
| Calamine and Gall on mental and moral phenomena | 645 |
| Futility of the so-called method of Internal Observation | 646 |
| Positive Pathology based on General Anatomy, Bichat and Broussais | 649 |
| Application of Positive Pathology to the theory and treatment of Madness | 651 |

INDEX TO THE FOUR VOLUMES | 655 |
SYNTHETICAL VIEW OF THE FUTURE OF MAN.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

In the two preceding volumes I have explained, in Vol. II. what the human order is in its primary constituents; in Vol. III. what has been the course which its development, broadly considered, has necessarily taken. On the basis of these two explanations, my task in this fourth volume is to construct, once for all, the stand-point from which true wisdom may embrace the whole range of human thought and action, combining for this purpose, as a last step, in Morals the two correlative aspects which science was obliged to keep provisionally distinct. But if Philosophy requires that they should be appreciated in succession, not less does Religion require that they should be habitually united, as so only can they guide our active life, whether private or public.

The fusion finds its natural place in this concluding volume, as throughout it, in order to determine man's future, I have to bring into continuous connection the statical and dynamical inquiries hitherto carried on in succession. In every conception of that future, we must in fact respect equally the general laws of man's constitution, and the great leading series of his antecedents. Lose sight of these two constant conditions, and prevision in Sociology would be inevitably defective either in coherence or in precision, and as such inadequate to fulfil its
practical purpose. When we undertake, as my eminent precursor Condorcet undertook, to base political science on history, our judgment of the past must be so far reduced to system as to enable it to reveal the future. The continuity this implies requires as the condition of its attainment that man's progress never represent aught but the development of an unchangeable order; the previous study of this order consequently presides over all historical explanations. But conversely, by a judicious fusion of the two points of view, we may judge the future with as much certainty as the past, so irresistible is the conviction inspired by a satisfactory agreement between our statical conceptions and our historical judgments; and it is in this ultimate determination of the future that we see on the one hand the principal aim of the two branches of Sociology, on the other the conclusive test of their reality.

We are in no way bound to discuss the prejudices by which, on empirical grounds, the process is rejected as inapplicable in social matters, though there is an unanimous recognition of its admissibility in the case of all other phenomena. The inconsistency only proves the non-extension as yet of the Positive spirit to the most complex order of events. The true characteristic of science in all cases is prevision, as its object at once and its test, at least in the eyes of all who recognise the subjection of all phenomena to invariable laws. This theoretical conclusion holds good in Sociology more than in any other science, as its phenomena are at once the most important and the most modifiable. Hence it was that Condorcet was led to conclude his sketch of the past with an outline of the future, and the failure of my spiritual father was solely due to the absence of a systematic view of history.

From the religious point of view, the definitive combination of the two previous volumes which this volume is intended to form, consists in the giving full effect to the supremacy in the scale of the sciences of Morals over Sociology properly so called, in obedience to the principle established in Vol. II. Ch. I. In fact, any really systematic guidance of man, even in his private conduct, is impossible without a certain determination of the future. This future depends in some degree on our own efforts, and therefore can never admit as exact a judgment as the past. But over and above the inutility of such exactness under this condition, to be efficacious our interference must adapt itself
always on one side to our nature which is unchangeable, on the other to the development of that nature through successive ages. It follows that Morals, and this is true even of practical morality, are objectively dependent on Sociology—on stational Sociology in the first place, then on dynamical—as determining the primary direction of all our tendencies without exception. If our advance is to be really positive in its character, it must rest on the theory of order and of progress equally, the one indispensable as a security against caprice, the other necessary to ensure relativity. Without the theory of order the inadequacy of our conviction of the prevailing unity would expose us to indefinite oscillations; without that of progress we should have for guidance nothing but inapplicable or vague precepts in default of any particular adaptation to the given situation.

To ensure the final and complete fusion of the two aspects of Sociology, its dynamical must, whilst retaining their own proper character, be kept in constant subordination to its stational conceptions. The necessary and systematic elimination of time in these latter in no way impairs their reality, either from the scientific, or even the practical point of view. The paramount importance we justly attach to them is due to this, that from them we draw directly our conception of that fundamental unity towards which our nature, individual and social, more and more is tending. In imagination we often mix up all the ages in order to place more vividly before us the permanent conditions of existence, witness in particular the greatest of all epic poems, the 'Divina Commedia.' The general supremacy thus accorded to Statical Sociology is peculiarly appropriate to it when dealing, as in this volume we deal, with the future, for in that future we have man in his maturity, whereas in the past we see merely the gradual and preparatory evolution of the type.

Although, however, as science or as art, Morals must always be statical rather than dynamical, yet if they are to be in the full sense of the term Positive, there must be a large admixture of the historical spirit and feeling. If deficient in this respect, they would fall short of the relativity indispensable to the reality of all our conceptions, but nowhere so indispensable as in the immediate systematic direction of our conduct. Individual existence, as national, is so influenced by the situa-
tion resulting from its history, that to regulate it as a whole we have always to modify the general conceptions of human unity by taking into account the actual stage of its development. In no other way can we form the manners and habits appropriate to each period, avoiding aberrations traceable to misconceptions of the difference of times, such aberrations being either the simple result of routine, or due to a false system. Hence it is that history remains barren, nay, often becomes misleading, for we see in it a mass of examples instead of looking for a series of preparations, in the inter-dependence of which lies their real utility.

In the preceding volume the dynamical conception is always so presented as to form the complement of the statical, on which it rests as its basis; each period, that is, is regarded as intended more fully to embody the type common to all, the type gradually, though imperfectly, evolved by its predecessors. I have now to carry on the succession of the ages—the filiation of man—so far as to determine the normal state, the advent of which is shown by the whole past to be at hand. Direct observation is here unattainable, but as a compensation we have the more complete predominance of statical ideas, and the more extensive series of historical judgments. To guard against illusion, in every step of our argument we have but to see that we are in entire accordance on the one hand with the nature of man, on the other with the sum of his antecedents. Thus doubly checked, we may, in regard to the future, arrive at conclusions as demonstrable as, though less exact than, the conclusions reached in regard to past periods; the investigation of which could not be of equal logical value from the want of a sufficient field for observation.

In accordance with the object of this concluding volume, its task is to complete the Positive doctrine and method by subjecting them, as it does quite naturally, to a treatment hitherto inadmissible, and yet the only one which can establish a satisfactory agreement between theory and practice. In it the judicious combination of statical and dynamical Sociology will define the legitimate position of time in the sum total of human conceptions. In it Morals will take their place at the head of the encyclopedic hierarchy as a direct consequence of the normal convergence of all positive theories towards the regulation of the conduct of nations and individuals.
This, the definitive constitution of the human Synthesis, may with advantage be condensed in a form suggested by its inevitable agreement with the constitution of the human brain. Whilst ever asserting the complete supremacy of feeling, I have been compelled hitherto to concentrate the attention mainly on intellect and action as the dominant sociological forces. But with the growth of these beyond dispute, comes the period for their taking their true place in the human system, an ultimate destination which leads to the explicit recognition of the preponderance of feeling as the independent domain of morals.

After indicating the general character of this fourth volume as devoted to the direct construction of the Positive religion; a statement of the object and connection of its five chapters is required for the completeness of this introduction.

Taken together, their ultimate object is to lay the foundations for a policy capable of directing on system the unsystematic advance of each people towards the normal state, the time for which, as I have shown, is come. But the direct construction of this policy must be reserved for the last chapter, as it requires for its basis a sketch of the human order more complete at once, and more exact than the primary outline drawn in our social statics. In its larger half the volume deals with this capital operation, an operation which is of itself the inauguration of the state it describes; for what is the maturity of the race but its hitherto spontaneous action reduced to system? A satisfactory conception of the general future of Humanity thus attained, the proximate phase of that future will become quite intelligible, and as such will make it clear what in detail is to be the course of the transitional period of organisation.

Examine these two consecutive operations, and it will appear that the essence of the one is the exposition of the definitive religion, of the other its application in the present. So real and so complete is the Positive synthesis, that its true exposition involves the definite presentation of the adult age of Humanity, just as the indispensable preparation for that synthesis represents its age of initiation.

For a satisfactory exposition of the religion of Humanity, the guide of our maturity under all aspects, we need first to grasp it as a whole, then to survey each of its essential constituents. Hence the first chapter establishes directly the
fundamental theory of the Great Being, and as a consequence gives a general view of man's normal existence. Proceeding from this synthetical basis, we have in the second chapter the system of worship, in the third that of the doctrine, in the fourth that of the life, thus regulating the three elements of our nature, feeling, intellect, and activity. Then in the fifth and last chapter we intercalate the present between the future and the past, in order to close the Western Revolution, and in order to avoid its recurrence or reproduction in the rest of the world. So the volume as a whole, condensed in a general conclusion, on which follows the conclusion of the whole work, is destined to inaugurate definitively the Positive Religion as a consequence of its direct exposition of that religion, triumphantly applied to practice.

Such a statement is for the present sufficient to produce the sense that the fourth volume is adapted to fuse and to complete the leading conceptions of the three others, in accordance with the spirit of the 'General View.' In it my religious construction and the philosophy on which it rests as its foundation, will be at once marked off from one another by the definitive transfer to Morals of the encyclopaedic primacy originally assigned to Sociology in the proper sense of the term. Sociocracy, the ultimate, must thus be brought into connection with Theocracy, the initial stage of the race, and closes the period of transition which separates the two, a period of ever deepening revolution, the leading characteristic of which has been the growing tendency of intellect to rebel against feeling.

The paramount position thus irreversibly assigned to Morals issues in the subjection of man's life at length to a real and complete discipline, a discipline in constant harmony with his true wants. The relative character distinctive of that discipline does not make it less regular; far otherwise, it gives it strength and vigour, as it eliminates caprice as well as all absolute tendencies by allowing for the just influence of time, by making, that is, our dynamical conceptions ultimately react on our statical principles. Man's emotional nature wears an appearance of unchangeability, but this is but an appearance; it is inevitably subject to constant modifications, slower it may be, but as regular as those of his intellect and his activity, the progress of which again, it should be remembered, bears upon
the means which feeling employs. The creation of Positive
Ethics, the work of this volume, will as a natural consequence
bring into relief the truth, that throughout the phenomena of
human life, equally as with all other phenomena, movement
and existence are radically at one. The natural result of
making the emotional nature finally paramount will be to es-
tablish a complete agreement between theory and practice, as
the impulse given by either concurs with that simultaneously
derived from the other, both together aiding us in our system-
atic conception of the normal state and the last phase of the
transition. The indispensable convergence of the two will
appear in this volume to be a necessary deduction from our
primary principle, that in all cases considerations of progress
are subordinate to those of order. This law applies equally to
the art and science of Morals; we have only to extend to the
improvements of our own creation a relation originally mani-
fested in changes over which we had no control.

In my judgment of the future and the present, I need not
aim at a greater degree of exactness than that attainable in the
preceding volumes in the treatment respectively of order and
progress. Though merely approximative, it is sufficient for
any immediate want. When succeeding generations come to
need more detailed rules, they will draw them from moral
science by the aid of an advance in sociological science, such
advance at times involving a corresponding progress in Biology,
perhaps even in Cosmology.
CHAPTER I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL THEORY, THE THEORY OF THE GREAT BEING;
WHENCE A CONSEQUENT OF THE RELIGION OF THE RACE AND
OF ITS EXISTENCE IN THE NORMAL STATE.

Its foundations laid in Social Statics, the Positive religion has
already irrevocably taken possession of the Past in its whole
range, which never was within the cognisance of the earlier
and absolute synthesis. As a sequel of this decisive step the
priesthood of Humanity must now take possession of the Future
also, that it may impart to the Present the combined impulse
of its predecessors and its successors. It will then have com-
pleted its attributions by the addition of a new and equally
characteristic function—the function of the prophet—to its
primary office of judge, and so complete, it will soon overcome
the existing anarchy, unprecedented though it be, for it will
bring to bear on that object in permanent combination the
whole intellectual and moral powers of man.

The spiritual power of the West in its three social attri-
butes of counsel, consecration, and regulation has more and
more fallen into desuetude since the end of the Middle Ages,
by virtue of the gradual downfall of the provisional beliefs.
Raised to new life by the definitive belief, its future course will
be one of unceasing and efficient action. The necessity of its
revival is now submitted to the most unambiguous of tests,
viz. its exclusive competence to thoroughly reconcile order and
progress.

For an adequate estimate of the difficulty of this task, we
must place ourselves at the historical point of view, as we are
enabled to do by the preceding volume. The past is divisible
into two great periods: the one, common in its essential features
to all nations, includes Fetishism and Theocracy; the other,
peculiar to the Western nations, effects as a spontaneous pro-
cess the transition from Theocracy to Sociocracy. Now the two
periods, as successive stages of the education of the race, repre-
sent the one, order, the other, progress; and it is the existing
discord between order and progress that expresses in its latest
form the inevitable opposition of the East and the West. For
the order compatible with man's initiation, taken as a whole,
was really alone attained under the theocratic organisation, in
which we have the true source of the opinions which in many
respects still govern the Western mind. On the other hand,
all the progress in speculation, in action, and in affection made
by the West during the last thirty centuries has been more and
more revolutionary in its character, as is most strikingly shown
in the system of election and the impairment of the sense of
continuity. If the close of the Middle Ages is always to be
taken as marking the beginning of the Western revolution, it
is so taken only because that is the epoch at which the move-
ment passed into anarchy, on the exhaustion of Catholicism,
the latest form of the provisional synthesis. But the three
partial evolutions which succeeded one another previously had
been in no real sense organic, save as regarded one particular
aspect of our nature, to the sacrifice of the other two; none of
the three could offer the peculiar completeness which attached
to the discipline of Theocracy.

The Initiation of the race, then, under the auspices of the
theological synthesis, first establishes order, but an order which
has an increasing tendency to become retrograde, sanctioning,
though unable to attain, entire fixity; then progress, but a
progress which grew more and more revolutionary, a progress
incompatible with unity. It was not till the latest phase of
modern anarchy that the true principle of the movement of
society could take a definite form and statement, the entire
completion of the training process being the necessary condition
of such statement. Hence its first proclamation had a ten-
dency to sanction an indefinite agitation more alien to human
nature, whether in the individual or in the society, than the
stagnation of Theocracy. If this tendency were to remain un-
checked, it would seem that in the future the two necessities
of Humanity, order and progress, far from combining, would
but stand in more systematic opposition, and so there would be
renewed, in an aggravated form, the spontaneous divergence
manifested in the past. Whilst retrograde theologians are
alarmed at the thought that nothing short of miracle can
PREVENT the entire dissolution of society, the metaphysicians who advocate progress justify their opponents' alarm by their aspirations, for the practical issue of those aspirations would be the overthrow of all the institutions on which society ultimately rests.

In this state of things, to calm the blind anxiety of the former whilst correcting the vague hopes of the latter, what is needed is a true picture of the future of Humanity. The priesthood of Positivism, connecting directly Sociocracy and Theocracy, will represent the intervening period of transition as inevitable in the West, and as issuing finally in the modification and completion of the original conception of order by the substitution of a relative for an absolute order. The change is indispensable, and in no way implies a lower estimate of order; on the contrary, it consolidates and extends the power of the principle of organisation, as a consequence of duly subordinating movement to existence. This systematic conception of the human order tends to make it more complete and more stable, as more in conformity with our whole nature. Unquestionably the future will witness no return of the series of a stagnant order, a dispersive transition, and as the latest step in such transition, an oscillation between retrogression and anarchy. What it will see is the continuous development of a relative synthesis, such development, even when the result of man's conscious efforts, consisting essentially in the perfecting the unity which constitutes the synthesis. Whilst, however, we allow for systematic modifications of order, there must be none of the abrupt changes which were fated throughout history to be the distinctive features of the second period of the education of mankind.

The great task of the manhood of the race being the discipline of the powers developed in its period of preparation, there is a natural connection between our ultimate condition and the complete series of its antecedents. Each singly, looked on as a necessary step in our advance, claims and deserves our gratitude and veneration, a gratitude and veneration which will deepen as our estimate rises of the peculiar difficulties attaching to an evolution which had no guide but experience. Each singly offers more than this, it offers a special programme which, transitory in its original form, is eternal in its substance. Where in the past there was succession, in the future there
must be co-existence, for all the social states of the past, though apparently contradictory, answered to so many wants or tendencies of human nature, and as such must be susceptible of harmony. So we verify the complete and exclusive competence of the Positive religion by virtue of its relative character for the ultimate regeneration of Humanity, to which all our aspirations will converge, each having lost the peculiar features which for the time placed it in opposition with the others.

This affinity of Positivism for all earlier states, an affinity implied in its idea, has been already conclusively shown in the preceding volume, especially in reference to the earliest of all, Fetishism. But the full expansion of the idea belongs to our general survey of the future, for no religion could gain universal acceptance in that future unless able to sanction in a certain degree the various tendencies of the past.

At present I have to show the dependence of all these programmes, all alike unsystematic, on the programme of the theocratic period, the Theocracy alone being in its way complete and coherent.

True completeness constitutes the main value, as it constitutes the great difficulty of the discipline of man; if it do not extend to our whole nature, it must ever be precarious as well as inadequate. For thirty centuries the priestly castes of China, and still more of India, have been watching our Western transition; to them it must appear mere agitation, as puerile as it is tempestuous, with nothing to harmonise its different phases but their common inroad upon unity. But on the advent of Positivism, they will soon come to feel that the series of partial evolutions has issued in the most complete and most stable order, offering to the East an acceptable union with the West, the concert of the race for the development of all the attributes of Humanity.

In its systematic constitution of this ultimate state, the definitive re-introduction of the basic formula of the Theocracy is of itself conclusive evidence of the complete agreement of the sociocratic and theocratic priesthoods. To know in order to improve, the motto of our primeval ancestors, will equally, with our remotest posterity, be the expression habitually used to indicate the bounden duty of the intellect to devote itself continuously to the service of society. The intervening period
of transition from one to the other regime has for result the perfecting the formula, by inserting prevision between knowledge and action, as in the absence of this link the agreement between the extremes could not but rest on merely empirical grounds, until the idea of law triumphed over that of will. But the Western mind has been so trained by its more recent education to look upon prevision as the result of theory and the basis of action, that the intermediate term may be suppressed in the formula, provided that we are ever ready to replace it. By this adherence to its original form, we render it more apt to express the really important combination, making it a better definition of true wisdom without diverting the attention in ordinary cases to a progression which is universally admitted.

To appreciate at its true value the indispensable harmony of the two priesthoods, we must extend it so as to embrace their instinctive agreement as to what is the most important sphere of man’s effort, of his intellectual no less than his practical effort. Sociocracy adopts definitively the great fundamental tendency of Theocracy to claim for Morals the first place, equally as science and as art. Whilst the theory of human nature controls both in method and doctrine the whole encyclopaedic hierarchy, this, the highest branch of study, is in turn controlled by the directly practical nature of its object.

Naturally then the ultimate Synthesis is destined to consolidate and develop the initial in all its leading features, and it will enable us to form a juster estimate of the merit and difficulty of that effort, even whilst establishing an unity of a completer, purer, and more stable kind.

More unmistakable still is the natural affinity of Positivism for the characteristics respectively of the three periods of transition, each of which, succeeding its predecessor by a necessary law, was the direct source of a distinct contribution to the solution of the Western problem.

Although our final state will subordinate the intellect to the heart more wisely than any other could, it will offer a more favourable field for the true culture of man’s mental powers than was possible under the undue predominance accorded to the intellect in the Greek evolution. An integral constituent of Positive life, as the normal complement of happiness and improvement, art will evoke purer and more universal
sympathies than it could do when there was a tendency to sacrifice to it feeling and activity. As it has become the doctrinal basis of religion, science, no longer separable from philosophy, will, as disciplined by Sociocracy, enter on wider fields, and acquire a greater power than it could acquire under the undisciplined anarchy which, in the course of events, replaced the oppressive yoke of Theocracy.

In the future, Humanity will stamp with a special sanction the two characteristics of the social life of Rome: its decided preference of action to speculation, and its constant subordination of private to public life. Drawing out the naturally collective character of human activity, so long of necessity individual, the adult age of the race will embody firmly both these conditions, which have lost but too much during its adolescence, from the inability of Catholicism to accept them. Whilst deeply conscious of the superiority of the industrial to the military life, Positivist nations will ever recognise that war had great moral and political utility as a preparation, being as it was the only spontaneous type of temporal organisation.

Catholicism was ungrateful to its Greek and Roman antecedents, but the regenerate West, whilst not deterred by this action of Catholicism from paying habitual honour to our intellectual and social progenitors, will know how to reconcile such honour with due reverence for the Middle Ages. Although the medieaval or affective transition could offer no real discipline for our powers, either of speculation or action, yet from the mere fact that it inherited those powers in an advanced state of cultivation, it was able to give a better form to the programme of man’s action than that of the earlier theocracy. The Positivist, equally with the Middle-Age construction, only more directly and more unrestrainedly, asserts the supremacy of feeling, but without unduly hampering the intellect or activity, and as a natural result of its assertion vindicates the wisdom of Catholicism and the soundness of the feudal instinct.

The relativity, which is its characteristic, enables the final religion fully to recognise the advantages accruing to the race during the two periods of its childhood, from the fusion of the spiritual and temporal powers effected first by the priests, then by the military class. Not the less will it deeply honour the triumphant effort of its adolescence to establish the separation
of the two as their normal relation. The heart and the intellect concur in this conciliatory judgment as indispensable to the true love or the true understanding of the Great Being, the condition of such love or understanding being the right appreciation of the several periods of unsystematic preparation which must precede its systematic creation.

Impelled by the same relativity, the Western world will justly extend its gratitude to the singular period of anarchy which, in the course of events, followed on the above series of transitions of a partially organic character. Ultimately, no doubt, the whole education of the race in its entirety is the basis of settlement, but immediately, the settlement must issue from the double movement of destruction and construction; from the negative as well as the positive operation peculiar to the last five centuries. The true religion has to look for its adherents mainly to the conservative party; but for its origin, it could take its rise nowhere but in the revolutionary camp; there its first germs found a due welcome as heralding the satisfaction of an imperious want, the termination of the revolutionary movement.

In this introductory recapitulation of the points of affinity between the future and each of the great constituent phases of the past, there seems at first sight an omission; it does not include, that is, the regime adapted to the infancy of mankind. The readers of the third volume, however, must have felt that this solitary exception, far from indicating less sympathy between Positivism and Fetishism, is on the contrary a consequence of their closer connection. The various forms of Theologism have wholly to disappear, leaving no other traces as a rule but the perpetual celebration of the services they rendered in their day; hence the obligation to recall their several contributions, so indispensable as steps in the preparation of the ultimate state. Fetishism, on the other hand, alone of the series of educational states, by virtue of its unequalled spontaneity, is destined to incorporation with Positivism, and the passage from the one to the other might be immediate. I was justified then in reserving any indication of this enduring affinity for the occasions which will naturally arise in the course of the volume for its exposition in detail.

Summing up the five antecedent comparisons, Sociocracy will combine the synthetic power of the Theocracy with the
threefold stimulus derived from the three successive periods of partial and transitional organisation, and the result of the combination will be the carrying out of the true programme of the revolution, which it is its task to close. In this way all the stages of the preparatory life of man, all without exception, contribute to inaugurate the definitive form of his existence. This convergence of all the epochs of the past to the future is but a consequence of the fact that the problem for the race has always been in substance one and the same: viz. to constitute as far as possible the general unity of our nature for the individual and the society. Not to mention that each fresh approximation to such an end necessarily rested on the succession of previous steps, the entire series is required when we come to the special question of the solution, the systematic solution, of the problem, for otherwise it were impossible to state it aright. We may add that the several programmes of the past all admit of combination, provided that we begin by disengaging them from the perishable forms which alone rendered them conflicting.

Such a fusion of the normal state with the whole of the existence which has prepared it, offers us at once the strongest guarantee for the stability of the future, and the best guide in determining its general character. As the philosophy of history rests beyond dispute upon social Statics, these are henceforth its most conclusive summary. For there can be no surer mode of gaining a right conception of the conditions of unity than by tracing it in the consecutive phases of its natural development. Hence the dependence of the future on the past, though not of our choice, is so far from an obstacle to our meditations on the process of reconstruction, that without it they could not be sound and fruitful. By its aid we may avoid, in regard to them, any Utopian speculation, or retrace our steps if we have fallen into one, and this even on the secondary points on which the series of our antecedents does not throw light enough to supersede the necessity of some additional deductions.

Nor on any other method could we so present the future as that its conception, accepted by all the Western nations in the first place, then meeting, as it is bound to do, the wants of the less advanced portions of mankind, should gradually, by its free adoption, inaugurate the religion of Humanity. One Utopia after another has, during the last three centuries, claimed the
guidance of the movement towards definitive reorganisation, none has ever united in real conviction two human souls. Their common failure is simply due to their always having attempted to conceive the future independently, and not as deduced from the past as a whole, a conception beyond our grasp prior to the rise of Positivism. Thus isolated, prophecy was inevitably as barren as it was chimerical when dealing with phenomena, the complex nature of which involves the highest difficulty for the imagination, even with all the aid derived from observation. In Biology we can hardly imagine a completely new organism free from all incompatibilities. In Sociology the difficulty is naturally much greater; there the freest dreams have ever fallen short of actual changes, the most striking instance being that of slavery. Yet the persistent recurrence in recent times of Utopias, undeterred by their inevitable failure, was a sign that the time was approaching for satisfying the instinct of continuity which has been characteristic of the intellect of Western Europe ever since its abandonment of a heavenly for an earthly future.

We are thus led to recognise in the Positive Religion two properties, the one intellectual, the other moral, standing in close relation to one another, and in their consequences forming a clue to the leading conceptions of the present volume. These properties are, on the one hand, the perfecting the constitution of our minds by extending prevision to all phenomena without exception; on the other hand, the basing the unity of our emotional nature on the innate existence of the sympathetic instincts. The two attributes are inherent in true Positivity, and follow on the simultaneous substitution of a demonstrable faith for belief in the supernatural, of pacific industry for existence founded upon war.

It were a waste of time here to prove, that to determine the future by the past is everywhere the note of a really rational method, as establishing the true connection between speculation and action. During the last three centuries science has satisfactorily exhibited this power, its conclusive test, while industry has, as a natural result, popularised the conception. But the most powerful minds dare not as yet apply it in its most important sphere, owing to their not substituting in that sphere laws for causes.

None the less is it to social and moral phenomena more
than others, that rational prevision is applicable, seeing that continuity is the distinctive characteristic of sociological conceptions, and it is to them that, objectively, our thoughts on Morals must be subordinated.

It follows that the future of Humanity offers the best field for the intellect as for the activity of man. To determine that future, and to inaugurate it,—for both equally we need the same principle of historical filiation, the recognition of the necessary dependence of the future on the past in which it has its roots, and from which it derives its guidance. The inductions of dynamical require, it is true, in all cases to be verified by comparing them with the deductions of statical sociology, but they are our sole immediate means for the right construction of that synoptical survey of man's future on which alone we can henceforward consent to lean.

The achievement of this construction will at no distant period ensure the universal triumph of the Positive religion, putting an end at once to agitation and stagnation, both equally noxious—both equally empirical. Theology and Metaphysics, from a sense of their common incompetence as regards this highest domain of human thought, will doubtless unite with the distinct object of resisting the solution offered by Positivism. Their ineffectual protest will but serve to display more clearly its exclusive competence to satisfy the chief want of modern reason.

The determination of the future, adapted as it is to form a rallying point for man's instinctive aspirations and his philosophic tendencies, is the foundation for the direct inauguration of the religion of Humanity as the natural sequel of this work. The result must be the definitive establishment of the true Synthesis, since all sound speculations will converge to regulate the general action of the Western nations. Moral science, thus tested and found able to stand the test, will be supreme from the subjective, dependent from the objective, point of view, and the combination of the two constitutes it the immutable basis of our unity, both in theory and practice.

Allowing its just importance to this intellectual attribute of Positivism, we must attach superior value even intellectually to the moral attribute which completes it, and this on the ground of its greater influence on the creation of the true Synthesis. For this very reason Theology and Metaphysics reject...
instinctive altruism more unreservedly than they reject sociological prevision. The innateness of the benevolent instincts and the earth’s motion are the most important results of modern science, as laying the essential bases, the one the subjective, the other the objective, of true relativity. The two prepared the way for Positivism, but had to wait for its advent for their due influence on man’s whole existence. Dimly seen, each in its own way, at the very beginning of our advance, they could not emerge into full light till Monotheism had lost its power.

Standing in direct connection with the fundamental principle of the Positive synthesis, the doctrine of innate altruism alone enables us to establish a systematic morality, which, by virtue of its subordination objectively to Sociology, may take the presidency, subjectively, of the encyclopedic hierarchy. Before the establishment of this doctrine, in fact, Morals were universally recognised as supreme, but that they were so was due to the wisdom of the priesthood; their supremacy was an empirical truth not able to stand discussion. Theoricians aimed at placing philosophy, practical men politics, above Morals, as a branch of study which seemed limited to the individual, the social point of view being as yet inaccessible. If the selfless instincts are not part of man’s nature the problem of man’s life is insoluble, and is not even susceptible of any synthetical statement. Unity from within, subjective unity, thus unattainable by man in consequence of the antagonism between the individual and the species, philosophy would have perpetually oscillated between the various attempts at an objective systematisation. Over and above, then, its value as an affective, the innateness of our sympathies has great importance as an intellectual, conclusion, as indispensable to any abstract conception of social existence. But by virtue of this very connection, its triumphant demonstration, hampered as it was, moreover, by the obstacles offered by theological beliefs and metaphysical hypotheses, naturally coincided with the definitive advent of Sociology.

To give its full signification to this indispensable connection we must trace it even in social dynamics, though it may appear applicable solely in statics. It is easy to see that, were it not so traced, we could not form the practical scale of man’s progress, which, originally material, becomes subsequently in-
intellectual, and finally moral; for we should, in regard to it, be simply coordinating means without taking account of the end. Further, on the same hypothesis, any philosophical theory of the whole evolution of the race would also become impossible, from the want of any natural condensation. The preceding volume proves to our satisfaction that progress, in reference to the affections, whilst not amenable to any direct impulse, is the resultant, the necessary resultant, of the two simultaneous movements of the intellect and the activity. Had the advance of the two no effect in modifying feeling, it could never be more than a preparatory step, and as such could not be brought under any really comprehensive law. This necessary adaptation of the emotional changes, to be the condensed expression of the whole human evolution, cannot be a property of egoism; it resides exclusively in altruism, for it is altruism alone which enables us to represent the entire movement by the gradual advance towards ascendency of the social feelings. Thus it is that in the social instincts we find the source of order and the aim of progress, and this as a consequence of their non-contact with the external world, their dependent position making it, however, more difficult to estimate them, veiled as they are by the dominion of egoism.

Adopting this conclusion, the two leading attributes, moral and intellectual, of complete positivity are henceforth to be held inseparable. So long as social phenomena are not brought within the scope of scientific prevision, the innateness of the benevolent instincts cannot be demonstrated so conclusively as to overcame the repugnance of theologians and the sophisms of metaphysicians. But conversely, the past as a whole remains unintelligible if in its study we have not the guidance afforded by a full conviction of the innateness of these instincts, they alone rendering collective existence a possibility. In their origin a protest against an oppressive system, the two doctrines will now preside at the inauguration of the second period of man's existence, nor could we hope for a better aid at its opening. But, allowing this, it is still for the peaceful development of our maturity that is reserved the main growth of the two attributes, when all the struggles of preparation and installation finally over, the normal powers alone come into view.

Still, in reference to the two, we must not go too far in
claiming them as exclusive characteristics of the Positive state, as that might clash with what has been previously said of the general connection of the second life of the race with its first. It is only since its inevitable decline that the older Synthesis has been really adverse to these attributes. In its period of power it naturally lent encouragement to their spontaneous growth, which had been impossible without it. Firstly, there was no incompatibility between Fetishism and scientific prevision, the rudiments of which we trace in regard to celestial phenomena; still less was there such incompatibility in regard to the direct recognition of the value of the sympathetic instincts. And although Theologism proved less favourable, yet as Polytheism it encouraged both attributes on a decisive scale. By the extension of divination, the priestly, as the military, period of antiquity fostered the practice of prevision in the only form admissible under the then conditions of intelligence and action. Altruism could not receive its due recognition in the polytheistic Synthesis, but the vague presentation of it which that Synthesis allowed, was sufficient to extract their beneficial effects from the impulses of practical life, so long as the fusion of the two powers concentrated man's attention upon his earthly existence.

Passing to Monotheism, it is its doctrine alone that is responsible for its more marked opposition to these associate attributes, and the defects in that doctrine were long counter-balanced by the wisdom of its priesthood and the influences of the social state. In the name of its doctrine, Catholicism, the religion of our adolescence, proscribed the divination appropriate to our childhood, but could not substitute prevision, as that was reserved for our adult age, and the proscription would have seriously compromised an indispensable branch of mental cultivation had not some fortunate inconsistencies tempered the compression. Astrology, anterior in time and superior in value to Theologism, in defiance of the official belief, was the source of a philosophical impulse which saved our tendency to look forward from irreparable disuse, and gained the victory over the competing power of revelation. As for altruism, the monotheistic period of transition found in its system of life the corrective of its doctrinal antagonism. Its purely objective immortality gave, it is true, in principle the predominance to absolute egoism, but the result, in a social point of view, of the
doctrine was the separation, however imperfect, of the spiritual and temporal power, and the consequence of that separation was, throughout the whole Western world, the culture—the indirect it may be, yet the decisive culture—of our moral nature. The sympathetic portion of our nature was the supreme province of the divine power, and the defective theory of human nature was hereby corrected as far as it could be. Moreover, as any moral discipline whatever tends to second the spontaneous growth of the benevolent inclinations, they really found the greatest encouragement under the empire of the beliefs which were least disposed to admit their existence.

Practically, then, the adverse attitude of the older Syntheses to the two attributes of Positivism must be limited to the decline of Monotheism during the Western revolution, when the priesthood had lost its power of correcting the doctrine. But the peculiar circumstances of that period gave the ascendency to an intellectual and practical movement, which, in spite of the empiricism and egoism that defaced it, led directly to the growth of prevision in science and of innate altruism in morals. The strongest condemnation of the reaction attempted in the name of order is its futile protest against this fuller acceptance of the two doctrines, an acceptance ever tending towards a complete systematisation.

The doctrine of historical filiation, the inevitable dependence, that is, of the ultimate solution on the whole of the preparatory state of human life, were incompletely stated if in its consideration we neglected the important point of the formation, the instinctive formation of the habits, nay, even of the principle adapted to the maturity of mankind.

The most difficult point for Positivism in its effort to reorganise is to secure in the minds of men the continuous development of the subjective existence. Each generation as it passes must ever feel itself by virtue of that existence placed between the sum of the generations that have preceded it, and of those which are to follow it, so as to give full effect to that basic continuity in the name of which it obeys the past and serves the future. We shall be bound to keep up an intercourse with the dead, and even with those yet unborn, more uninterrupted though less intimate than our intercourse with our contemporaries. We cannot avoid the difficulty of this requirement, and yet it were too great for us were it not
for the previous theological training, which yet had no eye to this capital result. Fetishism gave life to all around us, but in Fetishism we were never in contact with any but actually living, though in many cases absent, beings. It was during the long period of Theologism that we gained the habit of living in the presence of purely ideal beings, in whom, however, none the less was our whole destiny bound up. And although the rise and growth of this habit—of this subjective life—were necessarily due in larger proportion to Polytheism, it was Monotheism which organised it provisionally into a system, and by so doing in some degree made amends for the diminution of intensity it produced.

Lastly, when we come to consider the fundamental conception of the new Synthesis, it is not difficult to see, in the light of the last volume, a distinct preparation of it running through the whole past. To minds influenced by the existing anarchy, every collective being tends to present itself as a mere entity, yet none the less is it true that no coherence, no dignity have been or are possible for the individual unless in subordination to some larger and composite existence. It is only in dependence on some such existence that we can satisfy our desire to perpetuate this transitory life, for we thus link it to an imperishable being. This, the direct mode of satisfaction, must be held to have long preceded the indirect mode due to the fictions of Theology, since it dates from Fetishism, being a consequence of the creation by Fetishism of the Family. This primal solution was never superseded by the promises of supernatural religion, for its promises, though increasing in attractiveness, appealed exclusively to man's selfish instincts. Unconsciously he was constantly drawn on by his unselfish affections to extend his relations, so the better to secure a subjective immortality. Prior to the impulse given by Monotheism towards absolute isolation as the true aim of each individual, Polytheism in both its forms, sacerdotal and military, had already definitively created the Country, and in practice the influence of the idea habitually overbore that of the monotheistic theory.

The Family and the Country, these are the two collective beings which in due succession were to lead by a natural process to the conception and the feeling of Humanity, which may be looked on as the common country or the universal
of the individual effort masks the influence of the collective, the sublimity of the results of that effort removes the mask, as is evidenced by the incomparable poem in which Dante, under the stimulus of the Middle Ages, has unconsciously embodied the whole system of Catholicism. It is a consequence of the indivisibility which characterises human nature that each particular proof of the highest Unity, Humanity, strengthens all the others, and might logically serve in lieu of them, but that it is wiser to multiply demonstrations inseparably bound up with our noblest emotions. All the current sophisms, of anarchical or retrograde origin, against the accumulating evidence of the existence of Humanity, are inherently self-contradictory, in that the very language in which the blasphemy finds vent is of all human constructions the most social. And no protest has yet been consequent enough to dare to deny also the existence of the Family or the Country, both equally with Humanity, by their nature composite beings, composite whether we regard coexistence or succession, only more limited in extent, and so facilitating our perception of co-operation.

That the conception of Humanity and the feelings it evokes are useful—this is a point which the individualist, be he theologian or metaphysician, can hardly dispute as he disputes their reality. The more sincere among them do not dispute it; they limit themselves to asserting the superiority of their Synthesis as regards man’s interests in the other world, leaving this world to the wise guidance of Positivism, which accepts the arrangement. Impracticable, so long as the government of the world we know necessarily vested in theologians of some denomination or other, this final settlement is inevitable when rivals appear, avowing a contemptuous indifference to heaven, and concentrating with dignity their interest upon earth. Then it is at once generally felt, that to govern the world we require on the one hand the knowledge of its laws, on the other, a real interest in its destinies. Exiles in a world governed by unintelligible caprice,—all who so look on themselves are by that very fact incapable of swaying it, for they can as little imagine its future as they can interpret its past. But the exclusive competence of the Positivist conception for the direction of human affairs may be best shown by reference to the question of universality, a question distinctly broached twenty
guidance of the movement towards definitive reorganisation, none has ever united in real conviction two human souls. Their common failure is simply due to their always having attempted to conceive the future independently, and not as deduced from the past as a whole, a conception beyond our grasp prior to the rise of Positivism. Thus isolated, prophecy was inevitably as barren as it was chimerical when dealing with phenomena, the complex nature of which involves the highest difficulty for the imagination, even with all the aid derived from observation. In Biology we can hardly imagine a completely new organism free from all incompatibilities. In Sociology the difficulty is naturally much greater; there the freest dreams have ever fallen short of actual changes, the most striking instance being that of slavery. Yet the persistent recurrence in recent times of Utopias, undeterred by their inevitable failure, was a sign that the time was approaching for satisfying the instinct of continuity which has been characteristic of the intellect of Western Europe ever since its abandonment of a heavenly for an earthly future.

We are thus led to recognise in the Positive Religion two properties, the one intellectual, the other moral, standing in close relation to one another, and in their consequences forming a clue to the leading conceptions of the present volume. These properties are, on the one hand, the perfecting the constitution of our minds by extending prevision to all phenomena without exception; on the other hand, the basing the unity of our emotional nature on the innate existence of the sympathetic instincts. The two attributes are inherent in true Positivity, and follow on the simultaneous substitution of a demonstrable faith for belief in the supernatural, of pacific industry for existence founded upon war.

It were a waste of time here to prove, that to determine the future by the past is everywhere the note of a really rational method, as establishing the true connection between speculation and action. During the last three centuries science has satisfactorily exhibited this power, its conclusive test, while industry has, as a natural result, popularised the conception. But the most powerful minds dare not as yet apply it in its most important sphere, owing to their not substituting in that sphere laws for causes.

None the less is it to social and moral phenomena more
revolution, the twofold movement of destruction and reconstruction threw up successively the germs from which immediately sprang the systematic conception of the Great Being.

This capital advance, marking as it did the point at which the intellect at length overtook the feeling of man, was due to the undesigned concurrence of three general propositions, enunciated respectively by Pascal, Leibnitz, and Condorcet. Although originating solely in the scientific evolution, the first was an adequate expression of the convergence of the whole past towards the present, as it likened the development of the race to that of an individual. The second perfected the inchoate notion of the progression which concerns man, by making the future depend on the present. The two together formed the introduction to the third, the logical conclusion from which is the direct conception of Humanity, for it conceives of the species as one single people. The three are the immediate precursors of the definitive systematisation reserved for me, the systematisation in which one and the same principle is to serve as the condensed expression of the feelings, thoughts, and actions peculiar to Humanity.

The Great Being is the whole constituted by the beings, past, future, and present, which co-operate willingly in perfecting the order of the world. Every gregarious animal race has a natural tendency to such co-operation. But it is only the paramount race on each planet that can attain unity as a race, for its ascent to power necessarily checks that of the lower animals. This justifies, in our systematic definition of the composite being, our omitting its peculiar species. On the other hand, the spontaneity of the co-operation and its external end are clearly indispensable conditions, if it is to be consistent and permanent. Eliminating, then, what may be understood without indistinctness, we confine our definition of the Great Being to: the continuous whole formed by the beings which converge. In this condensed form I shall often make implicit use of the definition, leaving it to the reader to reintegrate the terms suppressed.

Starting from this definition, the theory of the Great Being resolves itself into (1) its constitution, (2) its position, (3) its destination.

And first for its constitution. The great point is to distinguish between the peculiar constituent elements, immediate
centuries ago, but not answered. It awaits its answer from Humanity, the older Synthesis having evidently failed.

It were needless to dwell longer on these two general properties of reality and utility, they will come out more and more clearly as we proceed. Before proceeding, however, to the direct statement of the theory of the Great Being, I must here pass in review, in regular order, the germs of that conception. It is of importance, in the case of this basic principle, to bring out with more than usual distinctness the filiation of ideas; a point always to be attended to in synthetical conceptions.

The fact of man's living in society led, at an early period, Feeling to a rudimentary conception, without any rational basis, of Humanity. Pure Fetishism was unable, it is true, to get beyond the family, but within that sphere it gave distinct expression to continuity, primarily in reference to the coming generation, but extending it subsequently to the preceding, a progress dating from the institution of the Elders. But it was more especially civic existence, in which alone there could be a satisfactory development of the intellect and activity, which originated the tendency, inherent in every human society, to consider itself the nucleus of Humanity. Polytheism—Conservative Polytheism—gave a direct encouragement to this aspiration after universality by the comprehensiveness of its synthesis. The intellectual Polytheism called out the esthetic and scientific powers of man, an implicit foreshadowing of the general convergence of his efforts. The social Polytheism awoke a sense, never again to be lost, of this convergence of the Race, by its successful organisation, under the only form then practically admissible, of collective action. The last step was taken, and the course of preparation was complete, when Monotheism formed a spiritual union between a number of nations politically independent.

In spite of the anarchy of post-Catholic times, this general result of the education of mankind tended gradually to assume a systematic shape, in consequence of the general adoption of the only form of intellectual and practical activity which is susceptible of universal acceptance. The utter collapse of the theological and military regime was really favourable to this tendency, as it evidenced the want of a synthesis based on positive science and peace. In the latest phase of the Western
revolution, the twofold movement of destruction and reconstruc-
tion threw up successively the germs from which immediately
sprang the systematic conception of the Great Being.

This capital advance, marking as it did the point at which
the intellect at length overtook the feeling of man, was due
to the undesigned concurrence of three general propositions,
enunciated respectively by Pascal, Leibnitz, and Condorcet.
Although originating solely in the scientific evolution, the
first was an adequate expression of the convergence of the
whole past towards the present, as it likened the developement
of the race to that of an individual. The second perfected the
inchoate notion of the progression which concerns man, by
making the future depend on the present. The two together
formed the introduction to the third, the logical conclusion
from which is the direct conception of Humanity, for it conceives
of the species as one single people. The three are the imme-
diate precursors of the definitive systematisation reserved for
me, the systematisation in which one and the same principle
is to serve as the condensed expression of the feelings, thoughts,
and actions peculiar to Humanity.

The Great Being is the whole constituted by the beings,
past, future, and present, which co-operate willingly in perfect-
ing the order of the world. Every gregarious animal race has
a natural tendency to such co-operation. But it is only the
paramount race on each planet that can attain unity as a race,
for its ascent to power necessarily checks that of the lower
animals. This justifies, in our systematic definition of the
composite being, our omitting its peculiar species. On the
other hand, the spontaneity of the co-operation and its external
end are clearly indispensable conditions, if it is to be consistent
and permanent. Eliminating, then, what may be understood
without indistinctness, we confine our definition of the Great
Being to: the continuous whole formed by the beings which
converge. In this condensed form I shall often make implicit
use of the definition, leaving it to the reader to reintegrate the
terms suppressed.

Starting from this definition, the theory of the Great Being
resolves itself into (1) its constitution, (2) its position, (3) its
destination.

And first for its constitution. The great point is to dis-
tinguish between the peculiar constituent elements, immediate

(1) Constitution.
(2) Position.
(3) Destination.
or mediate, of the supreme organism, and the agents or representatives it requires. Every being must be composed of parts similar to itself, so Humanity is divisible primarily into States, then into Families, never into individuals.

Our race was educated under a synthesis at once egoistic and absolute, succeeded by a period of anarchy. Hence its lack of conceptions and formulas adequate to express a reality which has slowly dawned upon us. The consequence is a proneness to look on the parts as more important than the whole, though the whole alone, and not the parts, admits of completeness and permanence. The true Synthesis will modify this frame of mind and enable us to overcome our earlier habits, so that the opposite tendency, as alone consistent with the Positive spirit, will become natural to us. Familiar as we shall then be with the idea of Humanity, in this new state of regenerated mental power we shall constantly refer to that idea the subordinate ideas of People and even of Family, in obedience to the principle of passing from the more definite to the less definite conception. Even now it is not difficult to understand this, as it is the course we spontaneously adopt in the case of the animals: we refer them to the human type, at least in regard to their principal attributes. By a like process in the case of our own species, we judge each family by the standard of the people of which it is a part. That we do not adopt this course with nations is owing solely to the fact that we do not adequately realise the highest form of human existence.

That highest form is in fact the only one of which we can form a conception, free at once from indistinctness and arbitrariness. All partial associations, on however vast a scale, are but parts, and parts inseparable, save by a process of abstraction, from the whole race. The limits which seem natural to the several nations, or even families, are but the expression of those relations which have hitherto excited attention. But if we take into account all their real relations, direct and indirect, we see that the distinctions between them have no real foundation in nature. At any rate we may assert confidently that the contact between the nations has become so extended at the present time, that no one is really separable from the others. If it seem capable of separate existence, it is to the detriment of its true attributes, moral, intellectual, and even physical, all
of which, in their different degrees, are affected by the continuous reaction of the whole upon its parts. The remark is still more applicable to families; each family is, to begin with, inseparable from the people to which it belongs.

The race alone, then, admits of a clear and precise definition; the subordinate associations prepare that definition by their mutual relations and by familiarising us with those relations. Each of them has been the nucleus, actual or virtual, of Humanity, and will never lose its value as an aid to its less systematic conception. The two essential attributes of all social existence, solidarity and continuity, are necessarily attributes of the lower forms of that existence; we meet them there, not, it is true, as perfectly developed, but more within our grasp. Thus it is that the Family and the Country will always be, to the intellect no less than to the heart, indispensable introductions to Humanity. But in systematic education, in default of which the process is incomplete, we must henceforth invert the order; now that we have reached the full conception of the Great Being, we may spread it even to our children, without retracing the series of unsystematised efforts originally required for its elaboration. The essential point is to use more skilfully the power inherent in feeling to outstrip the generalising of the intellect, a result ensured in the Positive system of education by placing it throughout under the proper natural control of the sex in which feeling is predominant.

The conclusion we have reached is this: we definitively look on the Family and the State as each in due order an introduction to Humanity; we do not consider this indivisible being as composed of elements in the proper sense of the word. The philosophical conception once sufficiently accepted, the priesthood will abandon any formal definition. It is needed now as against the extraordinary pressure brought to bear on any movement in a synthetical direction by the anarchical spirit of analysis which prevails.

Further we must not forget that the highest existence, equally with the lower forms of vitality, is subject to the two laws of growth and improvement, these phases being more marked in the more complex organism. Hence a new obstacle to our grasping the idea of a being of so pre-eminently relative a character, so long as we are under the sway of habits formed under the absolute Synthesis. They lead us to forget that
every living being must be judged by its adult state, whilst in the case of Humanity we have as yet before us only its childhood and its adolescence. This explains why it is that the idea of the Great Being could not effectually assert itself previously; it marks the opening of our mature existence; it is an evidence that its preparatory stages are past. But henceforth, in the light of that conception we can appreciate the Normal state by the conjoint aid of the previous periods, sufficiently to ensure a truly rational, as opposed to an essentially empirical development.

The peculiar difficulties attendant on its acceptance once fairly overcome, the hardest point remaining in the theory of the Great Being is the right estimate of individuals as its ministers. An uninterrupted service on their part, either as agents or even as representatives, is a necessary condition of collective existence in any form. No association could act, or make itself felt, except through individuals. As this is clear for the Family and the Country; à fortiori must it hold good of Humanity. In this condition we find the primary source of the attributes and the difficulties which alike inhere in the very idea of a composite existence.

To combine, and that persistently, concert with independence is the capital problem of society, a problem which religion alone can solve, by love primarily, then by faith as the basis of love. The superiority of Humanity lies mainly in this: that its immediate instruments are beings in nature similar to itself, though at a lower stage of development, and apparently capable of standing alone. On the other hand, as such, they tend to separate, losing sight, in an exaggerated sense of their own importance, of the absolute dependence of the parts on the whole. The danger exists in the best constituted society; in periods of anarchy it takes such proportions as at the present time to be the main hindrance to the advent of the Great Being. And yet the danger to society would be equally great if concert could ever succeed in stifling independence. Distinctness then, no less than convergence of effort, being an essential condition of human co-operation, the great problem ultimately comes to this, how to reconcile Order and Progress, universally held by Antiquity to be incompatible. Of the two dangers, however, the greater is, it must be allowed, the excess of
independence; with few and transient exceptions that from excess of concert is less urgent.

It follows from this discussion of the question that the existence of the Great Being requires, as its necessary basis, that the actual generation be in permanent dependence on the two subjective portions of Humanity, its past and its future generations. In the past we have the source, in the future the aim, of the active service rendered by the present. Man always labours for posterity, impelled thereto by the labour of his ancestors, who have handed down to him the materials with which, the processes by which, he works. It is his highest privilege that the individual can perpetuate himself indirectly in a subjective state, if whilst actually living his course has left worthy results. Thus, even from the very earliest beginning, arose the idea of Continuity properly so called, an idea more really characteristic of man than mere Solidarity. Continuity implies that our successors continue our service as we continued that of our predecessors.

The Family by its very constitution manifests this primary attribute of every composite existence, the children representing the future, the elders the past, both in immediate dependence on the members in full vigour. Hence it is that the chief historical period, the century, equivalent to the length of human life in the normal state, is subdivided into three generations, the object being, that the active portion of any society may be in close connection with the two which can understand it, a conception which had dawned on the old friend mentioned in the general preface of the work.

To simplify this dependence and give greater precision to the notion, we should now suppress the second subjective element, the element of the future, which indicates the end of human co-operation, but does not affect the question of its origin, or its exercise. Reduced to this dual form, the sphere of continuity is the connection between the representatives and the agents of Humanity. The dead are her representatives, the living her agents; since the dead stand pre-eminent in dignity, the living are superior in efficiency.

The direct service of the Great Being is the exclusive appanage of our objective life; but the excellence of Humanity can only be worthily shown by its subjective and eternal existence. Our nature needs to be purified by death for its higher
attributes to be seen; they stand out then clear of the grosser accompaniments which previously obscured them. In death alone can we attain the sublime transformation towards which our animal nature tends. The cerebral life, in constant dependence on our organic life, seems ordinarily to have no other function than to strengthen and perfect this last. And yet the higher parts of man's nature, his affections, thoughts, and even actions, all have a relative function, all look to the collective organism and reject a mere individual purpose, in proportion as the animal life attains fuller development. Social life advances in the same direction towards that state in which the body becomes simply the support of the brain, whilst the direct action of the brain becomes the characteristic of our nature. The change indicated is not, however, fully realised till we reach the subjective life, which at once, by virtue of such a power, becomes our ideal in the objective.

In two senses, then, the living are brought more and more under the patronage of the dead, the dead being at once their protectors and types. The dead alone can represent Humanity; they collectively really constitute Humanity; the living, born her children, as a rule become her servants, unless they degenerate into mere parasites. Granting it possible to form a judgment of the objective life during its course, it seldom is so fruitful in results as to secure its main achievement from being obscured by subsequent degeneration. Till it be ended, even in the best men, the true attributes of our nature cannot fully assert themselves; we have to make constant allowance for the defects due to the necessities of our physical constitution. The true sphere of the soul's superiority is the subjective life; that, apart from exceptional cases of reprobation, belongs exclusively to such of its functions as are assimilable by others, the purely personal elements no longer interfering.

No amount of superiority, however, can call the subjective life into existence, or give it permanence; for this it is dependent on the objective. The living, it is true, are subject to the sway of the dead, but, on the other hand, the dead cannot exercise their power save through the medium of the living, though it is not open to the latter to refuse their co-operation even when rebelling against the inevitable yoke. The objective life is direct and complete, its chief characteristic is will; the subjective passes under the empire of fate. The function of
the dead is to form the immovable foundation, that of the living to introduce the secondary modifications of man's destiny. The direct service of Humanity, then, has its source in the will, the condensed expression of all our brain action; for the will, in its proper sense, combines the impulse given by the heart with the light derived from the intellect and the guidance furnished by the character. And the will has a natural safeguard against caprice, in that its efficiency depends on the maintenance of the subordination of the living to the dead. Emancipated from this control the will loses its power for good, and becomes a mere source of disturbance.

Our conception of the constitution of the Great Being remains defective unless we associate with man all the animal races which are capable of adopting the common motto of all the higher natures: Live for Others. Without the animals, the Positive Synthesis could but imperfectly form the permanent alliance of all voluntary agents to modify the external conditions of our life so far as they are modifiable. Since the close of the fetichist period there has been a growing inability on the part of the provisional religion to sanction this coalition, though its utility has been constantly on the increase. It was reserved for Positivism to organize it by recognizing as integral portions of the Great Being the animals which voluntarily aid man, whilst eliminating its unworthy parasites in human form. The service rendered by the animals is, it is true, indirect, for it is in two senses individual, there entering into it no consciousness of a social function; yet as voluntary, we are justified in our recognition of it.

The constitution of the Great Being sufficiently explained, the next step in elaborating its theory is to examine its situation, and subsequently its destination. The first of the three points was the hardest, so that I may be briefer in my treatment of the two others.

It is a strict consequence of the reality of its existence that Humanity is more dependent, as more complex, than any other being. Freed, so far as the subjective condition is concerned, from the laws of the outer world, her never-ceasing subjection to the laws of the social or moral world is but the more distinctly seen. Although this subjection, owing to its higher degree of complication, could not be understood till last, it was
felt before any other, more particularly in reference to the moral laws.

But Humanity, whilst bound by laws of her own, submits, for she has an objective basis, to the laws of our bodily existence, the laws that is of vitality; nay, further, she submits to the laws of the outer world, the laws of that material order in the midst of which man lives and works.

The laws of vitality make themselves constantly felt in those conditions of organic life on which ultimately depend the extent and the exercise of all our faculties, during life in the first place, and consequently after death. Nay, more, the Great Being can never escape the sad fate which often deprives it through some flaw in these conditions of its best servants, their highest powers yet unexerted. As for the laws of the outer world, it is equally impossible not to recognise their power, for though less direct, it is more beyond our intervention.

As the economy of things, then, is such that increase of dignity implies increase of dependence, the peculiar eminence of the Great Being subjects it to all the necessary conditions of existence without exception. Still less independent are its servants, indulge what anarchical illusions they may at the suggestion of the will, which is the distinct feature of our objective life. For with it they are subject to the external conditions, whether inorganic or vital, as they are to the statical and dynamical laws of the collective existence. But, besides, they are always subject to the action of the body upon the brain, an influence we need not take into account in the social economy, neutralized as it there is by individual differences, but which cannot but deeply affect the economy of the individual. Without any break, then, the empire of will is subordinate to that of necessity.

Accept it in a right spirit, and in this very dependence lies the chief source of our true greatness. I have shown in the last volume, that the attribute of omnipotence introduces a radical contradiction into the idea of God, from the impossibility of reconciling omnipotence with wisdom and goodness. Compare the two cases and we see more distinctly the logical connection between the dignity and the dependence of the true Great Being. The condition of unity for man is complete submission; without it, as I have shown over and over again, his feelings would be ill-regulated, his thoughts incoherent, his
actions a mere source of disorder. We may regret that the order of things is not more within man's power to alter. But true wisdom forbids our wishing it to be in any part open to indefinite modification. As we advance, so far from shrinking from this inevitable yoke, we extend its range by paying to human institutions the obedience we cannot refuse to the laws of nature.

These considerations lead me to the concluding part of the theory of the Great Being, the examination of the destination which its situation assigns it. That destination is, in truth, to give full effect to the action of will, in modifying, so far as they are modifiable, the conditions to which it is necessarily subject. Even when beyond its power to modify, they call for constant exertion on its part—intellectual and active exertion—the better to accommodate itself to them. Its main task, however, is the effecting the modifications within the scope of human will, which the secondary arrangements of the world around us always admit, with the exception of the phenomena of the heavens. Our power in this respect increases as the phenomena become more complex and higher, a compensation, though an imperfect compensation, for the disadvantages attendant on the increase of dependence.

On this view, the action of the Great Being has for its main object the perfecting the order of man's world, for the individual as well as for society. Hence it is that human institutions are so mixed up with the laws of nature, that by a grave mistake the dominion of the one is often confounded with that of the other two provinces. Now, the rules of man's creation depend for their value entirely on their having as their substratum natural arrangements, the legitimate sway of which it is their function to increase.

Such a destination is peculiarly that of the future of Humanity, her systematic existence. Yet so appropriate is it to the Great Being, that even in the past, its age of empirical effort, with admiration we see how largely it achieved it. Its instinct led it to create: first, the Gods of antiquity, then the one God their heir, as the respective guides of the second period of its childhood and its youth. The praises offered in all sincerity to these subjective guardians are so many acts of indirect homage to the instinctive wisdom of Humanity. In substituting rational for empirical grounds, the Positive religion will
give a new being to this gratitude, and a thorough sanction, for that obligation rests upon it to see that no one of the states through which the Great Being has passed lacks its due appreciation. In its full maturity, its direct and deliberate care for its true servants will be the object of just admiration. This habitual attitude of our minds will naturally deepen the respect deserved by its indirect and instinctive efforts to raise itself, in its earlier life, when the agents it had at its disposal were invariably blind, and often intractable.

Such is the theory which forms the foundation of our construction. Sketched with sufficient precision at the outset of this work, in the subsequent volumes it was supported by statitical, and completed by dynamical considerations, so as to demand in the present place nothing more than a definitive systematization. It forms a general basis, from which we must now proceed to explain the whole system of the true religion, and with it the life which that religion is to regulate. The full success, however, of this twofold picture depends on this condition: that it present two views in succession, the first abstract, dealing with human nature in each of its leading aspects; the second concrete, dealing with the actual combinations of those aspects in their most important forms.

First, however, the power for synthesis inherent in the preceding theory, must be distinctly drawn out.

Its value in this respect is derived from the fact that the Great Being offers, by its very constitution, the best type of unity; its composite nature precluding divergence, giving full scope to convergence. The offspring of the cooperation of the race stimulates and invigorates cooperation as the embodiment of the idea. In constant submission to the primary order, it condenses and consecrates, even whilst modifying, that order. Endowed with equal power to regulate and to unite, its empire is the source of unity in its true servants, for it impels them to identify themselves with the highest existence. Our personal instincts, concentrated in the will peculiar to our objective life, find in Humanity a guide free from all capricious tendencies, and the more so as all the impulses derived from it are in natural accordance with intelligible laws.

The true providence of man has not yet been reduced to system, yet we can even now adequately understand what it will be, morally, intellectually, and materially. Besides, the
measure of its efficiency may be taken by looking to the sum of the results attained during the minority of the Great Being. Superior even then to all real existences, it appears originally placed in a circle without issue, needing, that is, a competent guide, and unable to find one outside of itself. But by its instinctive wisdom it overcame this great difficulty by a spontaneous impulse, creating imaginary guides and endowing them one after the other with the attributes adapted to their provisional function. Victorious in this trial, the being which is destined to regulate everything even then proved its ability to give regularity to its own existence, so far as its age and situation allowed. So admirable an empirical result contains the promise, for the near future, of the great results to be attained by the wisdom of Humanity when systematised,—when she has reached the stage of development at which she can take on herself the guidance of her various servants, using to that end all the means accumulated during her past life. Such is the primary source whence the theory derives a religious efficacy, which in the rest of this chapter will appear under its more general, in the rest of the volume under its more special, aspects.

Previously, however, to entering on this exposition we have to define the normal relations of the Positive religion with the two capital modes of the provisional synthesis. The relations are these: we connect directly Positivism with Fetichism, not excluding astrological Fetichism; we eliminate Theologism, monothetic Theologism more especially.

It follows from the several explanations which had their place in the last volume, that the function of Theology was purely to prepare the way for Positivism in the spontaneous evolution of the race, that it can be no element ultimately of the normal state, as the two syntheses are incompatible. Nay, I went further, and showed that its aid was ceasing to be available henceforward wherever an individual or a nation could be submitted to wise direction. Of the two modes of causation under the provisional synthesis, it is the second or theological which, by its introduction of imaginary powers, becomes unsusceptible of any modifications of the absolute tendencies of that synthesis. Then too becomes preponderant its tendency to egotism, for its Gods step between man and Humanity, binding on him a yoke he cannot shake off, a service at all times
inherently of a personal character. Though created in order to extend the principle of causation to the world of man, they preclude any social conception from their incapacity to embody even the idea of solidarity, much more that of continuity. On the contrary, social life is the chosen sphere of the relative religion, and therefore it has nothing in common with a purely personal religion, which owed its great social utility, in all essential points, to the wisdom of its priesthood for the time being—the priesthood of Theocracy and the priesthood of Catholicism. Still, in the most distant future, the servants of the Great Being will honour, with just honour, the guardians it created to protect its minority.

Far different is the relation of the final synthesis to the primeval system of causation. I have already represented Fetishism as susceptible of an immediate connection with Positivism, with no theological interlude. Nay, I have stated that the combination was coming to be indispensable for the attainment of our definitive unity. The time is come for explaining the nature of their accord.

As an intellectual question, the primary object of this ultimate fusion is to fill, as far as possible, the unavoidable gaps left by the Positive spirit in its empirical no less than in its systematic stage. It is essentially to the abstract coordination of our conceptions that laws properly apply; they almost invariably fail to express adequately the concrete facts, even though we use inductions of practice to supplement the deductions of theory. In such cases we must have recourse to causes, as in the beginning of things, as a provisional colligation of facts, bringing Fetishism to the support of Positivism. Not under the illusion that such accessory explanation corresponds to any reality, we avail ourselves of it to facilitate our necessary speculations; we are justified in acting on an instinctive tendency of our nature, which may always be reconciled with a true rational method. A real connection once formed, we throw aside the temporary support we gained, for contemplation and even meditation, by the fiction of an active will.

The value of such a provisional hypothesis is still better seen from the point of view of art, for esthetically, Positivism differs from Fetishism only in that it pays its homage to results, Fetishism to materials. They find a point of accord naturally, in man's disposition to reverence in each substance or phenome-
non the various uses to which it may be put by the Great Being in its wisdom. Hence Positivism will offer a worthy field for the display of the poetical capacity of Fetishism, a capacity which could not pass the rudimentary stage during the infancy of the race.

Lastly, from the moral point of view, the combination of the two Syntheses is at once easy and fruitful in results. Fetishism, as loving all things and reverencing all things, will always be adapted largely to aid Positivism in its grand function of fostering tenderness, and giving cohesion to submission.

Thus it is that in the final religion we connect directly the maturity of the Great Being with its infancy. Thus it is that we reconcile, as far as possible, real laws with imaginary wills, so that they supply each others' wants in all respects. Limited by its nature to the external world, Fetishism, unlike Theology, never claimed to represent the world of man, reserved for Positivism to grasp and to regulate. Fetishism traced the foundation of man's true wisdom, in practice and in theory, by its institution of fatalism. That it made it absolute was simply due to its ignorance of modifications, a true view of which was left for Positivism. The primeval synthesis and the definitive religion rest on one and the same fundamental principle, a principle adopted by the instinct of the race and then by its reason; they agree, that is, in proclaiming the constant predominance of feeling over thought and action. Such being their natural affinities, the two extreme ages of Humanity deserved the definitive consecration given by their both sharing in the formation of its true unity. Their fusion with a view to complete that formation I have just explained—without it the true religion could not satisfactorily connect our future in all its stages with our remotest past—a past which invariably recurs in the spontaneous evolution of each servant of Humanity.

It might seem, however, that we are inconsistent in thus incorporating Fetishism with Positivism and excluding Theologism, springing as it does from the one, tending to the other. But there is no real inconsistency, since the two extremes admit of direct contact, and will frequently be brought into such contact, especially in individuals. The only ground for the final acceptance of Fetishism is its perfect spontaneity. When admitted it ceases to have any connection with Theologism, which never can accept the position of inferior as regards Posi-
tivism. In the combination Fetishism, in accordance with its nature, still confines itself to the external world, and no longer strays in the direction of mau's world. There is this change, however: its domain was of old purely concrete, it is now in the main abstract, its application, both in affection and action, will concern Phenomena rather than substance, but without ever separating the two.

Its deficiency thus naturally and regularly supplied, the Positive doctrine is able, without further preliminary, definitively to organise human unity, the unity of which I proceed to give the general characteristics, by a description at once of the Positive religion and life. That I can describe them thus simultaneously, first from the abstract, then from the concrete point of view, is in itself an indication of the full completeness of that unity. For hitherto such a conjoint presentation has been impossible, from the want of sufficient agreement between theory and practice.

It is the best note of true Positivity,—the harmony, systematic but also spontaneous, which it introduces as a permanent link between the various aspects of our personal and social life. Ever bent on the preservation and amelioration of the Great Being, the affections, thoughts, and actions of man, are, when so harmonised, brought as far as possible under control and into concert.

The composite nature of Humanity involves its having as its principle, love, the sole source of voluntary cooperation. The constant supremacy of feeling over thought and action thus becomes the fundamental law of the human consensus. Love, as the principle of synthesis, had been instinctively recognised by Fetishism, and deliberately sanctioned by Theocracy. But apart from their inadequate estimate of the benevolent instincts, these two rudimentary religions were found irreconcilable with the ulterior progress of our intellectual and active powers. Their triumphant advance broke through the earlier discipline, but the sense that they needed control gave rise to an admirable attempt to reconstruct the supremacy of the heart. The ultimate result of the effort was, however, to show the increasing loss of power in the fictitious synthesis in regard to this capital problem, the true solution of which necessarily devolved on the principle which gave to reality the sanction of utility. The gradual outcome of the unfettered evolution of
thought and activity, the positive spirit has a natural tendency to restore to feeling its ascendancy, the better to place under its direction the normal development of our powers.

The several aspirations evolved by the successive stages of the education of mankind thus find a simultaneous satisfaction, however conflicting they may be in appearance, the result simply of the inadequacy of the provisional synthesis. Ever looking to the nature of man in its entirety, the discipline of Positivism ought to promote in an equal degree the growth and concert of all our functions. More favourable to the intellect than the civilisation of Greece, as a social system, it has greater power than Rome had to make public life control private, speculation depend on action; whilst more than feudal Catholicism does it give the primacy to our emotional nature. Completely real, profoundly sympathetic, unceasingly active, the Great Being is pre-eminently qualified to regulate without obstructing. It has a direct tendency to discipline our wills, as it forms us to order by love, with a view to progress. Its nature asserts at once the subjective origin and the objective basis of the true religion. Sanctioning as it does the close connection of the three parts of the soul, Humanity as centre makes the improvement of each depend on the reaction upon it of the two others, founding thereby true unity, an unity as stable as it is perfectible.

Fully to appreciate in the abstract a state which, however near at hand, does not admit of direct inspection, I must now take it in detail, dwelling separately on feeling, intellect, and action.

And first for feeling. Unity in this respect, as conceived by Positivism, has for its basis the existence in human nature of the sympathetic instincts, which found no place in the theological synthesis. So only can we state in its true form the problem man has to solve, the subordinating egoism to altruism. To these instincts we look mainly for the solution of this problem, and it is their continuous growth under the influences of society which is the one standard by which to measure our progress, ever unsatisfactory unless accompanied with this growth. Their unceasing search after the true has for its aim the attainment of the good under the inspiration of the beautiful, and their ascendancy is at once the best stimulus and the best regulator of all our powers. In no degree oppressive as
regards the personal instincts, they offer those instincts the legitimate satisfaction of a noble purpose.

The right understanding of this moral unity necessitates our taking into account the inherent differences between the instincts of benevolence. Arranged, as the whole hierarchy of our conceptions is arranged, on the principle of decrease in energy, increase in dignity, the first unites, equals, and regulates the present; the second regards superiors and consecrates the past; the third looks towards inferiors and prepares the future. In every social relation there is room for the free and simultaneous play of the three; but the proper province of the first is private, that of the third, public life, the second alone being common to both. From the closest ties to the widest relations of man, they form, then, by their union, a complete discipline. Attachment secures the growth of the love on which our whole system rests, whilst benevolence directs that love to its true end, universal love; veneration institutes subordination, the indispensable condition of stability in human relations.

The preparatory stage of human existence hampered this discipline, in theory as in practice, yet in the natural course of things it tended to prevail, though its rational acceptance was reserved for the present century. It had a natural origin in the fetishist state, for in Fetishism the feelings of man were attributed to all things; but the doctrine of Fetishism could give it no sanction, limited as it was to the outer world, and the life confined to the Family was too narrow a sphere. Subsequently, when theology and war were dominant, the benevolent instincts could have but an indirect and partial sway, for man’s action was destructive, and his creed egoistic. Still they grew even then, by virtue of the extension of human intercourse due to common opinions and collective purposes. When Polytheism was condensed into Monotheism, the latter declared them alien to human nature, but in this very rejection lay a consecration of them, for it rested on the superiority which marked them out as the special province of the divine will. The compression of the personal instincts by the religion gave a fuller ascendancy at that time to the sympathetic; although the denial of them on principle stamped a character of selfishness on our whole moral culture. It was under these conditions of provisional acceptance that they received a triumphant recognition by the devotion to them of the three
finest chapters of the extraordinary poem in which Catholicism found its condensed expression.

The metaphysical philosophy, the prevalence of which is due to the indiscipline of modern times, is more adverse than Theology to the free growth of sympathy; and yet sympathy has grown with the Positive spirit even whilst the action of man wore a purely personal, his speculation a dispersive, character. The tendency of science was to demonstrate the inatness of our unselfish affections, and industrial life prepared the way for the universal acceptance of their legitimate rule. Since the outbreak of the final crisis the maintenance of moral order in the midst of intellectual disorder is due solely to the influence of sympathy, nor is there any other possible basis for the reorganisation of the West.

Thus it is that the Positive spirit—the unfailing characteristic of which is the combination of the real and the useful—ends at length its chief sphere, as an intellectual theory and a practical system, in the study and the cultivation of the benevolent instincts. The true unity of the individual, the true unity of the society, springs from their normal predominance, as in them, and in equal degree, order has its source, progress its end. Ever ready to accept dutifully all that is inevitable in our condition, they make a noble resignation the basis of our amelioration, whilst they incessantly urge us to wise exertion. As a consequence of the omnipresent control of Morals, they offer philosophy the soundest discipline and the sublimest object, to the exclusion of all idle speculations and the concentration of our intellectual efforts on the continuous improvement of our nature. To poetry they throw open its noblest field, as by their aid it can idealize all human ties, present, past, or even future. Political action, recognising them as supreme, is enabled peacefully to carry out the largest plans, by bringing all our practical energies to bear on the direct improvement of man's condition upon earth, in concert with the animal races which, as sympathetic, are justly associated with Humanity. These hints give a sufficient idea of the general character of the Positive order of things, as a synthesis resting on universal love, that love aided by a faith susceptible of demonstration.

And yet the idea were incomplete without a direct examination of the chief attribute of human unity, viz., the necessary
coincidence of duty and of happiness, both equally placed in *Living for Others*. Complete as is the sanction, and natural as complete, given by the sympathetic instincts to every right exertion of our intellect, every right exercise of our active powers, such efforts are always urged as means to an end, the means adapted to the overcoming the difficulties of man’s position. The highest gratification they can afford is derived from their unavoidable and constant ministration to the Great Being. Set aside these wants, and man’s happiness, as his true unity, depends on his emotional nature. A woman’s pen has fitly expressed this prerogative of man, and the admirable expression is her chief claim to immortality, ‘*There is nothing real in the world but love.*’

This maxim of Delphine may seem at first sight an exaggeration, yet the Positive religion must adopt it, to enforce the conviction that it is in feeling that lies the chief value of feeling. Whilst speculation and even action contribute to our happiness by their results alone, and results as dependent on external conditions often elude us, the gratification we derive from affection is always direct and certain and depends on ourselves alone. Real happiness, then, cannot reside either in our thoughts or actions, but exclusively in our sympathies, and their highest recompense is their existence. When once by a right exercise we have learnt to appreciate this sovereign good, we cease to find satisfaction as formerly in the most successful intellectual or active exertions. We then see that our opinions and our efforts depend for their main value upon our feelings, the only immediate sources of happiness and duty for the individual as for the society.

Thus realising the highest aspirations of theology in its dreams, the kingdom of Humanity is a kingdom of love, perfecting our inward satisfaction by cooperation from without. Each makes others his chief object, and as a natural result gains the support of others in his own need. But he may not gain it, and if he gain it, it is not the motive for altruism nor can it be its adequate reward. We are liable to set too much store by such reciprocity of services, owing to habits contracted under the egoistic synthesis, and any over-value of it would endanger the unity of our sympathetic, by stimulating our personal, instincts. Even in the anarchy of modern times, the true moral conception found its spontaneous expression in the noble wish
of the great Danton, *Perish my memory, only let my country be free.*

Yet even in this heroic cry we trace the idea that the outward reward of a great life extends to its subjective immortality. He who has truly lived for others should hope to live on, in, and by others. This subjective return is purer at once and surer than the objective, for it carries on the services rendered and perfects the judgment of those services. Under the impulse given by the Positive spirit, spontaneously and systematically, this noble recompense is accessible to all who are capable of understanding it and deserving it. The unhappy daughter of the old friend before mentioned, a few days before her death expressed to me naively her deep sense of the value of such a recompense in a touching utterance which connects her memory with that of my eternal companion. She said of her—it was three years after her death—*She is fortunate indeed, she is sure of immortality.*

An examination in detail of the emotional aspect of Positivism was obligatory from its immediate connection with the fundamental principle of true human unity. In dealing with the intellect and even with the activity of man, I may limit myself to a clear explanation of their proper subordination to feeling. In judging the altruistic synthesis from the intellectual side, we shall take first its esthetic aspect, then its scientific.

Rising above modern prejudices, the Positive religion decides that in dignity art ranks above science, as art is more closely connected with feeling, science with action. Hence a synthetical hierarchy, embodied in the order of succession of the principal phases of education, which, common to all equally, is first the education of the affections, then of the esthetic faculties, thirdly of the scientific, lastly of the practical capacity. The classification is in conformity with the principle of the encyclopædic scale; it is a condensed expression of the natural affinities of our various powers; it marks their serial order, and so makes it easy to compare them.

Art satisfies the deeper wants of our nature better than science. It is more sympathetic; it is more synthetic. At the same time it is invariably alien to mere speculation, and leads directly to action of the noblest kind, viz., the elevating our feelings by their ideal expression. No other form of existence is as completely in unison with the sacred formula of Positivism,
for an all-comprehensive sympathy is its source, the highest progress its aspiration, the highest order its basis. Its normal development issues naturally in the combination of independence with cooperation, for its productions are emphatically individual whilst the aim of those productions is agreement on the widest scale.

It is a common error to overrate the ultimate importance of science from regard to its services as a preparation. So long as it was the prime object to call out our several powers, the special exercise of our scientific faculties, as weakest in point of energy, was of importance; for though weakest, it was to them we had to look for the construction of an objective basis for human wisdom. But now that our immediate object is to regulate those powers, religion must employ art rather than science, art being the nearer to the principle of unity. Although art and science alike, tend, if cultivated amiss, to stimulate unduly pride and vanity, the pursuit of science exerts, besides this, a more noxious moral influence—an influence inseparable from it—in that the concentration it demands discourages affection. Therefore it is that in the normal state, science must, by suitable means, be limited to its strict function; the knowledge of the order of the world sufficient for a dignified acceptance and wise modification. Such knowledge is a paramount necessity solely because of the exigencies of our physical condition, binding us to a form of action which at the outset is egoistic, whereas, given a situation so favoured by nature that we stood in no need of science, art would still have an inherent charm and a power to raise us. Even in reference to the objective construction we require for wise action, art contributed more than science to the intelligence of the higher and less obvious phenomena, poetry hitherto having anticipated philosophy in stating, in outline at least, the laws of our intellectual, and still more those of our moral nature.

As a part of the system of Positive education art must hold equal rank with science. In real life it passes before science, as all that science gives us is the rational basis for action; its guidance does not enable us in practice to dispense with the complement of experience. With all classes, the priesthood included, the mind will, as a rule, exert itself in the esthetic rather than in the scientific direction, so the better to concentrate our efforts on the knowledge and improvement of our
nature. Scientific works are seldom to be read again even by the theorician, whilst the creations of the artist are the objects of ever fresh admiration. It were superfluous to dwell longer on the strong esthetic tendency of a synthesis, the natural result of which will be the prevalence of the intellectual and moral dispositions most favourable to poetry.

The history of the past carries with it the proof, that such is the future which awaits the Positive spirit in the normal state, as since the disappearance of the Theocracy the master works of poetry have multiplied in proportion as the West disengages itself from the trammels of Theologism and war. The creation of Positivism as a system evidences its affinity for art; for art already owes to it a philosophy of esthetics, whereas true thinkers of the metaphysical school sought one in vain.

To place in a clearer light the decided superiority, esthetically speaking, of Positivism, I would indicate here, in general terms, the introduction of a new series of poetical appliances, originating in the perfectly legitimate fusion of the Fetichist with the Positivist spirit.

By the incorporation of Fetichism, art in its maturity possesses the external world, which in the full sense it possessed only in its infancy, and even then its idealisation of it could only be inchoate. Poetry in the Positive state, whilst cultivating this its original domain, will extend it so as to include phenomena no less than beings, empowered to do so by the general growth of abstraction since the Fetichist age. The new field thus opened requires, to be available, the previous creation of subjective milieus; otherwise, in the cultivation of it, it would be difficult as a rule to avoid lapsing into a metaphysical tendency, in essential antagonism with art—a tendency to consider events independently of beings.

In its true idea, Space is the first and hitherto the only perfect example of this logical artifice, which, when interpreted, in an objective sense, gave rise to so many errors. For Space logically is to be looked upon simply as an universal fluid, created by man's instinct, in the infancy of his genius, in order to enable him to conceive of extension and even of motion independently of actual bodies. In default of such a milieu, signs without images would be our only resource for the abstract development of geometrical and mechanical speculations.

The long familiarity of the western mind with this primeval
institution is a hindrance to our due appreciation of its value, yet we may by imagining it in abeyance, measure the void actually existing in the case of all other phenomena, owing to the want of so powerful an instrument. It follows that we must deliberately create for the phenomena of Physics, Chemistry, nay even of Biology, the equivalent of the milieu which Space offers us without effort in the domain of Mathematics.

In this way, and in this way only, can art in its maturity adequately idealise the world without, by giving life to these milieus of man's creation, just as in his infancy he attributed life to all the objects of nature. This done, the philosophy of art will be as complete as that of science; as, in accordance with its peculiar genius, it will organise its twofold empire, the world and man, an empire which it has in common with science, though poetically the world is not on the same level with man. Thus comprehensive, art will be better adapted than science to explain and promote the Positive logic, for art has exclusive competence in regard to images, and in Positive logic it is images which bring signs into convergence with feelings in order to facilitate thought.

The value of Positivism in regard to science admits of a less full statement than its power in regard to art; since as a synthesis resting immediately upon natural philosophy it will be certain to perfect the whole range of scientific investigations. Suffice it here to indicate under its more prominent aspects the influence of religion upon science, in which it repays more than it received.

Subject to the inevitable control of moral science, all scientific theories cleared of misdirected investigations take a sacred and synthetical character, as being definitive portions of the body of Positive doctrine, which, step by step, in the natural course of things, has been formed by their contributions. Science, thus renovated, regains with greater completeness and stability the majestic unity it attained under the fostering care of the Theocracy, so justly regretted by the leading thinker of the last half-century. The speciality without unity, which has hitherto been the great feature of modern scientific enquiry, reduces it in truth wellnigh to the level of empiricism, with an exception for Mathematics. And even in Mathematics, the scientific character is but too often purely superficial, since the prevalence of the tendency to substitute the combination of
signs for the higher processes of thought, or at any rate, to make the latter subordinate. All the other branches of natural philosophy are so completely given over to anarchy and consequent retrogression, that religion alone, with its power of direction and repression, can introduce discipline and prevent the dissolution of the whole system. Now, for a state of synthesis, it is imperative that every Positive theory, normally viewed, become an affluent of the science by which man studies his nature in order to guide his conduct. For we are still under the dominion of analysis so long as the laws of the inorganic world, with their complement, the laws of life, are not referred directly to the laws of man's social and individual existence,—the domain of Humanity, the sole fountain of intellectual unity.

I can give no better idea of this convergence than by setting it forth in detail with reference to the grand problem of moral science, the continuous development, viz., of our sympathetic instincts, a problem which of itself alone is large enough to allow for all wise efforts, whether in thought or action.

To begin with, the end proposed connects with the whole of active life, the results of the exercise of our feelings reacting on them to raise them. For the present, however, limiting ourselves to the purely intellectual question, we see that the growth of sympathy depends on the cultivation of the sciences, even as regards the external order, in our inevitable submission to which we have a check on egoism, and so an encouragement to altruism. Without forestalling an examination reserved for the third chapter, it must be added, that the contiguity of the organs of sympathy with the apparatus of the intellectual affords us the means generally of modifying the former. Not in contact with the world without, not in contact even with the viscera of organic life, it is only indirectly through the intellect or activity that they can be influenced. Still, by virtue of their peculiar connection with the organs of egoism, we can bring to bear upon them, by the agency of these latter, the influences derived from the nutritive system. So this practical problem, in which Morals depend primarily on Sociology, is in connection with Biology in its whole extent, and through Biology with the whole of Cosmology. Selecting one of the essential elements of the problem for special consideration, we reduce to system the instinctive tendency of the ancient world towards the interpretation, any more, the direction of dreams; for in dreams there is,
in the conjoint action of physical, intellectual, and moral laws, a basis for a valuable influence.

These remarks suffice to show that, if Positivism discipline the scientific spirit to the discouragement of idle enquiries, it is solely in order to direct it to the more difficult and the more important questions, as a more worthy field for its full powers. With a nobler object it gives science new means, not merely indirectly in the aid derived from the mutual support of the several parts of the system, but also directly by the creation of the true logic, left inchoate by its analytical treatment.

Although art on this point will anticipate, and even always surpass science, science may benefit largely from this definitive reduction to a system of the Positive method. Hitherto, scientific meditation has had no help but from signs, the use of images was purely subsidiary, except in Mathematics under the impulse given by Descartes. When synthesis prevails, images will lend their powerful aid in all abstract speculations, in particular by a larger introduction of subjective milieu, an institution not less adapted to science than to art. The discipline of religion, however, must exert its greatest influence, logically, in the systematising the reaction of the feelings on the intellect, such reaction being due, as is that of the intellect on the sympathies, to contiguity of position in the brain. While denying the constant part taken in intellectual operations by affective impulses, the anarchical thought of modern times blindly subject to them so far as the self-regarding instincts are concerned, their superior energy balancing their greater distance from the speculative region of the brain. Their power entitle us to understand what would be that, purer and more direct as it is, of the altruistic instincts, which are certainly better qualified to facilitate and stimulate thought than the orgiastic stimuli so vaunted by materialists. The admission that veneration is indispensable to success in teaching, implies that equally necessary in original thought, and the recognition of this fact will lead shortly to a juster sense than was att in the Middle Ages, of the great power over the intellect of the three instincts of sympathy.

After adequately estimating the capabilities of the P. religion from the intellectual point of view, I have to consider the description of the synthetical state in the abstracting forth in the general its bearing on active life. I
The whole question of the regeneration of man's action may be reduced to this: how to shape into a system the spontaneous tendencies of modern industry to assume the collective character. Sociocracy in this respect will fulfil the Theocracy; it will, by judicious methods, abolish the irrational and immoral distinction, provisionally accepted, between private and public functions. A social order in which everyone habitually labours for others, affords more scope for social feeling than war, though it is in war that such feeling originally finds its sphere. Industrial life gives it purity and consistence, and it gives moreover that which it alone can give, full room for expansion, by extending it from the relations of citizenship to those of mankind. There is no more distinctive note of the Positive religion than its power to deal with industrial activity, the sanction of which in the theological period was mainly due to the priesthood, and even the priesthood failed when the opposition of supernatural religion was aggravated by the condensation of Polytheism into Monotheism.

The organisation of industry has its own difficulties, but at bottom it is easier than the intellectual reconstruction to which it must look for guidance. The power derived from material, is less exposed to illusions than that based on spiritual, superiority; hence pride, nay, even avarice, are more amenable to discipline than vanity. To give its new form and direction to human activity is, it is true, the chief object of the wisdom of the priesthood; but a far more difficult task for the Positive religion, and one far more decisive, if successfully performed, is the formation of a competent priesthood. The disorganisation of industry is more thorough than that of the intellect, but the latter is at present the more serious evil, as it affects our only available instrument for the reconstruction demanded by feeling. Therefore it is, that in the intellectual power of the altruistic synthesis we have the guarantee at once and the basis of its competence in the sphere of action. Cooperation, the cooperation of contemporaries, or even that of successive generations, has never been so completely ignored by the pride of the temporal, as it has been by the vanity of the spiritual power. Consequently, the religion of Humanity once
fairly constituted, it will not be long before it regulate the social milieu most disposed to adopt as final its fundamental formula.

Parasites, as more and more the exception, may be put aside and, in the Positive state, all practitioners become immediate servants of the Great Being, their service regarding the wealth transmitted by its providence to the present generation in trust for its successor. As this accumulation of former labour suffices in its transmission by the very fulfilment of its proper purpose the great point in the service is its perpetuation by reproduction. Hence the necessity for continuity in industrial action, a continuity useless in the case of the intellectual treasure of mankind. But in industrial action, more than elsewhere, order necessarily implies progress as its complement, for any development of Humanity had been impossible had reproduction not been attended by increase, on some scale or other. The habits however, formed by the consideration of the productions of the intellect which do not lose by transmission, and in reference to which the spreading them should be our great care, leads us to underrate the importance of increased production in industry and to underrate that of conservation of the products. If reproduction, and there is no other means of preserving perishable materials, added nothing, their amount would soon be lessened. Yet as such necessary augmentation of the capital of the race is but a fraction of the whole, a fraction constantly decreasing in value the Positive religion should lay the chief stress on industrial conservation, even in the exceptional cases where it results no increase. Conservation is the primary duty; in this respect the requirements of practical life differ radically from those intellectual. Second to this in difficulty stands the access function, the transmission of the social capital with the diminution of the share to be allotted to the individual.

In order to organise industrial action on these two poles the altruistic synthesis sanctions two coexistent services, division and execution, in intimate connection with one another yet so as not to interfere with the normal condition of section, for the capacities they require are distinct, and so preparation for either. Humanity ratifies, that is, the division between the capitalist and the workman, the gradual simultaneous outgrowth of Western industry, dating from the close of the medieval period. The adoption of this dual a
ment, with its complement, the hierarchy of the patrician order, constitutes the chief actual difficulty of the regeneration of activity.

In this capital operation, the Positive religion will put out its power as a social system, by disciplining at once command and obedience, as both equally consecrated to the service of the Great Being, the highest functions of which have as their basis industrial action. The industrial chiefs are the representatives of Humanity, in the sense of being indispensable as the ministers of its material providence; the condensation they offer being the condition of its right exertion. Individually they may use amiss the wealth committed to their charge, but they do not therefore lose their sacred character, unless the abuse be in degree such as to endanger the conservation of the capital of the race. Still more immediate, still more tangible, is the honourable service rendered by the working classes, though it is inferior in point of generality and duration. They are the chief depositaries of technical skill; the patrician should especially cultivate administrative capacity. In fact, the workmen, in the strict sense of the term, are to be looked on as the proper organs for connecting in detail industry and science, as they work out in a concrete form the theories of abstract science. All their legitimate demands, the appeal of veneration to devotion, are made in the name of the Great Being, as is but natural, seeing that it entrusts its general representatives with the permanent guardianship of its individual servants.

For patrician and workman alike, the habitual sense of usefulness—an usefulness intelligible to all—ennobles and disciplines industrial existence by keeping it in constant connection with Humanity. Private life is raised and strengthened by the stimulus thus given in all directions to public life, each taking that degree of interest in the welfare of the whole which answers to his particular function.

As regards progress, the great point in the organisation of industry is to combine concert with independence, ever respecting the spontaneous character of the services rendered, as a consequence of the inherent gratuitousness of human labour, the wages of such labour aiming simply at the replacement of materials. The Positive religion leads chiefs and subjects equally, not to use force in any dispute whatsoever; all that is admissible is, the refusal of either party to cooperate with the other, a refusal
not incompatible with the continuance of their collective All classes equally, find their main happiness in the unint play of their sympathetic instincts, consequent on their v participation in the action of the society. But whilst tl of human happiness is identical for all, it admits vi: adaptation to the diversities of capacity and situation, t application of the education all have in common. l the inferiors, attachment holds the first place, with the s benevolence, the function of the inferiors being favou private, that of the superiors to public life, whilst vene common, wealth respecting numbers, numbers respecting All the relations of the two rest on confidence, and responsibility; even the material retribution of particula is in every case dependent on the free initiative of th The same principle of confidence regulates the trs functions and of the capital they require for their dischi so upholds the social continuity; the retiring functionary freely his successor, subject to the assent of his in superior.

Such a constitution of industry allows it to attai proportions, without ever weakening the moral source of unity or its intellectual basis. Nay, the industrial lif ceived offers the best guarantee for the sound gro expansion of feeling and intellect, owing to the natu dependence of the several kinds of progress, the sim: lowest being always the easiest and least uncertain. T way in which the Great Being, in its full prime, will tak sion of its domain, the Earth, marking its proprieto effecting all the improvements compatible with the orc whole, in accordance with the principle that particul must in all cases be subordinate to the general unity.

The appreciation in the abstract of the ultimate ended, the rest of this chapter must be devoted to an e of the Positive state in the concrete, thus completing inscription of human regeneration. The first point in suc tion is to determine the constitution of the sociocer general, afterwards the peculiar character of each of its separately.

In classing these elements, we may have regard eit emotional source of the Positive religion, or its intellect The spontaneous convergence of the two modes, the on
tical, the other analytical, gives the hierarchy of Sociocracy a solidity which nothing can shake. Further, we have a general verification of the two in the agreement which, by the nature of the case, exists between the constitution of society and the nature of the individual.

From the moral point of view, society as constituted by Positivism is the objective presentation of the Great Being. It follows that its constituent elements take rank by their aptness to represent Humanity; that is to say, by the degree in which their nature is sympathetic. From the intellectual point of view, society, or the hierarchy of man, is the highest term of the ascending series formed by the aggregate of known existences. Thus regarded, the elements of society must, equally with the other terms of the series, be classified by their degree of generality, the standard by which throughout we measure the approach to unity. We may coordinate them, by taking as the principle of comparison either sympathy or synthesis. Now the two modes are, in fact, equivalent, sympathy being the source of any true synthesis. We find in language a presentiment of this fundamental agreement; language always offering us a connection of generality with generosity, the fruitfulness in results, common to both, being the ground of the connection.

Both principles of classification point to the distinction of the sexes as the primary basis of the constitution of Sociocracy. For women, the representatives of Humanity, are both more sympathetic and more synthetic than her servants. They are, then, the higher in dignity; in power we cannot but reverse the order. Thus woman occupies the first rank in Sociocracy, as the best personification of the Great Being. Though her intellectual claims have hitherto been less acknowledged than her moral advantages, the Positive religion will secure them the recognition which is their due, by distinguishing what have hitherto been confounded without enquiry, capacity and cultivation. If in the disposition to unity we have the best measure of intellectual power, evidently woman is superior; we have only to take into account her instinctive tendency to consider morality in all cases as paramount, morality being the point to which all our conceptions converge. But this natural superiority of woman does not admit, generally, of any systematic assertion, from her being shut out from collective action, which is adapted only to the active sex.
In fact, we must consider this first division of Sociocracy as answering to the distinction between private and public life. Properly speaking, women do not form a class, since they are never to be considered collectively. Each one of them, the soul of her own family, whilst taking no immediate part in the service of the Great Being, naturally represents that Being for those who serve it directly, and her function is to breathe into them the dispositions most in harmony with their public duties. Whilst the advancement of science or of industry is the result of collective efforts, feeling, the source of unity, is evolved only in the individual. Woman, if she is to attain her full intellectual, still more her full moral, value, must be concentrated on private life, whilst man's development is imperfect unless he look to public life as his true sphere. The pre-eminence accorded to woman in Sociocracy offers no opening consequently for abuse, as, with here and there a well-grounded exception, woman inevitably sinks her claims if she step beyond the sanctuary of her home. She must restrict herself to the direction of private life, as the normal basis of public life, the latter alone, with the sex which administers it, being set apart for the direct service of Humanity.

This is the fundamental division, but beyond this the sociocratic order requires the division of the servants of Humanity into her theoretical and practical servants, whilst no distinction is admissible for her representatives. Although the theoretic class may never be more than an extremely small fraction of the whole body, it has been satisfactorily shown in the two preceding volumes that the separate existence of this class, under proper conditions, is the most distinct note of maturity in the Great Being. Eliminate this constituent, and human society remains national and incapable of coextension with the race. The superiority of the theoretic servants of Humanity, in sympathy as in synthesis, to her practical servants, is as indisputable as the inferiority of both to the affective sex. In their normal conception, its theoretic servants are the indispensable interpreters of the Great Being, for they alone possess the requisite knowledge of its nature and its destinies.

By these two divisions, the constitution of society is found to develop and to secure at once, the consensus in the individual of feeling, thought, and action. The actual generation is, on
in the class which suffers the most from its disorder, extends even to the temporary aberrations to which in private life an exaggeration of feeling might easily give rise.

This then is the ideal constitution of the Sociocracy: the representatives of Humanity preside over the family; under them as supreme, she ranks, first the interpreters of her laws, next the ministers of her designs, lastly the agents of her power. Love, knowledge, will, and power are the attributes respectively of the four indispensable branches of her service, the separation of which, and the coordination of which, mark the full maturity of the Great Being. To complete, however, this fundamental outline, we must combine with the human population the voluntary assistance furnished by the animal races it can associate, which bring a moral or intellectual or material contribution to the common task of directing the aid involuntarily rendered by purely physical forces.

This statement introduces, as the conclusion of the chapter, an examination of the peculiar character of each of the constituents of Sociocracy, the lower being, in obedience to the law of every objective hierarchy, the more independent. To simplify their comparison, we may reduce the constituents to three, for we may regard the service of women as the basis for the individual of his service to society. Subject to this influence in private life, public life aims above all at such a transformation of action, in whatever form it be predominant, as may strip it of its egoistic character, and make it support and expand the altruistic synthesis. The three sociocratic forces contribute by their own natural action to this general result, each in accordance with its peculiar constitution. It is, however, on the patriciate in particular that this transformation depends, as the patriciate alone is competent to give a collective character to individual activity by virtue of the capital it administers. The supremacy, however, of the patriciate, necessary as it is, would continue to have a purely empirical character and would be a source of abuse, were it not for the moderating power vested in the priesthood, which, as the special depository of our intellectual capital, gives a systematic direction to ordinary life by connecting it with our subjective existence. Lastly, the great body of the industrial workers, connected, though by a different tie, with each of the above classes, is the spontaneous regulator of the disputes which arise in the course of events from the
patrician desire of power, and the sacerdotal craving for influence.

Before characterising each of the three indispensable elements of society, it is desirable to examine into the moral stimulus constantly imparted to all the servants of Humanity by her representative in the family.

In some degree, greater or less, the affective sex has at all times accomplished this holy mission; but, to put out its full power, woman needs, within proper limits, independence, a condition for which the initiation of mankind has gradually prepared the way, though its full realisation is reserved for the adult age of the Great Being. The condition is so absolutely necessary, that its attainment will be a simple consequence of a sound estimate of woman's nature and function, as an intermediate being between men and Humanity. But the change does not merely involve the placing her moral higher than her physical function, hitherto coarsely held paramount. It implies in addition the previous correction of the existing opinions as to this physical function, originally held to be essentially a masculine attribute. On this point the permanent direction of the current of human opinion may be inferred from a comparison of the theory, on which Apollo in Æschylus justifies Orestes before Minerva, with the doctrine enunciated by Harvey.

Admitting, however, this growing disposition to look on man as the offspring mainly of woman, it is still a point on which opinion has by no means reached the normal conclusion. Yet in the antecedent movement we have an indication that the conviction will soon become general, that in the reproduction of the species the larger share by far is the woman's. Even already, and amid the actual confusion of biological conceptions, the share of the man is allowed to be much smaller than might be expected from the activity of his generative system. In the third chapter I shall clear up this difficulty by assigning the system in question another purpose as its main one. In the second place, the conclusive observation of Franklin, that if we go back but a few generations we necessarily come to common ancestors, is but an expression of the truth that, even physically, men are more the children of Humanity than of their several families. Over and above this community of origin, the distinct act of reproduction must also take a co-
lective character, and for this end we need a judicious return to
the ideas as to the influence of the nervous system, which,
though deficient in clearness, were sound, and which were too
blindly rejected during the recent period of anarchy. If, as
there is no reason to doubt, the state of the mother's brain
affects the constitution of the foetus, then the whole environ-
ment, physical and social, during pregnancy, plays a greater
part than in the lower races in the production of each child of
Humanity.

The physical function of woman becomes then a collective
one, social in its origin and its accomplishment, social also in its
result. On this view, and it is one even now susceptible of
demonstration, woman's high place in the family is placed
on a solid foundation. But to give definiteness to our con-
ception of the independence of woman, I think it right to
place here a during hypothesis, possibly destined to become a
reality in the course of our advance, though at what time, or
even in what manner, is not for me to expost. If in human reproduction the man contributes merely a
stimulus, one that is but an incidental accompaniment of the
real office of his generative system, then it is conceivable that
we might substitute for this stimulus one or more which
should be at women's free disposal. The non-existence of such
a power in the animal races nearest to man, is no sufficient
reason for refusing it to man as the most eminent race and the
most susceptible of modification. In man the privilege would
be in accordance with other peculiarities of the same function,
with menstruation for instance, which is a decided advance on
the rudimentary form of it found among the higher animals, an
advance due to our civilised condition.

I need not dwell further upon this hypothesis, the sole ob-
ject of which is to implant a presentiment, as it were, of the
degree in which woman, even in her physical functions, may
become independent of men. In social statics, an hypothesis of
a less warrantable kind enabled me, without objection from any
quarter, to establish on a surer basis the true theory of property.
I hope therefore that the indication above given will shortly
prevail over a repugnance which is without rational foundation,
and will tend to strengthen a theory of equal importance.
Supposing the independence of woman ever to attain this
limit, as a consequence of the sum of human progress, moral,
intellectual, and even physical, then her action on society would be increased in an eminent measure. We should then no longer hesitate between the coarse view now prevalent and the noble doctrine to which Positivism gives its systematic form. The highest species of production would no longer be at the mercy of a capricious and unruly instinct, the proper restraint of which has hitherto been the chief stumbling-block in the way of human discipline. The function and all the responsibilities it involves would then be vested, as it should be, in its highest organs, in those who alone can overcome the weakness of impulse—and the object of the transfer would be the accomplishment of all attainable ameliorations.

Be this as it may, it is to be remembered that the part assigned in the sociocratic institutions to women is independent of this hypothetical improvement. On this point I need not enter into details, I may rely on the three preceding volumes, and in especial on the General View. Shortly to state it: the just independence of the sex may be regarded as resting upon two conditions in close connection with one another: the exemption of all women from work away from home, and their voluntary and complete renunciation of wealth. For women suffer more from the aspirations of ambition than they do from the pressure of poverty. Priestesses of Humanity in the family circle, born to mitigate by affection the rule, the necessary rule, of strength, women should shrink from any participation in power as in its very nature degrading.

Support and encouragement to this deepest conviction will be naturally found in the common education, placed under the presidency of women, when they have learnt to appreciate it, may have themselves received it. Its training will put them on their guard most particularly against the instigations of vanity, less dangerous, it is true, but more irresistible to women than those of pride. Brought into close contact with the whole range of real knowledge, they will but the more keenly feel the value of affection and the justice of its claim to superiority over thought, the true function of which is simply to be the systematic guide of action. In this way, women's aptitude for synthesis, hitherto wholly uncultivated, will receive due cultivation, not such cultivation, however, as to interfere with her mission, but one calculated to give a firm cohesion to her superiority in sympathy.
By her constant preference of feeling, woman is naturally exposed to mistakes which might be prejudicial to her intellectual and practical growth, if the increase of her influence were not preceded by an improvement in her education. More truly synthetical than man as being more sympathetic, she is still less systematic than he is, be it as a result of her mental constitution, or most especially of her absorption in affection, affection ever aiming at the immediate attainment of some particular object. There is no other corrective for this defect but an encyclopedic education, and if uncorrected, it compromises the efficiency of women in the Positive society. A sound appreciation of the order of things would lead them to see how important submission is to dignity. Although confined on good grounds to domestic life, women should so far understand public life as to be able to direct the power exercised by the heart so as to qualify it for its high destiny. Positive education, whilst it deprecates the exaggeration of feeling, is also calculated to correct the deficiencies in women in regard to character. For in this, as in intelligence, their shortcomings are traceable rather to the system under which they live than to their natural constitution, and may be obviated so far as not to hamper an existence, the true purpose of which is as little action as it is speculation.

The above remarks suffice for the present as to the regeneration of woman in the sociocratic state. Consolidating, nay, even calling into greater activity her spontaneity, the Positive religion will enable the sex to attain the coherent existence in which as yet it is deficient. This new position, which will as a whole realise the highest aspirations of the Middle Ages, will meet with but little opposition from women when once they have grasped its idea; they will not be daunted by the conditions of intellectual and moral capacity which it exacts from them. In fact, errors traceable to feeling have this advantage over the errors traceable to intellect and activity, that, once recognised, our feelings are interested in the correction of them, as in all cases destructive of the object those feelings cannot but propose to themselves. The grand difficulty in the path of the Positive religion once overcome, the difficulty, that is, of forming the Priesthood of Humanity, the effort needed to regenerate women will be less than that required to regenerate the patriciate or even the proletariat.
courage and firmness should be most prominent in the priest, prudence in the woman. This comparison between the nature and position of the two moderating elements, represents the improvement of either, as mainly consisting in the careful cultivation in itself of the special qualities of the other, by the due discharge of its peculiar function. A consequence of this is the natural affinity, an affinity ever on the increase, between the priesthood and women. It finds at length its recognition in Positivism, for, no longer tolerating the fatal anomaly of Catholicism, Positivism binds marriage upon the priests of Humanity, so to offer the best type of our nature, by a noble combination of private with public life.

This previous condition fulfilled, the life of the priest will give ample scope for his power of synthesis so as to make it react on the development of his sympathies, just as, inversely, sympathy leads woman to synthesis. The chief function of the priest of Humanity is education, the encyclopaedic education which is needed to complete the training given in the family; the object being to allow the formation of a sound public opinion, calculated to consolidate the consultative influence of the priesthood throughout our life. Now education, as the primary function of the spiritual power, in regard to which it admits no competition, requires and fosters the systematic predominance of the synthetical spirit, left to its spontaneous growth in women. Better than aught else, this spirit tests the value of the various theories, which are necessarily idle speculations if not conducive to this end. To correct the habits formed by the long process of elaborating the objective basis required by the Positive religion, all we need is, to limit scientific training to such knowledge of the order of things as is indispensable for wise action. This limitation will flow naturally from the completeness of intellectual range characteristic of our public education, from which all specialisation must be banished, allowing for such developments as the ulterior needs of practical life require. Coming after the education of the affections, the education of the intellect, always, it must be remembered, given under the superintendence of women, will never encourage the intellect to rebel against the heart, a result generally traceable to excess of detail in our speculations.

Trained to comprehensiveness by their chief office, the priests of Humanity will carry the same habit of mind into the
scientific labours to which it may give occasion. Their other and complementary duties in reference to practical life will be an additional check upon, or a remedy for, an excess on the side of abstraction. Still, as their action on society requires not merely intellectual capacity, but intellectual capacity combined with rare excellence of heart and character, we must provide for the exceptional cases where the combination is imperfect, and where yet it is desirable not to hinder the intellectual development. In such anomalous cases, less frequent than is thought at present, Sociocracy relegates to the class of pensioners of the priesthood those who, from deficiency in point of energy or tenderness, are only fit for science. As for the special investigations which may for a time require the concentrated attention of true priests, they may be provided for by appropriate dispensations, without in any case impairing the legitimate supremacy of the disposition to synthesis and sympathy, which is the invariable characteristic of those who direct the relative religion.

To the impulse derived from women, and to its own social destination, we may add, as a protection to the Positive priesthood against degenerating from excess of abstraction, the fusion, which is an imperative necessity, of philosophy with poetry. If not combined in close alliance, they are a constant source of grave disturbance in the sociocratic order, as science and art, naturally rivals, claim on equivalent grounds the spiritual direction. Their rivalry is prevented if the priesthood absorbs both capacities in the complete comprehensiveness which is its note, in both its forms—spontaneous and systematic. The distinct advancement of either science or art will not call for more than exceptional efforts, as above stated, when the Positive religion shall have really closed the transitional period, increasingly revolutionary in its character, which lies between us and the Theocracy, the single instance hitherto of a normal society. In the doctrine the office of the priesthood is mainly scientific; in the worship it becomes mainly artistic; in the regime there is equal scope for both powers, for the theoretic in preaching and consecration, for the poetic in consultation and discipline. Art first shook off the yoke of Theocracy, as interfering with any decided growth; science could not but follow its example, to gain power to construct the objective basis of the final religion. All sound philosophy, however, with a presentiment of the
subjective character of the true synthesis, kept constantly before it as its aim a return, under proper conditions, to the plena sacerdotal organisation, whenever the twofold effort of art and science should have laid a sufficient basis for its definitive shape.

Philosophical or poetical,—it is indifferent which term we use,—to complete its legitimate attributions, the Positive priesthood must absorb all the other functions, which, as they direct regard man, are in their nature indivisible. Such is pre-eminent the medical—the provisional isolation of which has gradually led to a state of mental and moral degeneration urgently calling for its reincorporation with the priestly office. A portentous venality, combined with irrational speciality, leads in medicine to a blind ignoring of the indivisibility of human nature in the individual as in society. But by virtue of its encyclopedic training, the Positive priesthood will resume the medical office as the inseparable complement of its principal function, function which connects it with human existence under all its aspects whatsoever. Two special precautions, however, a necessary in reference to this complement, or the dignity of the priesthood might be lowered by mere manual and cruel duties.

The surgical department, reduced to its original subaltern position, must be handed over to those best qualified for it, must belong, that is, to the surgical instrument makers, when qualified by an encyclopedic education to avail themselves of the special opportunities afforded by their profession. So again, post mortem examinations will be limited to the functionary who, in the name of Humanity, performs the terrible duty of executing murderers; their bodies will be sufficient for the real needs of science in its renovated state.

This outline of the constitution of the priesthood would be incomplete unless I pointed out the solution, the natural solution of a serious difficulty; the difficulty, viz., consequent on the necessity of the extension of the Positive religion to all portions of the Earth. Evidently, its universal adoption depends on the existence of a common language, as is explained in the fourth chapter of the second volume. Its formation occupied the leading thinker dating from the period at which the Western revolution evoked strongly marked aspirations for a definitive reorganisation. But the metaphysical spirit led to the mistake of not seeing that such a construction must be spontaneous, its only possible bas
far from impeding the moral and intellectual progress of the race, is on the contrary the indispensable condition of its coherence and completeness.

Sufficient for this reaction. On the assumption of it I have now to explain the prerogative by which, from the abstract point of view, I defined the patriciate, when I said that the will, a feature peculiar to objective life, and in which alone that life finds its condensed expression, resides properly in the patriciate.

Nothing can show more clearly in what way this directing power contributes to the true unity of man, which finds its natural presentation in the will as the point of convergence for the impulses of affection, the deliberations of the intellect, and the virtues of the character. Although the convergence be of rare attainment, the necessary condition of its rise and duration is the ascendancy of a concentrated power, the only means of preventing or repressing the divergences attendant on our complex nature. It is on this point that the Great Being most needs the aid of its true servants to remedy the grand defect of its constitution, the composite and subjective constitution, which is the source of tendencies, nay, even of designs, but never of will. The dead, as a corporate existence, exercise a direct control over the thoughts and feelings of the living, whereas Humanity can only impel us to will through the agency of the laws, of her own creation or of nature's, which she gradually establishes. These laws, however, cannot go beyond the giving a general impulse. They cannot inspire us with the steady and definite resolution requisite for the details of action in particular circumstances. It is the will which is in immediate connection with action, and it is in the will that lies the leading difference between the objective and the subjective life.

But to will with effect, the primary requisite is power. Hence effective will is confined to the patricians, as a rule, as the indispensable condensers of the material forces of society, the immediate end of which is the development of man's activity. Their great duty is to subordinate their particular decisions to the general laws, laws free from caprice, which the Great Being imposes on its collective servants. Wealth leads to the non-recognition or contempt of this universal obligation, but not the less does it lie under it, and sooner or later the
aberrations it occasions are corrected by it, so that they do not interfere with its essential object. Will is, primarily, peculiar to the collective life of man, whence it extends to his individual life, from the essential interdependence of the two. In fact men are, in large majority, naturally irresolute, and would remain so were it not for the injunctions of authority, which, with a definiteness lacking elsewhere as a rule, supplement by a natural process the decrees of destiny. Provided that it be ennobled by love, and obedience to man meets this condition better than obedience to the external order, submission promotes individual happiness in as great a degree as it does the well-being of society.

The will, as the characteristic function of the patriciate, requires in the first place certain material conditions, the principal one being the concentration of wealth. The natural tendency of industrial life is, it is true, towards this concentration, but there are certain leading imperfections in this form of existence for which man's providence can and should provide remedies, and the remedies are twofold. In the first place, the manhood of the race will give a systematic form to the tendencies of its childhood, and will judiciously encourage the practice of gifts, gifts both from the state and from individuals, as a means of creating patricians fully inclined to accept the discipline of the sociocratic order. Secondly, the law which makes wealth depend for its efficiency on its concentration implies that each patrician, whether created as above, or born so, extends his sphere of action till it be commensurate with the responsibilities proportionate to his capital. This lessens the cost of administration, but it does more, and the great reason for the condition is, that we multiply the securities, so much needed, for the right use of wealth, in its distribution no less than in its production.

This last result, however, depends more on internal than on external conditions, and the former are most susceptible of modification. The most important point is the emotional part of our nature, in regard to which we must remember, that the personal instincts alone are habitually able to inspire the will with sufficient energy to direct firstly our collective, then our individual existence. It is on this ground that the Positive religion sanctions in the patrician, whilst it disciplines, pride, as the foundation of an authority indispensable to society, whereas
in all other classes pride is misplaced or childish. A competent priesthood will find it the easier to put aside the jealous objections of empiricism, from the circumstance that the patricians, as the ministers of the Great Being, whilst subject to the fatalities of our cerebral organisation, display, as a rule, a less ignoble egoism than that of the objectors. From avarice their wealth protects them; they ennoble labour by their free choice of it as their profession; and that choice is determined by the highest of our personal instincts—the instincts most closely allied to those of sympathy, and most open to social influences. Still, allowing for these natural dispositions, the spiritual power will have to exert itself constantly to modify by faith and love the energetic will required of the patriciate by its mission, with the view of bringing it into as close a connection as possible with the benevolent instincts. The regeneration indicated finds direct support in the concentration of wealth, such concentration strengthening the consciousness of the sway of Humanity, and so evoking generosity of feeling as a consequence of generality in thought and act.

Thus we introduce regularity into the phenomenon, so deserving our admiration, of the constant reproduction, with increase, of the perishable portion of human capital. Yet to ensure a right appreciation of this general result of human providence in its material aspect, I have to show in what way the several constituents of the patrician hierarchy contribute to it.

The constituent elements of the moderating power are each of them by their nature indivisible; as appears from the uniformity of the action of women; from the concentration which characterises that of the priesthood; for any division weakens it by interfering with synthesis. The patriciate, on the contrary, the directing power, is divisible, and must be so, from the speciality inherent in its object. All spiritual authority necessarily originates in a single brain, and radiates thence gradually in every direction whatsoever; that it requires a plurality of interpreters is due solely to its wide sphere of action; in itself it remains homogeneous. Practical power, on the other hand, admits of concentration only in a very limited degree; so limited that each department of industry, looked at as a whole, requires many chiefs, each independent one of the other, each providing for the wants of a
small population. Neglecting this secondary division, due to our weakness as individuals, what we have to attend to here is the main division of the patriciate, based on the differences in its industrial action.

The division consists in distinguishing three essential classes, according as industry, becoming more and more condensed, produces, manufactures, or transports the objects that supply our wants. Hence, as a consequence, the patrician hierarchy, in natural correspondence with the universal principle of Positive classification, the principle of increase in generality and decrease in independence. So viewed, to concentrate the hierarchy in one single chief becomes evidently impossible, not merely for our planet as a whole, but even for each independent state, as no single man could be competent simultaneously to direct its agriculture, its manufactures, and its commerce. Nevertheless the organisation of industry would still be impracticable, were it not that the progress of the most concentrated of its forms, commerce, has thrown up a still more condensed form, which connects with all the other forms by the circulation of values and the development of credit. This supreme degree of industrial abstraction leads to the creation of a patriciate on which naturally devolves the leading influence in the city, and the further function of bringing into active concert all the various states.

And yet the Bank, however legitimate its superiority when compared with commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, can offer no discipline for each several population, much less a rallying point for the different populations. But though in no sense a substitute for the continuous interference of the two elements of the spiritual power, its ascendancy smooths the way for their influence upon the directing patriciate, by concentrating such influence on its highest branch. In fact the encyclopedic education will lead habitually to close relations between the priesthood and the bankers, by virtue of the generality which characterises their operations, so that the banking class will be the civic organ for inaugurating the more important connections of science with industry.

After this examination of the patriciate, we may complete our conspectus of the Sociocracy in the concrete by that of its fourth indispensable constituent. Though it have the most of a collective character, it connects directly with the first, and
yet that first has the most of an individual character; for the proletaries do not, any more than women, form a class, properly so-called. The proletariat is to be regarded as the general milieu from out of which the two special powers take their rise, and which should control the action of those powers, because it constitutes the object of that action.

The real character of the popular constituent is best seen in its inherent homogeneity, which it maintains under the continuous pressure of influences in the contrary direction. The hierarchy gradually established in the patriciate does not apply to the proletariat, and this in spite of the subordination of workmen to capitalists, which has been on the increase ever since the close of the Middle Ages. Difference of employments, nay, even national differences, are lost in the community of position and object. The similarity becomes more easy to appreciate if placed in contrast with the habitual tendencies to rivalry of the industrial chiefs. The only point where it fails is in the division which exists between the agricultural labourers and those of the towns. Now the separation between these two depends not so much on difference of work as on the moral and intellectual inferiority of the rural population. This transitory consequence of the inequality in their advance will disappear under a common education, and when it disappears all proletaries, in town or country, will awake to a sense of their intrinsic uniformity, which has an immediate bearing on the success to which they are entitled in realising their common aspirations.

These considerations may show us that the mass of the people really has no peculiar features, but offers us only the general characteristics of Humanity, masked in its different chiefs by their respective functions. The peculiar office of the proletariat lends itself best to the rise of a community of feeling in regard to the harmony of the state, or of the world; given such social arrangements as shall allow it the proper leisure requisite for it to avail itself of the advantages of its position—the advantages of its disengagement in heart and intellect. Owing to the simple character of their special work, proletaries are the least synthetic of the constituent elements of Sociocracy, whilst their poverty is a hindrance to their being as sympathetic as their chiefs may be. For this reason there will always be a disposition in the proletariat to protest against the
classification by offices here given, and to prefer the classification of individuals by personal merit, independently of social position. Herein lies the main source of the attributes which characterise, and of the dangers which attach to, the influence of the people, an influence which is equally adapted to regulate or to disturb the common harmony, according to the direction it takes.

It should be a leading aim in the institutions of Sociocracy to give a systematic direction to the power of number—a power not unfrequently an element of temporary disturbance, but on which it devolves to give completeness, by its constant intervention, to the social order, the true foundations of which are wealth and wisdom. Such a change in the action of number depends rather on the people itself than on the influence of its circumstances. The first requisite is, that the people of its own impulse renounce the use of force, in all cases confining its just resistance to this or that abuse of authority, temporal or spiritual, to the refusal to cooperate or to the withholding its assent, the sole form of contest admissible in the Sociocracy. In the second place, the people must so far shake off class selfishness as not to look upon itself as the essential object of the whole social economy. The Positive religion will make the people feel that, unworthy parasites excepted, all men are practically fellow-labourers in a continuous work, a work never having for its object any one group, however large, but always concerning the whole of mankind. At bottom, the existing generation labours for that part of the subjective population which is to be, as the part which has been, laboured for it. Continuity, by the systematic teaching of the priesthood, once recognised as superior to solidarity, the proletariat will, of its own impulse, support the priesthood by virtue of the tendency of its form of activity to abstraction and unselfishness, bearing, as it does mainly, on the future of the race.

A further and last requisite for the personal regeneration of the proletariat must be a firmer control over their self-regarding instincts, a greater cultivation of their social. In regard to the former, the main effort will concern the love of gain, to which their position offers a constant stimulus, while it as naturally protects them against pride and vanity, the faults of their leaders, whether practical or theoretical. Once protected as a body from the pressure of want, they will feel
the contradiction involved in the outcry against the selfishness and idleness of the rich, whilst the poor make it the final end and aim of their own exertions to reach the same ignoble state. Guided by the priesthood, the proletaries will stigmatise any tendency to leave the class as a slur upon the dignity of the popular function, and as fatal to the just aspirations of the people, those who desert it invariably betraying it. In the second place, the plebeians—better placed for the attainment of domestic happiness than the patricians and the priests—whilst they cultivate attachment, will add to it veneration for all their leaders, even in the midst of civil or religious disputes. Their position as inferiors may seem to deny them the exercise of benevolence, for benevolence implies protection; yet in reality there is ample scope for it, as it is the Proletariate which presides over the relations of man with the animals. The development of the life of sympathy, in regard to these two instincts, will, more easily with the proletariat than elsewhere, be carried on under the constant influence of women, the best types of the sex being found in its ranks.

These personal requirements met, those of its position in the Sociocracy—the external conditions of its well-being—will be satisfied by the due performance on the part of the priesthood and the patriciate of the conditions which depend on them. These concern first education, next labour, as indicated in the General View and to be completely explained in the present volume. Destined for the proletaries above all, the encyclopedic instruction will enable them at once to give greater value to their own more special action, by virtue of the several connections which exist between industry and science, and at the same time to render more effective their general supervision by appealing to the common doctrine. As for labour, its normal conditions have been adequately stated in the second volume, allowing for the further explanations to be given in the fourth chapter of the present volume. At present I need only add that the guarantees of labour are not limited to the securing the labourer against want, but extend to the moral and intellectual elevation of the proletariat, the object being to allow the universal attainment of family life, in the name equally of order and of progress. The several conditions required for this purpose will be satisfied when, as a consequence of the voluntary acceptance of the sedentary form of human activity, the
quiet of industrial communities will no longer be disturbed by a nomad labouring class, an evidence at once of the neglect of the superiors, of the degradation of the inferiors. The above remarks, however, show that, to attain its complete form, the sociocratic constitution of the proletariat must await the advent of a patriciate worthy of the name, though the regeneration of the plebeians must precede and even prepare the way for that of the patricians.

If we combine our observations, they give a sufficient picture of the Sociocracy in the concrete to support the statement, that the Positive religion in its abstract form is competent to regulate human life in all its parts, through its great fundamental theory, the theory of the Great Being. In this way the constitution of Sociocracy is the continuous development of the sacred formula of Positivism, which consequently identifies private with public life. By the laws of her being, woman gives the impulse, acted on by which the patriciate becomes the organ of order, the proletariat the organ of progress, the priesthood systematically combining order with progress.

On the general basis here laid, and in accordance with the original plan, the second chapter is devoted to an exposition in detail of the worship which has to govern our affective life by forming the regular connection between the objective and subjective stages of our existence.
CHAPTER II.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE AFFECTIVE LIFE,

or,

DEFINITIVE SYSTEMATISATION OF THE POSITIVE SYSTEM OF WORSHIP.

The nature and object of this chapter will be set in a clear light by the introductory remarks elicited by its heading, in that it places, in the system of the Positive religion, the worship not merely before the regime but before the doctrine. This unusual arrangement is a modification of the order adopted in the second volume in the General Theory of Religion (Vol. II. pp. 17–20). It requires then a special justification. For this, I may confine myself to the simple enunciation of the considerations which suggested it to me. The statement of them will, I hope, show the change to be quite legitimate, and the propriety of it characteristic of the true religion.

From an excess of deference for my Catholic predecessors, I was led originally to place the doctrine before the worship, without asking myself the question: Was this arrangement in as full accordance with the genius of the new synthesis as it was with that of the older? An over-estimate of the importance of logical sequence induced me subsequently to adhere to it, in order that the worship might rest on a scientific basis. But the practical application of the original arrangement has gradually convinced me that it was defective synthetically.

In the first place, it is at issue with the fundamental formula of Positivism, in which love precedes order, as order precedes progress; and love is the domain of the worship, order that of the doctrine, progress of the life. In the second place, it is contradicted by the general theory of human nature, which puts feeling above intelligence and activity, the two indispensable servants of feeling. Lastly, it is at variance with the regular course of Positive education, in which the succession is: the education of the feelings, the education of the intellect, and the education of our active powers.
This threefold discrepancy is a sufficient justification of the new arrangement, implicitly announced in the last chapter, when I placed art above science. All who can appreciate the natural pre-eminence of questions of order, will be at once conscious of the importance attaching to this inversion of the previous arrangement, condensing as it does the general contrast between Theologism and Positivism. But, to clear up the point, I must first enter on a direct investigation of the grounds of the original arrangement.

The strongest was the fictitious character of the provisional religion, when worship was paid to imaginary beings, and therefore must have the doctrines to rest upon as the sole source of our knowledge of those beings. This indispensable prerequisite, never systematised in Polytheism, was reduced to a system under its Monotheistic concentration. But in both stages a custom of universal adoption heralded the ultimate predominance of the worship, for it was the worship which habitually gave its designation to the whole religious system.

This first arrangement, then, is to be viewed as a temporary inversion of the normal order, though the adoption of the latter was impossible till such time as our adoration should be paid to a being by its nature within the cognisance of all. It is true that, as yet, the education of our feelings does not propose the knowledge of Humanity as its aim, but the last chapter has so far stated the whole Positive doctrine as to warrant our proceeding to expound the worship without any violation of rational method.

The worship is the best expression of the state of complete synthesis, the state in which all our knowledge, scientific and practical, finds its condensation in Morals. The grand object of religion being to teach us to live for others, it must essentially consist in regulating the direct cultivation of our sympathetic instincts. In fact such would be its sole function, were it not that our physical wants necessitate the addition both of the doctrine and the regime, so by man's own exertions to give an altruistic character to the natural egoism of his incessant activity.

To complete the justification of the order ultimately adopted, it is necessary to give greater precision to the above explanation of the provisional arrangement, by presenting it as simply coeval with Theologism, properly so called, having no
antecedent in Fetishism. In point of fact, religion in Fetishism was worship, and nothing more. It was so absolutely spontaneous that its dogmatic element was a mere matter of intuition; and its regime was limited to the exercise of our sympathies, such was the then rudimentary condition of human activity. Consequently the definitive order adopted by the Positive religion is but the systematisation of the instinctive practice of the first childhood of the race, through the final removal of an anomaly peculiar to its second childhood—and in an eminent degree harmonising with its adolescence.

This fresh contact between the two extreme syntheses which are ultimately destined to coalesce, is possible, from the fact that in both alike the objects of worship are actual beings, and come within our immediate cognisance. There is this difference, that, in the primæval state, adoration was objective and simple, in the normal state it is subjective and complex; but it is a difference which will not affect the character of spontaneity common to the two, when Positive education shall have become sufficiently general. The Positivist worships results, the Fetishist worships materials; but both alike invoke the protection of the same supreme power, only their conceptions of that power are distinct, yet not irreconcilable.

The two forms, then, the instinctive and systematic, under which the religion of Humanity successively presents itself, alike disclaim the inversion, necessitated provisionally by the intermediate synthesis, but disappearing forever in the ultimate combination of the extremes. In both forms there is a natural correlation between the worship and the life, whereas Theologism, even as Polytheism, could never bring the two into satisfactory agreement. The definitive order of the three parts of religion furnishes a decisive proof of the superiority of Positivism in point of synthesis, and justifies the normal condensation of the law of human progress when we state it as an increasing tendency to unity.

In accordance with this indispensable introduction, I have now to treat of religion as consisting in the worship; and in fact the worship would suffice for our discipline, could our external circumstances become such as to allow it. The hypothesis can never be in the full sense realised, but the aggregate progress of mankind is bringing us constantly nearer to it, by constantly lessening the relative importance of material
wants, this change being a consequence of the accumulations due to our foresight, and the increase of power they give us.

Still, in assigning the worship its legitimate rank, we must duly take into account its necessary connection with the doctrine and the life, both at all times indispensable, though in a decreasing ratio, to its fulfilment of its moral aim. The agreement of the three is sufficiently indicated in the Positivist formula, if we take its three terms as answering to the three divisions of time. For love, the immediate source of the worship, in the main has reference to the future; order, the intellectual province of the doctrine, is derived principally from the past; progress, the practical object of the life, stands in closer relation with the present. Now, it is the future which becomes, and rightly, the more prominent consideration in proportion as man's action becomes more collective in its character. During the initiation of the race, man constantly laboured for his successors, in the Family originally, then in the State. It remains for him, in the period of maturity, to guide this instinct systematically, and make it subserve the interests of Posterity in the widest sense.

The paramount importance attached to the future is adequate as the distinctive feature of the normal state of Humanity, pointing as it does to deliberate action, and deliberate action implies constant provision. And yet, at first sight, such a view, whilst ulteriorly pointing to the supremacy of the worship, would seem to make it intellectually dependent on the doctrine, as necessary for the interpretation of the past, on which rests our conception of the future. The apparent contradiction disappears if we distinguish between the analytical and synthetical arrangements, both of which are admissible for the universal doctrine.

In fact, it is on the synthetical form that the worship must rest; it is this which it idealises, and by idealising develops. So little is the analytical a prerequisite, that the worship is a necessary condition of its right formation. Its actual importance is solely an empirical result of the objective character of the scientific process required as a preparation for the Positive method. In his adult period, man will correct the habits provisionally formed, and satisfy reason and feeling alike, by constantly subordinating analysis to synthesis. The two forms of the doctrinal system will then, each in accordance with its
nature, subserve, the one the worship, the other the regime. This allotment of their provinces answers to the distinction between the subjective creation and the objective appreciation of the central dogma, or Humanity. For this dogma remains one and indivisible so long as it is the immediate basis of morality; its division is allowable only when it is looked at as the condensation—a condensation imperatively required—of the whole order of the world.

The explanation shows that the only plausible reasons for maintaining the older arrangement of the three parts of religion are based on a mistake, viz., on the confusion of the doctrine, which is the foundation of the religion, with the system of dogmas properly so called. This latter is really nothing but a systematization of an analytical kind, necessary for our action, but by the nature of the case, secondary to the synthetical construction of which the worship is the natural expression, and therefore it is with the worship that the rational study of Positive unity must begin. However normal this course may be, it would yet have been impossible to take it, had we not made it our object in the last chapter to establish directly the fundamental theory of the Great Being.

To place in stronger relief the unsoundness of the reasons for upholding the present position of the worship after the dogma, it must be added that, allowing them to be valid, they would lead to its being placed after the regime, as there must be a general conception of the regime or the worship would be a failure. The truth is, the worship can idealize the two other parts of the religion when yet undeveloped analytically; all that is required is, a clear synthetical conception of them, such a conception as may guide us in their definitive systematization. All the scientific notions, cosmological, biological, and, above all, sociological, requisite for the theory of the Great Being, have been firmly established in the three preceding volumes on the basis of science formed into a complete whole. This enabled me, at the opening of the present volume, to proceed at once to the construction of the theory itself, a construction which involves the conjoint establishment of the three divisions of religion, with a view to their ulterior separation, under proper conditions, for the purposes of study. Such separate consideration of them is the condition of any satisfactory systematization of the doctrine and the regime, the objective
analysis giving completeness to the subjective synthesis by which alone it could be guided. The outline already given qualifies us however for now proceeding directly to the construction of the worship, as the principal portion of the religion, the portion in which the idea and the feeling of unity find their best expression. At no distant period Positivism will correct in all the provisional habits which are the result of the existing condition of things, with its proud sense of revolution, and its consequent stimulation of the reason of the individual to construct a universal synthesis independently of all collective influences.

The preliminary explanation here ended leads me to examine, in the first place, the destination of the Positive cultus; secondly, its nature in the general; before I give its direct exposition in detail, which must be the great object of the chapter.

We adore Humanity in order to serve her better by the aid of fuller knowledge; worship then cannot but modify, under all its aspects, the existence which, as a whole, is represented in the constitution of the Great Being. But the normal preference of the worship to the two other constituents of the universal religion rests on this ground mainly, that it has for its principal domain the direct and persistent encouragement of our instincts of sympathy, the sole source of the Positive unity. Once grasp this idea of Sociolatry, and we are qualified to appreciate its influence on thought and even on action.

The Positive worship depends for its efficacy entirely on the fundamental law by which the continuous improvement of man's faculties is the result of their judicious exercise. In the adoration of the Great Being these faculties find a simultaneous exercise, as it always expresses our emotions in an idealised form. Practically, the idealisation of our altruistic instincts consists more especially in their purification from their ordinary admixture of egoism. So purified, they become in the fullest sense communicable, and the communication requires the combined and persistent exertion of our intellectual and active powers. It does not, that is, call into play merely the function of language, but also contemplation, abstract or concrete, may even meditation, deductive no less than inductive meditation. As, for expression, when perfect, all the muscles of outward action are brought into use, it follows that communication makes a demand on the whole active life, whether we consider
it in its instruments, the muscles, or in its organs in the brain. Even when the outward manifestation is limited to the voice, without the aid of either gestures or attitudes, no part of our whole active system escapes its influence, from the close connection which allows each several part to substitute its cerebral influence for that of the other parts.

It is in this way that the worship becomes the synthetic idealisation of the life which it is its function to perfect. It consecrates all the parts of that life, by their direct cooperation in the adoration of the Great Being; but it does more, it assigns them all their proper rank, by vindicating the constant pre-eminence of feeling over intellect, of intellect over activity. The power to do this is seen, it is true, in a rudimentary form in the provisional religion, but it is the peculiar property of the definitive cultus, a property derived from its unselfishness no less than from its reality. For the synthesis based on imagination never gave a sanction to the benevolent instincts, nay it even denied their existence when it was condensed into Monotheism, and consequently the worship, in Theology, could but indirectly cultivate them. Their direct cultivation, on the contrary, becomes the leading object of Sociolatry, from the purely sympathetic character of the object of its worship; and the result is, that in the Positive system of cultus we have the best source of the just ascendancy of altruism over egoism.

To complete our view, it is desirable to place in direct juxtaposition expression and action, the object of the comparison being to obviate any charge of mysticism or quietism. The exaggeration of feeling which leads to the neglect of works, in favour of the exclusive cultivation of the inward dispositions, could have no serious importance except in the theological period, and even there it was due rather to hypocrisy than to error, as is seen by its not arising till the decline of the system. If the sincere culture of sympathy, even when indirect, was calculated to be a preservative against this excess, it is one which will easily be removed by the direct cultivation of benevolence resulting from the whole system of adoration.

Over and above the particular results which are the proper aim of action, action has more power than expression to excite altruism through the medium of the brain, inasmuch as it leads to an exertion requiring greater effort. It follows that nothing will ever equal the practice, even with intermissions, still mean-
the habitual practice, of good works as a means of cultivating our sympathetic instincts. Expression has however several natural advantages over action, and therefore, weaker though it be than action, it will always remain indispensable to the full development of our emotional nature.

As expression depends on ourselves exclusively, whilst action is dependent on the external world, action is intermittent, expression alone can be permanent under one or other of its various forms. Again, action is not only less at our command than expression, but is often of a more mixed character. In the first place it almost invariably demands efforts of the intellect or of the body, and these cannot but impair its results in point of sympathy. But in action we have, above all, the complication habitually arising of selfish motives mingling with our benevolent impulses. The only case in which we avoid these two disturbing forces is when the brain devotes all its powers to perfect our unity through the direct expression of love, with no external aim in particular.

A cultus of this kind has to discipline our action and therefore can never lead us to despise it. For it fosters the affections which urge us to the direct pursuit of the good. If our devotions seemed to lead to inertness, such a degradation would necessarily imply a want of sincerity.

If we analyse the moral influence of Positive worship with reference to the distinction between the three altruistic instincts, we find that it is greatest as concerns the instinct which by its organ and its function is in closest connection with the two others. The exercise of the affections which is the direct result of adoration more particularly concerns veneration, not merely veneration for the Great Being, but for its worthy representatives, as is indicated by the prevailing attitude. Now the instinct of veneration is the one in most constant use as the normal basis of true discipline, and at the same time it has the least strongly marked character as being nearly independent of the influences of the selfish instincts. Be it remembered however that it cannot act without stimulating by its action benevolence and attachment, between which it is the connecting link both statically and dynamically. Language bears special witness to this connection in the admirable expression piété (pietas), a term primarily implying respect, but, by a natural extension, embracing all the sympathetic instincts. Again, the two other
altruistic feelings receive direct encouragement from an adoration which has gratitude and love for its invariable basis. Benevolence, strictly so called, implies, it is true, protection, yet it is specially called into play in the Positive worship, most particularly towards the Great Being, not merely through imitation of that highest type, but also as a consequence of the nature of Humanity, who can never dispense with the aid of her servants.

Sociolatry is by its very conception emancipated from the interested motives which were paramount in the worship of Theologism, nay even of Fetishism; yet it grants the self regarding instincts the culture they require for their due cooperation in the practical conduct of life. In the first place, it stamps them with its direct sanction as the permanent basis of the conservation of the individual, and the primary source of the action of society. Secondly, their relations severally with the social instincts procure them in the Positive worship an indirect stimulus in constant dependence on their influence on our sympathies, and therefore not liable to abuse. This combination of sanction and discipline is especially applicable in the case of the higher personal instincts, pride and vanity, as more amenable to social influences. But it applies also to all the other personal motors, not excepting the instinct of destruction, each and all admitting an altruistic direction.

The proper province of Sociolatry is our emotional life, and it is to this that this chapter as a whole is devoted; so that having sufficiently explained its influence on that life in the general, I must now explain its power in reference to intellect, first in the domain of art, then in that of science.

The true definition of the two terms, art and worship, is sufficient to show the inseparable connection between them, a connection recognised as a matter of experience by Theologism, but which it devolves on Positivism to adopt and expand on rational grounds, whilst it accepts the spontaneous character it wears in Fetishism. In art and worship equally, improvement is ever the direct end of all our efforts. In the worship it is always moral progress, and therefore the worship alone can withdraw art from its natural predilection for physical beauty, the beauty most easy to represent as it is most easy to feel. Sociolatry, by displaying the charm inherent in the altruistic affections, throws open to poetry its noblest field, one which
under the egoistic synthesis was necessarily relegated to a subordinate place. Besides this general affinity between art and the worship of Humanity, that worship lends a special sanction to the three modes or degrees of all art of whatever kind, imitation, idealisation, expression. For it imitates the highest type, and yet ever idealises it in its expression of the emotions that type inspires. Conversely, as each act of worship of the Great Being, indirect or direct, is by the nature of the case a work of art, art in its turn is seen to be an essential complement of the worship of Humanity, into which it is once and for ever incorporated.

This incorporation, by relieving art from the degrading anarchy which was the result of its throwing off the yoke of Theocracy, is as calculated to develope as to discipline and ennoble it. The absorption of the poetical into the sacerdotal function, in conformity at once with our instinct and reason, will always obviate the lowering tendency inherent in the exclusive devotion of any life to expression. When the language of Dante and Ariosto shall have become the universal language, having previously been the sacred language, it will have acquired one by one the additional excellences it needs to qualify it as the fit organ of the greater poetic achievements reserved for the ripe age of human genius. But the use of that language will not be limited to such exceptional efforts confined to the more eminent members of the priesthood; it will be the language used by all worshippers of the Great Being in their daily expressions of their emotions, both in private and in public. Its musical capacity will lead as a natural result to its adoption as the regular transition from the fundamental art to the highest of the more special arts which are the complement of poetry, and which in Positive education will become familiar to all as a means of perfecting our whole worship. Whilst, however, vocal expression assumes more and more prominence it must not do so to the detriment of the plastic art, the language of form, less sympathetic it may be under any of its three forms, but more synthetic, as the eye is more synthetic than the ear. Each of the three, and painting more than any, independently of its own peculiar destination, will bring its valuable contribution to the Positive culture, and will be placed within the reach of all by the normal education.

Taken together, these hints are sufficient to express the
influence of Socilatry upon art, reserving further details for
the remainder of the chapter. Its influence on theory calls for
fuller explanation, for, whereas the worship absorbs art, science
can only be absorbed in the doctrine.

For a right estimate of the influence in question we must
apportion it between the method and the doctrine, the two
being too often confounded, even by philosophers.

From the logical point of view, the worship exercises
a greater influence than art, in the proper sense of the term,
though art again is superior to science, as science hitherto
has been almost limited to the use of signs, whereas poetry
combines them with images. In science, the two are found in
combination only in Mathematics, and even there their com-
bination is not anterior to the remodelling of that domain by
Descartes. But, although it is a combination which art cannot
avoid employing largely, its true origin is to be found in the
worship, where signs without images can never meet the
demands of free expression. The spontaneous result of Fetich-
ism, the object of special attention on the part of Theologism,
it is in Positivism more than elsewhere that the alliance of the
two finds its proper place, as the principal objects of Positivist
adoration are in the fullest sense subjective. Still, logically,
the superiority of the worship of Humanity lies in its power, a
power exclusively its own, to perfect the combination of signs
with images by subordinating it to the feelings. Theologism,
it is true, and above all monotheistic Theologism, had naturally
initiated this ultimate convergence of all the general appliances
which could facilitate our mental efforts, but it could directly
bring to bear in those efforts only those affections which are
least calculated to assist thought. It is by reducing to
system, and giving effect to, the instinctive sanction by
Fetichism of our sympathetic instincts, that Positivism alone
organises the true logic, in regard to which the worship
will always be of more value than the doctrine, by virtue of
its offering a better coordination of its three constituent
elements.

If from the method we turn to the doctrine, the worship
cannot retain this superiority, for the distinct progress of the
doctrine must depend on the dogmatic system properly so-called.
And yet even here the efficacy, as an intellectual stimulus, of
worship—and this is true in the highest degree of Positive
worship—cannot but be recognised by all but those who confuse information with intelligence. In fact the worship alone places before us in a thoroughly synthetic form the general body of doctrine, a result which flows directly from the fundamental theory of the Great Being. Sociolatry is the medium by which Morals transmits that theory to Sociology, as a general basis for the analytical investigation which is to furnish the guidance of Sociocracy, the aim being to make religion a reality. But over and above this most comprehensive object, the influence of worship on theory is exerted in a more peculiar sense with reference to the highest portion of the scientific domain. The initial conception of moral laws, and even intellectual laws, practically could not but originate in the impulse given by woman, and in the inspiration of the poet, the natural point of junction for the two being the worship; for science was reserved the discovery of physical laws following in the wake of action. Now the capacity of the worship in this respect cannot but be drawn out by Positivism, more real as it is and more unselfish than Theologism, since in the elaboration of the sociolatrical system it is urgent to keep continually in sight its relations to the feelings and the intellect.

Treating as sufficient this examination in the general of the efficacy of the Positive worship, first as regards the feelings then as regards the intellect, I have to complete the process by extending it to the activity.

Although in this last case it is naturally less efficacious than in the two other, yet it requires a distinct consideration in this place. Attaining supremacy solely in the sphere of feeling, the influence of the worship leaves the development of the intelligence to the dogma in especial, whilst that of the activity is served for the regime. Practical life, however, no less than speculative existence, feels the advantage of the training given by Sociolatry, fuller discipline being the condition of progress in both.

Human action, even when collective, springing originally from personal impulses, requires a constant process of purification, and nothing but the worship can give this. The pride of the practician is a less obstacle than the vanity of the theorician to the due recognition of this want. Although Theologism on empirical grounds met it in some imperfect degree, its systematic satisfaction devolves upon Positivism as the only religion
founded on the true knowledge of human nature. Not to mention that the worship of Humanity concentrates all our practical faculties on the noble object from which the natural preponderance of egoism always tends to divert them, it gives a distinct stimulus to each of those faculties by constant exercise. It is the highest in particular that feels this influence most, since adoration without perseverance either never attains, or loses its moral effect; long attention being required for the original production, as for the continuance, of such effect. The influence of the worship extends to courage also, may even to prudence, as may be seen if we consider the energy and circumspection often required for private no less than for public effusion. The faithful interpreter of all the relations of man, language has, since the Middle Ages, borne witness to this triple influence of the worship, for it applies the name religious practices to our habits of worship, as the exertions which that worship requires, by their greater persistence, though inferior in intensity, constitute a good preparation for active life.

As the combined result of the three estimates just given, we recognise the peculiar competence of Sociology to deal with each several part of the life which it idealises, and by idealising disciplines. So the domain of the Positive worship is seen to be all-comprehensive, as comprehensive as that of the religion of which it is the expression and development; whereas the dogma, on the other hand, and the regime, though not without a general influence, are more limited in their functions. If we complement the Positive by the Fetishist spirit, the various scenes of our individual or our social life admit of effusions or consecrations of never-failing value, as the growth of feeling depends more on inward culture than on its external results. But as a systematic institution, public and private worship can only take account of the more important phases and steps of life. The secondary incidents, the occasional events, for these we cannot provide; in regard to them the priesthood must leave it to the true believers themselves to apply by themselves the rules of Sociolatry. In these less important cases, the fundamental formula of Positivism is a sufficient guide, and the act of worship might often be limited simply to the proper enunciation of that formula. But as an improvement on this mode of expression, signs susceptible of universal adoption may be introduced, and these I have now to point out, proving
sense. For action, properly so called, has as its great object the modification of the world without, and therefore can in no sense form a part of our being when it has ceased to be in direct contact with that world. Intellect and emotion, on the other hand, concern exclusively the world within; their results therefore may pass into another brain, so as to be fused with the results attained by that other brain itself, supposing the two beings to be in sufficient harmony. The fruits however of this internal combination, its intellectual or moral influences, be they what they may, can appear only in the person who is the seat of this fresh combination; so that, in eliminating action from our subjective life, we include under the term that form of action which supplies the means of expression. Still the value of the incorporation as an influence on the brain is not limited to its more immediate domain, the provinces of feeling and thought; indirectly and by its connection with the two others, it should also affect the active faculties. Such a combination must always be binary, but it may be repeated; there may, that is, be a succession of combinations with many different beings, all in their subjective life contributing to guide the objective life of their common organ or representative.

It is in this way that the souls of many come to take up their abode in one brain, by a natural process, supposing its power of sympathy adequately supported by the spirit of synthesis. And the convergence of the many may at one and the same time inspire with life not one brain only, but all which satisfactorily fulfil these two conditions of subjective assimilation. Nor does the fusion interfere with our distinguishing the individual contributions, by the aid of their peculiar influence, though the difficulties attaching to the process must at times leave the conclusion doubtful.

Such are the two phenomena—identification of many with one, and conservation of the many in the one—which constitute the highest privilege of Humanity. The individual brain assimilates the feelings and conceptions of all its peers, in a truer sense than the body assimilates the different materials of its food. On the other hand, he who has left great results requires in others a subjective immortality, so that the work of his life is perpetuated and even extended.

The suppression of action, and limitation of the combination to feelings and thoughts, involves as a consequence the suppres-
existence—beings who are yet unborn. Such is the normal ascending scale of subjectivity demanded by our co-existent relations with the present, the past, and the future, when Humanity, as a conception and as a feeling, attains the proportions which shall meet the requirements of her reasonable service. Although the subjective or indirect mode of existence be also less vivid and less definite than the direct, yet it is consistent with reality in such a degree as to be exempt from any admixture of caprice, and so is qualified to produce the intellectual and moral effects which are in accordance with its object as an institution.

Guided by this series of indications, I have to conclude the explanation of the subjective life by determining its peculiar laws.

These laws are a direct result of the relation of dependence in which the subjective necessarily stands towards the objective existence. As this latter is in subjection to the whole order of things, the former is indirectly under the control of that order. But, for a correct estimate of its dominion over the subjective life, we must distinguish between the laws of man's world and those of the outer world. The indirect or subjective existence is free from all control of physical laws—the laws of life no less than those of matter—whilst it remains in complete subjection to the intellectual and moral order, which consequently stands out in stronger relief therein. Its emancipation from the laws of the outer world applies even to Mathematics, the most general rules of which, even the laws of space and time, would be often found irreconcilable with the subjective state. The full extent of this independence is reached when the representatives of all countries and of all ages take up their abode simultaneously in one and the same brain. Most universal of all are the laws of number, and yet from them too the subjective existence is free, for one and the same mind may be assimilated by several brains at once, and each of them may reproduce it in different forms.

Still, in the midst of all these changes, order, properly so called, that is to say, the arrangement, always remains undisturbed. We never place before, that which comes after, or the converse, neither in space nor even in time. All subjective changes, with no exception for cases of disease, are then, as are all objective changes, a mere question of degree, in obedience
upon feeling, even when apparently limited to the intelligence. For our instincts of sympathy contribute more towards its production than our powers of synthesis, as is seen in the education of the individual, where trust is sufficient for the imparting most of the more important acquisitions, language being the only mental faculty called into exercise. When so imparted, they demand, unquestionably, if they are to bear fruit, intellectual efforts on the part of the brain which receives the communication. But so entirely is the effect of the transmitted ideas independent of the source from which they come, that those of which we know not the proof often inspire greater confidence than the belief resulting from demonstration. On this point we may be content with appealing to the doctrine of the double movement of the earth, as showing that the principal influences of an opinion are not seen in its originators, nor even in the brains which admitted it from conviction without persuasion. Although the explanation is necessary in regard to the intellect, it would be superfluous in reference to feeling, and it is this which naturally holds the first place in the combination due to affection, where the fusion is often carried to the point of leading men, nay even societies of men, to exertion, from their devotion to the type they have assimilated.

The preceding explanation is, in and by itself, a verification of the superiority of the worship in point of synthesis; as in the worship the fundamental dogma of the religion is always taken in its unity, and consequently the most thorough and best directed study of it is naturally encouraged by its systematic adoration.

One last explanation, or the theory might render us liable to the error of exaggerating the independence of the subjective life as regards physical laws. The soul, when absorbed by another, shakes off its dependence on the external order, but that order still affects the image of the being to which the soul belonged. And though the evocation of that image is never absolutely necessary for the securing the intellectual and even moral benefits of the combination, such evocation heightens the beneficial action of the fusion on the brain, which is, without it, limited to the use of signs. Adoration should be as concrete as possible, in order that it may be in the truest sense synthetical. Therefore it is of importance to introduce images.
into it, and in introducing them we respect all the physical conditions which are calculated to give them distinctness and vividness. We may forgive poetry, especially ancient poetry, for asserting its independence by disregarding without any necessity the laws of matter and even of life. There may be occasions in which, in the normal state, we may properly claim the same power; but it inculcates, in regard to the external order, a degree of respect in our conception of it which was not required during the initiation of the race, when the economy of nature was essentially unknown.

This supplementary explanation leads to a statement of the idealisation in which the subjective state is, as it were, condensed. The process consists especially in eliminating defects, not in adding excellences. Our artificial order becomes thus, in obedience to the Positive rule, simply a judicious prolongation of the natural order. Our instinct leads us, in idealising any eminent exemplar whom we assimilate, to free him from the external laws to which he was subject whilst alive. If we would perfect the type, then, we must clear away the several imperfections, moral, intellectual, or even bodily, which obscure his leading characteristics, respecting, however, all the conditions of his real subjective existence. Nevertheless such idealisation by subtraction is not inconsistent with a rare admission of addition; we may add some attributes, especially external attributes, provided that in all cases they be secondary and probable. The judicious combination of the two modes allows the introduction of transfers, which enable the heart and intellect to attain a better conception of the being we assimilate, by supposing events to have happened which never did happen, although it was quite reasonable that they should have happened.

On the basis of this construction of the theory of the subjective life, I have now to enter on the direct exposition which forms the main object of this chapter. But at this point, where I enter on the full exposition of the Positive Cultus, I feel a special want, which prompts me to glorify the angelic being whose inspiration presided over the various steps of its creation. Nine years of uninterrupted adoration—of an adoration which became purely subjective after one year of chaste initiation—have brought with them in their natural course the conceptions which I am now to reduce to system, in such a way as to furnish at once an
evidence of the value, the intellectual and moral value, of a
noble identification.

The worship must be subdivided first into public and
private—public if paid directly to the Great Being; private if
paid to our highest personification of that Being; the mode in
which we perform this pious duty, whether as individuals or as
societies, not affecting the division. Secondly, private worship
naturally subdivides into personal and domestic, the divisions
of private life. The result is a sociocatrical series or progres-
sion, in which each individual soul successively connects itself
with the Family, the Country, and Humanity, with a view to a
regular cultivation of those dispositions from which we derive
a stronger love for, and comprehension of, the Great Being,
both with the object of better service. Nothing but such an
initiation can give a charm and even a sanctity to all the acts
of man, tracing, as it does everywhere, the supreme existence,
when once the Positive spirit has attained its due completeness
by its fusion with that of Fetichism. But this extension of the
sphere of religion—its spontaneous extension so as to embrace
all the actions of life, our daily avocations not less than more
occasional events, and that in a degree never attained by any
of the provisional forms of worship—does not take shape in any
particular institutions, except for such events as are to a certain
extent in connection with the regular epochs of our hu
man life.

The immediate basis of Sociolatry, personal worship, is
characterised above all by the heartfelt adoration of the affective
sex, on the ground of the inherent capacity of every true woman
to be a representative of Humanity. As composite, the highest
form of existence can hardly be appreciated unless personified.
All its true servants are, in their several degrees, each by virtue
of his leading attribute, capable of representing it. But as
sympathy is the great source of unity, and sympathy is strongest
in woman, woman must be the best personification of a being, the
foundation of whose existence, as a whole, is love. Woman, the
spontaneous embodiment of the Family idea, alone can worthily
represent any collective existence; the instinct of the race
made her the emblem of the Country before as yet she had
gained the estimation which should qualify her for the repre-
sentative of Humanity.

Here, then, we have the private source at which each
servant of the Great Being must habitually renew his vigour, the better to fit himself for his social function. The cares of daily life, be it one of study or of action, necessitate frequent recurrence to the ideal life arising out of the worship of Humanity in this concrete form, under pain of sacrificing the soundest foundation of duty and of happiness. This want, by its nature, requires for its due satisfaction a type chosen from the family; allowing for exceptional cases in which, from the family not supplying such type, we are obliged to seek elsewhere a fit representative of the Great Being. Now, in the normal order, we have not this difficulty in choice, as it offers each one a centre for all his affections in her who is necessarily, for each of us, the first embodiment of Humanity. In defiance of the efforts of Theologism, particularly in its monothestic stage, to turn from its natural course the initiation of mankind, the Fetishist spirit, which characterises childhood, always directed the earliest worship towards the Mother. Positivism sanctions and develops this instinctive tendency, and looks to it for the primary basis on which it rears the systematic worship of Humanity. Thus it is in the order of nature that the mother, as a rule, should take the place of our highest patroness by the continuation of her two offices of protectress and example—a combination which in French is happily indicated in the equivocal term _patronne._

The mother, however, the paramount image of Humanity, is not, if she stand alone, sufficient as the habitual representative of the Great Being. For she appeals directly only to veneration, and she expresses only our relations with the past. To represent the future and the present, the mother, as the Primary object of our worship, must have two adjuncts, both equally taken from the family—the wife and the daughter; the wife with the special object of cultivating attachment; the daughter for the culture of benevolence. Personal worship thus embodies and consecrates the three instincts which constitute altruism; the economy of the family; and the whole range of social relations—our relations to superiors, equals, and inferiors. To secure, however, the desired consistency and definiteness for this triple representation of the Great Being, the mother's image must always be the predominant one. The supremacy thus necessarily assigned her shows that in the subjective union, even in its simplest and most perfect form, there exists,
equally as in other unions, the need, common to association in all its forms, of a hierarchical arrangement. So complemented, the patronage of the mother is equally appropriate for either sex, on the condition that each borrow from the other the two supplementary types; the object being a more perfect cultivation of tenderness in men, of energy in women, to remedy the peculiar deficiencies of each sex.

The process of the above construction leads me to explain what is normally the state of each of the three types at the period when the worship has attained its complete proportions; this, as follows from the preceding remarks, will usually not be till the age of full maturity (at. 42). By that time the mother is generally removed by death; the daughter is alive, her type therefore is objective; the wife may be equally either one or the other. Now, far from weakening the effect of private worship upon the brain, this natural mixture of relations strengthens it; the subjective element purifying, the objective vivifying it.

In exceptional cases, in the first place, the family offers, by its very composition, the means of compensating the particular failure of one or other of the three general types. For the personal worship, as normally constituted, leaves out the sister; the want of definiteness and fixity in her position in general not qualifying her to take the place of any of the three more natural patrons. But this very ambiguity usually allows the sister, the least distinct of the feminine types, to be, as the case may require, associated with each of the three others in order to strengthen their influence without dividing the affection. It follows that she may, in exceptional cases of deficiency in the mother, the wife, or the daughter, make good that deficiency, as equally qualified to take the place of either. Even with this substitution, however, we could not meet all the anomalies that will occur, even after the complete cessation of anarchy in the West. There will be extreme cases in which we shall be driven inevitably to seek outside the family for all the types essential to our personal worship, if we have a soul equal to the right construction of a subjective family. A type of each may be found among the protectors, companions, or dependents, whether spiritual or temporal, who habitually group themselves around each of the three normal patrons, and by whom those patrons are linked, through a series of steps, to the whole social economy.
In this system of personal adoration neither the past nor even the future, but especially the past, are as fully represented as is compatible with the nature of the worship, and as is required by its object. As a first contribution to its subjective completion, we systematically adopt, and carry to a further perfection, the plan judiciously introduced by Catholicism as to baptismal names, which it wisely turned to useful purpose by consecrating them to the special honour of the highest types it could. The patronage thus initiated by the priesthood of the Middle Ages is yet, in its full power, adapted exclusively to Sociolatry, for Sociolatry alone allows its extension to all our progenitors. In the sex which has to act and think, each true believer is thus provided from the hour of his birth with two eminent types; one chosen from the theoretical, the other from the practical order; these he coordinates and completes by himself, choosing a third at the time when his vocation becomes sufficiently clear. For the sex in which feeling is predominant, its holy uniformity of vocation allows us to confine ourselves always to the patroness chosen by the mother under the sanction of the priesthood.

In reference to the future, it is less necessary to extend the range of our personal worship; and after the first generation it would seem inevitably to merge in the public worship, which alone appears to be competent to embrace all our successors. Yet it would leave a serious void in the system of Sociolatry, if its most individual form were without any appropriate connection with the second or future element of the subjective portion of Humanity. To supply this is the last step and must be the natural consequence of giving its full efficacy to the patronage of the past, the fundamental element of the conception.

Granting that we are so raised by our personal worship as to be worthy servants of the Great Being, the immortality we shall deserve will extend to the great saints by whose aid we have deserved it. They will be consequently incorporated in the noblest constituent of the future generations, and will receive the daily homage of their best members. Now, such a prospect allows us, even now, a personal sympathy with all our successors, on whom it thus devolves to continue our own most inward worship. The greater our sense of its beneficial power over us, the more we must desire that it survive us, the more affection we must feel for those who shall prolong its existence.
The legitimate hope of such prolongation must be our special encouragement to the service of posterity, as it is from posterity that we expect a reward, the purer as it is not paid to ourselves immediately, but to the beings through whom we deserve it.

At the present day, such a reward would be judged the exclusive appanage of exceptional merit, no religion but the Positive being able, by systematic appeal to social gratitude, to extend its due influence. But when the habits sprung from a selfish worship shall have been overcome by the habits and feelings formed by Sociolatry, all true servants of Humanity will be warranted in aspiring to this legitimate return, by which the grateful recognition of their services goes back to the main source of their own glory. The humblest citizen will be conscious that he can give his patrons a degree of immortality corresponding to his own merits, a degree summarily expressed at times by the fusion of names.

As the last aid to our full appreciation of this indispensable addition to the personal worship, we must not forget that woman is an essential constituent of the fundamental patronage. More keenly alive to the charm of self-sacrifice, woman feels less than man the want of subjective immortality. It would even seem that it is essentially denied her, in consequence of her exclusion normally from public life, the principal source of all immediate claims to honour. But even granting women to be wholly insensible individually to the attraction of a noble eternity, their instinct of sympathy should make them wish their moral providence carried on and not confined to those who are its direct objects. Each woman, then, will look beyond the immediate return for her holy services, and cherish the additional hope of an indefinite extension of those services. This is the normal form of woman's indirect participation in the immortality due to the services, whether of the theorician or practician, in which she cannot take a direct part. It is to the affective sex that the Great Being entrusts its most important and most difficult function, the function of forming all its servants. Each woman will ultimately be judged by her work; she will share the immortality accorded it by the future generations, who will know how to distinguish the merit of the training amidst the imperfections of the result.

Such is the normal basis in Sociolatry of private worship, the adoration, viz., of our own personal patrons, our guardian gods.
basis of the former, which would otherwise be inevitably deficient in depth. Hence, in the principal daily prayer, the effusion is only half the length of the commemoration. But then we divide the act of commemoration into two equal parts: the first, proper to the day of the week, as recalling the associations of that day; the second, common to all the days, in order to bring before us the whole of our social relations reviewed in their true order of succession. Though it thus embraces a larger field, the latter part need not be longer than the former, as in it we use mainly signs, in the other mainly images. Thus, two stages of contemplation, one more vivid, the second more comprehensive, precede and prepare effusion; this, invariably synthetical in character, is directed to the general object of our personal worship. Such is the normal distribution of private prayer into three phases of equal length, which together constitute a progressive action of the brain, in which images, signs, and feelings prevail in succession, the result of the whole being the subjective evocation, which shows that the act of adoration has attained its end.

The image evoked,—the triumph of private prayer,—never can equal, in clearness or in vividness, the impressions of sense. But as this ideal limit of subjectivity is reached, at times passed, under the excitement of disease, so in health we may come more and more near to it, in proportion as by our assiduous practice of daily prayer we increase its power over our brain. Nobler natures may thus procure themselves satisfactions unknown to those who leave their hearts uncultivated, may even to those who address their homage to beings of a different nature from themselves.

To give additional energy to our daily exercises, it is a great point to introduce a judicious combination of the most sympathetic with the most synthetic of our senses, calling in sounds to help forms. Though oral prayer seems confined to social worship, there has always been a sense that the practice tends to perfect solitary adoration, often spoken of as invocation. In any case, however, it suits better with the effusion than the commemoration, the first phase of which, in particular, should be sparing in its use of it.

It follows from the indications given, when taken in connection, that the daily prayer of Positivists is a work of art; each worshipper having to compose his own prayer, as he alone can
commemoration and effusion, as he should be able to avail himself in judicious proportion of subsidiary resources, without there being any necessity for detailed explanation on such easy points.

But these daily exercises, which should have as their central object the chief patroness, are incomplete without a weekly prayer, where the mother's presidency, with the two other essential types as her assessors, allows us to give suitable expression to the respect we owe as individuals to all whom we associate with them. The numerical properties which led the instinct of the race to institute this subjective period, the week, will introduce it into private worship, though in itself more adapted to the public services. On some of these weekly services each one will lay greater stress than on others, and so form for his own use annual festivals, thus completing his personal worship by bringing it into regular relation with the year, the second objective element in the division of time. As a rule, it were waste of labour to institute monthly festivals, as the universal adoption of the Positivist calendar, to be explained later, will bring the dates of the week and the month, the two periods of man's institution, into harmony. In the private, as in the public worship, there are in the normal state only three degrees: daily, weekly, and yearly prayers in the private; weekly, monthly, and yearly services in the public worship.

To ensure continuity in Sociolatry, in our chief daily prayer we must habitually take precautions to guard against the difference arising from its having a different beginning for each day of the week. We avoid this break by adopting an uniform introduction, consisting of a short invocation, in which the principal part is assigned to one of the subordinate associations connected with the previous day. Supposing that day to have left practically only one memory, we shall soon learn to draw the others from the subjective impressions to which the habit of worship will of itself give rise; its more marked influences becoming events to us personally.

In the second place, the power we have of suspending sight at will enables us to give to the images we evoke an increase of vividness unattainable by the impressions of hearing. It is wiser however not to close our eyes in order to secure a clearer internal vision by the exclusion of external objects, if there happens to be sufficient obscurity already. For the effort
required for such isolation diverts a portion of our brain power, whilst that required for the contemplation of external objects is an aid in the internal act of evocation, as it places us in a situation more nearly resembling that in which we received the original impression.

Nor must we omit—and this applies to all forms admissible in personal worship—a precaution suggested by its concrete nature, and as a consequence of the fact that the predominant image, the image of the mother, is usually subjective, as are also most of the others. Removed as she and they are from life, we should not shrink in each case from habitually calling up before us the circumstances of their death. The picture of their last moments should duly enter into our worship of them, the better to represent the natural commencement of the subjective immortality which, under their assistance, we hope to deserve as they have deserved.

With these subsidiary remarks, we leave as complete the explanation of the personal worship, the main source of whatever value attaches to the two other constituents of Sociolatry. The explanation enables us to appreciate more fully the general power recognised above as inherent in the Positive worship, to promote the continuous amelioration of all the three parts of our nature.

Considered as a whole, private worship familiarises us with the process of idealising human existence, for it daily brings before us our normal condition: the intelligence and the activity voluntarily submitting to the control of feeling. Not paid directly to the Great Being, it yet constantly recalls it, for each patron whom we invoke has no claim to our homage but such as is grounded on his qualification to be a representative of Humanity.

The highest value of this worship has regard to our moral advance, whether as concerns the growth of each of our sympathetic instincts in particular, or the general result of the three in their right combination. It draws its inspiration from attachment, and it develops benevolence, as we, the living, become protectors of our patrons who are no longer so. But above all it cultivates veneration by our worship of them, and veneration is the most important of the three social instincts, and the most difficult to stimulate, from the absence of any direct connection with the personal instincts; it has an indi-
rect connection with the two instincts of personal improvement, those of construction and destruction. Thus it is that we best realise the value of voluntary submission, which we find to be the habitual source of the truest satisfactions. As we subordinate in our personal worship more and more the subjective to the objective, in order to facilitate the evocation of the object of our love, it leads us to see that progress, as dependent on our own effort, always consists in the development of natural order.

The influence of the worship on the intellect is incontestable as regards art, each separate act requiring an effort of spontaneous idealisation, and the result being a poetical utterance aided by sound and form. This brings before us affection, as evidently the true source of artistic power, by virtue of the reciprocal action, developed with such a charm in the worship, between the improvement in the pictures we form and the expansion of our feelings. But the influence of private worship as regards science, though less evident at the present day, yet admits of equivalent results, in method especially, but also in doctrine. It makes us feel deeply, how necessary is the aid of affection in the operations of the intellect, in meditation no less than in contemplation, as in both equally it guides us in the combination of images with signs. At the same time it brings into evidence the principal laws of feeling and thought, which it also shows to be in constant dependence on our bodily constitution, a frequent source of disturbance to us in prayer as it is also the source of assistance; and, as it is the one or the other, it gives us a means of estimating the state of our health.

In regard to action, the personal worship tends to direct it to the most important phenomena and those most easily modified, without in any way concealing their unavoidable dependence on the more simple. It calls into exercise, for its own ends, our three practical virtues, and besides this it gives a general stimulus to their growth, as a consequence of the natural influences of prayer. The wish solemnly expressed that we may grow in courage, prudence, or perseverance, tends of itself to make us do so, were it only by the acknowledgment of our actual deficiencies. Solitary prayer does not, it is true, offer as powerful a stimulus as social prayer, but it is better adapted to make us feel the importance of consecrating all our
active powers to the service of altruism. Its tendency is to represent true morality as active rather than passive, disciplining our selfish instincts rather through the cultivation of our instincts of sympathy than by any direct compression.

So far for the basis of Sociolatry, the private worship; there follows the exposition of its second element. This, at first sight, would seem to be distinguished from the two others solely in so far as the Family completes concrete adoration, or initiates abstract effusion, the former of which has its proper place in the private, the latter in the public worship. Its difference from the two in these respects calls for no peculiar institutions, but it does require fresh prayers adapted to the use of the Family, the simplest form of human society. Concrete worship takes in the Family a collective and more comprehensive character, more particularly as regards the past; for the father of the Family invokes, as household gods, the chief ancestors of the Family; and such subjective invocation, with the aid of art, ought to rekindle the sense of fellowship. The priestly function vested in the mother within her proper sanctuary,—the home,—by her position, is a step towards the public worship of the Great Being, whom she represents in the Family by abstract prayers, to a judicious form of which I have directed attention already in the general preface of this work.

But over and above these, the two habitual ceremonies of domestic worship, the intermediate element of Sociolatry admits of an organisation, with quite distinct institutions, on the principle of the systematic consecration of the several phases of domestic life. In the private worship each one places himself under the patronage of the Family, whether subjective or objective. The next step is for the Family, as an unit, to receive from the priesthood, as a religious privilege, the protection of the Country. As the final step, in the public worship the State itself invokes the supremacy of Humanity. Such is the normal progression in which the Great Being sanctifies, in succession, the three indispensible stages of its continuous service, personal, domestic, and civic, by placing each under the protection of the next above it.

There never has been wanting the consciousness that it is necessary, for the due sanction and regulation of private life, to bring it under the natural influence of public life, as the only mode of checking caprice, and ensuring stability. But the
Family being the basis of all other associations must, as such, come under the conjoint influence of the Church and of the State, respectively represented by the Priesthood and the Patriciate. Previous to the separation of the two powers, its relation to both involved no difficulty, whether the ascendancy in society was vested in the priests or in the patricians. It was only however by virtue of their priestly character that the patricians held such ascendancy, as is indicated most clearly in the celebration of marriages, seeing that all authority in society has a theocratic origin. In accordance with both these antecedents, as soon as in Western Monotheism the two powers became separate, it was on the priesthood exclusively that it devolved to place the Family under the regular action of social influences. During the decline of Catholicism this privilege of the priesthood was more and more looked upon as an usurpation upon the civil authority, to which ultimately the ecclesiastical succumbed in the three principal events of private life, birth, marriage, and death. Nevertheless the ascendancy of the civil power would still seem provisional, as connected with the revolutionary tendency to the absorption by the temporal power of the spiritual function.

Positivism alone is able to introduce the normal conditions of things in this respect by giving systematic expression to the ultimate division of the two powers, both of which equally, each in its own way, have to regulate the domestic relations. As every important phase of private life has a direct connection with civil order, it is for the patriciate to prescribe, in reference to it, such legal conditions as are requisite to ensure harmony in action. But again, as the Family is in connection with the Church, it is for the priesthood to develop this connection, and with this object to maintain the due supremacy in the Family of the moral regulations called for by the religious consecration of the domestic relations. Higher in their nature, more difficult, and at the same time not so absolutely indispensable, the conditions prescribed by the priesthood lie entirely within the domain of conscience, supported by opinion, but rejecting all command. On the contrary, civil obligations, as more necessary, and of a less delicate nature, can never be optional. The several epochs, then, of domestic life demand a twofold discipline, the second of the two presupposing the first, the one civil, and alone legally indispensable; and if men brave
obtained by a purely oral exposition. In one sad case of death, we can even show a full adherence to the vow of eternal widowhood, the characteristic feature of Positivist marriage: a young mother so married (hers was the first instance) remains in consequence, to use her own noble language, a daughter of Humanity.

The first sacrament is the solemn presentation by the family to the priesthood of the child it devotes to the everlasting service of the Great Being. Sanctioning the judicious improvement introduced by Catholicism, the Positive religion requires, as the condition of acceptance of the future servant, that a second couple offer itself to complete the guarantees for his due training, physical, intellectual, and moral. The joint action of the natural and artificial protectors is indicated by the fact that each couple shares in the selection of the two-patrons, the one theoretical, the other practical, chosen, under—the sanction of the priesthood, from the public representatives of Humanity in the past.

So long as war was the great form of human activity, the newborn were often rejected, as not properly qualified to take their part in war. But modern civilisation finds a use for all organisations, and therefore the sacrament of presentation will never be refused, with exceptions so rare as to need no provision. Delay of this first sacrament would then only be admissible when the parents, artificial and natural, did not offer the proper guarantees.

This inauguration of a new life is a direct recognition of the principle of Sociocracy; since in it, there is vested in the two families by the priest, as the interpreter of the Great Being, an august office on behalf of the new child of Humanity. The ceremony consists chiefly in a full setting forth of the instructions which the discharge of the function in its completeness requires, its free acceptance being an admission on the part of the parents that private life is in the normal conception subordinate to public. To render more complete the guarantee of society, the priest presents the child to the witnesses, and receives from them a written engagement that, in the event of failure of its proper protectors, they will supply their place.

In the second sacrament, the child, at the age of fourteen, enters on its initiation into public life, by passing from its
amongst the proletaries. This fourth sacrament, then, or destination, is the only sacrament which, in exceptional cases, may be given more than once, although its administration is of itself a preservative against the mistaken wish to quit one's class.

The rudiment of this sacrament may be traced to Theologism, nay even to astrolatrical Fetishism. But, except in the Theocracy, and this is peculiarly true of Catholicism, it was confined to the highest public functions, the ordination of priests and the coronation of kings. As it is incumbent on Sociocracy to fulfil all its theocratic antecedents by giving them a systematic expression, it gives the sanction of religion to all professions indiscriminately; each thus taking the social character which will render it amenable to moral control in its exercise, whatever be the mode adopted for recompensing its services.

This sacrament gives the priesthood the opportunity of marking the close of education, in the special sense of the word, by a solemn appreciation of the duties of the several careers. The servant of Humanity is thus qualified to take his full share in social life by the foundation of a new family.

For such is the object of the fifth and most important sacrament, the exact age for receiving which must remain undetermined; only the lower limit may be fixed, twenty-eight for the man, and twenty-one for the woman. Nor must it be without weighty reasons that the priesthood permit marriage beyond thirty-five in the one case and twenty-eight in the other.

The reader is already familiar with the Positive theory of this fundamental bond, by his acquaintance with the General View, and the explanations incident to the second volume, explanations to be further developed in the course of the present volume. It is known, that the religion of Humanity looks on the establishment of monogamy as the grand result of the transition of the Western world from Theocracy to Sociocracy. In the thirty centuries of that transition this capital institution has approached by degrees its full completeness; it attains it in the Positivist regeneration, for that leads to the voluntary acceptance of eternal widowhood without which polygamy still continues in a subjective form.

This final and indispensable modification of marriage, the natural expression in brief of its true theory, offers a general guidance in relation to the fifth sacrament. That the promise
and think, and need therefore a long and complicated preparation to fit them fully for their normal function. The period of its active discharge is generally but half as long as that of preparation. This sixth sacrament is the solemn inauguration of that period; more than any other it admits of adjournment or even refusal; whilst but rarely may we anticipate, in any considerable degree, its proper date.

In conferring this sacrament, one peculiar to Positivism, the priest warns the servant of Humanity that, whilst previous errors have been repairable, such faults as he may now commit will be decisive as to his incorporation into the Great Being. In it the citizen sees the public announcement of his capacity to discharge in full a function, to the lower degrees of which he was hitherto confined. And, however uniform the career of the priesthood, such is the training it requires, that the full priestly office may not be conferred at an earlier age than that appointed for civil offices.

Through this sacrament we pass to the seventh, in which the practical servant of Humanity, at the age of sixty-three, enters on a wise retirement from active life; retaining, however, a consultative influence, by virtue of which he is distinctly constituted a legitimate auxiliary of a priesthood, traceable in its earliest form to the elders. He ends his active career by the proclamation, in the face of Humanity, of his final choice of his successor, a choice submitted seven years before to public opinion for acceptance or rejection. The office of the priest, unlike that of women, requires preparation, but it approaches closely that of women in duration; so that the seventh sacrament is confined to practical men, the theoreticians of course limiting themselves to those duties for which they continue well qualified.

The eighth sacrament is the substitute Positivism offers for the inhuman ceremony in which Catholicism, forgetful of its aim, but true to its doctrine, made the breaking of all human ties the indispensable condition of an eternity as selfish as it is chimerical. The priesthood of Humanity associates the regret of his fellow-citizens with the tears of his family, and represents to the dying man the existence on which he is entering, as the completion after death of the services by which in life he has deserved such reward. Whilst bound not to foretell the ulterior judgment, the priesthood will, as a rule, hold out the
of presentation, or it may be, with those of destination and retirement.

In estimating the power of these various ceremonies, we see that it depends throughout on the habitual practice of personal worship, whether prior in order of time or coexistent; in default of such habit the priesthood would be unable by the sacraments to excite any but mere transient emotions. But they who, by the habit of daily prayer, are ever ready to feel and to understand the Great Being, will receive deep impressions from these consecrations, sanctifying as they do in combination the life of each, as connecting it by gradual steps with Humanity. Their interdependence is calculated to secure easy access for the influence of each, as each resumes its predecessors, nay even heralds its successors, so as to be a conclusive evidence of adhesion to the true religion.

The family worship rests on the personal, and is a preparation for the public, by its introducing, in an elementary form, the abstraction and the publicity which are the characteristics of public worship. To give an ideal embodiment of Sociology and still more of Sociocracy, such is the aim of our system of Sociolatry, and its power to attain it is seen on a comparison of its three general forms or stages. For the first, purely statical, represents order; the second, mainly dynamical, represents progress; the last, both statical and dynamical, is the expression of the combination of order and progress.

Previous to entering on public worship, the direct worship, that is, of Humanity, I must explain the calendar it requires. Its introduction gives systematic form to a construction begun during Fetishism, and by the necessity of the case preserving its empirical character till the advent of Positivism.

To date, is to distinguish each day by the place it holds in the whole period elapsed since the beginning of the era chosen. If stated directly and simply, it would involve too large numbers, even as regards the duration of the life of the individual, much more in reference to that of the society. For dates then we must, as in abstract numeration, adopt an indirect and compound system by grouping the days, not however exceeding three orders of groups, or we necessarily get confused.

Of these periods, or groups of days, which are at once of man's
institution and natural, it is the smallest alone which hitherto has gained unanimous acceptance by virtue of the subjective properties of the number seven, pointed out in the last volume. Positivism explains the attributes of the week, and by so doing places on rational grounds an institution instinctively adopted, which goes back to Fetishism, even in its nomad stage. But Positivism, whilst referring to the week its whole system of public worship, sanctions and regulates the combination of the week with larger periods, for otherwise the date would still require too high numbers. As far as possible, it connects these periods with the week, in order to facilitate numerical comparisons, and most of all with the view of introducing the greatest possible concordance into our religious solemnities. The two conditions are met by a judicious combination of the month and the year, the two periods in common use, regard being had to their true nature; the month being subjective, the year objective.

All divergences relating to the calendar are to be looked upon as traceable, above all, to a want of the due recognition of this inherent difference of the two periods. It was from not being awake to it that our Fetishist ancestors, when arranging their calendar, had recourse to the external world for the two higher periods, guided by the apparent movements of the moon and sun. The first naturally was in the ascendant during the nomad period; that of the sun during astrology, properly so called, at which time the priesthood made a first attempt at its calculation. But the numerical discrepancy between the two movements soon became evident, and compelled the abandonment of an objective agreement, and the acquiescence in a subjective connection. Such a connection might assume one or other of two forms, each excluding the other, according as one or other period became artificial, though the lunar period was never artificial enough. Hence the two forms of the calendar, the lunar and the solar; in which at one time the year is made to depend on the month, at another the month on the year. Whichever form was adopted, the ground of connection was always essentially the worship, and the worship, since the period of astrology, was indissolubly connected with the week.

It is on the same ground that Positivism rests its definitive arrangement, by at once ratifying the unanimous preference of the western world for the solar calendar, as the direct combina-
tion of the two simultaneous movements of the Earth. Theocracy laid the basis of their general agreement by its institution of mean time; an arrangement completed, during the Western transition, by the intercalation of leap year, first by Julius Caesar, subsequently by Gregory XI. The Positive religion adopts without hesitation this slight alteration of the two natural periods, and its consequence, their perfect agreement; and devotes it to the evidencing the fundamental subordination of the subjective to the objective, a subordination which is the basis of the whole belief of mankind in its final form. In the solar year thus constituted by the Western world, the festivals of Humanity recur with the recurrence of the leading phenomena, the cosmological in the first place, and then the biological phenomena, characteristic of the planetary milieu which Humanity respects whilst she improves it. On various ancestors having thus coordinated the two natural periods, the day and the year, it remains for us to perfect the calendar as an institution by bringing into satisfactory agreement the two periods of man's creation which connect them.

All relation to the moon being set aside, and the month becoming as subjective as the week, we soon come to see that it is necessary to make the month invariably four weeks exactly, which leads to the division of the year into thirteen months. The complementary day with which, on this system, each year ends, will have no weekly or monthly designation, any more than will the additional day which follows it in leap years. Their names will be derived solely from the festivals appointed for them, and in this way we secure the continuity of the Positivist calendar, all its months beginning with a Monday and ending with a Sunday. We may add that it keeps the present beginning of the Western year, so placed as to represent a renovation, since with it the days begin to lengthen in the Northern or principal hemisphere of the Earth. Be they what they may, however, it is not the practical advantages of this ultimate modification of the calendar, so much as the requirements of the worship, which will ensure its acceptance.

Private worship alone would justify the modification, in order to avoid the painful uncertainty to which our affectionate memories are often exposed from the existing discrepancy between the two artificial dates. Though domestic worship less
respect of the different calendars. Yet we cannot at the present
day decide whether the new names will be taken from the
subjects to which they are consecrated, or from the order of
succession, the fortunate circumstance that the two grounds
coincide leaving the question undecided.

To complete this theory of the Positivist calendar, I must
indicate the ultimate form of the idealisation of the several
days of the week. In the first place, it is drawn from their
existing names, which we ought carefully to retain, as they
recall the whole education of the race, instituted as they were
by Fetishism, sanctioned by Polytheism, and adopted by Mono-
theism. Their adaptation to this end is the more valuable, as
it arises from their representing in succession the various
heavenly bodies which are in real connection with man's planet,
for all essential purposes independent of all the others.

The agreement of Positivism with earlier systems on this
point—its agreement, historically and dogmatically—in tho-
rough conformity with the whole conception of the week as
a subjective institution, is yet of too abstract a character not
to require a concrete addition, such addition to be derived
from the transition of the West from Theocracy to Sociocracy.
The addition consists in this, that whilst we adhere to the
actual names as precious, we consecrate the seven days of the
week to the memory of the seven principal organs of that
transition: Homer, Aristotle, Cesar, St. Paul, Charlemagne,
Dante, and Descartes. This series of names adequately repre-
sents the whole of this capital evolution; an evolution peculiar,
it is true, to the West, but deserving to be had in familiar
remembrance in all ages and countries as having been the
indispensable condition of the final regeneration. The intro-
duction of these names is a compensation for the inevitable
imperfection of the abstract worship as regards the concrete
commemoration of the past, the three months reserved for the
past being insufficient for such commemoration. Their adop-
tion will be the easier as it merely requires the definitive
transfer to the days of the week of the highest monthly types of
the provisional calendar, to be explained in the chapter which
treats of the last period of the transition.

Once more, the week admits of an abstract nomenclature,
as we may dedicate the seven days to the seven fundamental
sciences: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Bio-
drawn out by more special festivals, in commemoration of the different degrees or forms peculiar to human association, on the four Sundays of the first month. The first will glorify the union of the race, built on the foundation of a demonstrable faith; the only faith that is in the full sense of the term religious, but which is the outcome of a preparation to which all the fictitious beliefs of Humanity have contributed. The second Sunday commemorates the largest form of partial associations, a form which in the main has become a thing of the past, but of which a visible trace survives in the language common to several populations once subject to one government. On the third Sunday, the festival of the Country honours the political tie in its most perfect form, with a view to foster the feelings of affection between fellow-citizens which will then be deeply felt, as the nations will be reduced within moderate limits. Finally, on the last day of the month of Humanity, we pay homage to the primary form in which Families unite, the Township, the closest union of man for practical purposes, so happily expressed by the French word commune.

During the second month, the month in which will be concentrated the fifth sacrament, Marriage, the several forms of the conjugal union will receive honour. The first Sunday will be devoted to Marriage in its complete form, showing how greatly the harmony of the married couple is confirmed and increased by their concert in the due discharge of the holy function vested in them as regards the child of Humanity. It is, however, the second festival of the month that will represent in its truest character the conjugal union, by its recognition of the superior perfection of chaste marriage; where the union is the union of the heart only, procreation being formally reserved for those best qualified for it. We have in the last masterpiece of the great Corneille the anticipation of such an union; and it will lose the anomalous character now attaching to it, when Positive education has told sufficiently on the two sexes, without waiting for the realisation of the hypothesis of the last chapter, by which propagation is limited to the woman. The third Sunday will be devoted to a form of marriage which will be a rare exception; the form in which imperfect agreement is all that is attainable, by virtue of a deficient parity, a disparity naturally of age rather than of rank, never of wealth, as is evident, since dowries are abolished.
of Humanity will place in its true light this institution: an institution which, meant to perfect the family by binding it to society, could not be on its right footing whilst slavery persisted. Since the establishment of personal freedom it has been impossible, owing to the anarchy of the West, to estimate aright this indispensable link between man and man; the great misconceiving it in their pride; the inferiors in their insubordination. But when all life is viewed as an honourable service, it will be but natural to respect the families which offer, as their best contribution to the conservation and advancement of Humanity, their voluntary services in aid of her individual interpreters or ministers. On the first Sunday of the sixth month, we shall honour domestic service in its permanent and complete form, in which it more particularly applies to patri- cians, but never on conditions incompatible with the indulgences of conjugal and maternal affection, and to be given only where an improvement in habits, feelings, and position shall forbid service where it is undeserved. Such a voluntary fusion of two families will often be so complete, that the priesthood, when proclaiming the glorification after death of one of the two, will give the other a share in its consecrated tomb—in order that both together may receive the homage of their respective descendants and even of their fellow-citizens. The peculiar services of clerks call forth less self-devotion, as is indicated by their separate dwellings, yet when permanent it is a relation to be commemorated on the second Sunday in this month; the other two weeks of which will distinguish in like manner the temporary service of pages and apprentices. By its comprehension of these last, Sociolatry will show the universal applicability of a position which has been, dating from the Middle Ages, connected with the training of the individual, even in the case of patricians, and has been at all times calculated to develop, on both sides, the three social instincts.

Thus, in the first six months, the public worship of Humanity expresses in an ideal form the fundamental nature of the Great Being under all its essential aspects; it devotes the three months which follow to the commemoration of the principal phases of its necessarily gradual evolution. The festivals, hitherto statical in character, now become dynamical, but not therefore less abstract; for were they otherwise, not to speak of the impairment of harmony in the system, so short a
period would not afford scope for the adequate glorification of the past. Still, the better to fulfil this condition, it is desirable during these three months, as a preparation for the abstract ceremony of the Sunday, to fix a concrete one on the Thursday, in honour of the highest representative of the period under consideration.

This commemoration as a whole would appear most appropriate to the opening period of our maturity, to recall it to the sense of continuity which has been more and more falling into abeyance, especially in the West since the advent of Monotheism. And yet the most distant future will never, nor in any place, cease to commemorate the indispensable initiation of the race, limited though it was in its later stages to the nations on which devolved the task of shaping the whole social economy. Not only will the training of the individual in all cases repeat the leading features of the preparation; but the heart and the intellect will agree in honouring the first life of the Great Being, the perfectibility of its nature ever reminding us of a beginning which is a title to glory.

No period of man's existence on earth but must find its place in the worship, and yet the historical division of that worship will never receive any considerable addition; hence even now we may give it its definitive form. For, the normal state once fully established, its onward movement, continuous though gradual, will necessarily escape the marked changes of the preparatory period. The stronger the stimulus given by this dynamical period to the instincts of progress, the more complete also must be its control of those instincts, by implanting the conviction, that the anarchical advance of our educational age subsides, in the normal state, into the development of order with the aim of consolidating it.

The limits then of the historical portion of Sociolatry are irremovably fixed, and I have now to explain in detail its three constituents.

The definitive fusion of the Fetishist in the Positive spirit does not supersede the necessity of an historical commemoration of the infancy of Humanity. In fact, the absorption of Fetishism is limited to its principles, and does not extend to its institutions, which perished utterly with the state of things to which they were adapted. Regarding Fetishism as sponta-
neous Positivism in its earliest stage, the systematic worship of Humanity devotes to it the whole of the seventh month.

The nomad period was longer in duration than any other, and laid the main foundations of all human education; this we must not forget; yet as by the nature of the case the documents relating to it are inadequate, we only give the first week to its distinct commemoration. The object of the Sunday’s ceremonial will be, to produce a just sense of the benefits, transient or permanent, conferred on the race by this initial period; a period with which we shall always feel a sympathy, as recalling our natural fondness for the wandering life of the hunter and the shepherd. The Sunday, however, were incomplete without the preparatory festival on the Thursday, devoted to the capital fact of man’s alliance with the sociable animals, special honour being paid to the association, in succession, of the dog, the horse, and the ox—the three types round which the rest may be grouped.

During the second week, we commemorate the irrevocable adoption of the sedentary state, the state, that is, which was indispensably requisite as the condition of all ulterior advance, intellectual and even moral advance, quite as much as material. The ceremony of the Thursday is a special homage to Fire, the institution on which depended primarily our progress in all three respects; language perpetuates the memory of its introduction by borrowing from it the words which in ordinary use are characteristic of existence and religion, Foyer and Fête. Then on the Sunday, agricultural life, the common basis of industry and of commerce, has its ideal presentation, greatest stress being laid on the charm of its earliest spontaneous beginnings, its poetical and moral attraction, where the milieu was favourable to a prolongation of the Fetichist state.

The second half of the month must be given to systematic Fetichism, of which Astrolatry is the characteristic, and the origin of which is in the sedentary life, for that gave rise to the priesthood as a development of the earlier institution, the elders. Though this period was naturally less durable than its predecessor, its commemoration deserves an equal space, owing to its being the indispensable source of Theologism, under the military form as well as under the sacerdotal. When it glorifies the results of Astrolatry, Sociolatry will not fail freely to express the lasting regret due to the violent extinction of the
great, if primitive, astrolatrical societies in Malay and America. The third Thursday of the month of Fetishism will prepare the way for the commemoration of its systematic form by a festival in memory of the worship of the sun, such a festival as may appeal to the heart in favour of the deep reasonableness of that worship, purely instinctive though it was. So prepared, the ceremony of the Sunday will be the abstract glorification of the astrolatrical state, the true source of the polytheistic Theocracy; which lasted even throughout Monotheism, down to the rise of the doctrine of the earth’s movement, the immediate basis of Positivism. This first historical month closes with the commemoration of military Astrology, which, when it found a milieu suitable to it, was the preliminary of the system of conquest peculiar to Polytheism. On the Thursday previous to its commemoration, a special festival is allotted to the introduction of iron, the large use of which was originally for military purposes, but which was ultimately destined to play the leading part in our industrial progress.

All the main aspects of its preparatory period thus recognised, the way is clear for the commemoration of the second childhood of the race, the period of Polytheism and War; and to this the eighth month is devoted; setting apart the first Sunday for the veneration of Theocracy, to which we ascribe the most decisive influence in our initiation. The preceding Thursday commemorates more particularly the institution of Caste, the general basis of the theocratic system, and destined, notwithstanding constant modifications, to be the essential guarantee of order until the advent of the definitive Sociocracy. The caste system will be an object of just sympathy with our most remote posterity, a sympathy finding vent in the recognition of the affinities due to similarity of profession, though no longer needing the corroboratation of hereditary transmission.

Its due honour paid to conservative Polytheism, in the second week, we begin, on the Thursday, the commemoration of intellectual Polytheism, with the festival of its three highest artistic organs: Homer, Æschylus, and Phidias. From this introduction we pass, on the Sunday, to the abstract glorification of its whole poetic movement, which, breaking the yoke of Theocracy, then become retrograde, worthily inaugurated the Western transition, not without a presentiment, even at that period, of Sociocracy. As a preparation for the celebration of
the strictly intellectual advance, the following Thursday is the festival of its seven principal representatives; first its philosophical types: Thales, Pythagoras, and Aristotle; then its scientific: Hippocrates, Archimedes, Apollonius, Hipparchus. The Sunday will then suffice for our abstract idealisation of the intellectual construction, which, though provisional or introductory, was yet in the strictest sense decisive; for the genius of the West made it the inauguration of the systematic scientific creation, needed as the preamble of the Religion of Humanity. But on the morrow, we must place an extraordinary festival in honour of the battle of Salamis, and Themistocles as its personal representative, with Alexander to complete the conception; thus satisfying the full claims of intellectual Polytheism by celebrating the struggle which it could not avoid, and preparing the way for the glorification of social Polytheism. We enter on this, the following Thursday, with the festival of the three great types of the military society: Scipio, Caesar, and Trajan, worthy to be the precursors of Sociocracy by virtue of the high value they set upon peace. This enables us to consider the last Sunday as sufficient for the abstract commemoration of the Roman system of incorporation, the system under which the noblest of our ancestors prepared the way for the direct introduction of the normal order, by their preference of action to speculation, of public to private life.

The proper object of the ninth month is the glorification of the adolescence of Humanity; yet it must begin by honouring the peculiar form of Monothéism which arose as an offshoot of the true Théocracy; and that because in the East no less than in the West it has been intimately connected with Monothéism in its typical form. As a preliminary to its idealisation, the first Thursday is a festival in honour of its highest types: Abraham, Moses, and Solomon, the only personal representatives of the theocratic state in the imperfect presentation of it consequent on the monotheistic alloy; for their noble abnegation of self allows no pure theocratic types. On the following Sunday, the worshippers of the Great Being will, to the end of time, recognise with sympathy the services of the devoted Jews, not unprepared, as a natural result of their dispersion, for the acceptance of the religion of Humanity, as alone able to honour and raise their race, by making reparation for the stigmas fixed on it by ingratitude.

For the adequate idealisation of Monothéism in its defen-
the Thursday be devoted to the most complete representative of that movement, the incomparable Frederic. But this capital commemoration, in which we have a foreshadowing of the great crisis, must be preceded by the glorification in succession of the two types of the intellectual movement of modern times, Dante and Descartes.

Such is the ideal presentation in Sociolatry, as each year returns, of the whole initiation of the race, in a combined series of twenty-one concrete, and twelve abstract, festivals, during the three historical months. The vast picture, the artistic expression of the third volume of this work, will be at all times quite within the comprehension of all who have duly undergone the encyclopaedic instruction, and listened consequently to the exposition of the philosophy of history. The inevitable inequality of the division of the thirty-three dynamical festivals between the several phases of the past on which we rest, is no element of discordance, where the conspectus is one in which the room given to each phase depends not on the length of its duration, but on the amount of movement. Thus, although the glorification of the theocratic period is limited to two festivals, the very condensation is a new homage to the profound stability of the only complete order attainable during the whole earlier life of the race. So, too, when we limit to two festivals the idealisation of Rome, we do but give relief to the admirable homogeneity which is stamped on the most decisive of the three phases of the Western transition. Prior to the universal adoption of the Positive worship and the Positive education, the system of festivals here given will be sufficient to make ready for the Religion of Humanity all who assist at them, as well as the young children of true believers. Nay, its power in this respect will naturally manifest itself so soon as Sociolatry shall be inaugurated in Paris, for thither as to the world's capital will come from all parts all who thirst after religious culture, so to secure expansion, deliberately, for their instinct of continuity.

Examine the conspectus, and we find the definitive combination of Fetichism and Positivism solemnly ratified. For the infancy of mankind has as many festivals as the whole of its childhood, though Fetichism could leave no individual name connected with it. Its concrete festivals have a character, from the dogmatical not less than the historical point
In the eleventh month, set apart for the intellectual Providence of Humanity, we begin its glorification from the lowest stage; we begin, that is, by honouring it in its incomplete form, as it is seen in the man of science or the artist, disqualified for the priesthood by their deficiency in tenderness or energy. Such cases, hitherto the rule, will become, it is true, in Sociocracy as exceptional, or even more exceptional, than under the Theocracy; still, at all times they will be frequent enough to deserve a separate consecration, one honouring them, but marking at the same time their imperfection. This homage to the pensioners of the priesthood is paid on the first Sunday; on the second, a public recognition will do honour to the preparatory degree, by which the theorician, whose sacerdotal vocation has been recognised, aspires to membership in the Positive clergy.

With regard to these two preliminary modes, it will be well, as a compensation for the discredit attaching to their imperfection, to institute on the two first Thursdays in the month two accessory festivals, one in honour of art, the second in honour of science.

The third week introduces us to the priesthood in its definitive form, when we honour its secondary degree, the Vicariate, in which the clerk shares in the intellectual functions—teaching and preaching—but is not admitted as yet to the social functions of consecration or consultation. Vicars are, as such, irrevocably members of the priesthood; but there is an indistinctness of character attaching to them, which makes any additional festival unnecessary, allowing for individual distinctions possibly called for by the development of the universal religion. So ushered in, the direct glorification of the full Priesthood occupies the last Sunday of the month, the inherent homogeneity of the priestly functions rendering unnecessary any distinctions between the priests, even as regards the High Priesthood. Only on the preceding Thursday, there should be a festival in special honour of Old Men, the natural precursors, and ultimately the regular assistants of the priesthood.

During the twelfth month in the Sociolatratical system, we honour the Patriciate in its four general divisions as the organ of the material providence of Humanity. These festivals, as a whole, ought to give artistic expression to the feelings of
of great wealth, a function which cannot but render its concentration more easy to justify.

The final step in the ideal presentation of the general Sociocratic constitution is the devoting the last month of the Positivist year to the honour of the Proletariate, the body in which we see, by the necessity of the case, the homogeneous and complementary organ of Human providence. Its natural tendency to exercise a constant control over the more special powers will be so drawn out by the identity of education, that varieties of industrial employment, a consideration of minor importance yet to be taken into account, will never be able to impair its unity. The distinction between the four festivals of the month depends not on difference of occupations, but on the mode or degree in which the character of the class is represented.

Hence the first Sunday honours the Proletariate in its complete form, the form in which industrial activity is found in natural conjunction, not merely with the moral development of the citizen or the head of the family, but with the culture of the intellect,—its scientific, and even its esthetic culture. This, the leading ceremony of the month, to stand in its true light, requires, on the preceding Thursday, an introductory festival in honour of Discoverers and Inventors in general; Gutenberg, Columbus, Vaucanson, Watt, and Montgolfier, being taken as special types—types sufficiently diversified to represent the class. In taking them all from the first stage of existence of the Great Being, we imply that the second stage admits of no such personal distinctions. This second life has to regulate—this is its great task—the powers which the first threw up; and therefore it is the social function of the Proletariate, rather than its industrial service, to which attention must be given; not but that there will be a continuous advance in this latter, though less and less importance will attach to such advance. The aspirations of the proletaries after personal distinction will for the most part have their source in public life, depending on their right interference as indispensable auxiliaries and legitimate controllers of the two special powers. The preparatory festival must however make it clear that it is as proletaries that the discoverers are honoured, even when they seem to be of the Patriciate. It is indeed of real importance that when in the worship we give the regime
sum of imperfections to which Humanity is liable. In the Middle Ages, Mendicity received its due tribute of honour, for the Priesthood, in its wisdom, knew how to ratify the instinctive verdict of mankind; à fortiori must it receive it in Sociolatry, as a more sympathetic and more truly synthetical system. The anarchical repugnance to accept this conclusion shown by metaphysical empiricism, is but an evidence of an erroneous estimate of the social function of the Proletariate. Separate the function of the citizen from that of the artisan, and we shall at once feel that, in spite of their coexistence as a rule, the first may deserve honour when the second is entirely in abeyance. Nay, we may consider this festival as already initiated by the admirable idealisation which is the salient feature in one of the numerous masterpieces of the greatest poetical genius of this exceptional century.

Nor are we limited to this anticipation of a poet's instinct, the more conclusive, it must be allowed, as originating in a milieu of industrial egoism and Protestantism, for the past offers us a direct and collective type of Mendicity in the remarkable institution of the Mendicant orders. The admirable founder of that institution must have a special glorification, on the Thursday before the abstract commemoration of the passive element of the Proletariate—the complementary element of which he will ever be the patron Saint, as the characteristic representative, under the form adapted to the thirteenth century, of its social action. From the historical point of view, this festival gives us indirectly an opportunity of honouring as it deserves—and it is the only one which throughout was honourable—the effort to arrest the irrevocable decay of Catholicism, an effort however destined, such were the conditions, to failure.

The Positivist year ends with consecrating its complementary day to all the dead, the rulers of the living with an indispensable and inevitable sway. This concluding festival recalls the similar institution of Catholicism, and in doing so evidences the superiority of the Positivist systematisation as alone able to make the commemoration completely universal in its comprehension. Connected by feeling with the ceremony of the eve, it forms a natural introduction to the festival beyond compare, which on the morrow must open the new year by the direct idealisation of the love of Humanity.
Finally, the system of Sociolatry fills up its last void, by placing at the end of each bissextile year a festival in honour collectively of the women who have as individuals attained holiness. The affective sex, it is true, neither allows nor requires individual distinctions, save such as arise from its efficient discharge of its domestic duty, yet the tendency of the encyclopaedic education is to increase the number of exceptions even in the sphere of action, still more in that of thought. There would be incompleteness, then, in the public worship of Humanity, did it not remind us, by a supplementary festival every four years, of her highest representatives, some of whom will attain an individual glorification.

Such are the eighty-one solemn festivals, secondary or principal, which constitute the worship annually paid to the Great Being by its servants assembled in its temples. Well calculated to compensate the effort of abstraction required in the direct worship of Humanity, such public assemblies cannot but increase the moral effect of the worship by kindling the natural sympathies of the worshippers, each looking on the body of his fellow-worshippers as representing the supreme existence. The influence, however, of such collective worship would be but weak, appealing rather to our sense of beauty than to our affections, were there not the habit of solitary private prayer. Not to dwell on the fact that the personal worship is by its nature the basis of the two others, it alone is in the fullest sense free—a circumstance which must largely increase its natural power. Although the Priesthood may dissuade the Patriciate from compelling, in any degree, attendance on religious worship, it cannot prevent public opinion from blaming those who abstain from the social sacraments or the public festivals. We must not then, in the splendour of these last, lose the sense of the superior value of daily prayer, in which each believer becomes his own priest, and labours in freedom for his own moral improvement, through the veneration he pays in secret to the representatives of the Great Being within his family circle. Conversely, however, we must not lose sight of the fact, that it is only by regular participation in the collective services that we can secure our private worship against a danger to which it is exposed, of evoking tendencies to mysticism, and even selfishness, tendencies which would direct to the part the worship due to the whole.
To facilitate the comprehension of the general arrangement of the public worship, I have given it in a summary form in the subjoined table (Table A), where the words in italics and in parentheses indicate the subordinate festivals. This series of solemnities honouring every aspect of human life, cannot but have a powerful attraction for minds capable of grasping the conception in its fullness. The test, however, of their having had a deep moral effect, will be if each leaves on those who have assisted at it a feeling of regret that a year must pass before it returns, rather than a desire for the next in order, from a craving for fresh artistic emotions.

In completion of the exposition of Sociolatry two subsidiary explanations must be placed here; their earlier introduction would have been an interruption. The first concerns the edifices devoted to the Positive worship; the second the artistic aids it requires.

In the 'General View,' the symbolical representation of Humanity by sculpture and by painting is adequately set forth. Its architectural expression it is not possible at present to determine with equal clearness, be it because of the slower growth of the architectural conceptions proper, or that they depend on a much larger cooperation for their execution. Positivism is so real, and the times are so ripe for it, that suitable temples will rise more quickly than did the churches of Catholicism, for Catholicism was in open opposition with the world it came to modify. Still at the outset, the worship of Humanity in the West must be carried on in the buildings consecrated to the public worship of her immediate predecessor. They will be more easily adapted to Sociolatry than the temples of Polytheism could be to Monotheism. For the instruction and preaching introduced by Monotheism required a different form of building from that which sufficed for the earlier ceremonies, which were mainly in the open air. Positivism, then, need not introduce such sweeping changes in religious architecture as Catholicism was obliged to do; still its festivals, from their referring to the external world as well as to the world of man, will require alterations not to be specified at present.

Yet one point I may even now determine, the regular position, viz., of the Positivist temple—nay, even the general features of its internal arrangements—both the one and the
other being implied in the nature and object of the worship of Humanity. As it is the dead who deserve to live that are the chief constituents of the Great Being, so its public worship must be performed in the midst of the tombs of the more eminent dead, each tomb surrounded by a consecrated grove, the scene of the homage paid by their family and their fellow-citizens. In the second place, the universal religion will adopt and extend one of the best inspirations of Islam; it will direct the long axis of the temple and the sacred wood towards the metropolis of the race, which, as the result of the whole past, is, for a long time, fixed at Paris. This touching convergence, a convergence which the Kebla of the Mussulman applies to all the attitudes of worship and to the body after death, will naturally be similarly extended in the only worship which admits of entire unanimity. Later in origin and more social in character than the faith of the West, the Eastern faith was naturally a better manifestation of the direct aspirations after true universality.

As for the internal arrangement of the temples of Positivism, two directions only can be given at present. In the first place, the choir, where stands the pulpit with the statue of Humanity over it, must be able to hold a seventh of the audience, in order that the interpreter of the Great Being may be surrounded by the eminent women who are its best representatives. Secondly, each of the seven side chapels will contain the bust of one of the thirteen principal organs of the education of the race, in the midst of the busts of his four greatest subordinates, the fourteenth chapel being reserved for the group of representative women.

The foregoing exposition shows the boundless field opened by the Positive worship to art, not merely to the fundamental art, poetry, but to the subsidiary arts of sound and form. So extensive is the field, that at first sight it would seem to require a special class; the objection is, that such a class, however subordinate, would trench on the dignity of the Priesthood, and might compromise its unity. But if we emancipate ourselves from the peculiar habits of the West, we shall be led to acknowledge that all the needs of Sociolatry may be met, without devoting any one to the exclusive and constant exercise of the faculties of expression; for when made paramount they are no less degrading to the individual than
pernicious to society. For the Priesthood may produce all the compositions, poetical, musical, or even plastic, required for the worship, by granting partial and temporary dispensations to the priests qualified for the particular work required, just as in the case of scientific labours. As for the social execution of the dramatic or musical portions of the public festivals, the completeness in point of art of the common education will so qualify every believer to take his part in it, that the concert of all the worshippers will ensure an effectual expression of the emotions beyond what was attainable in the Middle Ages.

This chapter, viewed as a whole, ratifies, as a natural result, the systematic anticipations of the introduction as to the definitive arrangement of the three constituent parts of Positive religion. We can now see that the preeminence of the worship over the doctrine is completely in conformity with the nature of Positivism, and secures its attainment of its objects. Throughout the exposition here ended, there has been no want felt of the analytical order which we must adopt in the next chapter, in examining the doctrinal basis of the system, the synthetic conception of which suffices in Sociolatry.

Were it not that Humanity is so situated, physically, as to require the constant exertion of intelligence and activity, the direct cultivation, in the worship, of our altruistic instincts would enable them to triumph over the egoistic, in spite of the greater inherent strength of the latter. But the worship which was enough, while the second stage of human existence had not as yet called into activity our intellectual and practical powers, needs in our maturer period the aid of the doctrine and regime, to protect our moral nature against the disturbing influences attendant on our advance in thought and action. Hence the necessity that now lies upon me to explain how, on the basis of the ideal presented by Sociolatry, sociological thought and sociocratic action ultimately harmonise, in the service of our moral advance, these irremovable conditions, by stamping a collective character on an evolution which in its earliest stages was individual.
CHAPTER III.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL EXISTENCE OF MAN, RESTING ON THE RELATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE ORDER OF THE WORLD; OR, DEFINITIVE SYSTEMATISATION OF THE POSITIVE DOCTRINE.

To subordinate egoism to altruism—such is in its integrity the problem for man to solve, and its solution is seen on inspection to depend principally on the right use of the intelligence. His activity is in all cases neutral, does not distinguish, that is, between good and evil; has no aim beyond itself; and as such may be led to prefer the service of our social feelings as offering a wider field than the personal. The intellect has less energy, and would willingly limit itself to the efforts imposed on it by our personal wants; it shrinks from the greater exertion demanded by the service of society. Yet this social destination alone can satisfy its aspirations, by consecrating it as the minister of order, towards which its bent carries it. Such consecration, however, is powerless to overcome the natural torpor of the intellect, unless feeling have previously drawn out the craving for unity. It is on this ground that the love of the beautiful must guide us in our search after the true, quite as much as in our attainment of the good. The ideal rests ever upon the real, but does not therefore require an analytical knowledge of the real; the synthetical conception is sufficient.

Such is normally the position of the intellect when approaching the study of the doctrine under the impulse derived from the worship. The regular development of the emotional nature has cultivated the taste for, and the instinct of, order, by making us feel its power to confirm love by submission; submission alone being able to preserve love from the mutability consequent on the multiplicity of impressions. That this state of mind prevail,—this should be the result of the arrangement I have definitively adopted for the three parts of the Positive
religion. For it is a state which represents the still stronger tendency in the same direction which will be the natural outcome of the ordinary course of the common education, its scientific portion not beginning till after the previous training of the feelings, nay, even of the imagination, derived from the family life. The young disciple will have already received two of the social sacraments, and often gazed with admiration upon the public festivals; above all, however, by the habit of private prayer he will have attained the frame of mind requisite for the right reception of his abstract education. Thus taught by personal experience the importance of the order which he has prescribed for himself voluntarily, he is subsequently led by the same to respect, nay, even to love the laws which are beyond his control, be they the laws of external nature or of man's institution. Preserved from the impulses of selfishness by having his wants supplied by the providence of others, he is so placed as to be able directly to appreciate the value of the sympathetic instincts, and to feel deeply their natural connection with the habits of synthesis.

Thus in the normal state, the study of the dogmatic system will always be entered on in the state of heart and intellect most favourable to its producing its full results. The efforts now required to place the student at the true point of view intellectually will be then superfluous; he will have reached it in the natural course of things. The power of the brain may then be brought to bear at once on the study of the objective analysis, the object of which is to develope and consolidate the subjective synthesis which flows from the fundamental principle and is embodied in the worship. Without fear of any misdirection, the doctrine will always be studied with reference to its two objects: the perfecting the worship; the introducing the regime. It will be felt that the great aim of our intellectual existence is the establishment of a more and more complete unity, for the individual as for the society, and the means, the strengthening the sympathetic instincts, which are the source of unity, by the synthetical conceptions which are its basis.

To form a better idea of the true destination of the doctrine, we must begin by supposing a sudden interruption of the order of the world, so far at least as we can do so without absurdity. The hypothesis may take regular shape by availing ourselves...
of the ordinary distinction of moral, intellectual, and physical laws, the conceptions of which come spontaneously and in succession, not simultaneously. So necessary are the moral laws to the action of the brain that we could not possibly conceive of it without them, from our not finding in it any fixed tendencies. The hypothesis of the suspension of the intellectual laws is easier, considering their tardy recognition and its imperfect amount as yet, even as regards the higher order of minds. Nevertheless, it is especially the physical laws that admit with ease of the hypothesis in question, for the subjective state and the imagination of the poet both frequently emancipate themselves from their yoke.

Even within these limits, however, the fiction involves a contradiction, as soon as we recognise the dependence of the human order on that of the world without. For the most individual and most complex phenomena cannot be conceived of as under law if the most general and most simple are supposed exempt. But this very contradiction would suffice to show how intimate is the connection of order, even physical order, with man's whole existence. We must remember that the hypothesis suggested has no scientific purpose; it is simply offered as a logical artifice, with the view of showing more clearly that the doctrine is a necessary element in the constitution of the unity, the foundation of which is the worship. To serve this purpose, it is enough that, whatever their mutual interdependence, the different classes of laws be radically distinct; that they are so, is indicated by the long intervals which separate their several recognitions.

The hypothesis may have its usefulness enhanced, by considering in succession the degrees of extension it admits, according as we imagine the order of things more or less completely suspended. Reduce it within the narrowest possible limits, confine the order, that is, to the moral laws exclusively, unity could never come into being, and still more, could not persist, if there were allowed even a low degree of energy to the personal instincts. For the unstable character attaching to our thoughts and positions would preclude the feelings from acquiring any consistency, so that we should swing to and fro indefinitely under the impulse of vague sympathies. Nor would our state be very different, if the laws of the intellect were supposed to complete the moral laws without the resumption.
of its sway by the order of external nature. There would then be still an uncertainty in the world outside the brain sufficient to forbid man's attaining harmony; since in the designs suggested by the heart to the intellect there would be no steadiness from the impossibility of carrying them into execution; they would but increase our sense of impotence. Again, limit the suspension of law to the order of inorganic nature, so that the organic world, equally with man's world, were supposed subject to law; still there would be a deficiency of harmony, though the uncertainty would be lessened. The hypothesis in this last form is at once easier to grasp, and more conclusive than in its other two forms, and we may perfect it by the further supposition that our environment were such as to free us from the need of any continuous exertion; still even then we feel that unity would remain precarious at least, if not impossible.

Not to dwell longer on considerations of this nature, it is essential here to recognise that the intellect and the feelings must act in concert if we would establish and maintain a state of synthesis, although such state in the main has its source in the instincts of sympathy. Our purest affections could not ensure harmony were we not under compulsion to submit to an order independent of us, and independent even as regards the phenomena of our own being. But it is in the predominance of the heart over the intellect that lies the essential source of our unity, as it compels us to fulfil the intellectual conditions of that unity, and disposes us to love a necessity which makes us better.

Thus the worship, by its cultivation of love, gives its sanction to the doctrine, without reference to the requirements of action as the indispensable condition of our unity, whether as individuals or societies. It is not solely to modify the order of the world that we are bound to know it; the chief reason why we study it is that we may submit to it properly, in accordance with the fundamental theory of unity summed up in the word religion, the construction of which points to the without as consolidating the within. The laws most open to modification are the laws which make us most feel that such modifications, far from setting us free, do but in reality bind us with stronger bonds, in such a way as to bring out at once and strengthen our unity. In the normal state love is our guide to faith; we begin, therefore, by reverencing and
cherishing these bonds of our own institution, with their con-
tant tendency to secure the victory of our higher instincts,
and we soon learn to look with similar feelings on such nec-
cessities as are inevitable. The opposite course may become
necessary in times of anarchy, but is less noble, and also harder;
for submission then appears oppressive in its character, and,
as such, we are inclined to restrict rather than enlarge its
sphere.

It is the heart, then, that must ever rule, though the
intellect alone can indicate in the relations of things those
which are available. But the sway of feeling can never be
hostile to the intelligence; on the contrary, it gives it a
sanction unattainable under the regime of pure abstraction.
For as it bases unity on the subordination of egoism to al-
truism, the Positive religion sanctifies in the name of the
Great Being the thoughts as well as the actions, which, even
indirectly, are of a nature to support or develope the instincts
of sympathy.

But its sanction is never without the accompaniment of a
wholesome discipline, a discipline without which the mind
would shake off its torpor only to follow its natural bent to-
wards idle speculations. Its preference for them, on the plea of
their greater dignity, is invariably traceable to its weakness,
whether it be that it cannot continue its researches without
losing sight of its true aim, or that it recoils from the more
important questions as the harder. Such misdirection requires
for its due control the combination of all the peculiar appli-
cances of Positivism: the inseparable connection of the culti-
vation of science with the priestly office; the encyclopedic
character of our ordinary speculations; unceasing watchfulness
on the part of the public.

Such are the appropriate considerations which the prevail-
ing disorder of our time compels me to recall in detail; my
object being, that the study of the doctrine may be entered
upon and pursued in a proper spirit, in spite of the weakness
of our intellect, which leads it to lose sight of the end in the
means. Such is our feebleness, that it will always necessitate
constant precaution to prevent our intelligence from playing
false to the Great Being, by devoting itself to the service of
egoism rather than of altruism. There was no real danger in
this tendency prior to the developement of our speculative
powers; but it is the leading difficulty in the discipline of man, now that the intellect is being constantly appealed to, whether for action or for regulation. But if the difficulty is in a high sense peculiar to the Positive state, that state has more resources for meeting it, than were available under the conditions of the theological order, when the intelligence found it easy to gain a sanction for any deviation. The first foundation for the discipline of the intellect was laid when we placed Morals at the head of the encyclopaedic hierarchy; its final completeness is given it by placing the doctrine below the worship. When the intellect shall be thus consecrated to the service of the heart, we shall be justified in considering the problem of man’s existence as solved, so far as it can be solved. In fact, no serious difficulty can then arise as to the proper direction of human activity; errors in regard to it being principally due to the intellect’s proving false to the feelings.

Yet however legitimate this discipline, however urgent the need of it at the present time, we must still admit that its introduction, to be opportune, must coincide in point of time with the state of things which makes it practicable. During the whole of the first period of human existence, when the object was to call into action all our powers, without any possibility of duly regulating them, the Positive spirit naturally exercised itself on all the theories for which it was competent, with a preference of the easier to the more important. Apart from the fact that it was beyond its power at that time to devote its energies to the construction of a Synthesis, the nature of which and the source of which were equally unknown, the premature concentration on such an object would have been an obstacle to its developing its powers of abstraction by exerting them on subjects of logical rather than scientific value. The genius of speculative research was unchecked save by the influence of the discipline of Theology, a discipline for repression rather than guidance, and from its disparate nature at all times unable to reach it in the required degree. Science, however, in its onward course, empirical and dispersive though it has been, has gradually, under the strengthening impulse of Humanity, grasped more important and more difficult questions. This of itself constitutes an advance towards an efficient discipline, one which it can the less reject, as itself furnishes the intellectual basis for it. The distinct existence of that basis
dates from the time when the Positive spirit took definitive possession of its chief province by the foundation of Sociology, soon followed by the systematic construction of the Religion of Humanity.

To complete our conception of the share taken by the doctrinal system in the establishment of our normal unity, we must consider the discipline to which it is ultimately subjected as having for its chief object to regulate the wills, in order to direct the actions, of men. We then see that such an object requires the persistent consensus of the three parts of the true religion, its emotional, its intellectual, and its active elements. It requires, first of all, the development by the worship of our sympathetic instincts, as being the principal source of unity. But it implies, in the next place, the removal, by the doctrine, of our natural indecision in conduct, furnishing as the doctrine does, from without, reasons for action free from all alloy of caprice. The discipline suggested by love thus placed on a sure foundation of faith, the regime gives it completeness and strength by fostering a form of activity leading, as a necessary consequence, to the reaction of the whole on each part, a reaction which is at once a guidance and a check. Thus each in its due degree, feeling, reason, and opinion, take part in the spiritual government of man; the temporal government being its indispensable supplement and concerned solely with the outward act, with no direct power to modify the will. The acknowledgement that the temporal power is indispensably needed to secure society from the more signal mistakes, makes us feel how important it is that the intellect, which supplies the grounds of our determinations, should be in unceasing unison with the affections from which they spring.

The first point, then, is for the heart to govern the intellect, in order that the two, by their agreement, may discipline public opinion, which issues in a moral force calculated to improve our individual impulses. Public opinion as the general complement of the spirituality of Positivism, presupposes above all suitable feelings, and these easily attain power with the poorest order of minds as regards the conduct of others. But the term ought of itself to remind us that it is a force which also requires community of thought, as a basis for our judgment in each case. Where there is not such community, from divergence or from misdirection, the best sentiments fail to guide aright our
Great Being. But our resignation, in the earliest stage purely passive, before long is ennobled, by virtue of the activity suggested by the regularity of the order, regularity being always in proportion to simplicity. We transform our subjection, we make it the source of constant advance throughout the whole range of our life—physical, intellectual, and even moral—for we make it dependent on this unchangeable type, into accord with which in particular we bring the institution of time.

Still the theoretic, no less than the practical, power, must find its chief sphere in the phenomena most open to modifications, these being at once the most important and where the order of nature is most imperfect. Since our attainment of sufficient knowledge of the law of those phenomena to warrant rational prevision, we feel how greatly their study, in a positive spirit, may perfect human discipline, by its direct control over the internal sources of unity. It is in the continuous amelioration of the most imperfect, and yet the most important, order, that man’s intelligence finds its best field both for theory and practice, such is the surpassing difficulty of the inquiries and so much greater room is there for modifications. But the consecration of the Positive spirit to this object necessarily implies its discipline, as diverting it from cultivating the inferior branches of study in a degree unwarranted by their legitimate destination. Thus it is, that reason, the immediate function of which is to judge everything but itself, finds an indirect control in the being devoted, above all, to consolidate and foster our emotional nature, without being thereby debarred from proceeding steadily in its advance towards the more complex phenomena. Thus we get rid of the main difficulty which attaches to the problem of Positive unity; founded upon the predominance of the heart, it seems to involve a pressure on the intellect, whilst unable to dispense with its cooperation. On the contrary, it is obvious that in the maturity of the Great Being the intellect of man enters into possession of the domain hitherto reserved for the supremacy of God, without neglecting such logical or scientific preparatory training as the cultivation of its new domain requires.

This indispensable introduction justifies us in considering the final systematisation of the Positive doctrine as having reached the point at which it is easy to preserve it from the
possess in common, now to the sum of the qualities which constitute any given existence. To an analysis of this kind may be traced the origin of science, when towards the close of the first period of childhood, the childhood of the individual or of the society, abstract contemplation begins to prevail over the concrete. Till then, reason had not power to aid the feelings; not offering the fixity of conception which is the source of provisions qualified to guide us in action or in submission, as they remove the indecision to which we are naturally liable in all our resolutions.

This first fundamental step in advance is to be regarded as establishing the true distinction, and at the same time the true agreement, between theory and practice. The generality characteristic of theory, the speciality characteristic of practice, are owing to the fact that theory is abstract, practice concrete; for theory relates to events, action deals with beings. But the contrast between the two is no obstacle to their concert, as our action upon bodies aims solely at modifying their phenomena, the exclusive object of interest, whether for speculative or practical purposes. Abstract laws are, then, the common province of science and art—science applying them to the discipline of our intellect—art to the regulation of our activity. No serious inconvenience arises from ignorance of the concrete laws, for it does not prevent our giving both to our practical and intellectual life a sufficiently rational character, by the aid of such general indications as the simpler cases afford to guide us in the more complex. It might seem that action requires a fuller knowledge than does submission; but all the more essential conceptions, by the nature of the case, are available both for action and submission; as the basis of our conduct throughout is the invariability of the order of nature. In fact, such modifications as it admits solely affect the phenomena in degree, and therefore in effecting them we may find satisfactory guidance in an empirical estimate of the limits within which variation is allowable in each actual case, without requiring a concrete science which is beyond our reach.

However dangerous then for the heart, and even for the intellect, abstraction must receive a definitive sanction as indispensable to the systematic service of Humanity. The absorption, of withering tendency, to which it invariably leads,—the chimerical judgments which are its frequent attendant—
both these results should but awaken us to the importance of restricting intellectual cultivation within its due limits, instead of looking upon it as the ideal of human perfection. It must be remembered also that its general disadvantages are remedied, as far as possible, by the encyclopedic character of Positive speculation, inseparably connected with the sacerdotal office. For abstraction decreases as independence and simplicity decrease, with this result, that theory is brought nearer to practice in proportion as our conceptions become objectively less general, subjectively more general. When once abstraction has reached the phase in which all the aspects of science converge, it necessarily ends, in order that there may be scope for the intellectual efforts which are in direct connection with practical objects. During its provisional government, it tends to engender overweening claims, as it gives free course to the deductive faculty. There was a danger in this, so long as the cultivation of science retained its partial character; but the danger disappears in the encyclopedic regime, for that represents the perfection of deduction as due principally to the absence of complexity in the lower departments, without any diminution in the growth of power when the field for its exercise rises in dignity.

Our normal state is as yet so poorly outlined, that abstrac-
tion in the Positive sense, however evident the need of it in natural philosophy, has not been organised except for mathematical speculations. Everywhere else, signs without images are as a rule our only aid in abstract meditation. The institution however of subjective media, mentioned in the first chapter of the present volume, has for its object, as it extends, to furnish us with appropriate means for representing all events whatsoever, apart from the beings in which they are seen. Although Theologism had its origin in abstract contemplation, the means it offered were throughout limited to the search after causes, with no power to directly promote the study of laws, not even if we make it include entities as well as Gods. Speculation in Positivism will not have its full aids until, by the institution of subjective milieu, images are brought into habitual combination with signs, so as to allow a permanent influence to the emotions.

The abstract character of the doctrinal system of Positivism thus established, I proceed to examine the hierarchy which
which the doctrine rests.

First philosophy.

First group of three laws.

Law I. The simplest hypothesis.

constitutes it, not however without first determining the universal principles which are the foundation of the whole.

These principles, dimly anticipated, or rather desired, by Bacon, under the vague name of Philosophia Prima, form three groups of general laws: one group objective and subjective in an equal degree; the second essentially subjective; the third mainly objective.

I form the first group by combining two scientific laws, naturally in close interdependence, with a logical law, which must precede, though apparently dependent on them.

This law consists, and there can be no more fundamental principle, in the injunction in all cases to form the simplest hypothesis consistent with the whole of the facts to be represented. This, the sole basis of true rationality,—may be considered indifferently as objective or subjective, since it immediately controls the subordination of the subjective to the objective, as it satisfies at once our inclination and our duty. But in our use of it we must never forget that it is applicable to our affections; this definitive addition to its hitherto exclusively intellectual form was insisted on in the last volume. Complication being as pernicious to the intellect and to the heart when due to the feelings, as when due to the thoughts, we must clear our hypothesis from ill-will, not less than from other superfluities. If the latter, or intellectual, simplification is a direct aid to the process of thought, the former or moral simplification assists it indirectly; improving as it does the unavoidable participation of moral impulses in intellectual action, such impulses exerting a more disturbing, although intenser influence, when it is egoism, and not altruism, that takes the lead. Nor is the importance of this emotional complement less as regards the external object of our intellectual exertion, any excess of subjectivity interfering with the clearness of our vision equally, whether it be traceable to the heart or to the intellect. Thus conceived, the precept systematises at once the constitution of the Positive logic and its development, for it introduces the combination of feelings with images and signs as an aid to, and even a regulation of, the intelligence.

The second principle, generally considered of superior importance to the first, is the invariability of all laws whatsoever which govern phenomena and consequently beings, though
it is only in regard to phenomena, or in the abstract order, that they are cognisable. This dogma is regarded as purely objective in character, yet it is no longer incumbent on me to demonstrate its subjectivity, really less disputable than its objectivity. For the latter character must always rest entirely on the inductions of experience, irresistible as the conclusion may be, nay has long been, at any rate as regards the lower sciences, whereas the subjectivity has a natural basis of theoretic grounds. We can demonstrate the necessity there is to establish laws as a guide to conduct, but experience alone teaches us that those laws represent the order of the world, to the degree in which we require to know it. The conviction that they do so is, at bottom, direct and instinctive only in reference to man's world; when we go lower it is solely as the result of a long investigation, called for chiefly by our practical wants. The degree of certainty we attain can never be entirely satisfactory; such as it is, however, it is indispensable for the creation of the doctrinal system of Positivism, which, without it, might gratify the mind, but be no reflection of the external world. We see, then, why the second principle of the normal Positive doctrine is as inferior to the first in dignity as in usefulness; method, from every point of view, having a higher value than doctrine, as the will is of higher value than the act.

The object of the third principle is to complete the second, all modifications whatsoever of the order of the world being by it limited to the greater or less intensity of the phenomena, with no alteration in their arrangement. It follows from the explanations of the preceding volume, that this law of modifiability must be kept distinct from that of invariability, for this last might be confined to maintaining invariability of nature in events, whilst admitting change in their order of succession. Inasmuch as, so conceived, the second principle would lose its main value, by the conception we give sufficient prominence to the independence as well as the utility of the third. In theory, the law reacts in the direction of reducing all real questions to questions of quantity; a transformation, however, only possible in any high degree in regard to the lower phenomena. In practice, the law leads to the subordination, on rational grounds, of action to contemplation, for it limits our intervention, even our subjective intervention, to a change of degree, leaving the order undisturbed.
The distinctness of these laws renders an absolute synthesis impossible.

The second group.

Such is the first group of universal laws, as closely connected with the mental process as with the external objects of our speculations. Already, even at this early stage, it is evident that their number is sufficient to preclude all hope of constructing an absolute synthesis, either from an objective or subjective stand-point, since although convergent, they remain quite distinct. The second group, directly concerned with the intellect, subdivides into two groups; each comprising three laws, the one regarding the intelligence from the statical, the other from the dynamical point of view. The sphere of these six new laws would seem narrower than that of their three predecessors, but it is really as extensive. For by their regulation of the reason, in itself and in its exercise, they regulate implicitly the objects on which that reason is exercised, and which, but for it, would remain unknown.

In the statical group, the fundamental law, established by Aristotle, developed by Leibnitz, and completed by Kant, is the subordination of all subjective constructions to objective materials. This principle however is inadequate to express the state of reason, since it is equally applicable to insanity, whether transient or permanent. Hence for the right statical constitution of the understanding, we require a second law, a law which represents the internal images as less vivid and less distinct than the external impressions. Were it not for this comparative weakness, which ceases under mental alienation, the without never could regulate the within, though it might continue to afford it nourishment and even stimulation. Even this complementary law, however, would be insufficient to place our understanding in its normal condition, were all the co-existent images, as is the case in incipient madness, whilst weaker than the external impressions, equal in power among themselves. A third law, then, is required, and it lays down the necessity of one image predominating over all that are simultaneously evoked by the excitement of the brain. Thus complete, the statical theory of the understanding will never require any additional laws, since the within is no longer able to disturb the sway of the without.

As for the dynamical theory of the understanding, that has been satisfactorily laid down in the preceding volume by the establishment of the three fundamental laws of human evolution, as well individual as collective. The three preside, each in its...
due place, over the contemporaneous movements of the intelligence, the activity, and the feeling of man. The first law consists in the succession of the three states, fictitious, abstract, and positive, through which every understanding passes in all its conceptions without exception, but with a velocity proportioned to the generality of the particular phenomena in question. The second is a recognition of an analogous progression in human activity, which in its first stage is Conquest, then Defence; lastly Industry. The third law shows that man's social nature follows the same course; that it finds satisfaction, first, in the Family, then in the State, lastly in the Race, in conformity with the peculiar nature of each of the three sympathetic instincts. These two last laws have no immediate connection with the intelligence, but are not the less indispensable to any clear conception of its movements. For they preside over the necessary and persistent relations which exist between our scientific conceptions and our practical operations on the one hand, our moral impulses on the other, the former being the object, the latter the source of the said conceptions.

In accordance with this threefold progression, the second group of universal laws is perfectly harmonious. Its first half, in fact, makes order consist in the establishment of unity, whilst its second reduces progress to the development of the unity established. So becoming at one and the same time more synthetical, more synergical, and more sympathetic, human nature tends towards its systematic constitution, consequent on the growing ascendancy of altruism over egoism.

I must now complete the whole formed by the universal laws, by the consideration of the third group, where objectivity prevails. This group, as the last, is composed of six laws; as the last also, it subdivides into two equal series; adopting a distinction which accords with a difference in their nature, and which is most strongly marked in reference to their acceptance. For the first series, more objective in character, was originally limited to mathematical phenomena, without waiting for the systematic construction of Positivism, though they aided in its preparation, and derived from it exclusively their claim to real universality. The other series, on the contrary, has too large an admixture of subjectivity to gain acceptance, so long as Positivism had not yet embraced its
highest domain, although faint germs of its laws are naturally traceable during the period of preparation. The distinction is one which tends to disappear in the normal state. Nevertheless even then it will always retain a certain importance, from the analogy which cannot but exist between the initiation of the individual and the preparation of the race.

Originally discovered by the geometricals, at a time when the scientific spirit had already lost its old philosophical character and had not yet acquired its new, the first series of objective laws has never hitherto been at all adequately understood. For it is the outcome of a systematic generalisation of the three laws which are thought to be applicable only to motion, in the common sense, as an attribute of matter, and the Positive conception of which is materially obscured by the metaphysical alloy due to academic anarchy. The first law, in harmony equally with the dogma of invariability and with our need of permanence, is this: every state, statical or dynamical, has an inherent tendency to continue as it is without change, resisting all disturbance from without. In the second law, motion becomes compatible with existence by virtue of the power resident in every system to maintain its constitution, whether in exercise or at rest, when its constituent parts are subject to simultaneous changes, on the condition that the changes affect all parts in a perfectly equal degree. Lastly, the third law governs all reciprocal influences, as it proclaims the necessity of the equivalence of reaction and action, if the degree of each is measured in accordance with the peculiar nature of each contact. It is not difficult to see that the special laws enunciated respectively by Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, or rather Huyghens, in order to form a basis for the theory of mechanics, are the scientific germs of these philosophical theorems, which are applicable to all phenomena without exception. But we also see that for their systematic expression, the first step to which was taken in the *Philosophie Positive*, it was indispensably necessary that the Positive spirit should have risen by successive stages to the complete generality which it requires for its mission.

The second series of objective laws connects with the first through the medium of a law which, as they were, is traceable to a mathematical germ, although the origin in its case is not so distinctly seen. It is the law by which in all cases we make
the theory of motion subordinate to the theory of existence, by
looking upon all progress as the developement of the particular
order in question, the conditions of such order, whatever they
may be, regulating the changes which together make up the
evolution. In the hands of the geometricians, this law is
limited to the reduction of questions of motion to questions of
equilibrium; its generalisation was possible only in Positivism,
when I traced it in social phenomena, in which it finds its
chief destination. Still its origin in Mathematics deserves a
lasting remembrance, as it allows us, over and above any his-
torical considerations, to form a dogmatic connection with the
last law of the first series, a connection indicated by the original
confusion of the two. This relation, binding as it does more
closely together the two halves of the third group, will be at
all times kept in mind by the terms appropriated to the law
under consideration, the objective character of which should
thus stand out more fully.

On examining the next law, we come upon a close connec-
tion between this third group and its predecessor, as the second
halves of either seem indistinguishable. For it is the funda-
mental law of Positive classification, the invariable principle
of which is the increase or decrease of generality—equally,
whether subjective or objective. Now this principle fuses with
the law of the three states, and is indispensable as its com-
plement when applied to the arrangement of our conceptions
without taking account of the existences of which they are the
conceptions. That the two were introduced simultaneously in
the small work which forms the basis of all my subsequent
writings—this fact alone would suffice to establish their conne-
tion, a connection familiar to Western thinkers, owing to the
progress of Positivism. But so regarded, the penultimate law
of the third group would substantially belong to the second
group, whereas it must be kept distinct. For this purpose
then, in our consideration of it, we must insist most on its
objective character, making it to apply above all to pheno-
mena, and even to beings, or at any rate to existences. So
applied, it subordinates nobleness to force, by showing that the
higher phenomena in every case depend on the coarser attri-
butes, the sway of these last being recognised as inevitable but
not allowed to become oppressive, the regularity of its action
being accepted as a compensation for its inferiority in dignity.
I complete the last group of universal laws by the law which represents the intermediate state as in all cases subordinate to the extremes which it brings into connection. I have so frequently applied this law in the volumes of this work, as to make it unnecessary for me to dwell on it here. The great Buffon seems to me to have had a glimpse of it, but I think that I am as fully warranted ultimately in claiming it for myself, as I am in claiming the great majority of the fourteen previous laws, all more or less conjectures of my various predecessors, yet all peculiar to my systematisation. The appearance of subjectivity attaching to this law, due especially to its finding its application in logic rather than in science, must not throw into the shade its objective character. For it proclaims the interdependence of the objects studied quite as forcibly as it does the connection of their studies.

We have thus the ultimate basis of the dogmatic system of Positivism in the combination of fifteen laws of universal applicability, forming three natural groups: the first of three laws; the two others each of six, each also subdividing into two equal series. The various connections above indicated suffice to show the perfect interdependence of the whole so formed, although the number of such connections will be largely increased when we come to use it. Without insisting on this at present, I must call attention to the definitive nature of the arrangement of these fifteen laws, definitive by the nature of the case, no one of them being transposable without a violation of the rational order. As for their completeness as a whole, this follows from their giving us even now the means of satisfactorily regulating all healthy investigation. We may regard, then, as realised the noble aspiration of Bacon, the construction of a first, a prime philosophy, qualified to direct us in all our scientific meditations, nay even to aid us in the exercise of our practical reason.

The power of this philosophy as an instrument of systematic thought, will become palpable by the construction of the Positive hierarchy of phenomena and conceptions, on the basis of a relative view of the whole order of the world.

This hierarchy, the grand result of the course of objective investigation which prepared the way for the ultimate synthesis, has for its legitimate object the completion of the synthetic, the direction of the analytic, constitution of the Positive doctrine.
The synthetic form, the direct offspring of the fundamental theory of the Great Being, finds its complete ideal expression in the worship, and condenses all the various theories in Morals, for in Morals we study human nature for the government of human life. All our real speculations, the most abstract and the most simple not excepted, necessarily converge towards this human domain, for indirectly they help us to the knowledge of man under his lower aspects, on which the nobler are dependent. Strictly speaking, there is no phenomenon within our cognisance which is not in the truest sense human, and that not merely because it is man who takes cognisance of it, but also from the purely objective point of view, man summarising in himself all the laws of the world, as the ancients rightly felt. Yet each class of attributes must be studied with reference to the simplest cases; that is, in beings where it exists, if not isolated, at any rate freed from all complication with the higher attributes, which we eliminate provisionally by abstraction, the better to understand their foundations. Thus beginning with the simplest phenomena, we gradually increase the complication of our enquiries by the introduction in succession of higher properties, so training ourselves by a course of decreasing abstraction for the normal state of the scientific reason. When we have reached it, we enter on the regime of complete synthesis, the regime in which man, viewed directly as indivisible by nature, is the constant object of all theories calculated to make him more fit for the service of the Great Being. Abstraction thus loses its scientific preeminence and retains solely its logical utility; we habitually concentrate all our efforts on the most important problems, recurring to the lower only to meet the wants, in particular respects, of the higher domain.

Our intellectual life, however, as here sketched, will always require a training of the individual analogous in kind to the initiation of the race; a training in which objective analysis provides us with the necessary basis of the subjective synthesis which, in the normal state, is to be paramount. In the second place, the direct cultivation of the higher domain will often call for new researches, logical or scientific, in the various inferior sciences. Now the training and the researches equally must be guided by the Positive hierarchy which is a consequence of the threefold system of universal laws above given. That hierarchy realises the confused wish of Bacon as to the construction of a
scala intellectus, having for its object the enabling us to pass, in both directions, without a breach of continuity from any one class of researches to any other. This encyclopedic scale, instituted in my philosophy, and become an integral part, by constant use, of the present work, requires no further explanation here except as to its immediate connection with the subjective synthesis.

The conception of the hierarchy of the sciences from this point of view implies, at the outset, the admission, that the systematic study of man is logically and scientifically subordinate to that of Humanity, the latter alone unveiling to us the real laws of the intelligence and activity. Paramount as the theory of our emotional nature, studied in itself, must ultimately be, without this preliminary step it would have no consistence. Morals thus objectively made dependent on Sociology, the next step is easy and similar; objectively Sociology becomes dependent on Biology, as our cerebral existence evidently rests on our purely bodily life. These two steps carry us on to the conception of Chemistry as the normal basis of Biology, since we allow that vitality depends on the general laws of the combination of matter. Chemistry again in its turn is objectively subordinate to Physics, by virtue of the influence which the universal properties of matter must always exercise on the specific qualities of the different substances. Similarly Physics become subordinate to Astronomy when we recognise the fact that the existence of our terrestrial environment is carried on in perpetual subjection to the conditions of our planet as one of the heavenly bodies. Lastly, Astronomy is subordinated to Mathematics by virtue of the evident dependence of the geometrical and mechanical phenomena of the heavens on the universal laws of number, extension, and motion.

When it has reached this term, the subjective arrangement of the objective hierarchy is complete, by its termination in the one science which has no other below it, and which therefore can be the direct object of study on the basis of certain spontaneous inductions independent of all deduction. Although the encyclopedic series is here rested solely on the ground of scientific relations, yet, as at the outset, the ground so taken always coincides with its logical appreciation. For although the Positive method is necessarily uniform, nevertheless, it is only in the simplest branches of study that its deductive capacity
can find its proper development. Its inductive properties must come into view subsequently, as in due and gradual course more complicated phenomena introduce observation in Astronomy, experiment in Physics and Chemistry, comparison in Biology, filiation in Sociology. When induction has thus complemented deduction, the final science brings the two into their normal and direct combination by its construction of the subjective method, properly speaking peculiar to Morals.

Such, under its two aspects, is the connection by virtue of which this supreme science organises, one after the other, all the Positive sciences, the culture of which henceforth will be controlled by the inseparable relations which exist between them and the science of man. Morals, as the synthetical terminus of the whole scientific construction, is as superior to its various preliminaries in rationality as it is in utility, since the phenomena which are its proper subject matter necessarily influence us in our examination of all the rest. At first, it is true, they must be kept out of view, but as our speculations are not in the fullest sense real till this temporary abstraction has ceased, we must not continue it longer than is necessary.

To appreciate at its just value the hierarchy above given, it is necessary to recognise its competence to guide us in the subdivision of each special science no less than in the coordination of the whole body of distinct sciences. The same principle of the interdependence and simplification of studies by virtue of the degree of generality in the phenomena, will give us in all cases our subdivisions of each of the seven fundamental sciences, provided that we attain sufficient precision in our classification. It follows, from the necessarily homogeneous character of these several subdivisions, that in combination they perfect our scientific scale, in relation to its most important attribute, by developing its continuity. In this way thought may habitually pass from the lowest mathematical speculations to the sublimest moral conceptions, or vice versa, by a series of intermediate steps so easy as to require no effort to a well-trained mind. To whatever degree we specialise our enquiry, the unity of human science remains intact, the student never losing sight of the two or three consecutive subdivisions which connect each particular branch of science with the general hierarchy.

Again, the full appreciation of this Positive scala intellectus as a logical and scientific institution, involves our looking on it
as equally adapted to represent the interdependence of beings or existences as that of phenomena and speculations. Under its concrete aspect, when viewed as a whole, it forms a series of states which rise in dignity in a direct ratio with their complication, each resting upon its predecessor. The result is the relative conception of the order of the world, an order necessarily distributed into seven categories, superimposed one on the other in such a way that each modifies that which precedes, and commands that which succeeds. This series of modifying and commanding influences issues in presenting man as the true condenser and spontaneous regulator of the social, vital, and inorganic milieu, in dependence on which he develops. But his personal action, as it has for its object the modification for the better of destiny by will, is efficient and noble only on this condition: that it be freely devoted to the constant service of the Great Being, the being of which the individual is the indivisible element and the necessary product. When his activity thus takes its normal direction, man is continually improving the order to which he is subject, by strengthening the reaction of its vital influences on its material, availing himself, for this purpose, of the ever-growing cooperation of all his voluntary associates. We thus see how our relative conception of the economy of the world, by using, both in theory and practice, the Positive hierarchy, is able, in an equal degree, to give systematic expression to the dignity of the individual, and his devotion to society.

To this concrete application of the encyclopædic scale I must extend the observation above explained when treating of the abstract hierarchy, the object of which was to introduce into it greater continuity. The classification on the principle of increase of complication and decrease of generality, is as applicable in the subdivision of the hierarchy of beings as in that of attributes, so as to connect, by sufficiently easy steps, all the intermediate terms whatsoever. Its power in this respect is most sensible in regard to the higher beings, in Biology, that is, first, and then in Sociology, whilst it is in the lower domain that the abstract subdivision finds its most appropriate sphere. Thus we form, in as full development as our enquiries can possibly require, a general scale of co-existent beings, and as the completion of such scale, a series of states offered to our view by the only being capable of continuous advance. So
constituted, the Positive hierarchy becomes the condensation of all real sciences, and the basis of all practical conceptions, as it brings the classification of the arts into coincidence with that of the sciences.

The conclusion here reached is the last step in our explanation of the construction of the doctrinal system, which from the synthetical point of view is now complete. Before, however, I enter on its analytical constitution, it is important to throw out into relief the threefold preamble just accomplished by affixing to it a name adapted to remind us of it as a whole. For this we may use the expression First Philosophy, limited by me above to the system of the fifteen universal laws, so giving definiteness to the vague design of Bacon, after making his aspiration a reality. Since this system of laws is but the intermediate and principal portion of the basic introduction to the definitive co-ordination of the Positive doctrine, the denomination which I originally reserved for it, being practically at liberty, may be applied to the whole introduction. All that is requisite is to treat it as inseparable from the institution of abstraction on which it rests as its basis, and from the hierarchical construction for which it gives the basis. Thus viewed, the First Philosophy forms a distinct and definite whole, a whole which gives systematic form to the subjective synthesis idealised in the worship, and which must be our guide in our objective analysis, to enable us to develop the Positive doctrine on a scale answering to its destination. I shall bring out the importance of this First Philosophy in the following chapter, by making it the object of a special study at the outset of our encyclopaedic education, where it is our only direct safeguard against degeneration into scholastic puerilities.

There is and can be but one synthetical arrangement of the Positive dogma, for such arrangement treats the several sciences as branches of moral science, without giving beforehand any specific division, but leaving the way open for all suitable subdivisions. The contrary is true of the analytical arrangement; it admits of several distinct forms, according to the degree of connection we introduce between the different terms of the encyclopaedic hierarchy. From the objective point of view, it is not possible to fix the number of the sciences, since the generalisation of thought is as appropriate for theory as the specialisation of action is requisite for practice. In reality the name attached
to each science merely indicates the group of investigations generally acknowledged to have a certain unity, and this may vary at different times and for different minds. From the subjective point of view, the division of the sciences is equally fluctuating, as when so considered it marks the several resting places of the intelligence in its encyclopedic course, and that course may always be continuous whatever the number of its stages.

Be this as it may, the seven sciences which we established as the result of the preparatory evolution of the race, will not need, as a rule, subdivision, when the human mind has attained greater power of synthesis, allowing always for educational requirements. At the same time the number is one that will always lend itself to the establishment of a satisfactory continuity. But their hierarchical combination, with the object of bringing objective analysis into closer relations with subjective synthesis,—this admits of many different forms. Of all the forms possible in the abstract, I select for present treatment those only which have a real utility both for theory and practice. The selection gives the seven analytical arrangements of the Positive sciences, which I proceed to explain, one after the other, in the order in which they are derived from the synthetical arrangement above examined.

One and the same subdivision of the synthetical arrangement gives two binary arrangements, the one more objective and dogmatical, the other more subjective and historical. The first sanctions the most marked distinction admissible throughout the whole range of real investigations, the distinction, that is, between the domain of the inorganic world and the system of the organic, in other words between the study of the earth and the study of man, Cosmology and Sociology. In the second we break up the one great whole by separating the external or physical order from the human or moral order; hence the division of the general term philosophy into natural and moral. Thus the two binary arrangements of the doctrinal system of Positivism differ only as to Biology, Biology standing in the one case as the introduction to Sociology, in the other as the complement of Cosmology. This last conception best represents the natural course of scientific education, the other is the most appropriate for our ultimate studies, as manifesting the impracticability of an objective synthesis. If we look to practical
results, the two modes have distinct yet equivalent merits. We find that the historical arrangement fixes attention especially on the highest kind of progress, by marking off into a separate class the most modifiable phenomena, those in which invariability was but of late recognition. The dogmatical arrangement on the other hand expresses the systematisation of the activity of the Great Being, which consists in bringing all vital power whatever to bear on the modification of the world of pure matter.

This last dualism would seem as valuable as the other, yet it is the other, as more easily divisible, to which we have recourse for our ternary arrangements, from which we likewise draw the succeeding ones. Subdivide the external order or the human order, and the result is two ternary arrangements, each endowed with important properties. The first best gratifies the craving for continuity, as viewing the order of the world in reference to the normal series—material, vital, and human. The second is more favourable to the dignity of our studies and practical exertions; in it the Positive hierarchy is formed by the subordination of physical to intellectual and both to moral laws. This last mode represents the theory of the brain and the economy of Sociocracy, whereas the other is the systematic expression of the abstract evolution and the concrete series of existences.

As the two are of equal importance, it will be often advisable to combine them, and form a quaternary arrangement by a subdivision of the human order or of the physical laws. This mode was adopted in the second volume, and makes Positive philosophy consist in the normal hierarchy of Cosmology, Biology, Sociology, and Morals. It enables us to state clearly the main series of the introductory sciences, whilst not concealing the science which is their ulterior object.

A second quaternary arrangement may be formed by the combination of each term of the encyclopaedic scale with its successor, so that we rise to Morals by a progression formed of three couples, inferior, middle, and superior. This mode was introduced in my discourse upon the Positive spirit, and represents the closest degree of connection which exists between the several branches of science, since each of the preliminary sciences is more nearly connected with the one that precedes it than with the one that follows it, as is shown by the order of their genesis.
168 SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY. THE FUTURE OF MAN.

Only one quinary arrangement is admissible, drawn from the first quaternary arrangement by breaking up its first term, on the basis of the distinction between Mathematics and Physics as a whole. Although this mode, which is at once historical and dogmatical, is less convenient for our ultimate investigations than for systematic education, it has this advantage, that it begins the encyclopaedic series with that branch of study which is directly accessible. At this point, however, our objective analysis immediately tends to full completeness; to return, that is, by virtue of the twofold subdivision of physics to the primary arrangement of the scale, the only one admitting of satisfactory continuity.

Such, amid the possible analytical arrangements, are the seven by which we bridge over the space between the complete development of the encyclopaedic series, and the systematic unity which it is the object of that series to promote or to prepare. Apply them and compare them, and we shall feel more fully the value of the subjective synthesis, which alone combines in itself all the several excellences of the various stages of the objective analysis. The comparison will at the same time evidence the main advantages of the Positive scale, which, in a more or less developed form, suffices for all our intellectual wants.

To complete the systematisation of the doctrine, the remainder of the chapter must be devoted to less general considerations, to such an elaboration of the basic hierarchy of the sciences as may make it an adequate expression of the order of the world. Each of the seven sciences which it establishes, will always form a distinct branch of human study, an object for the speculative and practical reason of man, first during the period of education, and subsequently even during the whole course of the normal existence. The maintenance of the distinction between the sciences is the condition on which the objective analysis secures for the subjective synthesis its requisite clearness and coherence. But as these distinct sciences always tend to divert attention from the general unity, it is important to reduce them within the narrowest possible limits, according to the rule laid down in the first volume of this work. All I have to do here is to explain the agreement which necessarily exists between this law of restriction and all the grounds on which we properly and persistently eliminate all idle speculations.
Our aims in studying the order of the world are a noble submission to, and a wise modification of, that order; we must therefore examine, singly and by itself, each of its independent phases, the phases which, following one another in regular succession, result in a relative, to the exclusion of any absolute, conception of the whole. Nor is such a separation indispensable merely to satisfy our unintermitting need of speculation and of action, it is the sole condition of our attaining an adequate conviction of the great primary principle of invariability. For that principle will never admit of deductive demonstration, inasmuch as by its nature it is itself the common basis of all Positive deductions. It will always rest on convictions of an essentially inductive character, convictions therefore to be formed separately for each distinct class of irreducible phenomena. Allow its full power to philosophic analogy, and yet the whole course of our scientific initiation shows that human reason persists in not recognising the universal applicability of the Positive principle, so long as it has not in detail been applied to each and all of the natural categories. Scientific prejudices notwithstanding, it is possible, and that without inconsistency, to consider phenomena as generally and in large majority subject to immutable laws, whilst one exceptional class is left alone under the dominion of arbitrary wills. This is a state of mind which is not removed by virtue of the real connection which exists between the different laws, for such connection is traceable only when the several laws have been separately recognised; its removal can only be the result of a direct and special extension of the Positive principle to each distinct province of the domain of science.

It is concrete knowledge alone that admits of a really deductive demonstration of the principle of invariability, nay, without deduction we were here powerless to conceive it as applicable, for we shall never know the greater part of the laws proper to complex events. But as these depend of necessity upon the simple phenomena, we are warranted in looking on them as being, equally with those simple phenomena, subject to the Positive principle, although the difficulty of the inductions and deductions is so great, that we cannot in regard to them carry it out in detail. From this point of view the word chance no longer stands for the empire of caprice; it comes to be simply the general designation for the laws which we do not
know,—destiny being the term which sums up the laws we do know. The distinction is one which requires appropriate names, since our ignorance of relations is equivalent to their non-existence, as equally in either case we can form no provision with a view to action. Still, philosophically considered, this mental attitude, though never to cease, is no obstacle to the complete generalisation of the Positive principle when once verified in detail in all the separate classes of irreducible phenomena.

Nothing, then, can ever supersede the necessity for the individual to acquire successively, as the race has acquired, the knowledge of each of the seven phases which meet him in the relative conception of the order of the world. It is only by the aid of this series that the fundamental invariability can attain the degree of coherence and precision required to give it its full value for the intelligence, its full influence on the moral nature. But the course is one which risks the narrowing of the intellect, and the withering of the heart, as it diverts us from our true object, synthesis, by concentrating our powers on analysis. The risk is the greater as the larger portion of the noviciate of seven years is taken up by natural philosophy, the two last years only being devoted to the human order. The normal state however offers on this head satisfactory safeguards, safeguards both of instinct and of reason, as well during the period of education as throughout our whole subsequent life.

Our abstract training does not begin till after the development of the affections under the mother’s watchful eye and with an admixture of esthetic culture. The first step in it is the study, above explained, of the First Philosophy, with its systematic preference and inculcation of the spirit of synthesis and of a social purpose. Throughout the course of scientific education, the influence of the worship, public and private, tends to prevent or to remedy deterioration from excess of intellectual culture. This threefold guarantee ought to suffice for the period of education in the strict sense; as the natural dominion of feeling is not as yet disturbed by the cares of life. With regard to adult life the remedy, even with the theoretic class, lies in the persistent recognition of a paramount social purpose. Absorption in science will be looked upon as exclusively confined to the childhood of the individual, or the race, and held unworthy of human reason in its maturity.
care of the priesthood and the vigilance of the public will save those, in whom inferiority of intellect is combined with poverty of feeling, from an aberration inconceivable in superior natures.

Without this system of safeguards, it were impossible for the servants of the Great Being to pass with success through the full scientific preparation requisite for the Positive state. Throughout the initiation of the race, man found in his absolute beliefs a natural means of meeting his permanent need of some independent and superior power to which his existence is subordinated. But the new Synthesis, a relative, not absolute synthesis, can meet this want only by implanting a deep sense of the order of the world, the comprehension of which is, if traced to its root, based on experience, and only rises into unassailable conviction after a half of sufficient length before each distinct group of phenomena to be comprehended. In fact, the fundamental dogma of Humanity even when set forth at large in the worship can give full expression only to moral laws; is inadequate to present intellectual, and à fortiori, physical, laws. It follows that these two become the principal object of the abstract scientific initiation, which will lead us, step by step, to conceive of the Great Being as the indispensable condensation of the order in which it holds the highest place.

But, however necessary the preparation may be; notwithstanding the precautions calculated to guard us against its abuse; such is the weakness of our intelligence that we shall ever be liable to neglect the end in our attention to the means, from our inability to keep the combination of the two sufficiently in mind. The danger is the more urgent, that abstract thought, though after a certain training easier than concrete, is less in union with our nature and exacts greater efforts, whilst demanding more complete isolation. Therefore it is that it is absolutely necessary to restrict, within the narrowest possible bounds, the natural prevalence of scientific concentration during the age of preparation, and later, to limit analytical work to the episodic efforts required to meet the wants of synthesis. Far from any exceptional indulgence to the priesthood on this point, it is for the priesthood especially, as alone unremittingly concentrated on the sum of human wants, to assert for all, and for its own members before all, the paramount importance.
of religious discipline. It attains this end by limiting the separate and special cultivation of each preliminary science, not excepting Sociology, to what is required for the systematic treatment of the succeeding science, in order to rise or to return, as soon as possible, to the ultimate science—to Morals.

In accordance with this rule, the relative conception of the order of the world is drawn out, step by step, as fully as its true destination enjoins. For, granting each category so studied as to enable us to enter on the rational study of the next, that portion of the economy of nature with which it deals, is, by virtue of this result, sufficiently known. In this series of preparations, our sole aim should be, so to grasp the whole of the destinies which rule us, as to be able to appreciate the connection, both general and special, of our existence with the system of the world which it is their commission from the Great Being constantly to amend. Now, the condition here stated is met, when the dogma of Humanity, which feeling and the worship present to us at first as isolated, becomes the rational condensation of the whole economy of nature, as the result of our gradual ascent from the lowest phenomena towards the noblest. If carried further, the cultivation of the intellect inevitably becomes a mere idle amusement, and is exposed to indefinite divergence, giving room for an insurrection of objective analysis against the subjective synthesis which it ought to promote. But the state of pure speculation is blameable only when it becomes persistent, as it is under the dispersive regime of the Western transition. Religious discipline will always sanction the incidental enquiries called for in particular cases by the ever present demands of universal advance, moral, intellectual, or physical.

In introducing this system of intellectual cultivation, Positive religion is really only giving regular expression to the tendencies which the reason of man always instinctively obeyed, when as yet the education of its powers was incomplete. Whilst the lower sciences were being elaborated, the more eminent men of science always felt that, normally, the moral domain was supreme, though its systematic study was as yet premature. From a dim but strong instinct, the speculations most remote from man were pursued as a preparation for the doctrines and the methods adapted to the highest branch of knowledge, the study of which led often to admirable unsuccessful attempts.
This accounts for the non-discovery of the more important conceptions, even in the lowest pair of sciences, prior to the time when the wants of society demanded their definitive elaboration, a point I distinctly proved in the preceding volume with regard to the earth's motion. So also we explain the continuous decrease in the length of the several encyclopædic phases, in proportion as they approach their terminus, man; and this notwithstanding that, at that point, the domain of speculation becomes larger and more difficult. Thus the limitation of each phase to what is required for the introduction of its successor, is as thoroughly in conformity with experience as with reason acting on the inspiration of feeling. The temporary prevalence of academic divergences was due solely to our modern anarchy, committing as it did the cultivation of the lower sciences to men incompetent to work out the higher subjects.

Thus, the discipline of science which Positivism establishes, is simply the systematisation of the instinct which guided all true thinkers more and more during the thirty centuries of the Western transition. But such is the difficulty attendant on this systematisation, that it seems at first sight to be a circle without issue. For the rule which limits the proper culture of each science to the degree required for the rational study of the next in succession, must wait for its full efficacy till the completion of the encyclopædic course, as then only is it possible to construct the ultimate science, the science from which all discipline must emanate. Now, on the other hand, this last and decisive step is beyond the competence of minds swayed by the habits of divergence instilled by the special cultivation of the preliminary sciences. The only possible escape from these conflicting difficulties was the reaction in favour of synthesis, which sprang from the social convulsion in which Positivism originated. It was but natural then, that the new philosophy and the religion of Humanity should take their rise in France, as the central seat, by virtue of the whole of the past, of the ultimate crisis. From their not feeling this connection, most of those who at the present day recognise the intellectual benefits of Positivism, are guilty of grave inconsistency in blaming me for making it inseparable from its social mission, to which alone its advent is attributable.

The relation in which the sciences thus normally stand to one another is the indispensable condition of their being
brought under discipline, nor will it ever cease to corroborate and extend that discipline. The reasonableness of the rule is indisputable; yet as mediocrity of intellect will always be the prevailing type in the theoretical class, there will ever be an instinctive leaning to the specialisation of science, in order to avoid the efforts imposed by synthetical meditation. The danger of this tendency is the greater from its being in unison with the habits universally formed by practical life. In assuming the industrial form, action loses the synthetical character which it had in the military period. Industrial life confines our conceptions of a whole to operations on a very limited scale; any really general views are the exclusive appurtenance of the priesthood; a circumstance, however, not without its advantages, as it offers the best security for the normal separation of the two powers. But the reception, by all without exception, of the encyclopædic education,—this will act as a counterbalance to industrial specialisation, and check the divergent tendencies of commonplace theorists. All comprehensiveness in thought is, as generosity of feelings, a pleasure even to those who are aware that it is beyond them.

It will always be possible then to secure the acceptance of discipline by synthesis as against the disposition to analysis, by appealing, in the name of the Great Being, to the moral and social reasons for its original institution. But, although in principle it seems solely a question of doctrine, all the constituents of the Positive state will combine to develope it and to strengthen it. The worship will lead us to it by its evocation of our sympathies; and the regime will give it a stronger hold as a result of the system of precautions to be explained in the following chapter.

The inauguration of this discipline necessitates some encyclopædic efforts, efforts, be it remembered, of permanent utility for the education which is to be universal. They must consist in the production of types of the true intellectual state; in the construction, that is, for each distinct branch of real speculation, of a philosophical treatise, presenting its particular science reduced to its normal limits, and duly incorporated into the religion of Humanity. Vast and difficult as such a construction may appear, it may be condensed into seven volumes, the books in habitual use by the priesthood and the public.

My career is too far advanced for me to be able to execute
in all its completeness this capital elaboration of the doctrinal system of Positivism; I must limit myself to giving a clear idea of it. The two preceding volumes have done the work adequately, so far as regards the last of the preliminary sciences, for they are a systematic exposition of Sociology, on the basis laid in the *Philosophie*. Of the three works which are to follow the present, two are meant to be analogous constructions for the two extreme sciences of the Positive series, and will systematise, the first, Mathematics; the second, Morals. The renovation of the intermediate sciences, by a synthetical treatment, has been satisfactorily explained in the first volume of this work, more particularly as regards Biology. Enough then if I now give a sketch of the *aperçu* or the summaries, corresponding to this systematic comprehension of the whole range of the intellect, adopting the encyclopaedic order.

In Cosmology — more than elsewhere — it is important to inaugurate the subjective synthesis, as it is in Cosmology that objective analysis has most consistency, nay most dignity. When we enter on the study of vital phenomena, the indivisibility which is the normal characteristic of all real investigations, so forces itself upon the attention that, in spite of the existing anarchy, the most ordinary thinkers are found always open to systematic suggestions. For in Biology we are too near the terminus of speculation, man, to ignore or despise the true aim of Positive theories, each problem soon tending to evidence the irrationality of all conceptions from which this aim is eliminated. Whereas the domain of inorganic matter may be kept so perfectly distinct as a study, that sound speculations could be entered upon and accepted within its limits, whilst in all the other departments of human thought, the fictions of Theology maintained undisputed empire. Man is, it is true, by his constitution, subject to all the laws, without exception, of the material world, but the search after these laws has no immediate reference to man; it is always confined to some part or other of his environment. Over and above our need of the knowledge of this milieu, if success is to be attained in cosmological researches, it is requisite that we pursue them in regard to the simpler cases, even when the results have reference exclusively to the more complex. Further, the study of matter is favourable to dispersion, as dealing with an existence without unity, in a milieu which as a whole is beyond our grasp.
This is the explanation of the great persistence of the analytical regime in the study of the material world, even with eminent thinkers who would never have endured it in other branches of enquiry. And the same result would recur in the study, if, from inattention on the part of the priesthood and the public, it were ever again to be exclusively pursued. Events in which man is directly a simple spectator, will always offer scope for the aberrations of theoreticians, alarmed at the continuity of exertion demanded by the subjection of all phenomena to the subjective method. The futility of an objective synthesis is however by this time so freely admitted, that true thinkers may accept, in Cosmology, the human point of view as paramount, as alone adapted to connect everything. The divergence natural to this department of science has gone so far, since the old discipline succumbed to the anarchy of scientific academies, that its need of coordination, nay even of elimination, becomes undeniable. Appealing nobly to moral and social considerations, the priesthood of Positivism will find it no difficult task to secure general respect and love for the only system capable of protecting the feeble powers of our intelligence from being wasted on puerile investigations. All that is required is that the rationality, as well as the dignity, of our abstract enquiries, be always vindicated, as a result of the definitive fusion of science in religion.

The attainment of this result is the great aim of the several works above mentioned, and the accomplishment of which is in the main reserved for my successors. Taking the most critical for myself, I hope soon to show to what an extent mathematical science, grown almost out of our grasp as a whole, gains in coherence and dignity, under the synthetical discipline instituted by the Positive religion. For the present, I must limit myself to some hints bearing on this typical result, whilst I explain the plan and the general spirit of my next treatise.

A single volume will suffice for this work; originally I thought it would require two, an abstract and a concrete volume, when I announced it in 1842 at the end of my Philosophy, and even when I repeated the promise in 1851 in the general preface of the present work. So decided a condensation will scarcely surprise those who can appreciate the synthetical determination indicated at the opening of the construction I am now ending—the determination to make the modern
calculus a component part of general geometry. By carrying out this project, the new volume, which I hope to publish before the end of 1856, will definitively systematise the philosophy of Mathematics. Between a religious introduction and a synthetical conclusion, seven chapters will put into their proper shape the calculus, arithmetical and algebraic; preliminary geometry; algebraic geometry; differential geometry; integral geometry; and general mechanics. The title of this forthcoming work, 'System of Positive Logic,' or 'Treatise of Mathematical Philosophy,' is in itself sufficient to express its chief object, which I proceed summarily to explain.

That object is a deduction from the natural combination of two apothemata, both indisputable: the study of methods is inseparable from that of the doctrines; all important observations must be shown to hold in the simplest cases. Combine these two principles and the practical inference is that the general laws of the reasoning process are best traced in the abstract study of the form of existence common to all objects equally—the form in which existence is reduced to its simplest attributes, number, extension, motion. Although this systematic delimitation of the province of Mathematics is exclusively due to Positivism, yet the confusion indicated by its plural name has never concealed the fact, that the initial science alone is sufficiently simple in character to be suited to the exposition of these laws.

It would seem, however, that by thus simplifying in the highest degree the speculations of Positive Mathematics, we preclude ourselves from finding in them well-marked types of all the processes of logic, several of which seem exclusively reserved for the higher studies. Alarm may be felt, lest the field of Mathematics be sufficient only as regards deduction and coordination, the two processes spontaneously developed in Mathematics, with a perfection thought to be unattainable elsewhere. Induction and generalisation—these, it would appear, can be satisfactorily appreciated only in the departments in which their several forms successively had their origin. But, in establishing the normal state, we must not rest in the blind repetition of the course followed during the preparatory period. Those on whom the Great Being devolves the task of transmitting to all its servants the general results of the intellectual development of the race, must more and more emancipate themselves from the obligations which were binding during the
original movement. There is coming forward an increasing
difference between the dogmatic exposition and the historical
creation, as human thought becomes more synthetical; as has
long been traceable in mathematical teaching, notwithstanding
its extreme imperfection. Whilst bound ever to respect the
natural correspondence between the education of the individual
and the evolution of the race, the intrinsic uniformity of the
Positive method enables us to introduce its leading artefacts in
simpler sciences than those which originally gave them birth.

In a special treatise, 'Analytical Geometry,' I have already
shown that it is possible in Mathematics to teach that branch of
inductive logic which seems most peculiar to biology, viz., the
comparative method and the theory of taxonomy. Its two
capital forms, the formation of natural groups, and even the
institution of hierarchical series, are perfectly available for the
normal classification of surfaces from the point of view of their
generation. Although the simplicity of this particular case
naturally disqualified it at first for spontaneously exhibiting
these general processes, it constitutes a strong ground for
choosing it as the proper place for their systematic investigation.

The capabilities of Mathematics are, it is to be noticed, recog-
nised as regards the less eminent forms of inductive logic,
observation, and even experiment; which find large scope in
Mathematics, in spite of the tendency of geometricians to look
on their science as purely deductive. Lastly, the most exalted
processes, historical filiation and the subjective method, may
fitly, by virtue of their evidently universal applicability, be
introduced into the science of Mathematics, and the use of them
there is decisive of the matter in hand.

Admit these capacities, however, and yet they seem in-
adequate to show the logical completeness of Mathematics, if
we confront them with the systematisation of Positive logic
foreshadowed in the first volume of the present work. For, if
not confining ourselves to the special processes of induction or
deduction, we press beyond to the general means we use for
contemplation and meditation, the most instinctive, the most
ancient, and the most powerful of those means seems to have
no place in Mathematics. Mathematical speculation is, more
than any other, adapted to display the logical power of signs,
and signs are the chief resource to which the prejudices of pedants
would reduce us in reasoning. Simultaneously with signs, in the
very first beginnings of Mathematics, the use of images is spontaneously introduced. After a long separate existence—signs prevailing in the calculus, images in geometry—the final and irrevocable combination of these two resources was effected by Descartes in his capital reform of mathematical science. It is the only branch in which the combination has as yet been effected. But it is an inadequate expression of the real system of Positive logic, and must remain so till the influence of feeling give completeness to the fusion.

The revolution effected in Mathematics by the most important of my precursors, carries with it, then, for me, an obligation to base the regeneration of science on the power of affection as an intellectual instrument. The combination thus formed of signs, images, and feelings, must, if it is to be definitive, be worked out in regard to the simplest sphere of science, and the one farthest removed from man. In no other way can the pure reason be raised to the level of practical reason, for the latter has always been able without effort to avail itself of the above combination in its concrete researches. When this has been done, we shall have removed the great danger of abstraction, and be able to use freely its inherent powers for our generalisations and coordinations, without imperilling the natural alliance of synthesis and sympathy. Such a regeneration is destined to be at once the consequence and the condition of the definitive fusion of science in religion.

Prior to the publication of my forthcoming work, it is impossible to judge a reform so opposed to the actual tendencies of scientific men, nay, even of the general public. But minds suitably disposed may even now forecast its practicability, guided by the convergence of the observations on this head which have found their place in the several volumes of the present work. In especial, it should be evidenced by a judicious combination between the ultimate fusion of Fetishism in Positivism and the moral reaction of mathematical studies.

Whatever dryness it is sought to retain in Mathematics—the necessary commencement of rational Positiveness—no efforts can prevent a healthy mind from drawing from them deep and salutary emotions, as it submits to the influence on its affections of a demonstrated order. The efficacy of the irresistible convictions thus formed, their efficacy in raising and purifying our
inclinations, must come to be indisputable even without personal experience, for anyone who feels how great need we have to subject ourselves to external laws. Of the three species of natural laws, physical, intellectual, and moral, the second are so suited to the sphere of Mathematics that it is looked on as not able to admit others. This is an unwarrantable exaggeration, which disappears when we trace to Mathematics, on the one hand, the origin of physical laws, especially in mechanics, or even in geometry; and when, on the other hand, we see that the laws of the intellect are only unveiled in the speculations of Sociology. Still, after correcting this scientific prejudice, we cannot but be struck with the inherent aptitude of Mathematics to verify and give a true conception of intellectual order. If so, we feel that they have a corresponding aptitude to manifest, and even enlarge the sphere of moral laws, so natural is the connection of these last with intellectual laws. This, then, is the conception we should form of the true aim of mathematical education, as furnishing a complete basis for the systematisation of Positivism, a basis for the doctrine no less than for the method.

Human reason in its maturity will adopt Fetishity as the complement of Positivity, and by so doing will open the field of mathematical speculation to the familiar influence of the emotions, inadmissible at an earlier stage of its culture, as it was necessary to avoid the risk, the imminent risk, of pernicious illusions. The simple fact that Positivism radically precludes all objective error as to causes, allows us without scruple to enlarge the sphere of subjective vitality, which we instinctively attribute to all beings of whatever kind. Far from checking this propensity, Positivism sanctions and gives it a systematic direction, as a powerful aid not merely in language and art, but also in thought, especially in abstract thought, where it lends the image the support of feeling. Emancipated from the prejudices of science, the Positivist will be more fetishist than the Fetishist, for he will extend to phenomena the tendency which the Fetishist confined to bodies. Enough if the emotions we imagine have in all cases a real resting-place, it is indifferent whether it be abstract or concrete; the essential is that they be not attributed to fictitious beings. On this single condition, Positive reason is guaranteed against a relapse into Theology, and so is free to act on a tendency as favourable to
the intellect as it is to the heart. And the regime here indicated is peculiarly adapted to Mathematics, for it is in this department that the institution of subjective milieus has its origin, by availing ourselves of which we shall be able to advance abstraction, by endowing with life curves, and even equations.

We have a foreshadowing of this ultimate condition of the earliest and best cultivated of human speculations in the growing tendency of the most eminent mathematicians to combine the cultivation of Mathematics with their meditations on higher subjects. In defiance of modern anarchy, Descartes and Leibnitz made it their aim at one and the same time to advance Mathematics and to regenerate Philosophy. Their worthy successor, Lagrange, would have prolonged this noble spectacle, the scale of which was always being enlarged from Thales to Pascal, had he not, confined his high systematic genius within the limits of Mathematics, in the midst of a demolition in which it was not for him to take part. And although such co-existence cannot take the place of a combination, it heralds it and prepares it, by showing us the highest minds, and such minds are always favourable to scientific unity, engaged in cultivating simultaneously the two extremes of the domain of speculation. It cannot be that this tendency should disappear at the very time appointed for its systematisation; so I have ground for the hope that my synthesis of Mathematics will be rejected only by the geometricians, or rather the algebraists, from their incapacity to rise above the existing academical regime.

Unheeding their futile opposition, I will remove its only plausible ground by the rejection in toto of their troublesome claim to the intellectual presidency. Since their triumph over the physicians, they invoke, utterly without justification, in support of this noxious domination, the principle, in itself indisputable, of generality. Previous to the advent of Positivism there was no refuting the academical sophisms from the inability to distinguish the two forms, objective and subjective, which the rule may wear, and which make it issue in opposite modes of discipline. But since the second volume of this work, this capital distinction has been too fully and clearly stated for me to dread any involuntary mistakes on that point. The properties common to many beings do not, by virtue of their
being common, present difficulties in point of abstraction; on the contrary, the study of them is made easier by this community, as it is an evidence of their simplicity. It is only when abstraction has to deal with very complicated notions, as in the higher sciences, that by the nature of the case it increases the difficulty and the merit of our inductions, and still more of our deductions, though the objects which form their sphere be fewer in number. So, it is generality in the subjective sense that justly claims the intellectual presidency, for it is competent to raise in Morals, in Sociology, and even in Biology, systematic constructions, in utility, in difficulty, and even in perfection, surpassing those of Mathematics.

But the incorporation of science with religion, by ensuring the prevalence of encyclopaedic culture, puts an end once for all to discussions which depended for their importance on the regime of specialism. It is exclusively by virtue of their greater simplicity that the domain of Mathematics offers the best field for the development of Positive logic in its final systematic form. When cultivated in this spirit, there can be no revival of the unreasonable claim to precedence on the part of a science which, by its very nature, is confined to the most elementary subjects of human contemplation.

When restricted to its true object, a logical rather than a scientific one, this fundamental branch of science acquires a dignity which it could not have whilst vainly claiming supremacy. Its capacity for systematising true logic will be shown more fully by our drawing from it a general improvement of the art of thinking. This conclusive result of the treatise under consideration will be explained in detail in its synthetic conclusion; for the present I only anticipate so far as to give an idea of the nature of the progress contemplated.

It consists in the creation of a species of universal Algebra, calculated to facilitate thought, whatever be the subject on which thought is exercised, in as great a degree as ordinary algebra facilitates our meditations upon quantity. Without here explaining this new algorithm, I simply announce that it will condense alphabetic writing, as its predecessor condensed hieroglyphical writing. So that the writing of Sociocracy will thus receive an improvement, the equivalent to that which the Theocracy introduced in its writing. By such a creation alone will systematic Positivity be able to offer, as it comes to
embrace all departments of thought, resources no less perfect than when confined to the simplest speculations. Then, and then only, will human language be constituted in its normal plenitude, for then only will the signs which are the best medium for communication have become the best medium for mental labour.

In this way, the logic of Mathematics, made synthetical by the introduction of feeling, will in its turn react upon the general advance of abstract reason. From the scientific point of view, the definitive systematisation of the first step in the abstract encyclopedia, carries with it results of equal importance, as it gives us an elementary general conception of the whole order of things, moral, intellectual, and physical. This triple system of laws will consequently find recognition, not merely as regards the study of motion, but also in that of extension, and even of number, on the ground of the necessary relation between the object and the subject, a relation more appreciable in the more simple abstraction. The earliest phase of our initiation in science will thus elicit from the doctrine a moral influence of a kind to complete that derived from the worship, more particularly from the personal worship. In fact the worship develops the fundamental instinct of veneration, by its accustoming us to be fond of order: of order imposed by will; of order of our own institution; of order enforced by external necessity. Now the synthesis of Mathematics should exercise an equivalent influence, with the terms of the progression inverted. Although this reversed course is less pure and less noble, it forms irresistible convictions, which tend to consolidate the discipline arising from the worship, as they bring with them a profound sense of the value of this threefold submission, which thenceforth is as precious in the eye of reason as of feeling.

The proximate publication of the work, the character of which I have been explaining, left it still incumbent on me to point out here the nature and the object of the first of the seven volumes, constituting the ‘Abstract Encyclopædia,’ which is to condense the definitive system of the Positive doctrine. The foundation once duly laid by the execution of this volume, it will be impossible any longer to dispute the feasibility of reducing the normal exposition of true science to seven volumes, each volume devoted to one of the seven sciences of the ency-
clopedic hierarchy, each also composed of seven chapters. On comparing the volume on Mathematics with the mathematical phase of Positive education, as laid down in the plan given in the 'General View,' there may seem reason to fear that so short a book will be insufficient for such a science. For each chapter of the mathematical synthesis offers, on an average, a condensation three times as great as that effected in the other volumes. But, besides that the science, owing to its greater simplicity, admits of more concentration in its written exposition, though its oral teaching must be much fuller; two other reasons combine to explain this exceptional condensation. Easier, older, and more independent, the speculations of Mathematics have naturally been more exposed to idle digressions, so as to require expurgation on a vaster scale. As the end they have in view is to develope method rather than science, their culture demands more time and even effort than any other, but this is no reason why their systematic exposition in writing should occupy more space.

Be this as it may, it is only synthetical thinkers duly trained, and such at the present day are extremely rare, who will consider practicable so great a condensation, previous to my effecting it. But this first step once taken, it will no longer be possible to reject the concentration of science requisite if feeling is to preponderate, activity to have free play. Hence naturally, I attached peculiar importance to this explanation, as in no other way could I make it clear, to what an extent the admirable wish of Diderot comes to be, after the lapse of a century, attainable in a satisfactory degree, nay even in a degree beyond the hopes originally entertained.

Such remarks as I have to offer on the rest of Cosmology may be more brief. For Biology, though in the first volume I treated it in some detail, so as to prepare the way for its definitive systematisation, it still requires as much explanation as the whole of the inorganic sciences together. But in this place, it is Morals to which the fullest development must be given, as soon as I have pointed out the form which Sociology will definitively take by the condensation of the present treatise.

Of the seven fundamental sciences, Astronomy is actually nearest its final state, so as to require merely coordination and some elimination, for which the way has been prepared by my first volume. My treatise on Astronomy, published in 1844, the
result of a course of philosophical and popular teaching continued during seventeen years, completes my justification for not insisting at present on the second phase of the abstract encyclopedia. These two preparatory steps should suffice to enable the reader to grasp the plan of the second volume of the doctrinal system of Positivism. Its seven chapters will organise preliminary astronomy; the statics of celestial geometry; the laws which sum up its dynamics; the application of those laws for legitimate prevision; the fundamental law of celestial mechanics; the reaction of that law on the statics of the science; and its dynamical development. All I have to add here is, some hints with the aim of completing my earlier judgment as to the constitution, the subjective and relative constitution, proper for the study of the Earth—its geometrical and mechanical study.

Such complementary observations can have no place in the seven chapters of the volume on Astronomy, those chapters having already their definite object marked out as a result of the work above alluded to, which cannot, however, be a substitute for them. But the second volume of the abstract encyclopedia must, as its predecessor and those which follow, open with a religious introduction, and be summed up in a synthetical conclusion. The introduction is meant to set forth the general constitution of the science treated, and its normal relations with its predecessor. In the conclusion, we estimate its chief results, and its value as a preparatory step to the next phase of the encyclopaedic construction. Now it is in reference solely to this preamble and this summary, both, though in a different way, relating to the whole of the science under review, that the astronomical volume of the second philosophy can here admit some complementary aperçus.

Confined to the most intellectual of our senses, the study of the heavens creates the best type of observation, which is too simple in Mathematics, too complex everywhere else, for us to systematise it as satisfactorily as in the second phase of the encyclopaedia. The same unavoidable limitation makes it the destiny of Astronomy to furnish us spontaneously our model, when we would construct hypotheses of a really Positive character, hypotheses, that is to say, always admitting of verification. Again, no other science can so thoroughly regulate the extent to be allotted to its predecessor, for nowhere else is the connection between two sciences so perfect. These, its various
logical advantages, do not however here require any new explanations. Conversely to Mathematics, Astronomy, our second abstract science, has a scientific rather than a logical object: so that it is from the point of view of the doctrine in particular that I must now complete its examination.

Although in Astronomy, as in Mathematics, existence in the widest sense is reduced to its lowest attributes, in Astronomy the laws of those attributes produce a more irresistible conviction of the fundamental order. The previous study of these attributes, as much a question of touch as of sight, was better adapted to show their universality, but it did so by compelling us to set aside the properties which co-exist with them in such bodies as are entirely within our reach. Now in consequence of this abstraction we were unable adequately to appreciate numerical, geometrical, and mechanical order, as the indispensable basis of the higher economy. Existence, in the mathematical sense, must be seen realised in bodies capable of offering us no other form of it, if its laws are to serve as the direct foundation of the whole of the second philosophy. Such is the privilege in regard to synthesis of Astronomy, it affords us the advantages of the concrete point of view in our study of the most eminent types of material existence, whilst it keeps the abstract character required for scientific generality, as we only know of these beings under this one aspect. So that in it numerical, geometrical, and mechanical existence is no longer confined to the subjective milieu created by the instinct of the race to facilitate especially the conception by all of such existence. When made the object of direct study in the case of the heavenly masses which govern the Earth's motions, it traces in them an order of the more capital importance in that it is entirely beyond the reach of human interference.

We are thus led to see that mathematical existence is the normal foundation of all other existence, as we cannot withdraw ourselves from the dominion of the bodies which present it isolated, and in which it implies attributes which we shall never be able to appreciate. The character of relativity which attaches to all real enquiries can never be so strongly stamped on any other science, as it is on the science which would escape us were we to lose the only sense qualified to create it, or were the bodies it studies and their milieu destitute of the properties it requires for its creation. Since the acceptance of
the earth's motion, Astronomy, more than any other science, enforces the conviction that a subjective unity is the only one within our reach, for any real astronomical knowledge is limited to the planetary domain of the Great Being. Were it not for this centre, the study of the heavens would become as incoherent as it would be idle, by tending towards the absolute, though with evidently less hope in this particular case than elsewhere. In its own nature indefinite, Astronomy can be defined only by affecting it to the knowledge of man's planet, and the heavenly bodies in connection with it; a restriction which implies the earth's motion. But by the fact of this connection the earth's motion is of such importance to relative philosophy, that in its maturity human reason requires no demonstration of its existence. It was really accepted without demonstration, since its acceptance, preceding the conclusive evidence for it, took place at the time when the advent of the Positive state gave a seasonable opportunity for a change which had been in preparation from the very earliest beginning of science.

Whilst, however, we study the heavens in order to know the earth, astronomical science must have granted it the whole field required for the relative conception of the fundamental order. Taking no account of the stars external to the solar system, we study amongst those which compose it only such as can really influence the earth. Those then, which as visible to the naked eye, were at all times observed, should constitute the real domain of Astronomy; for the others, as too small or too distant, are necessarily alien to us. The field thus marked out, is, it should be remembered, sufficient for our practical wants; may less would suffice, the two bodies, viz., in direct connection with the earth, the one as centre, the other as its satellite. Nevertheless, the philosophical aims of the science require an habitual attention to the old planets, and their study finds a consecration in the institution of the week, an institution adopted into the Positive worship. Their aggregate is needed to give us a sufficient number of worlds to examine, as was admirably shown by Fontenelle. If we excluded them, our conception of the order which is a fate to us must be deficient in relativity.

The same train of philosophical reasoning, if produced, sanctions the study of the satellites and even of comets, although
if we regard simply our wants, either intellectual or practical, we might entirely eliminate both these appendices. On the condition of its constant subordination to the subjective construction, the cultivation of the two branches in moderation will give greater completeness, from the logical as well as the scientific point of view, to our study of the celestial order, as a result of a systematic comparison of the three general cases in which we trace that order. Nothing but this comparative study can impress the fact that the regularity of the heavenly order is due solely to its simplicity; as soon as the influences become complicated, the economy of the heavens tends to less regularity, than do the institutions created by the foresight of man.

Having carried even into the domain of Mathematics the definitive fusion of Fetishism with Positivism, so the better to effect the combination in logic of feelings, images, and signs; an analogous transformation requires no effort in Astronomy. It was by the spectacle of the heavens really that Fetishism survived through the theological era, and reached its incorporation with Positivism. The ancient verse, my definitive rendering of which raised such bitter feeling towards me, could only have come from one who was a stranger to Astronomy. In fact, the admiration really inspired by the contemplation of the heavens is paid directly to the bodies, the regular movements of which we watch. It is an ungrateful as well as a blind disposition—the child of fictitious and temporary beliefs—which alone diverts us from so natural a movement, by representing to us these immense beings as purely passive under wills external to them, and eternally impenetrable. But the definitive systematisation revives the normal attitude towards them, which has been swerved from during the Western transition, or rather during the last phase of that transition. If the heavens should above all recall to the Positivist the Great Being which revealed their laws and conformed to those laws its own providential arrangements, they may also inspire him, and that in a higher degree than the Fetishists, with the involuntary gratitude which corresponds to our appreciation of the universal order, an appreciation especially resting on experience.

The doctrine can never on this point run counter to the disposition sanctioned by the worship, and to be confirmed by
the life, as it should never lose an opportunity of enforcing the importance of assisting, even by artificial means, the growth of our sympathies. Putting aside the prejudices of science, we admit the impossibility of demonstrating the non-existence of the Gods to whose will Astrolatry looked as the continuous source of the celestial order. Since we have suppressed the idea of cause, the introduction of personal wills into science would tend to disturb the study of laws, to which it served of old as a preparation. But there is no reason why we should not persist in our natural dispositions, and use these wills as a logical instrument to facilitate our speculations in Astronomy by the due introduction of the emotions. In this way the intellect concurs with the heart in justifying the sanction definitively given by Sociolatry to Idolatry, in direct contradiction with the empirical conclusions of Theology, Metaphysics, nay even of Science. If, even in Mathematics, we ought to animate space in order to think the better by loving more, a fortiori is such a method appropriate in Astronomy, where it has been usual strongly to recommend feelings of a disturbing character. By the adoption of this method, the state of synthesis and sympathy become so entirely spontaneous as no longer to require a subjective milieu; our feelings may be directly referred to the objects of our contemplation.

In Astronomy in its subjective form, the last point is to explain what is the true function of celestial mechanics. Abandoning the irrational hopes entertained by mathematicians in their pride on the original discovery of the fundamental law of this branch, we recognise that Astronomy will always remain essentially a geometrical study; we have not the power, nor do we need it, to reduce everything in it to system. The laws of Kepler would always suffice for reasonable previsions, if the six elements of every elliptical movement were in each case adapted anew to the case. Although the theory of the perturbations in these elements must render easier their periodical determination, it can never dispense with the labour of a distinct working out of the problem. In celestial mechanics, then, it is the philosophical object that will remain predominant, be it the perfecting of the astronomical synthesis, be it the better connection of that synthesis with those which precede or follow it, by simplifying and adding force to our conception of the order of external destiny.
Such are the indications, logical and scientific, which I was bound to place here in order to complete my earlier treatment of the second step in the abstract encyclopaedia. The primary pair of cosmological sciences thus adequately organised, I need not linger on the couple which forms the transition from the lower objects of contemplation to the higher domain. For in the first volume of this work, the systematisation of Physics and Chemistry has been set forth as far as is possible in the present state of the Positive reconstruction, whilst at the same time the conditions yet to be met are pointed out. In accordance with the fifteenth law of the First Philosophy, the intermediate couple is the least near its regeneration, to effect which will need the concurrence of the two others. I must leave, then, to my successors, the definitive execution of the third and fourth volumes of the Second Philosophy, simply pointing out the seven chapters into which each is to be divided.

For Physics, the religious introduction will explain the purely subjective unity attainable in the case of a science, the branches of which must always be objectively independent, notwithstanding that they subsolve in common the study of the general constitution of inorganic matter as existing on the earth. The order of the seven chapters and their contents will be next determined by the senses to which they relate, ranked by their increasing speciality, a principle of arrangement which is in conformity with the gradual transition between Astronomy and Chemistry. Barology comes first, then the study of Gustation in the abstract, when founded; then Thermology, followed by the theory of Smell, Optics, Acoustics, and Electrology.

As for Chemistry, it is a science which admits of a more satisfactory coordination; since, being of narrower extent, it is susceptible of a definition in the fullest sense synthetical, a definition already given in my fundamental work. The introduction will first set forth the science as a whole, and it will then be possible to effect its definitive systematisation in the seven chapters of the volume devoted to it, assuming that sufficient preparation has been made by the elaboration indicated in the first volume of the present work. The seven chapters will organise the study of the elements; the chemical examination of the earth's environment; the theory of the simplest compounds; the theory of the second and most im-
portant degree of composition; the general laws of combination; the examination of the third degree; lastly, the complement relating to substances of unstable composition.

It is in this intermediate couple that the institution of subjective milieus, systematised by Positivism on the basis of its rudimentary form in Mathematics, will most fully display its efficiency as an intellectual instrument, not that it may not be extended also to the province of life. So adapted is it to geometry and even to mechanics, that its peculiar mode in those studies came in spontaneously, neither the scientific education of the individual or the race permitting us to trace the formation in the brain of the idea of space. It is in the physico-chemical domain, however, that the institution finds its widest field in consequence of the greater variety of the phenomena there observed, each class of which requires a milieu suited to its abstract study, a milieu but imperfectly indicated by the original type.

Having thus set forth sufficiently the definitive systematisation of the existence common to all bodies, in its three stages, mathematical, physical, and chemical, I must now enter on the special sphere of unity, and so on Biology as a preparation for it.

In my first volume I worked out the systematic study of vitality more fully than any other part of natural philosophy. I carried its organisation so far as to give separately each of the forty lessons, which, in the general plan of Positive education, are devoted to Biology. Notwithstanding this, the fifth volume of the abstract encyclopædia must here receive fuller explanations than any of its predecessors, in order to give its true character to a systematisation of equal difficulty and urgency by drawing out into special prominence the necessary connection of Biology with the religion of Humanity. The slight attention gained, these three years past, by the capital conceptions I put forward on the immediate reconstruction of Biology, is but one more proof how impossible it is to give any science its systematic form, if we isolate it from the whole of the doctrine. Never would the theory of life be disengaged from the analytical regime which is destroying it, were not a social impulse to secure its due submission to the discipline of synthesis.

Referring to the treatment of Biology in my first volume,
I am bound in the first place to point out a definitive elimination which will place it in a better light. The systematisation of Biology stood there between two expositions essentially alien to the fifth encyclopaedic phase, but for which I could not then find another place and yet which I needed for the exposition of Sociology. Both really concern the ultimate science, the one for the theory of unity, the other for the synthesis of the cerebral functions.

Assume these two episodes transferred to their proper place, and it will be seen that in the Introductory Principles, Biology is not treated on a scale disproportioned to that of Cosmology. If this is allowed, a few systematic considerations are all that is needed here to complete the work then done, and their aim will be to mark more strongly the dependence subjectively of the vital order on the human order. We cannot do this better than by stating the object and the connection of the seven chapters into which the fifth volume of the Second Philosophy is to be divided.

In its religious introduction, the first point will be to show the greatness of the step taken by the intellect, when it passes from the inorganic world to the world of life. So disconnected is mere material existence that the corpuscular theory is necessary to determine in Cosmology what is the proper field of abstraction, abstraction there always relating to molecules even whilst studying masses. In Biology, on the contrary, we enter the domain of unity, the unity of simple nutrition in the first place, then the unity of action and sensation, in the case of beings, whose characteristic is a permanent consensus, which allows analysis only as the preparation for synthesis. A law, as indisputable as it is inexplicable, connects, in all cases without exception, this contrast between independence and concert with the opposition between fixity of composition and renewal of the material substance. Thus is established the great primary dualism of relative philosophy; the preparation for which is the dualism introduced by the absolute philosophy, when it separated, as early as the Fetichist period, the external order from the human. This instinctive division, which drew no distinction between vitality and materiality, was destined under Theologism, concentrated as it was on Humanity, to serve as guide to Positive science in its gradual ascent, from its first step in Mathematics to its final terminus in Morals. By giving over to Positive
science the province of life, it impelled it towards the study of man, only separate from that of life when we take into account the succession of the several degrees of unity.

In this way, the religious introduction of the biological volume makes us feel the strictly preparatory object of the science, a point more appreciable the nearer we get to the goal of our theoretic efforts, which alone allows a true synthesis, all partial syntheses being futile. As preparatory, the study of life in the strict sense tends to be limited to the preamble required for the systematic appreciation of Humanity. All the great problems as to Unity can be stated only in an inchoate form in Biology, as their solution depends above all on the functions of the brain, the essential sources of the consensus, which is but imperfectly perceptible till we reach the ultimate domain, or Morals.

We are thus led to condense Biology in seven chapters, the two first of which organise its stational basis, anatomical in the first place, then taxonomical; the others being all devoted to its dynamical portion. The biotomical chapter gives, in a systematic form and in succession, the three normal stages of stational analysis; it treats, that is, of the elements, tissues, and organs, thus completing duly the fundamental conception of Bichat. Leaving molecular questions to Cosmology, Biology must yet begin with the study of the elements, in order to gain a right understanding of the harmony between the solids and the fluids, since the fluids can contain nothing but the rudiments of the solids.

The second chapter arranges the hierarchy of life with the view of linking Vegetality, properly so called, to Humanity, through the series of degrees admissible for Animality. Scientifically viewed, the scale so formed gives at once the succession of independent barriers which separate man from the inorganic world, and the series of intermedia which transmit to us the action of that world. Logically viewed, it throws light upon the analysis of life by fixing all its modes in beings which present them isolated from the higher degrees, and it allows biological synthesis to follow throughout the series the modifications of the unity originally expressed in man as its supreme type. These two uses of the scale of life admit, nay, demand a subjective conception of that scale, in which we put aside on system unpropitious cases, whilst we introduce such imaginary organisms as...
may facilitate our transitions and our comparisons. This done, the vital series becomes unassailable, and connects equally with the progression traced in the material order and the evolution of man, whilst it secures the continuity of the Second Philosophy in obedience to the law of classification which it derives from the First.

With this preparation, dynamical Biology is condensed in five chapters, in which animality is distinguished from vegetality, in accordance with the mode of alimentation, for in animal life the materials of nutrition must be elaborated in lower organisms if they are to be adapted to the higher. The third chapter of the fifth volume of the abstract encyclopaedia must be devoted, then, to the three fundamental laws of vegetative or organic life, to the study, that is, of renewal, of development, and lastly of reproduction. The next chapter proceeds from this point to an equivalent treatment of animal life, by examining in succession the laws of exercise, habit, and improvement.

The complement of these two groups of vital laws must be given by their connection, the proper subject of the fifth chapter, where the seventh law, the special law of hereditary transmission, combines the functions of nutrition which are intermittent with the functions of activity which are intermittent. We are thus enabled in the sixth chapter to examine directly the relations which necessarily exist between the organism and its environment, which relations are the permanent sources of the modifications of either. As the result of this, the whole preparatory process issues, in the seventh chapter, in the general study of vital modificability, and we base this study on the third law of the First Philosophy, the law which connects all variations whatever, even the variations of disease, with the normal state.

This construction of the abstract theory of life is summarised in the synthetic conclusion of the volume, which states the grand results of the biological treatise, and forms the direct introduction to the Sociological volume. Under its logical aspect, Biology, as the highest portion of natural philosophy, gives completeness to the relativity originated by the lowest portion, and developed in the intermediate sciences, the ultimate object being to form the basis for moral philosophy. Summed up in the movement of the earth and the gravitation of the planetary system, the astronomical synthesis is a preparation for the rela-
tive conception of human existence, by revealing the relative character of our conception of the environment to which we are subject. But the systematisation of Biology extends the same process to the constitution of our bodies, on which rests our cerebral life. As a consequence, the science of Sociology is enabled to effect the decisive revolution in the human understanding, by its direct proof that all opinions whatever are relative, by virtue of the laws of their movement. It is, however, solely from this final branch of study that we get the power of understanding why the change was so long in coming, why it was destined to await the close of our initiation, though the foundation for it had been laid from the very first beginnings of the scientific development. If on the one hand, the conception of the earth's motion was early accepted; on the other, the spontaneous comparison of the various degrees of animal existence was at all times sufficient to establish the relative character of our biological conceptions whenever the time should be ripe for its acceptance.

Under its scientific aspect, the treatise on life develops and consolidates our primary conception of the order of the world, connecting as it does the intellectual and moral order with the material, by laws whose sway is a matter of direct consciousness. The study of these laws prepares the way for the systematic conception of a destiny admitting modifications, a conception which is the leading characteristic of the Positive dogma. For in Biology the phenomena become so complex, as to evidence the possibility of modifying, no less than the impossibility of withdrawing ourselves from, the natural order. Its imperfection is more sensible, its instability more marked, and both tend to inspire a deeper sense of the dignity of our nature and the true purpose of our existence. Even Cosmology excludes the idea of absolute security, by its unbroken prospect of material catastrophes, either celestial or terrestrial, catastrophes against which we cannot provide. But Biology widens and completes our sense of insecurity, by making us aware how precarious is the individual existence, which is the foundation of the whole social economy. We are thus compelled to connect ourselves more closely with the Great Being, whose service gives scope for the feelings which give our life a nobility and even a consistency, which rise above all the fatalities of the inorganic or vital order.
Coming now to the logical and scientific preparation for the sociological volume, the synthetical conclusion of the biological construction effects it directly by its outline of the study of the brain, and of the theory of unity, guided thereto by investigation of the lower animals. But this twofold introduction becomes negative rather than positive, when we suppress the notions derivable from the higher science, although the placing them in biology may have its advantages in teaching, if it be in subordination to the succeeding phase of abstract education. The great object in so placing them must be to show the inevitable impotence of the treatise on life, as regards such speculations; they have their fundamental type in the sacred science, profane science serving as a preparation, and as a preparation only. Biology represents each animal species as a Great Being which has aborted, the cause of its failure lying rather in its circumstances than in itself, and by this presentation it establishes the law which reserves to the preponderating race the development of collective existence, the sole source of real unity. Historically derived from the sacred science, dogmatically the conception may be transferred to take its place at the head of profane science, in order that the preparation for the former may end in the demonstration of the insufficiency of the latter.

To give completeness to the new views here advanced on the final systematisation of Biology, I must give those which, at each stage of the process of revision, I have been obliged to put aside in order not to interrupt the general succession of ideas.

In the first chapter, there must be added, first, the application to the anatomical series of the law of ternary progression, may even to the coordination of the elements of the organism. The subjective organisation of Biology—such is the only security again is the uncertainty which results, in reference to the general divisions of statical analysis, from distinctions or connections alike arbitrary. If we rightly conceive the object of the progress— and it is rightly conceived as essentially logical— to determine its limits by the consideration of the scientific which it has to satisfy. In that case we keep only the three terms above mentioned, the true conception of which is in reality due to Bichat, for he it was who established the middle term, by virtue of which the two others, at all times instinctively recog-
nised, are at length accepted on system. In like manner we must determine the anatomical elements, by looking on them as destined to represent the harmony which is indispensable between the solids and the fluids of the body, provided always that we first separate the elements from the products, with which they were often confounded. This destination involves our looking on the blood as containing all the rudiments of the tissues, and, consequently, of the organs. Now, the tissues are necessarily three in number, in order to allow the life of nutrition, muscular action, and nervous excitability, and they are three by virtue of the structure, cellular, fibrous, or tubular, adapted for the discharge of these functions respectively.

As for the second chapter, all I have to do is to explain the feasibility of condensing therein a study to which academical routine devotes several volumes. Such condensation would still be impossible, or would be found unsatisfactory, had we not already, at the very commencement of the Second Philosophy, created the general theory of Positive classifications, in accordance with the principle laid down in the First Philosophy. But with these antecedents, we may reduce the taxonomical chapter of the treatise on life, almost entirely to the construction, a subjective rather than objective construction, of the scale of organic beings, and that contracted within the limits appropriate to its legitimate destination.

The third chapter is calculated to place in a clear light the true nature of the systematisation of Biology, by the way in which it establishes the theory of vegetal life. If it were our object to systematise Biology, from an objective point of view, it must be reduced to this its first province, the only one admitting an exact demarcation as regards the higher science between which and Cosmology it is the link. Since the abstract study of vegetal life is undertaken only with a view to animal life, this usage adopted by common consent foreshadows the ultimate triumph of the subjective synthesis, which can have no other source but the primary type of unity.

The conclusion here reached, a conclusion at once logical and scientific, gains its full force in the fourth chapter, where the special study of the life of relation never lets us forget the conviction to what a degree biological reasoning remains irrational when it is isolated from its true human application. It makes vain efforts to establish the consensus of the muscular and
nervous functions, so long as it misconceives the functions of the brain, which alone bring the others into combination. Now, the study of these higher or cerebral phenomena, though we may enter on it in a certain imperfect degree in regard to the lower animals, can be pursued fully only in man, and man is inseparable from Humanity.

The like remark is applicable to the fifth chapter, as it forms the only possible connection, biologically, between the two preceding chapters. But whilst it evidences the insufficiency of this direct connection, at the same time it evidences its importance and its reality. Although the seventh law of vitality, logically speaking, may be deduced from the others, whereas they are irreducible, it is wise to distinguish it from them, be it to use it as a bond of union for them, or be it above all to keep in sight its own particular object, at once a theoretical and practical object.

For the sixth chapter, I have nothing to add at present, save a particular recommendation, in working out the theory of organic milieux, to adhere to the subjective point of view: on that theory depend the principal problems of life, and it will be characteristic of the efficiency of the synthetical method.

So again for the seventh chapter at first, since the theory of vital modificability exists as yet only in its general principle, an immediate outcome of the First Philosophy. But it needs a complement here, in the law which applies to all modifying influences whatsoever, provided always that they be distinguished from foreign bodies. The law consists in limiting an aptitude for modifying to such substances as are assimilable, regarding each as an irritant or a calmative, when the dose exceeds or falls short of the point at which it is an article of food. This law completes the theory of modificability, which ought not to be confined to the organism modified, but should include the modifying milieu. Its application in science is to establish, between therapeutics and hygienics, a subordination analogous to that which the principle of Broussais established between pathology and physiology. I have not here to bring out its utility; in practice, it eliminates specifics, and offers a satisfactory substitute for them. If we inquire into its origin as a part of the system dynamically, it is traceable to the connection between nutrition and action,
rity cannot be doubted, admirably adapted as it is, to represent, in its best form, the contrast between the two social powers. To guide the reaction of the organic on the inorganic world in its full extent, man must rank his auxiliar animals amongst the beings to be modified; so that the external order and the human order are the respective departments of the Patriciate and of the Priesthood.

This definitive comparison of the two binary arrangements, both equally normal, allowable for the Positive dogma, may be summarised by an examination of the extreme limits assignable to the institution of subjective milieu, the scientific object of which is to facilitate abstractions. Though the institution is more available in Cosmology than in Biology, speculation in the latter becoming less abstract; still it ought to be of use in perfecting the general study of life, and that by enabling us to form a clearer idea of the typical organisms. In Astronomy it helps us to realise the movements without the bodies; à fortiori in Biology it can assist our comparisons, too often partial and as such, in default of images, limited to the help of signs. But in social and moral investigations, the institution loses at once its aptitude and its destination, as does analysis which it assists; for at this point abstraction is nearing its end, owing to the coincidence of the object and the subject. The scientific value, then, of subjective milieu, as well as their aesthetic power, extends as far as the limits of the domain of profane science, neither the one nor the other can ever have place in the domain of sacred science.

It remains to complete the construction of the Second Philosophy by the exposition of its two last portions; the irrevocable disjunction of which expresses in brief the chief superiority of my present work over my Philosophy. Though moral science is more especially the object we have in view, we must first touch on Sociology, to which will be devoted the sixth volume of the abstract encyclopedia. But by virtue of the work done in the present treatise, the definitive systematisation of Sociology may be practically reduced to the combination in a single volume of the two in which I have shaped the statics and dynamics of the social science.

So condensed, and the condensation is one attended with only minor difficulties, the sociological volume of the Second Philosophy will consist of seven coordinate chapters, standing,
the Positive doctrine, I must dwell on the marked distinction which, without destroying the connection of the whole, will always make itself felt between the five first and the two last. The historical division of the Second Philosophy into natural and moral, is one the utility of which is not confined to the initiation in science, either of the individual or of the race. As the motives which led to its adoption as a natural result still operate, we see that it is destined ultimately to become equally for theoricians and practicians the binary arrangement of the doctrine most in use. The one with which I above confronted it is objectively more rational, for it rests upon more marked distinctions and more close connections; but subjectively it is less rational, so as to offer us less aid in our synthetical meditations. We must, then, look upon the chief binary intellectual division as a definitive outcome of the distinction, at first spontaneously adopted, then systematically, between the human order and the external order, two branches of study which are to be compared under the expressive names of sacred and profane science. In the normal state, whilst due attention will be paid to the inevitable contrast between the organism and the environment, the great use of that distinction will be to bring out more clearly all the relativity of all our conceptions, and the futility of all objective syntheses. These two results once become familiar to all, the historical dualism will prevail over the dogmatical.

Compare the two under their logical aspect, and we see that the first is better adapted than the second to subordinate objective analysis to subjective synthesis. For the second seems hand over to analysis a domain in which analysis must ever preponderate, as disconnected existences are in question; whilst the former terminates the system of dispersion by a rudimentary introduction of unity. Although the organic scale, by its want of continuity, tends to give a sanction to the dominion of analysis, we have a legitimate resource for anticipating remedying this downward tendency in the subjective aim of our biological studies, directed as they invariably are to an invisible problem. The dogmatical combination could be referred to the historical only if analysis were destined to finally the general characteristic of the Second Philosophy. But as, on the contrary, that philosophy is in its ultimate form to be synthetical, the historical dualism, as a better preparation for it, is theoretically preferable. Its practical superio-
may make a third quaternary arrangement of the system of Positive doctrine, we might, that is, separate this highest from the two lower pairs of sciences by intercalating Biology, as the science in which the profane and the sacred effect a junction.

All the rest of the present chapter relates exclusively to the final science, the science to which all our theories whatsoever normally converge, and from which as from a common source, spring all our conceptions of action. Up to this point all investigation, not excepting Sociology, preserved its abstract and introductory character, as a consequence of the interval, one, it is true, constantly lessening, between the subject and the object. But in Morals the full coincidence of the two ushers in the definitive state of human reason; for in Morals the development of objective analysis results in the complete establishment of the subjective synthesis. In a word, in Morals the doctrine unites with the worship in order to systematise the regime. It is in Morals that is effected the general transition from the life of thought to the life of action. Nevertheless, the seventh volume of the Second Philosophy must still retain the speculative character which has pervaded the whole scheme, the better to mark that it terminates in a synthesis. Such explanations, then, as I here give, must bear solely on the theory of Morals, that is to say, on the direct study of man, reserving for the following chapter their application to practical Morals, the aim of which is to regulate human life.

But the treatise on the supreme science promised above, will not carry the division between the theory and practice of Morals farther than to make it distinguish between the two volumes of which it will consist, in agreement with its double title: 'System of Positive Morals,' or 'Treatise of Universal Education.' It was under this second title that I naturally announced it in 1842, at the end of my Philosophy, in which I had not yet separated Morals from Sociology. Since the decisive and irrevocable separation of the two has been effected, I have felt more and more that the direct study of the art which is emphatically human, must have a special antecedent in the construction of the science which is peculiarly human, the science which previously had not attained distinct existence. This is why, instead of the one volume originally promised, the work will be in two, dealing respectively with theoretic and practical Morals, as the term, Morals, by a happy ambi-
as in every other case, between the religious introduction and the
synthetical conclusion. The introduction will delineate the
general arrangement of the sixth encyclopaedic phase and its
dependence on the preceding one; the conclusion will give its
principal results and its function as regards its successor. These
two explanations are in Sociology more urgently needed, and
more difficult than in the previous sciences, as in approaching
our goal we are tempted to hurry over the intermediate steps.
When Biology had been created in a certain sense, the
attempt was made to found Morals without having formed
Sociology, and there will always be a tendency in the individual
to repeat in his educational period this natural but over hasty
process of the evolution of the race. The decisive point in my
career was the construction of the social science, and there will
never be a time when it will not be essential to give the reasons
for its intercalation, though the explanation no longer involves
the efforts and the fullness which it required of me. After
having studied first the milieu, then the body, we must enter on
the systematic study of the soul, by unveiling the laws, statical
or dynamical, of the intelligence and activity of man, as
verified in the collective existence of man, which has direct
relation to the Great Being. Its examination leads us to com-
plete sacred science by studying the true unity in order to
develope and consolidate the real Providence by regulating the
emotions, the thoughts, and the acts of its voluntary servants.

The seven chapters of the sociological volume are devoted
to establishing the stational theories of property, the family,
language, and society; then to the dynamical theories of Fetich-
ism, Theocracy, and the threefold transition which completed
the education of the race by the developement of its powers.
The plan is, as we see, a condensation of the results of the pre-
sent work, with the introduction of no absolutely new conception,
but separating off Morals, the existence of which as a distinct
science began in the course of my construction, and so could
not have its proper influence upon it. As for the study of the
normal state in itself, that is reserved for the last of the sciences,
the science of which Sociology is the immediate precursor and
the imperative necessity for this distribution of the
never throw into the shade
the two halves of sacred
different parts of profane
may make a third quaternary arrangement of the system of Positive doctrine, we might, that is, separate this highest from the two lower pairs of sciences by intercalating Biology, as the science in which the profane and the sacred effect a junction.

All the rest of the present chapter relates exclusively to the final science, the science to which all our theories whatsoever normally converge, and from which as from a common source, spring all our conceptions of action. Up to this point all investigation, not excepting Sociology, preserved its abstract and introductory character, as a consequence of the interval, one, it is true, constantly lessening, between the subject and the object. But in Morals the full coincidence of the two ushers in the definitive state of human reason; for in Morals the development of objective analysis results in the complete establishment of the subjective synthesis. In a word, in Morals the doctrine unites with the worship in order to systematise the regime. It is in Morals that is effected the general transition from the life of thought to the life of action. Nevertheless, the seventh volume of the Second Philosophy must still retain the speculative character which has pervaded the whole scheme, the better to mark that it terminates in a synthesis. Such explanations, then, as I here give, must bear solely on the theory of Morals, that is to say, on the direct study of man, reserving for the following chapter their application to practical Morals, the aim of which is to regulate human life.

But the treatise on the supreme science promised above, will not carry the division between the theory and practice of Morals farther than to make it distinguish between the two volumes of which it will consist, in agreement with its double title: 'System of Positive Morals,' or 'Treatise on Universal Education.' It was under this second title that I naturally announced it in 1842, at the end of my Philosophy, in which I had not yet separated Morals from Sociology. Since the decisive and irrevocable separation of the two has been effected, I have felt more and more that the direct study of the art which is emphatically human, must have a special antecedent in the construction of the science which is peculiarly human, the science which previously had not attained distinct existence. This is why, instead of the one volume originally promised, the work will be in two, dealing respectively with theoretic and practical Morals, as the term, Morals, by a happy ambi-
guity lends itself to such treatment, and serves as a representative for our whole synthesis. In the present place, the indications I offer must bear solely on the first volume, the seventh and last volume of the Second Philosophy, as it constructs the synthetical science, on the bases supplied by the hierarchy of the analytical sciences.

The religious introduction of this final treatise will be directed, as in the other cases, to tracing the general plan of the volume, and its proper dependence on the phase next below it in the encyclopedic construction. The difference lies in the greater importance and the greater difficulty of these two explanations, owing to the closer affinity evidently existing between the two elements of the sacred domain, however necessary it may be on systematic grounds to separate them. Consequently, it will be requisite to insist on this point of the distinction, a distinction no less indispensable to theory than to practice, for it is solely in virtue of it that the analytical construction can have a synthetic conclusion, as it allies the doctrine with the worship in order to organise the regime.

Distinct prominence must be given to the superiority of moral science, its logical and scientific superiority, as compared with all the others, which are but its necessary preparation. Thus only do we grasp in its entire range the Positive method, after having appreciated in Mathematics, deduction; in Astronomy, observation; in Physics, experiment; in Chemistry, nomenclature; in Biology, comparison; in Sociology, filiation. In point of fact, the subjective method, the appanage of Morals, is a seventh step, on which all the others depend for the regulation they cannot get elsewhere, a power derived from the entire coincidence of the object with the subject, whereas hitherto the two were always apart, though tending more and more to union.

This coincidence again is the source of the superiority of moral science in point of doctrine, which in no other science can attain complete rationality. As the human point of view is commingled, as a subjective element, with all the aspects of science, their preliminary study can give but incomplete notions, waiting for a systematisation derivable only from the knowledge of man. Recognising this as necessary, still the introduction formed by the other sciences is none the less objectively indispensable to the regular elaboration of the system, in obedience
to the fundamental law which throughout subjects the highest phenomena to the most elementary.

Subjective superiority, objective dependence,—such is the relation between any two consecutive degrees of the encyclopaedic scale, but in no case is it so applicable as in the two last. The goal being neared, we are in their case more alive to the defective rationality of the preparatory sciences, notwithstanding the greater difficulty of establishing the just distinction between the two. Profane science having in its own way given us an elementary knowledge of the milieu, and that of the body as its complement; sacred science enters on the systematic study of the soul, by analysing our collective existence, first from the statical, then from the dynamical point of view. But, though indispensable as a preliminary, this process is only a last preparation, the incompleteness of which we cannot but allow. We feel in regard to it that, as the intellect and activity are studied by themselves apart from the emotional nature, we are left to judge results alone, their origin and their purpose being questions for the following science. If, in the present work, the false position in which the mind is thus placed is not obvious, it is due solely to this, that the elaboration of Morals is therein, by a spontaneous process, blended inseparably with the construction of Sociology. Similarly, in my 'Philosophy,' I was enabled provisionally to shirk the obligation to create social statics prior to attacking social dynamics, by attending incidentally to existence, as occasion offered, in the course of the study of movement.

Without any illusion as to the character and object of the twofold mission devolving on me, as the result of the whole antecedent evolution of the race, I have always been aware that the full execution of the final construction would belong to my successors. What was reserved for me was to lay its immediate basis, and to characterise its spirit after having conceived its plan. In a word it was for me to institute the Positive religion, it was not for me to constitute it. Superior as is my religious construction in point of system to my philosophical creation, the present work cannot achieve the complete rationality which was ever my aspiration. For the normal distinction between Sociology and Morals, which is capital as regards the synthesis, arose whilst I was effecting a construction over which it ought to have presided. The atti-
tude required for the creation of a strictly dogmatic system could be finally taken only in this fourth volume as a result of the whole series of preparatory labours; labours I venture to say, as much needed for the public as for myself. What I have to do at present then is to complete my exposition of the true character of a definitive systematisation, in which, at the actual stage of my career, the normal execution of two works only falls to me, the two extremes of the Second Philosophy; between them my successors will intercalate five indispensable treatises.

Enough having been said on the introduction of the last volume of the abstract encyclopædia, I must examine, in more detail than in the case of the others, its seven chapters.

I shall devote the three first to establishing systematically the general doctrines which form the immediate basis of moral science as a whole. The first chapter will state the Positive theory of human nature, under the guidance of my subjective conception of the consensus of the brain. On the basis thus laid, the second chapter will construct the theory of the Great Being, the Being in which alone we can trace on a decisive scale the development of this consensus. Then it will be possible in the third chapter, without any preliminaries, to establish the definitive theory of true unity, as its nature and origin have been already determined. Evidently then the present work contains all the great primary principles of the one announced, not however in such a form as to dispense with their synthetical elaboration.

In the other four chapters of this last volume, the immediate object is the construction of the indivisible science of man, by laying down the real laws of human existence in its normal form, with full recognition of the external necessities to which man is subject. The fourth chapter will deal with the body, the study of which in Biology could only be preliminary, even as regards the lower animals, from want of the notions relating to the brain which are indispensable to a right conception of its consensus. After this, the direct and special object of the three last chapters will be the study of the soul; in them we shall lay down the general laws of human existence as a synthesis of the affections in the first place; then of the intelligence; lastly of activity.

In regard to the work in question, which alone will give the full conception of the Second Philosophy as a system, I
am bound to explain more particularly the character and object of the middle chapter, that in which we effect once for all the normal fusion of the profane with the sacred domain. The right understanding of this chapter is more calculated than anything else to set in a clear light the ultimate unity of the Positive doctrine, all the several elements of which will thus be shown to cooperate in the direct solution of the most important problem in the science of man. The aim of this decisive chapter is mainly this: to delineate the consensus, the indispensable consensus between our bodily existence and our cerebral life, the end in view being the perfecting the one and the other by the aid of their mutual influence.

The principal point in the work under consideration is to give completeness and system to my subjective theory of the brain, proceeding on the logical and scientific bases laid down in the first volume of the present treatise. To do this I must first deal with the external functions of the central apparatus, particularly with the part it plays in sensation, on which point my original remarks are not sufficiently clear. As with the organs of the soul, so I must determine by the subjective method the number and position of the cerebral ganglia which preside over the relations of the organism with the milieu, so far as it is the source of impressions.

This inquiry involves, as a preliminary, the enumeration of the senses, properly so-called. Now the ultimate conclusion which I feel bound to adopt is, that there are eight really distinct senses, one general, the sense of touch, and seven special: the muscular sense, the sense of taste, the sense of heat, the sense of smell, the sense of hearing, of sight, and of electricity. I rank the seven following Gall and Blainville, on the principle of increase in speciality, in harmony with that of the phenomena to which they correspond, and measured by the succession of their appearance in the animal series. The first and last alone require any special explanation. For the first, I adopt substantially the opinion of Blainville, who distinguished it from the general sense of pressure and assigned to it the direct appreciation of muscular efforts and of the fatigue consequent on them. As for the last, its feeble habitual development in man must not prevent our recognising its distinct existence, in some animals very strongly marked, and more or less common to all the vertebrata. For each of the eight senses we must
admit separate nerves, nerves not so easily traceable, but quite as independent, as those of sight and hearing; unless we do so, the functions which the nerves subserve would remain as indistinct as they would be if we had only the lower organisms to draw inferences from.

The same reasoning leads us to admit for each sense, the necessary existence of a cerebral ganglion, in which the nervous apparatus terminates, equally when it has a circumscribed sphere of action, as when it extends to the whole of the integument, internal or external. Since contemplation takes place equally though the senses involved differ, its organ must be distinct from theirs. Nevertheless these latter must be nearer the speculative region of the brain than the two other regions, with which they have no direct relation. Neither, again, have they with the organs of meditation, so that their position is necessarily under the organ of contemplation, so to avoid any disturbance of the operations of the intellect by lying athwart their organs. But as it is the knowledge of phenomena rather than of beings that the senses give us, their analytical character requires a position adjacent to that of abstract contemplation. This decision finds support in the obligation to place them on the median line, in order that the symmetrical impressions may be in sufficient agreement. As for the site of each of the eight sensitive ganglia in particular, all I can do at present is to give an idea, taking the easier cases, of a complementary explanation which has its proper place in the promised work.

Looking at the pre-eminent importance and the greater diffusion of the sense of touch, always common to both the external and internal integument, its ganglion must be nearest the organ of contemplation, thus better informed of the general state of the envelope, mucous membrane or skin. The ganglion of musculature marches with the active region of the brain, in order that its impressions may affect in an equal degree the three portions of the apparatus which regulates movement, excited, controlled, or sustained. On a comparison of the senses of sight and hearing, the one more intellectual, the other more social, we see that the respective ganglia of the two must be placed, that of sight nearer the faculty of synthesis, that of hearing nearer the instinct of sympathy.

As for the other division of the external functions of the brain our remarks for the present may be less detailed.
avoid all exaggeration on this point, we must consider it the function of innervation to stimulate contractions which the muscular fibre can effect of itself, and which are effected in the animals which are without nerves. The close solidarity which characterises the motor apparatus, the various parts of which can supply the place of one another reciprocally, does not require, and does not even allow of, any special ganglion, but does demand a direct relation with the active region of the brain. To afford such connection is the great function of the spinal cord, which also affords a rallying point for the impressions of touch. The only serious modification of this connection is due to the distinctions relating to the will, which condenses the whole cerebral existence. But the division of movements into involuntary and voluntary resolves itself into this, that we substitute intermittent for continuous action. This done, and putting aside spontaneous contractions, we recognise that innervation is always voluntary in its origin, though it may become involuntary in its results by long habit.

After this introduction with its two divisions, the chapter under consideration has for its main subject the relations of the principal region of the brain with the body. The system of these relations will constitute the theory, a theory in outline so adequately sketched by Cabanis, of the general connection of the physical and moral nature of man. But to constitute it we must begin by drawing a fundamental distinction between the two simultaneous influences constantly exerted by the body upon the brain, through the blood-vessels or the nerves, the two bonds of union between the life of nutrition and the life of relation. Common to all the regions of the brain and indispensable for all, the action of the blood which oppress or stimulates according to the mode and degree of its supply, only so far concerns the affective apparatus more than the others, in that this portion of the brain predominates by itself and has connections with the other parts. Over and above this general influence, the centre of the brain has a particular connection with the body through the special nerves of nutrition. These nerves perform for nutrition, though with less energy, a service in the way of perfecting it, analogous to that which the nerves of motion perform for the muscular functions. More necessary the higher the organism, the relation between the viscera of organic life and the brain, a relation which equally, whether
active or passive, is unconscious, is concentrated by means of a triple series of ganglionic communications, which serve the further purpose of increasing the solidarity of the motor organs and even of the organs of tact.

Such are the two sources, the one general, the other special, of the relation between man’s physical and moral nature. They come into direct combination by virtue of the close connection, peculiar to the higher organisms, between the vessels and nerves, which everywhere mutually aid one another, for nutrition and for stimulation. But the doctrine of vital harmony, to be sufficiently precise, demands more detail on the mutual relation between the organic life and the cerebral existence.

In the first volume of this work, I limited the relation to the affective region of the brain, since for the two other regions we can admit a direct connection solely with the outer world, for movements or impressions. By a further application of the same principle the relation is restricted to the self-regarding instincts, the only instincts which are concerned with the within; so that the organs of sympathy are connected with the life of nutrition only by virtue of their special relations with the egoistic propensities. But with them we must also exclude the two noblest personal affections, vanity and pride, as being directed on the without equally with the social affections, though with a different object. As a last application of the same principle, we eliminate, as not within the scope of this particular relation, the two instincts of improvement, destructive or constructive, for they are in as close connection with the environment, as the active region of the brain which they command. This suite of restrictions leads ultimately to the limitation of the special relations between the body and the brain to the three instincts of conservation.

But again, in regard to these three, a broad distinction must be drawn, founded on the nature and function of the several organs. In all the higher animals, the two instincts that relate to the preservation of the species may be set aside, almost as completely as those which directly bear on this external world. They have no immediate connection but with their respective viscera, the one as regards the germs, the other as concerns the offspring. There is a difference in this respect between the sexes, especially in the human species, the sexual instinct being more developed in man, the maternal in woman.
For the due appreciation of this difference, I must intimate that the organic viscera which correspond to these two instincts, over and above their direct and special action on the brain, affect it indirectly through the blood it receives. In fact the fluids they secrete are always susceptible of reabsorption into the system when they are not discharged. The reaction of these fluids, the more normal the higher the organism, is to stimulate or calm, according as it proceeds from the fertilising or the alimentary liquid.

It follows that we must restrict the special relations between the life of the body and the life of the brain to the correlation between the nutritive apparatus and the instinct of self-preservation, both in their own way bound up with the whole economy of which they are parts. Paramount and unintermitting however as this connection is, it must never put out of sight those which are due to fecundation or lactation. Finally, if we would systematise the vital harmony, we must ever combine these special ties with the general tie furnished by the blood.

In this combination we see the nature and the difficulty of the theory to be explained in the fourth chapter of the seventh volume, which deals directly with all the relations whatsoever of man's physical with his moral constitution. The three influences just indicated suffice to explain all the normal interactions, and even those originating in disease, whether mental or bodily; and as a consequence, medicine re-enters, on system, the domain of sacred science. To show more clearly that this capital property resides in the three, it will not be out of place to instance it in the case of Dreams, where the two distinct investigations of disturbance and agreement are found in spontaneous combination.

When constructing social dynamics, I lamented the disuse imposed by Monotheism on the polytheistic inquiries into this important phenomenon, and I anticipated the systematic resumption of such inquiries in the ultimate state of human reason. We have now reached the point at which we can understand the Positive grounds for such resumption, to be given at length in the promised work. By the aid of the three influences above mentioned, we can appreciate the direct, nay even the indirect, modifications of our internal life, whether bodily or cerebral, due to the suspension of all relations with the exter-
active or passive, is unconscious, is concentrated by means of a triple series of ganglionic communications, which serve the further purpose of increasing the solidarity of the motor organs and even of the organs of tact.

Such are the two sources, the one general, the other special, of the relation between man's physical and moral nature. They come into direct combination by virtue of the close connection, peculiar to the higher organisms, between the vessels and nerves, which everywhere mutually aid one another, for nutrition and for stimulation. But the doctrine of vital harmony, to be sufficiently precise, demands more detail on the mutual relation between the organic life and the cerebral existence.

In the first volume of this work, I limited the relation to the affective region of the brain, since for the two other regions we can admit a direct connection solely with the outer world, for movements or impressions. By a further application of the same principle the relation is restricted to the self-regarding instincts, the only instincts which are concerned with the within; so that the organs of sympathy are connected with the life of nutrition only by virtue of their special relations with the egoistic propensities. But with them we must also exclude the two noblest personal affections, vanity and pride, as being directed on the without equally with the social affections, though with a different object. As a last application of the same principle, we eliminate, as not within the scope of this particular relation, the two instincts of improvement, destructive or constructive, for they are in as close connection with the environment, as the active region of the brain which they command. This suite of restrictions leads ultimately to the limitation of the special relations between the body and the brain to the three instincts of conservation.

But again, in regard to these three, a broad distinction must be drawn, founded on the nature and function of the several organs. In all the higher animals, the two instincts that relate to the preservation of the species may be set aside, almost as completely as those which directly bear on this external world. They have no immediate connection but with their respective viscera, the one as regards the germs, the other as concerns the offspring. There is a difference in this respect between the sexes, especially in the human species, the sexual instinct being more developed in man, the maternal in woman.
by virtue of the power over its own organisation, even its physical organisation, possessed by the species most susceptible of modification, a power of which as yet we have only witnessed the faint beginnings. As success must depend principally on the general development of the relations between soul and body, the persistent effort to solve the problem will place on a sound footing the systematic study of the vital consensus, as it will supply at once the noblest end and the best instruments.

Summary as these remarks must necessarily be, they seem to me to define with sufficient clearness the character and object of the most critical chapter in the whole of my elaboration of moral science. In reference to the treatise in which the Second Philosophy receives its complete and systematic form, all that remains is to explain its synthetical conclusion, which will be the general summary of the abstract, and the immediate source of the concrete, encyclopedia.

In natural correspondence with the introduction already examined, the conclusion will give prominent expression to the capital renovation of profane science, due to its amalgamation with the sacred science. From the logical point of view, the continuous application of the subjective method will by this time have evidenced its intrinsic superiority to the objective in all its forms. Whilst the supreme science offers the only possible connection of the six preliminary sciences, its method alone can systematise deduction and the five modes of induction which answer to these sciences. Suppress this two-fold service, and analysis could never have issued in synthesis, where the doctrine allies itself with the worship with a view to the regime. And it is in this synthesis only that we can fully appreciate the intellectual efficacy of feeling, the sole possible source of any systematic construction. In principle, we had an indication of its power in this respect in the peculiar prerogative of feeling in regard to the continuity of our cerebral life, which it alone upholds during sleep and in spite of disease. But for this, its general influence, to exhibit the true logic, it is requisite that moral science give prominence in particular to the combination of feelings with images and signs, the combination which is destined to regenerate even Mathematics, as I explained at the outset.

This grand result of intellectual progress finds direct expression in the systematic incorporation of Fetishism with
nal world. This implies, however, that, realising the wish Cabanis, we have previously formed sounder views of sleep than those which as yet prevail. According to my theory of the brain, sleep never has the character of a purely passive state, the affective life persisting during sleep quite as much as the vegetal. Neither the one nor the other objects of direct cognisance, they produce appreciable results by modifying the intelligence and even the activity, more profoundly even than when their influence is complicated with that of environment. Adopting this principle, the sacred science will be enabled to reduce to system the subjective interpretation of Dreams, to the point of directing their course by means of suitable impressions derived from the brain or the body.

To complete the exposition of the theory of vital harmony, I have to point out its legitimate connection with the bold hypothesis I ventured, in the last chapter, on the limitation to women of the function of reproduction.

The higher the organism, the more extensive naturally become the inter-reactions of the physical and moral constitution, and this as a consequence of the relations between the three kinds of nerves and the vessels assuming greater importance as compared with the purely vegetative functions. Now, in this respect, woman is superior to man, by virtue of a more complete development of the nervous and vascular systems. Woman is naturally qualified to be the highest type of the mutual influence of the cerebral and bodily life. This superiority in organisation has been aided, and that increasingly, by the social position of woman, for by it she has been, step by step, set free from the pressure of active life, and made more and more amenable to the influence of the emotions, especially of the sympathetic emotions. When the Positive reorganisation of opinions and manners shall have given women the first place in the Sociocracy, their share in reproduction will be largely increased, as a result of their increasing accessibility to the combined influences of continuity.

If so, the Utopia of the Virgin Mother will become, for the purer and nobler women, an ideal limit, well adapted to stand as the concise expression of human progress, carried to the point of systematising and so ennobling procreation. This adaptation of the theory will always be independent of its realisation in practice, provided only that it be looked upon as realisable,
-correlation which exists in Morals alone between theory and practice. The study which, as its direct teaching, asserts the supremacy of feeling can never lead us to ignore the truth, that feeling, as the general motor power of human existence, finds a better encouragement in its exertion, whether that exertion take the shape of action or be limited to an artistic form, than in any scientific grasp of its own peculiar laws. So we find the fundamental law by which the degree of cultivation of each science depends on the requirements of the science next above it, embracing even the last science, where we have the completion of the abstract, with a view to the formation of the concrete, encyclopedia. To suit the formula of the law to this extension, all we have to do is, if theoreticians, to give the term science as large a comprehension as practitioners do; the instinct of synthesis in practitioners including in science all the precepts of human wisdom, whether practical or theoretic.

The conception of the Universal order becomes full and definitive only in Morals, for it is there that the laws of the lower phenomena are brought into systematic connection with those of the higher, as a result of the perfect completeness of the methods and doctrines. Condensed in Man, according to the admirable anticipation of Antiquity, the whole order at length combines coherence and dignity. Its greater relative perfection in regard to the lower phenomena is attributed justly to their greater simplicity. We feel that the model which they unconsciously furnish, ought to be, and may be, exceeded by the systematic exertion of the true Providence. In fact, the existence of man will surpass in regularity the order of the heavens, for in this latter the perturbations take the first place as soon as there is any complication of the forces at work. But, whilst it puts out to the full this superiority, the Great Being will never cease to reverence the type which was the natural guide of its infancy. The fusion of Fetichism in Positivism will enable man at all times to evince his just gratitude towards the order to which he is subject.

By their combination with the laws of Morals, the sole immediate objects of consciousness, a combination effected through the medium of the laws of the intellect, laws implied throughout, if not expressed, physical laws become rational in a degree which they could not by themselves attain. The last of the sciences should consolidate as well as complete the order which
began with the first by giving its full effect to this interdependence, a point hitherto unnoticed, which establishes a mutuality between the several demonstrations of the invariability of nature. Notwithstanding this, from the independence, as between themselves, of the laws of Physics, there will always attach a certain empirical character to the order to which they belong, though its simplicity made it originally the type of regularity. But by the absorption of Fetichism by Positivism we are enabled to systematise the solidarity above indicated, as we thereby assimilate the external to the human order, thus made the subjective source of the universal synthesis. Retaining for Fetichism its old domain, nay enlarging it so as to include abstract contemplation, Positivity commits to it the function of giving the indispensable consecration to the economy in which we live, and in which without such consecration our gratitude could be paid only to beings whose existence is a chimera.

The synthetical conclusion of the last volume of the Second Philosophy thus adequately treated, the scientific encyclopaedia has been duly set forth. In no better way could I present it as a whole than by naming separately each of the seven treatises which, in hierarchical succession, are to constitute it, the two extremes alone being reserved for me to execute. But the full inauguration of the definitive systematisation of Positive doctrine requires me to terminate this chapter by pointing out the normal affiliation of the concrete, to the abstract, encyclopaedia.

The first trace of this complementary work may be found in the treatise of which I have just sketched the plan. For it is to consist—by the engagement above taken—of two volumes, and as yet I have only spoken of the first. There was no need to give any particular attention to the second, sufficiently explained in the ‘General View,’ and as a result of the whole of the present chapter, not to speak of the opening of the next. But this second volume, as the last of the treatise which concludes the abstract encyclopaedia, connects it naturally with the concrete, as it is the passage from the theory to the practice of Morals. Education is in fact the first of the arts, the only art which is entirely in the full sense of the term general, the art which perfects action by improving the agent.

Availing ourselves of the transition education offers, a transition as spontaneous as it is systematic, we must now bring
before our minds, as a direct object, the arrangement of the concrete encyclopedia, as it regards the whole system of the special arts, no longer the arts which concern man, but those which deal exclusively with the external world. Their need of coordination made itself deeply felt during the last phase of the modern revolution, as a result of the near approach of the Positive state under the impulse given by Descartes, most powerfully seconded by Diderot. But attempts of a necessarily empirical character only served to point out, in a confused way, the end to be aimed at, with no other definite results save an useless accumulation of technical treatises. As every art ought to be learnt solely by judicious practice, these books, calculated to disturb rather than regulate our advance in skill, are of no value except from the historical point of view, so far, that is, as they looked to science, as a whole, to supply an addition, the nature of which had been hitherto misapprehended. And yet, the necessity to abstract in order to generalise, and the impossibility of discovering the laws of concrete phenomena, even when we combine dogmatism with empiricism, seem to preclude the real systematisation of the industrial arts.

The fact is, they do not admit of coordination in detail, for multiply precepts as we might they would never meet the variety of individual cases. But man’s action upon the world as a whole, can be, and ought to be, systematised on the basis of the systematisation of his scientific conception of that world. This is the proper object of a work which I projected at the very beginning of my career, promised afresh at the close of my Philosophy, and a second time at the opening of this work. Its execution will be my last effort of construction; its specific title will be: System of Positive Industry, or, Treatise of the aggregate influence of Humanity upon her Planet. Here I must content myself with an outline of this work, the indispensable complement of the normal synthesis, and I adopt the same method as in the previous treatises.

It will have, as all the others have, a religious introduction setting forth the constant dependence of the concrete on the abstract encyclopaedia, setting forth also the synthetical character of the volume, a volume in which all the theories of science must constantly converge. As, however, it is the external order which is exclusively the province of industry, the human order can have no place in the volume, except as being
necessarily the source of systematic modifications. The two first chapters will have, then, to organise this general relation, the first explaining the spiritual, the second the temporal economy of Positive industry. On the basis of the two, the five following chapters will deal respectively with mathematical action; astronomical action; physical action; chemical action; and biological action, the action of animals as well as that of plants. The work will thus develop the homogeneity shown by the First Philosophy inevitably to exist between the classification of the arts and that of the sciences, allowing for the fact that the first is limited to the profane, the second embraces also the sacred sciences. To aid us in this construction, the institution of subjective milieu must once more be made to do service as an instrument of teaching, to give life and definiteness to our practical conceptions, the sphere of which is identical with its own. This done, the synthetical conclusion of the concrete volume will confirm the religious impression created by its introduction, by noting strongly the inadequacy, nay even the danger, of this outward art if it forget its sub-ordination to the art which concerns man.

Thus arises a Third Philosophy, and its object is to complete the Second, in its turn the offspring of the First. Devoting a volume to the First, the systematisation of the Positive doctrine may ultimately be condensed in ten volumes, volumes embodying the essence of human knowledge, practical or scientific, allowing for special developments, oral rather than written.

The whole chapter issues in a conception of the Positive Philosophy, of greater completeness and higher unity than could have been hoped for. By virtue of the three degrees of generality which it brings into combination, the development of this conception forms the gradual transition from the sphere of feeling to that of activity, in accordance with the true mission of the intellect. Such a result is corroborative of my synthetical decision, definitely to subordinate the doctrine to the worship, the better to institute the regime, the systematisation of which is my next task.
CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL VIEW OF MAN'S ACTIVE EXISTENCE,
OR
DEFINITIVE SYSTEMATISATION OF THE POSITIVE LIFE.

In instituting the Positive Religion, the great difficulty consists in reconciling sympathy and synthesis, severally cultivated in the worship and in the doctrine. The normal combination of the two is the grand object of the life, which is dependent in equal degree on the one and the other. It is in this way that the three elements of the true religion contribute to the foundation of Positive unity, by the simultaneous systematisation of love, faith, and action, the triple basis of real virtue.

Were it not for the exigencies of our physical condition, the worship would suffice to regulate our existence, an existence devoted exclusively, as it would then be, to affection, which the worship fosters. Speculation, as a part of our life, would be confined to the moral laws which the worship reveals, our action to the esthetic exercises in which it is our guide. The stimulus of necessity removed, egoism would be sufficiently repressed, so great is the all-pervading charm of altruism. Even the instinct of domination would need no discipline, for it depends for growth on the promptings of cupidity, in the inferiors at least, if not in the governors. Under these conditions, sympathy would lead directly to the establishment of unity, asking for no synthesis beyond that which would be the natural offspring of the unbroken supremacy of feeling over intelligence and activity.

As it is, our bodily wants necessitate a more complex religion, as they give rise to a form of existence which, first from the practical, then from the theoretic aspect, does not easily harmonise with our moral existence. The ever present obligation to modify an unpropitious milieu develops an activity which in its initial form is egoistic. The intellect thus driven to the study of the environment has a tendency to
forget that its normal attitude is one of subordination to the heart.

This same existence, however, at a certain stage of its growth has the power of reproducing unity, relative unity, when the doctrine and the regime are so far developed as to accord with the worship. Our study of the laws of Physics leads us to the admission of the laws of the intellect, the link between them and the moral laws. Our conception of the universal order, originally limited to the moral laws, becomes in this way complete and systematic, with the effect of subordinating intellect to feeling. In like manner, man’s active life requires for its full development a collective advance, which of itself cultivates altruism. This moral reaction of his activity at first affects veneration only, as the basis of discipline, but it includes subsequently the two other social instincts, in proportion as the efforts of the individual are found to conduce to the welfare of the state, nay even of the race. Thus ultimately the doctrine and the regime converge to the worship, the result being a more complex, but also a more highly developed unity, than one which should rest simply on feeling. The stability of this unity is ensured by its affording a legitimate occupation to the powers which have a tendency to disturb it, and it employs them by devoting them to its own consolidation.

In the installation and maintenance of this normal state, the share of the regime is to be held greater than that of the doctrine, considering its more natural and more complete affinity with the worship. For the isolation requisite for the cultivation of science has a tendency to make us despise, or at any rate neglect, our moral life. Nor is it any security against this error, that the intellect is occupied in synthetical investigations, and that with a directly social aim. Action, on the contrary, by its nature, predisposes us to sympathy, as it never lets us lose sight of the necessity of others’ cooperation. Practical life stimulates this moral influence, even when analysis becomes the prevailing characteristic of its course, by the ultimate predominance of the industrial life.

Taking into account this difference in their influence on feeling as the principle of unity, the doctrine must hold a subordinate position in relation to the regime, as it does in relation to the worship, though in order of time the systematisation of our intellectual must precede that of our active life, as it is to
guide the latter. The most important part of the Western transi-
tion—the Roman—made contemplation the handmaid of action. 
Although later the monotheistic synthesis impaired this relation, 
the practical instinct of man has upheld it, and that avowedly in 
the interest of feeling, as the common superior alike of intellect 
and activity. Retrograde as are the tendencies of modern anarchy, 
the whole of human existence has so fostered the previous dispo-
sition as to make it easy for the Positive religion to secure the 
recognition of action as the principal minister of affection. In 
the normal state, it is only in the developement of our esthetic 
faculties that the intellect takes precedence of action, and for 
them we should interrupt at regular intervals the ordinary course 
of practical life. If, on the one hand, the doctrine completes the 
worship by connecting the human with the external order, on the 
other it prepares the way for the regime by systematising man's 
submission to, and interference with, the world without. The 
object thus assigned it regulates the developement of the 
intellect, guarding it against the misdirection to which, if left 
to itself, it is liable, and concentrating it on the great problems. 

Action then becomes the best guarantee of unity, if once 
developed on such a scale as to combine faith and love. 
Maugre their natural affinity, sympathy and synthesis tend to 
diverge, if sympathy degenerate into mystical affections, syn-
thesis into speculation for speculation's sake. Such degenera-
tion, such divergence, find in the influence of action their only 
permanent prevention or remedy. It must be remembered, 
however, that if action is thus to regulate and combine love and 
faith, it can only do so when it takes a collective character, no 
other being compatible with the predominance of the heart and 
the free growth of the intellect. Now, the essential feature in 
the ultimate regeneration is the promotion and consolidation of 
this transformation of activity, as a consequence of the whole of 
the gradual preparation made during the first life of Humanity. 
Thus the solution of the human problem is drawn from the 
working out in full of the very conditions in which the problem 
has its origin. To demonstrate this is the main object of the 
present chapter, which is more than any other adapted to de-
lineate the genuine system of the Positive religion.

Whilst it is the active class that must be most affected by 
the systematisation of the regime, whilst it depends for its 
attainment principally upon women, to inaugurate it and
uphold it belongs exclusively to the spiritual power. It is on this
ground that, before proceeding farther, I must here explain in
detail the constitution of the Positive priesthood, and even state
its fundamental function in reference to the common education.
These two points determined, we then form a direct estimate of
the definitive systematisation of human life, in relation suc-
cessively to the Individual, the Family, and the State.

So intimate is the correlation between the constitution of
the priesthood and the system of education, that any clear defi-
nition of the former is not possible, so long as the latter remains
undetermined. But in the 'General View' the education has
already been explained, so that I may here proceed to examine
the former question in which are necessarily implicated all parts
of the regime.

First, however, there are two cautions to be given, applic-
able equally to the other sections of this chapter and even of the
next. The first relates to the numbers which I have thought it
right to introduce in order to give precision to our conceptions,
though any exact determination is as yet unattainable. When
the necessary data are obtained, it will be easy, on the principles
here stated, to effect the requisite corrections in my primary
estimates. In the second place, in my exposition of the life,
just as in those of the doctrine and of the worship, I have to
keep in view the Positive state in its normal plenitude; I
assume it, that is, established throughout the world. It belongs
to the next chapter, the determination of the general course of
its advent to full power; the question is as much out of
place here as it would have been in social statics. For clear-
ness' sake, however, my detailed statements will bear exclusively
on the West, in the full sense of the term, including therein its
colonial settlements; this gives a total population of one
hundred and forty millions, and to this population the regene-
ration will at first be confined. We must multiply the numbers
given by seven, when we take the whole race into account (its
amount at present is quintuple), allowing for the normal
increase of the nations which at present are below the western
rate (sixty inhabitants to the square kilometre).

In order to consolidate the separation of the two powers, the
general basis of the Positive regime, it is essential to limit the
numbers of the contemplative class as far as is consistent with
its full functions. Without this reduction, it would be im-
possible to secure the rare combination of intellectual and moral qualities, required for the priesthood of Humanity, the extent of which must be determined with especial reference to the encyclopaedic instruction which completes and systematises Positive education. I have already stated that this instruction will occupy seven years, during which each pupil remains throughout under the same teacher, teaching, be it added, both sexes, though in separate classes.

Each Positive school, then, will require seven priests, and in addition three vicars, in order that the philosophical presbytery may suffice for the demands of the worship; of preaching; and of consultation, on moral, intellectual, or even physical questions. The scheme already referred to binds each professor, as a rule, to two lectures only in each week during ten months of the Positivist year, besides a month of examination. Every school is annexed to the temple of the district, as is the presbytery, the residence of the ten members of the sacerdotal college and of their families, with the senior member for president, and with a separation of residence for the vicars from the priests.

On these data, it seems to me that the spiritual wants of the West may be duly met by a corporation of twenty thousand philosophers, of whom France would have the fourth. This rate is equivalent to having a temple for every ten thousand families, each family consisting of seven members, in agreement with a law to be explained later. Positive religion by its nature admits of this great reduction of the contemplative class, though its duties are more extensive than those of the analogous class under any Theologism. Always demonstrable and never ambiguous, its precepts will but seldom require explanation from the priests, remembering the universal diffusion of systematic instruction, which will often enable women and the elders to supply the place of the priest in counsel. With a view to their more entire concentration on the duties of teaching and worship, the philosophical class will be freed from all material cares, each temple being placed under the protection of the nearest banker, on whom it devolves to maintain the fabric and the priests.

The Positivist clergy must be recruited from all classes, by conferring, at the age of twenty-eight, the provisional degree of aspirant on anyone who is thought qualified for the priesthood, on a judgment of his scientific noviciate, and of the subsequent
abstain from throwing difficulties in the way either of individuals or societies if they wish to enter into legitimate competition with the public schools. Persistent however as must be our respect for liberty in teaching, such liberty will exist in principle rather than in practice, unless the regular teaching become altogether degenerate, a condition of things which the spiritual head of Humanity may guard against or remedy by remodelling at need his whole clergy.

Such are the introductory observations I was bound to offer here on the special constitution of the Positive priesthood. They will be complemented in the natural course of things as I explain its regular intervention throughout the regime. But without this introduction to the whole, the several particulars could not have the requisite precision and clearness.

The next point to examine is the principal function of the Positivist clergy, and for this I delineate the education which it reduces to a system. The essential outlines of this exposition were given in the 'General View,' so that all that is here required is to complete, coordinate, and above all to summarise it, with such minor corrections as have been from time to time, not unnaturally, suggested by the course of the present work.

Positive education founds the true unity, by teaching us to live for others. Its aim being to fit us for the unintermitting service of Humanity, it remains above all moral, even when most intellectual in character. Based on the innate existence of the sympathetic instincts, it subjects to them the personal instincts, during the period of life in which the natural predominance of these latter is very largely kept in check, owing to the providential interposition which frees us from the necessity of acting.

This educational preparation, continuing till twenty-one, is divided into two parts, the one private, the other public, the point of separation being the age of puberty—at fourteen. The first part has for its object the cultivation of the affections, the second that of faith; the first under the superintendence of the mother, the second under that of the priest; the two together issue in a period of free action during a complementary period of seven years. Twenty-eight years, then, are allotted to the training of the individual, and the beginning, two principal phases, and close, are distinctly marked in the four first sacra-
never with any share in the government of the holy city. But, in order to ensure the noble simplicity demanded by such a supremacy, his annual income is only fivefold that of the ordinary priests, exclusive of the expenses incident to the administration of the central budget.

The vastness of his office makes it necessary for the Pontiff of the West to call habitually to his aid seven national superiors, each with a salary the half of his, over and above his necessary expenses. Four are allotted, one to each province, to Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany, which will always remain distinct by their history, if not in language, after the normal disgregation of the actual nationalities. The three others are reserved for the colonial settlements of the West, no assistant being named for France, to which the High-Priest, as in direct contact, can pay sufficient attention.

But the number will naturally be increased in proportion as the Positive religion advances towards its normal state of universality. This eminent branch of the priesthood will, then, furnish forty-nine members when mankind is completely regenerated. Besides their ordinary duty, on them it will devolve, on the death or retirement of the Pontiff, to influence or correct the choice he will have freely made of his successor, with regard to whom they will consult, if need be, the whole of the senior members of the colleges within their respective jurisdiction.

As for the dress of the priesthood, in public or private, imitating the judicious reserve of the founders of Catholicism and Islam, I prefer to adjourn a determination which if it is to be effective, must be completely spontaneous. We may be confident, however, that, from the definiteness of Positivism as compared with any form of Theologism, the appropriate modifications in dress will be of more rapid introduction. The form of its clothing will remind people, that the priesthood, by its true position intermediate between the sexes, has more affinity with the female sex; and the colour will show that it speaks in the name of the past, in the interest of the future. Whilst disorganising costume, the anarchy of modern times has instinctively respected the distinction of the sexes, and therein lies the germ of discipline for the less strongly marked cases. The reorganisation of costume should naturally begin with the clergy, as, in its social character, more homogeneous and better defined than the patriciate or the proletariat.
an indication speedily confirmed by the whole of the child's relations with others. The distinction between the mother and Humanity does not interfere with the unity of the child's worship, for the mother even at this early age becomes the personification of Humanity, in which at that time the Country is lost.

Although the education of the infant is almost exclusively moral, the intelligence is awakened by the observation of beings, guided by a purely Fetichist synthesis, all interference with which must be carefully avoided. Under the influence of this synthesis, as emotional as it is intellectual, the first beginnings of the true logic are traceable in the combination of feelings with images, soon aided by signs. Thus is attained in its simplest form cerebral unity, wherein activity, with no outward object to secure, subserves the intelligence to express emotion.

This form persists during the second period of childhood, but with a tendency then to the more complex unity required in real life, because the child is now in contact with others outside the Family, the only collective being originally within its cognizance. This enlarged contact is a consequence in especial of its esthetic studies, then entered upon on the basis of the images derived from the first period. Although these studies in the main should be left to the child itself, the mother's care prepares the way for the normal discipline, by instituting the practice of exercises in poetry, in music, and in drawing, even prior to reading and writing. When, by the acquisition of these last, full communication is established, the child enters at once on the knowledge of the Great Being, through admiration of its master works, in spite of the diversity of languages, ancient or modern. From familiarity with this difference, there dawns the idea of Country in the widest sense, hitherto undistinguished from Humanity, but henceforward characterised by language, even when the difference has become purely a matter of history, in consequence of the universal adoption finally of the Positive language. Indeed, in the normal state, the study by all of the seven languages which presided over the three grand phases of the Western transition must never be suppressed. Apart from the imperishable monuments which are their consecration, their spontaneous concurrence will always remain indispensable to the complete creation of the language of mankind, a direct
outgrowth of the fusion of the five modern languages, under the presidency of the Italian as the most musical.

During the second period, the moral education given by the first is carried on, by virtue of the influence on the affections exerted by the esthetic culture. From the relation between the two we must draw the best criterion of the intellectual advance, instinctively directed towards the perfecting of the personal salus, the formation of which comes now to be distinctly traceable. A prayer, a hymn, a drawing, in honour of the mother, will evidence, by their gradual improvement, the gradual increase of power to body forth real feelings, not without aid borrowed from the artistic treasures of Humanity.

Art during this period holds avowedly the first place, but it forms, as it were, a preparation for science, by encouraging the observation of all events, whereas previously beings and beings only had been its object. For art, whether fine art or industrial, has to do, as science has, solely with phenomena: it differs from science in always referring them to bodies, instead of treating them as abstractions. Towards the end of the first Period of childhood, the child spontaneously forms subjective milieus, and by their aid combines these two modes of contemplation, by forming images distinct from beings, at least in the case of the inorganic world, the primary domain of scientific investigation.

In the 'General View,' I attributed to the second period of childhood a polytheistic synthesis, as a natural product of abstract observation and in perfect harmony with the esthetic culture. I would now limit this modification to the three first centuries of the normal state, for by that time the historical filiation of that state should be a matter of universal consciousness. When, as a result of the fusion of Fetishism in Positivism, Theology in all its forms shall be eliminated, the philosophy of the earliest period of childhood will persist through the second, to be incorporated, in the third, with human reason in its definitive state. The cultivation of the artistic faculties will be found compatible with this improvement of the individual initiation, which by it is dispensed from servilely reproducing the evolution of the race. With one language paramount, Fetishist poetry, finding free scope by a large introduction of subjective milieus, will evoke master works more in keeping than the ancient with the normal age of Humanity.
an indication speedily confirmed by the whole of the child's relations with others. The distinction between the mother and Humanity does not interfere with the unity of the child's worship, for the mother even at this early age becomes the personification of Humanity, in which at that time the Country is lost.

Although the education of the infant is almost exclusively moral, the intelligence is awakened by the observation of beings, guided by a purely Fetishist synthesis, all interference with which must be carefully avoided. Under the influence of this synthesis, as emotional as it is intellectual, the first beginnings of the true logic are traceable in the combination of feelings with images, soon aided by signs. Thus is attained in its simplest form cerebral unity, wherein activity, with no outward object to secure, subserves the intelligence to express emotions.

This form persists during the second period of childhood, but with a tendency then to the more complex unity required in real life, because the child is now in contact with others outside the Family, the only collective being originally within its cognizance. This enlarged contact is a consequence in especial of its esthetic studies, then entered upon on the basis of the images derived from the first period. Although these studies in the main should be left to the child itself, the mother's care prepares the way for the normal discipline, by instituting the practice of exercises in poetry, in music, and in drawing, even prior to reading and writing. When, by the acquisition of these last, full communication is established, the child enters at once on the knowledge of the Great Being, through admiration of its master works, in spite of the diversity of languages, ancient or modern. From familiarity with this difference, there dawns the idea of Country in the widest sense, hitherto undistinguished from Humanity, but henceforward characterised by language, even when the difference has become purely a matter of history, in consequence of the universal adoption finally of the Positive language. Indeed, in the normal state, the study by all of the seven languages which presided over the three grand phases of the Western transition must never be suppressed. Apart from the imperishable monuments which are their consecration, their spontaneous concurrence will always remain indispensable to the complete creation of the language of mankind, a direct
ments, in which the child of the Great Being gradually passes into the servant.

That servant is by marriage directly consecrated to social existence; and then enters on a last period of fourteen years, during which the exercise of his activity as a citizen is needed to complete his preparatory life. As, however, both this last and even the preceding phase are periods of full liberty, I would not include them under education properly so called, as that always implies a state of tutelage. An additional reason for excluding them is their being confined to the active sex, whereas the first half of our preparatory life is common to both sexes. It is the combination of these two characteristics, universality and minority, that must fix the sense of an ill-defined term, which in its widest acceptation may embrace the whole of our objective life, considered as a course of preparation for our subjective existence. In this last sense its use is proper only in the work already promised; there education will be the name for every preparation under the guidance, first, of the Family, then, of the Country, lastly, of Humanity.

Restricting the term here to its more usual acceptation, I have, in the first place, to explain the private phase of Education. The second dentition divides it into two equal portions; the one essentially affective; the second that in which begins the cultivation of the intellect, under the direction of the mother, through esthetic studies. Hence the subdivision of the whole of education, properly so called, into three septennial periods, the distinction between which, clearly indicated in all the Western languages, is most strongly marked in Spanish, in the names Niño, Muchacho, and Mozo, with their derivatives.

The first of these periods must be held the most decisive, since then it is that the mother's discipline lays so firm a foundation of morality that the rest of life is seldom able to affect it. Then it is that, sheltered from the egotism of action, the three sympathetic instincts grow beyond recall, more particularly veneration, but also benevolence, for which, even in this dependent state, there is a sufficient sphere. From the moment of birth, all worship during this period is condensed in the adoration of the mother, the only Providence which infancy can be taught to recognize. The consciousness of the Great Being, however, comes instinctively as soon as language begins, for its transmission by the mother is an indication of its social origin,
an indication speedily confirmed by the whole of the child's relations with others. The distinction between the mother and Humanity does not interfere with the unity of the child's worship, for the mother even at this early age becomes the personification of Humanity, in which at that time the Country is lost.

Although the education of the infant is almost exclusively moral, the intelligence is awakened by the observation of being, guided by a purely Fetichist synthesis, all interference with which must be carefully avoided. Under the influence of this synthesis, as emotional as it is intellectual, the first beginnings of the true logic are traceable in the combination of feelings with images, soon aided by signs. Thus is attained in its simplest form cerebral unity, wherein activity, with no outward object to secure, subserves the intelligence to express emotion. This form persists during the second period of childhood, but with a tendency then to the more complex unity required in real life, because the child is now in contact with others outside the Family, the only collective being originally within its cognizance. This enlarged contact is a consequence in especial of its esthetic studies, then entered upon on the basis of the images derived from the first period. Although these studies in the main should be left to the child itself, the mother's care prepares the way for the normal discipline, by instituting the practice of exercises in poetry, in music, and in drawing, even prior to reading and writing. When, by the acquisition of these last, full communication is established, the child enters at once on the knowledge of the Great Being, through admiration of its master works, in spite of the diversity of languages, ancient or modern. From familiarity with this difference, there dawns the idea of Country in the widest sense, hitherto undistinguished from Humanity, but henceforward characterised by language, even when the difference has become purely a matter of history, in consequence of the universal adoption finally of the Positive language. Indeed, in the normal state, the study by all of the seven languages which presided over the three grand phases of the Western transition must never be suppressed. Apart from the imperishable monuments which are their consecration, their spontaneous concurrence will always remain indispensable to the complete creation of the language of mankind, a direct
outgrowth of the fusion of the five modern languages, under
the presidency of the Italian as the most musical.

During the second period, the moral education given by
the first is carried on, by virtue of the influence on the affections
exerted by the esthetic culture. From the relation between the
two we must draw the best criterion of the intellectual advance,
instinctively directed towards the perfecting of the personal
cultus, the formation of which comes now to be distinctly trace-
able. A prayer, a hymn, a drawing, in honour of the mother,
will evidence, by their gradual improvement, the gradual in-
crease of power to body forth real feelings, not without aid
borrowed from the artistic treasures of Humanity.

Art during this period holds avowedly the first place, but it
forms, as it were, a preparation for science, by encouraging the
observation of all events, whereas previously beings and beings
only had been its object. For art, whether fine art or indus-
trial, has to do, as science has, solely with phenomena; it differs
from science in always referring them to bodies, instead of
treating them as abstractions. Towards the end of the first
period of childhood, the child spontaneously forms subjective
milieu, and by their aid combines these two modes of contem-
plation, by forming images distinct from beings, at least in the
case of the inorganic world, the primary domain of scientific
investigation.

In the 'General View,' I attributed to the second period of
childhood a polytheistic synthesis, as a natural product of
abstract observation and in perfect harmony with the esthetic
culture. I would now limit this modification to the three first
centuries of the normal state, for by that time the historical filia-
tion of that state should be a matter of universal consciousness.

When, as a result of the fusion of Fetichism in Positivism, Theo-
logism in all its forms shall be eliminated, the philosophy of the
earliest period of childhood will persist through the second, to
be incorporated, in the third, with human reason in its definitive
state. The cultivation of the artistic faculties will be found
compatible with this improvement of the individual initiation,
which by it is dispensed from servilely reproducing the evolu-
tion of the race. With one language paramount, Fetichist
poetry, finding free scope by a large introduction of subjective
milieu, will evoke master works more in keeping than the
ancient with the normal age of Humanity.
In regard to private education, the present is the fitting place for a remark, affecting both its periods, but specially applicable to the second, on the spontaneous beginning of practical life. Though such action as there is at that time should be of an esthetic rather than an industrial character, it is well to assist the natural growth of the instinct of construction, were it only as a counterpoise to that of destruction. The mother will easily turn to purpose, if she attend to the point: intellectually, the power there is in action to evidence the conditions and difficulties of effecting any result whatever; morally, its tendency to implant a direct consciousness of the value of the voluntary cooperation of men and even of animals.

Again, these two periods are the time for creating the fundamental habit of mind which should always put forward feelings as more important than acts, and this is effected by leading the child to judge of acts by their bearing upon feelings, be it as exercise or as result. Such teaching can only begin with effect at the age when actions, as of no serious consequence, leave the motives which inspired them open to view and more intelligible from their simple character. It is then that the mother lays the synthetical basis of Positive morality by making the child feel that happiness consists above all in the gratification of our kindly affections, acts being only the means by which we satisfy and even excite them.

Having said enough on private education, we must pass to the public instruction which is its systematic complement, the nature and course of which I have already determined.

The chief difficulty it presents is this, how to develop the intellect without detriment to the supremacy of the heart, which indeed it ought to fortify. To bring the two into harmony is the high prerogative of Positivism, which succeeds Theologism in the spiritual government of mankind, in order to repair the errors, intellectual and moral, inherent in the second or indirect causality. For the earlier form sanctioned the primacy of feeling as well as allowed the search after laws; so that in reality the sole flaw in the Fetishist synthesis was its absolute character, inevitable in the beginning of things. When limited in its scientific application to the cases in which we cannot discover the law, Fetishity, thus made relative, from the esthetic point of view should keep and even enlarge its original domain, in order to aid Positivity in the intellectual, no less than in the
moral sphere. Theologism, on the contrary, the value of which was mainly political, aggravated the main disadvantages of the absolute philosophy, by making happiness and perfection consist in a life of contemplation. True it is, that the revolt of the intellect against the heart reached its full proportions only under the impulse of metaphysics, and that more particularly during the period of modern anarchy, yet if we trace it to its source we come to the synthesis of Theology, at the time when the priesthood no longer controlled the doctrine. But by introducing Positivism as the direct successor of Fetichism, the normal state enables us to avoid, in the education of the individual, the dangers unavoidable in the evolution of the race, as it gets clear of the disturbing influences of unchecked abstraction.

For this, it is enough if the analytical study of the doctrine be entered on under the synthetical direction of the worship, as is indicated in the everlasting fusion of the philosophic function in the priestly office, to which the scientific elaboration will always be made secondary. With its foundations laid in the development of the affections, and with the preliminary cultivation of the artistic faculties, the study of abstract science closes education by establishing the systematic unity which is the only possible guide for active life. The effort of analysis required for the construction of this unity must always be treated as limited to adolescence, and as introductory to the regime of synthesis, the only perfectly rational regime, as in it all our conceptions converge to the service of Humanity. Such is the judgment formally enunciated in the sacrament appointed for the inauguration of the public education, a judgment expanded on fitting occasions during the whole course of scientific study. It is more firmly rooted during that course, by three influences: the continuity of the mother's care; the prolongation of the esthetic culture; the opening of the preparatory stage of practical life.

Bound to teach in succession the seven fundamental sciences, the professor is preserved from any excessive predilection for any one of them, by keeping constantly before him their synthetical object, one in full conformity with the priestly character. Addressed alternately to the two sexes in the same week, his lectures, as a natural result, lead both teacher and learner to appreciate the continuous submission of the intellect to feeling.
The High Priest must exercise constant watchfulness to guard against intellectualism. The novice must be moral, not intellectual.

Still in spite of all the safeguards inherent in the encyclopedic system, the concentration of the intellect acts with such force, that nothing but the watchfulness of the High-Priest aided by public opinion, can prevent or remedy its dangerous influence on the heart and on the intellect.

For the right institution of the scientific noviciate, it must be always represented as having a moral, rather than an intellectual aim. Through it faith ought to perfect love, in order to regulate activity, the means being, the study from the relative point of view of the universal order. In the private education, the growth of affection and the culture of the imagination have given, as a natural consequence, the sense of moral laws, and even of the value of voluntary submission, more particularly through the instrumentality of personal worship. But this spontaneous result remains insufficient and precarious so long as the order within us is disconnected from the order without to which it is subject. It is not possible to consolidate the one but by linking it to its environment by the intermediate of the body. Hence arises the necessity for a course of abstractions, the object being the formation of general conceptions as indispensable condition of fixed convictions shared by all. This course must begin, then, with the simplest phenomena, which underlie all the others, and must proceed by gradations to phenomena of moral science, where abstraction ceases, where, consequently, the episode of analysis ends in the tematisation of the state of synthesis, in its origin pure spontaneous.

The Positive religion triumphs over the tendencies to cism encouraged by its scientific introduction and certain recur during the abstract education unless there be a constant surveillance. In cultivating demonstration it aims at producing, not barren or divergent discussion, but active and voluntary submission, which is to ennable even the most physical necessities, by connecting them with moral advance. It is a demonstrated faith, but a faith which at all times is demonstrable, that suits the maturity of human reason, when it be the object to trace consequences, not to discuss principle.

At the close of his encyclopedic noviciate, the Positivist will feel, more strongly than before, the need of subordinating the individual intellect to the intelligence of the race, an keeping speculative powers for the incidental demands of a
life in its natural course. Those whom their vocation singles out as destined for the priesthood will share more profoundly in these two convictions, otherwise they could never become the interpreters of the Great Being and the discipliners of human life.

Such is the general spirit which must always preside over our intellectual education as a safeguard against tendencies fatal to the religious aim of that education. Its necessity will be deeply impressed by the synthetical preamble to the encyclopedic noviciate, the first three weeks of which will be devoted to the eighteen lectures on the First Philosophy, explained in the preceding chapter. The object we have in view in this extraordinary concentration of lectures will be the better attained, by addressing them to both sexes at once, met for the occasion in the temple, in the presence of the whole presbytery, with the chief magistrates and the families of the catechumens as assessors. An appropriate introductory discourse having been given by the senior priest, one lecture will give the theory of abstraction, the fifteen following will be devoted to the fifteen universal laws, the two last to the construction of the encyclopedic hierarchy. The effect of these nineteen introductory lectures on the pupils, the teachers, and the public should be a lasting impression, calculated to ensure a tendency to prefer synthesis whilst engaged in analytical studies.

With this introduction, the Second Philosophy will systematically develop the Positive doctrine during seven years, forty lectures on one of the seven sciences being given each year to either sex. But Mathematics require a larger number, three times as many in fact, sixteen being given to each of the five first chapters of the work I have described, and twenty to each of the two last. To suit this distribution, the ordinary number of lectures must be doubled during each of the two first years, an exception limited to the boys; the girls' teaching, though more condensed, must not be curtailed in substance.

Remembering the explanations of the last chapter in completion of the indications of the first volume, there is no need for further details on the scientific noviciate. It coincides in time with the industrial apprenticeship, the influence of which is calculated to reinforce its synthetical character and its purpose. This cooperation is furthered by devoting the three last years to travel, according to the judicious practice of the
Still in spite of all the safeguards inherent in the encyclopedic system, the concentration of the intellect acts with such force, that nothing but the watchfulness of the High-Priest, aided by public opinion, can prevent or remedy its dangerous influence on the heart and on the intellect.

For the right institution of the scientific noviciate, it must be always represented as having a moral, rather than an intellectual aim. Through it faith ought to perfect love, in order to regulate activity, the means being, the study from the relative point of view of the universal order. In the private education, the growth of affection and the culture of the imagination have given, as a natural consequence, the sense of moral laws, and even of the value of voluntary submission, more particularly through the instrumentality of personal worship. But this spontaneous result remains insufficient and precarious so long as the order within us is disconnected from the order without us, to which it is subject. It is not possible to consolidate the soul but by linking it to its environment by the intermedium of the body. Hence arises the necessity for a course of abstraction, the object being the formation of general conceptions as the indispensable condition of fixed convictions shared by all. The course must begin, then, with the simplest phenomena, which underlie all the others, and must proceed by gradations to the phenomena of moral science, where abstraction ceases, and where, consequently, the episode of analysis ends in the systematisation of the state of synthesis, in its origin purely spontaneous.

The Positive religion triumphs over the tendencies to criticism encouraged by its scientific introduction and certain to recur during the abstract education unless there be a constant surveillance. In cultivating demonstration it aims at producing, not barren or divergent discussion, but active and voluntary submission, which is to ennoble even the most physical necessities, by connecting them with moral advance. It is not a demonstrated faith, but a faith which at all times is demonstrable, that suits the maturity of human reason, when it will be the object to trace consequences, not to discuss principles.

At the close of his encyclopedic noviciate, the Positivist will feel, more strongly than before, the need of subordinating the individual intellect to the intelligence of the race, and of keeping speculative powers for the incidental demands of active
destruction of the accumulations which now compress or mis-
direct thought.

To end our examination of the universal education, we must
direct our attention to the harmonious relation of its two periods,
public and private, the agreement of which is hidden and even
impaired by their being consecutive and not simultaneous. In the
normal state the one prepares, the other completes the definitive
consecration of each child of the Great Being to the continuous
service of Humanity, by fashioning him, at first unconsciously,
then consciously, to a true unity. The first leads us to faith by
love, the second strengthens love by faith. The first develops
voluntary submission, the second continues the work by making
us acquiesce in the involuntary, the two together resulting in
a discipline as noble as it is stable, where veneration and necessity
assist one another. The first phase has for its basis the sense of
moral laws, the second the knowledge of physical laws, the two
are in concert in reference to the laws of the intellect, which
are equally connected with the two orders. The one em-
joys analysis in the spirit of synthesis, the other consolidates
synthesis by analysis. But their difference in nature and in
their processes is manifested in their results, always certain in
the private period, as in conformity with the normal state; fre-
quently missed in the public phase, which merits not the name
of education when not completed.

The encyclopedic noviciate, then, must be held to consist
emphatically in its last year, the others being but steps in its
preparation. The scientific education which stops short of its
termination in Morals will be an object of contempt, as it would
tend to encourage discussion to the exclusion of systematic sub-
mission; it would be, that is, a perversion of analysis from its
ttrue aim, synthesis. It is, then, on the last year that the sacra-
ment of Admission must directly depend, the sacrament which
follows and condenses our public education. Still so necessary
are the preliminary notions, that none may be admitted to study
Morals, who are found, in the annual examinations, too unversed
in profane science. Even in these exclusions, however, the
priesthood must show its liberality; they are to depend on
defective appreciation of method rather than on want of know-
ledge; and in no case must depend on the question, where the
candidate got his knowledge; it is quite open to him to have
acquired it by his own unaided efforts.
Western proletariat, a practice which might be useful to all. By long residence in one place their travels may be combined with continuous scientific study, considering the homogeneous character of the sacerdotal teaching and its complete regularity, as the same lecture will at one and the same time be in course of delivery in all schools of the globe. Yet it must not be forgotten that the real preparation for active life should follow, not coincide with, that of the intelligence. But it is a consequence of the free trials which come after the scientific course during the seven years between the sacrament of Admission and that of Destination. For this period, which alone is, in the full sense, practical, the preceding is but the simple introduction, and however necessary it may be, it bears rather on the intellectual and moral than on active life.

On this plan, the public education will perfect love by faith, so to systematise action, the paramount influence of which latter will be found the best security for Positive unity, as preserving affection and thought equally from the peculiar aberrations of either. It is not a foolish pride, but rather profound humility, that should be encouraged by our encyclopaedic initiation, such is the pervading contrast between the difficulty of the real problems and the weakness of man’s power to solve them, if we put aside idle questions which cloke our incapacity. Limiting the process of analysis to preparing the synthetic construction, our initiation subordinates speculation to action with a view to affection, whose empire it consolidates by its systematic recognition of submission, enforced submission in the first place, then voluntary.

The regime described, so far from encouraging the habit of reading, makes all feel to what an extent it hampers meditation, the only real aid to which is to be found in the inexhaustible study of the master-works of poetry, invariably in relation with the problem of man’s existence.

Guided by the hints I have given, the true Positivist may, even if a priest, reduce his library to a hundred volumes. Philosophy is condensed into ten, poetry into twenty more; another twenty will suffice for the whole of our concrete conceptions, the data required for industrial purposes, natural history, and the knowledge of the past. The second half of the collection will be devoted to the monumental works which deserve from their original merit to survive the systematic
which reason confirms feeling, at the age at which we are most ready to treat egoism as the great defect of our nature. Far from encouraging discussion, Positive instruction systematises submission, as the permanent basis for action, which is the real end of our being, in order to better our condition and more than all our nature. At the close of the encyclopædic noviciate, we feel that what we want is simply to retain the principles it has given us, whilst forgetting their scientific proofs, the more perfectly to devote our intelligence to the practical applications of those principles.

This general result is characteristic of the system of Positive education in and by itself, even supposing it not derived from the clergy, though the clergy alone can secure its universal reception. Thus we attain the adoption by all of the dispositions which make it possible for the priesthood of Humanity to systematise the action of man with a view to its consecration to the service of the Great Being, such systematisation being effected by the development of the unity, the groundwork of which was laid by the preparatory period. It is this systematisation which I have now to consider in its nature and course, in relation, first, to the individual, then to the Family, lastly to the State.

Our progress will be the sounder, if I first explain a religious institution, the special object of which is to condense our whole advance towards perfection, physical, intellectual, and moral, by concentrating it on one capital step. This is, the systematisation of human reproduction, by making it depend solely on the woman. But before I examine an Utopia, pointed to in the previous chapters, I must set forth clearly its aim, an aim traceable to the need of a condensation inherent in every synthesis, even when partial, much more when general.

Such a condensation is the natural consequence and the necessary complement of the separation of the two powers; this separation alone makes it possible by calling for systematisation, and exacts it when it divides theory from practice. At this point it is hopeless to avoid or remedy the divergence of feelings and thoughts save by resuming the synthesis in a special institution, as a focus for our highest emotions and conceptions. There are however two distinct ways of satisfying the want here indicated, mysteries if the religion be theological, utopias if it be Positive.
The sole decisive example of such a complement to synthesis naturally, then, emanated from Catholicism, instituting, as it did, at its origin, the incomparable sacrament of the Eucharist, to condense at once its worship, its doctrine, and even its regime. So completely characteristic of the Western Monotheism was this admirable condensation that the system lost all coherence as soon as it was changed. Although, however, as the first type of the concentration of a synthesis, the Catholic sacrament deserves eternal reverence, in the Positive religion we must satisfy the same want in another way. As a fact, the Catholic systematisation was, strictly speaking, limited to the emotions; it was not able satisfactorily to include intellect or activity, though it managed to evade their demands so long as the affective transition lasted. On the contrary, the comprehensiveness inseparable from the Positive synthesis compels the institution, which is to serve as its condensation, to be a presentment at once of the three constituents of human nature, in their true order of dependence. In a word, the synthetical conclusion of Positivism must harmonise order and progress, by the institution of a progress which is the development of order in the full signification of the term. Now, this is what rightly constructed utopias can effect, and in the increasing production of such utopias we have the indication, though not the satisfaction, of the craving for unity arising from modern anarchy.

There is a necessary correlation between these synthetical constructions and the progress of Positivity; hence, as yet, they have been confined to the external order, especially the inorganic order, but not to the exclusion of the vital. The best worked out and the most effective took its rise in the Middle Ages, with Chemistry. During the greater portion of the Western revolution, the transmutation of metals offered an admirable rallying-point for all the efforts, both theoretical and practical, directed to the improvement of man's environment. Its sway lasted till the approach of the final crisis, when the spirit of utopian speculation was ennobled by having a social aim given it, as had been foreshadowed, for three centuries, by abortive attempts. But the social or ultimate domain of Positivity, whether imaginative or dealing with reality, required a doctrine of universal application, in default of which an utopia, which ought to be a condensation, remains simply an
sorpus, an element of disturbance rather than a source of progress. Now this great primary condition is adequately met by the definitive advent of Sociology, with its consequence, the irresistible convergence of the revolutionary movement towards the installation of the Positive religion. This religion, as the legitimate issue of previous advance, comes forward at once to eliminate subversive utopias, and to substitute a synthetic conception which shall rally all high aspirations around one important progress, representative of the universal supremacy of Morals.

As early as 1838, in the third volume of my 'Philosophy,' there was the implicit announcement of a movement in this direction, in the proposal to introduce, deliberately, in Biology imaginary organisms, in order to perfect the science as a whole. But as, in this its earliest form, the suggestion had only an intellectual bearing, it could not be taken as a type of Positive utopias, which must be practical quite as much as theoretical. Yet, compared with the transmutation of metals, it was an advance in the institution of utopias, for it enlarged their sphere by adding to the inorganic the vital order. A better instance of progress in the same province, was the suggestion made at the beginning of the present work, as to the transformation of herbivorous into carnivorous animals, viewed as the limit of the improvement of animals. Whilst it opens a wide field for science, this utopia equally interests art, not as regards the animals which elaborate our food, for in them an excess of animalisation would be an evil, but as regards the companions of our labour, which are thereby rendered more active and more intelligent. This advance, however, is still inadequate, confined as it is to the domain of profane science and not carrying Positive idealisation into the world of man, which is its true sphere, as being at once more important and more modifiable. To direct aright, then, the growth of utopias, which are to be the condensations of the final synthesis, we must carry them into the domain of sacred science, as the only one in which we can condense progress on the basis of order, by a combination of the three modes or degrees of amelioration, physical, intellectual, and moral.

Such is the theory, from the historical as well as the dogmatical point of view, of utopias in the Positive sense, in which poetry and philosophy should be in more perfect concert than
The sole decisive example of such a complement to synthesis naturally, then, emanated from Catholicism, instituting, as it did, at its origin, the incomparable sacrament of the Eucharist, to condense at once its worship, its doctrine, and even its regime. So completely characteristic of the Western Monotheism was this admirable condensation that the system lost all coherence as soon as it was changed. Although, however, as the first type of the concentration of a synthesis, the Catholic sacrament deserves eternal reverence, in the Positive religion we must satisfy the same want in another way. As a fact, the Catholic systematisation was, strictly speaking, limited to the emotions; it was not able satisfactorily to include intellect or activity, though it managed to evade their demands so long as the affective transition lasted. On the contrary, the comprehensiveness inseparable from the Positive synthesis compels the institution, which is to serve as its condensation, to be a presentment at once of the three constituents of human nature, in their true order of dependence. In a word, the synthetical conclusion of Positivism must harmonise order and progress, by the institution of a progress which is the development of order in the full signification of the term. Now, this is what rightly constructed utopias can effect, and in the increasing production of such utopias we have the indication, though not the satisfaction, of the craving for unity arising from modern anarchy.

There is a necessary correlation between these synthetical constructions and the progress of Positivity; hence, as yet, they have been confined to the external order, especially the inorganic order, but not to the exclusion of the vital. The best worked out and the most effective took its rise in the Middle Ages, with Chemistry. During the greater portion of the Western revolution, the transmutation of metals offered an admirable rallying-point for all the efforts, both theoretical and practical, directed to the improvement of man’s environment. Its sway lasted till the approach of the final crisis, when the spirit of utopian speculation was ennobled by having a social aim given it, as had been foreshadowed, for three centuries, by abortive attempts. But the social or ultimate domain of Positivity, whether imaginative or dealing with reality, required a doctrine of universal application, in default of which an utopia, which ought to be a condensation, remains simply an
an element of disturbance rather than a source of progress. Now this great primary condition is adequately met by the definitive advent of Sociology, with its consequence, the irresistible convergence of the revolutionary movement towards the installation of the Positive religion. This religion, as the legitimate issue of previous advance, comes forward at once to eliminate subversive utopias, and to substitute a synthetic conception which shall rally all high aspirations around one important progress, representative of the universal supremacy of Morals.

As early as 1838, in the third volume of my 'Philosophy,' there was the implicit announcement of a movement in this direction, in the proposal to introduce, deliberately, in Biology imaginary organisms, in order to perfect the science as a whole. But as, in this its earliest form, the suggestion had only an intellectual bearing, it could not be taken as a type of Positive utopias, which must be practical quite as much as theoretical. Yet, compared with the transmutation of metals, it was an advance in the institution of utopias, for it enlarged their sphere by adding to the inorganic the vital order. A better instance of progress in the same province, was the suggestion made at the beginning of the present work, as to the transformation of herbivorous into carnivorous animals, viewed as the limit of the improvement of animals. Whilst it opens a wide field for science, this utopia equally interests art, not as regards the animals which elaborate our food, for in them an excess of animalisation would be an evil, but as regards the companions of our labour, which are thereby rendered more active and more intelligent. This advance, however, is still inadequate, confined as it is to the domain of profane science and not carrying Positive idealisation into the world of man, which is its true sphere, as being at once more important and more modifiable. To direct aright, then, the growth of utopias, which are to be the condensations of the final synthesis, we must carry them into the domain of sacred science, as the only one in which we can condense progress on the basis of order, by a combination of the three modes or degrees of amelioration, physical, intellectual, and moral.

Such is the theory, from the historical as well as the dogmatical point of view, of utopias in the Positive sense, in which poetry and philosophy should be in more perfect concert than
they were in the utopias of Theology or Metaphysics, since in
the Positive the relative takes the place of the absolute. The
theory, as here stated, becomes the complement of the theory of
religion, by condensing the real unity in an ideal limit, the
point of convergence for all the distinct aspirations, plans, and
attempts bearing on the continuous advance towards perfection
of our threefold nature. The better to secure this convergence,
it is necessary to assign it one single object; we may substitute
others when it has been attained; a course always open, so
boundless is the domain of human Providence, though as yet
scarcely existing in rudiment, even as regards our environment.

In this way I am led to present the utopia of the Virgin-
Mother as the synthetical condensation of the Positive religion,
all the various aspects of which find their place in it. Its
examination in detail belongs to the work promised for 1859
on the theory and practice of Morals. All that I can do here, is to
coordinate, in regard to it, the main points.

Rising superior to scientific prejudices, we must first acco-
knowledge that there is no flaw in the agreement of the insti-
tution with the whole system of natural laws. Restricted to the
most modifiable species, and in that species peculiar to the sex
which is most perfectible, in that sex it concerns the noblest
function of organic life, the one in which the brain can most
influence the body. The reasonableness of the problem has
ground in our determination of the real office of the male
generative system, which has as its chief purpose the supply to
the blood of a stimulating fluid, capable of invigorating the
action of all the organs, the organs of animal as well as those
of vegetal life. When compared with this general function,
fecundation becomes but a particular case, one more and more
secondary as the organism is higher. It is conceivable, then,
that in the noblest species, the liquid may cease to be indis-
ensible to the fertilisation of the germ, and that this result
might be attained by many other means, even material means,
but especially by a better action of the nervous on the vascular
system. The advance is foreshadowed in the constant growth
of chastity, an idea peculiar to the human species, at least in
the male, and which shows the value for that race of a right
use of the vivifying fluid—its value physically, intellectually,
and morally. Still more applicable is the observation to
women, if we take account of the unfailing combination of
three special symptoms: the very slight share of the liquid in fecundation; menstruation; and the influence of the mother on the foetus.

In support of this objective induction, we may adduce the subjective consideration of the general course opinion has followed in reference to human reproduction. In point of fact, as shown in the comparison pointed to in the first chapter of this volume, the current of opinion is more and more in favour of the greater participation of the woman. Now, an advance of this kind does not merely tend to smooth the way for, and bear witness to, the advent of the utopia in which it finds its completion. All who estimate at its due value the general unison between the objective and the subjective, will allow that this course of our conceptions may represent the course of phenomena, in an order which is very modifiable, the earlier steps of which are unknown to us, from the want of a theory of hereditary transmission. If so, it is conceivable that civilisation not only predisposes men to a better appreciation of woman, but also increases the share of the latter in reproduction, and that in the limit, reproduction should be the exclusive appanage of the sex.

Adopting this conclusion, the higher minds can feel no repugnance to examine, in the general, the legitimate consequences of an improvement, unattainable unless as a result of the aggregate advance of man, his physical and moral amelioration, fixed in the race by hereditary transmission. The synthetical aim of the institution makes it incumbent upon me, in the present place, to indicate summarily its several reactions on the individual, the Family, the State: with the further advantage of enunciating its chief conditions.

As regards personal morality, the modification is calculated to improve the constitution, of brain and body alike, of both sexes, by encouraging the habit of chastity, the importance of which was more and more felt by the general instinct, even under the rule of license. In the woman, this result will be ensured by the weakness of sexual desire, any activity of which, in her case, usually depends on the wish to become a mother. In the man the reverse is true; but when the pretext for sexual indulgence is gone, education and opinion will not find it difficult to make it yield to the need of preserving the vivifying fluid for...
its proper function, the scope of which will be enlarged, the value more duly estimated.

From the point of view of the Family, the change would bring its constitution more into conformity with the general spirit of the Sociocracy, as it would complete the just emancipation of woman, thus rendered independent of man, even physically. It would be no longer possible to contest the full ascendancy of the affective sex over children which were its offspring exclusively. But the most important consequence would be the perfecting the fundamental institution of marriage, its Positive theory becoming, in the case supposed, irrefragable. So purified, the conjugal union would experience as marked an improvement as when monogamy took the place of polygamy; for it would be the realisation of the medieval utopia of maternity compatible with virginity. The full development thus allowed for woman's most eminent quality would not, it must be remembered, exclude the symptomatic influence of the sexual instinct, the more certain the more limited its satisfaction, without absolutely forbidding a pleasure which loses its dignity after the primary concession.

Judged in reference to the State, this institution alone allows us to regulate the most important kind of production, any satisfactory regulation of which is impossible while accomplished under the delirium of passion, and with no sense of responsibility. If restricted to its best organs, the function of reproduction would improve the human race, by introducing greater certainty into the hereditary transmission of such beneficial changes as have been effected by the sum of the continuous influences, social or individual, to which the race has been subjected. The main laws of this great phenomenon of transmission will probably remain unknown till this simplification has been effected. But, as reproduction in its systematic form must ever remain more or less the special privilege of the higher types, the comparison of the two forms would, besides throwing valuable light on the subject, give rise to an important institution, conferring on Sociocracy the greatest advantage possessed by Theocracy. For the extension of the new method would soon give rise to a caste without the hereditary principle, a class better adapted than the mass of the population to supply spiritual, nay even temporal chiefs, with an authority resting in
this case on a real superiority of birth, which would not shrink from investigation.

Combine the above remarks and we can see in its true light the utopia of the Virgin-Mother, the aim of which is to furnish Positivism with a synthetical condensation, the equivalent of that given to Catholicism by the institution of the Eucharist. Supposing the problem never solved, its utility, morally and intellectually, will never cease to be as great as was for material progress that of the dream of the transmutation of metals. But, supposing it solved, then, so imperfect is man's world, another will soon take its place, one not less adapted to be the central focus of our advance. Though I may not here broach the question, lest I distract attention, I recommend my successors to connect the new enquiry with our bodily existence, the material and the moral progress between which that existence is the link being already occupied. In any case I have now laid the groundwork for the systematic employment of utopias, in default of which the religion of Humanity would be incapable of adequately presenting the totality of our highest aspirations, poetical, philosophical, and political.

With this preamble I have it in my power to enter properly on the direct examination of the Positive regime, abstraction made however, in treating it, of the ideal limit just constructed, except in so far as I may make implicit use of it in order to bring out more clearly the general tendency of human progress.

Though for the regulation of our existence, the concert, the permanent concert of the two powers in society, is a necessity, the function more particularly belongs to the priesthood. Giving full effect in the name of Humanity to the power, both for control and guidance, it derives from the education, the priesthood disciplines the wills of men, whether as individuals or as corporations, by appealing in succession to feeling, reason, and lastly to public opinion. The action of the temporal government bears only on the outward act, it can only therefore complete the spiritual discipline, by establishing, for the ruder and more urgent cases, a force for prevention or correction. But this subsidiary material power, though never to disappear, must be constantly on the wane, in proportion as civilisation develops the moral power. Its sphere is the larger, the more distant and the vaster the relations with which it
deals. I have here only to treat it accessorially, in reference to each several portion of the direct discipline. The leading function of the temporal government is to direct man's activity, and the systematic view of human industry is reserved for my concluding treatise, promised at the end of the last chapter, for 1861.

Social under all its aspects, Positive morality, in distinguishing between the three forms, personal, domestic, and civic, of human life, distinguishes them only as the natural gradations of one and the same discipline, in which each is a preparation for the next, and is acted upon by the next. Ranked on the principle of increase in the extension, decrease in the intimacy of the relations, a principle from which flows their interdependence, the rules applicable to them are always referred to the service of the Great Being, the sole source of the true unity which they confirm and develope. It is in the perfect homogeneity thus obtained, that should lie the superiority, morally, of Positivism over Catholicism, for Catholicism, owing to the egotistic character inherent in the absolute Synthesis, could directly regulate only individual existence.

Henceforth regarded as the basis of social life, the importance of individual existence will not be less, and its dignity will be increased. But this primary form, even more than the two others, ought to be always considered from the point of view of the indivisibility of our nature; we must see, that is, in the intellect and the activity the indispensable ministers of feeling, on any true estimate, inseparable from it. It is in this way that our physical progress, and à fortiori our mental or moral progress, will be organised synthetically under the perpetual invocation of Humanity, who alone can dispel uncertainty of convictions, hesitation in conduct. Besides the general cases which admit of formal rules, the discipline of Positivism must extend equally to the minor events of life, referring them to the Great Being through feeling as the source of unity. The most trivial resolutions may thus be ennobled and become consistent to a degree unknown to the individualistic system of Metaphysics or Theology.

It is especially in regard to physical injunctions that Positivism will develope its competence to regulate aright our personal existence, when medicine shall be more thoroughly incorporated with religion than it was under the theocratic
regime. Health, as happiness, consists in unity, whether considered as the unity of the body or of the brain. Taking into account the close connection of our physical and moral existence, disorders in the one can never be treated apart from the other, even in the higher animals, much more in man. Civilisation increases this consensus, and therefore requires that the function of the physician be more and more absorbed into the office of the priest, instead of sanctioning the ever-widening divergence of the two, which was applicable only to the Western transition. But it is for Sociocracy irrevocably to effect the fusion, by virtue of the encyclopedic character of the common education; everyone by it being qualified to assist the priesthood in these accessory duties, always subordinate to its principal function. Such aid is particularly to be looked for from women, who will know how to recover for the sanctuary of the home most of the functions which have been one after the other usurped by Western physicians, leaving the clergy only the more important consultations. Not to dwell on the facilities for concentrating medicine in the hands of the priests given by its systematisation, we see that, notwithstanding their limited numbers and their other avocations, the sick will have the advice and the care they require, without any necessity for a distinction which is as indefensible on moral as on rational grounds.

Our object being to regulate individual existence, we must always consider it under two aspects, distinct yet co-existent, nay, correlated, the one negative, the other positive. The solution of the human problem, on which we now enter directly, lies in compressing egoism, developing altruism. The first method was the one naturally preferred by Catholicism; the second is essentially the more effective, even from the negative point of view, since the most powerful check on any instinct is in the uninterrupted growth of its antagonists. Instead of sacrificing everything to purity, Positivism sanctions the resistance of Chivalry, and places it below tenderness in women, below both tenderness and energy in men. Still it adopts the term, and gives it a wider extension by giving it a systematic definition, for it condenses in purity the proper repression of all the seven personal instincts, not limiting it to the most troublesome. Still, the restraint of this last will continue to require in the man direct efforts, as the sexual impulses are the least amenable to
discipline, from relating to the wants which offer the greatest opening for sophistry. But Positivism will triumph over them more completely than Catholicism could, and transfer its principal effort to the noblest pair of egoistic instincts, so to complete the process of purification begun by Theocracy when it disciplined the instinct of nutrition.

The process has been a gradual one; the better to make it a systematic one, we should group the personal inclinations by pairs, in the order given in the synopsis of the brain, first excluding the maternal instinct as imperfectly developed in man, the main subject of the discipline we propose. The result is, three couples, lower, middle, and upper, so named quite as much in reference to their dignity as to their position. The first couple determines the predominant impulses, whilst the two others are destined above all to satisfy those impulses, the one acting upon things, the other on persons, so to convert the without into the instrument of the within.

Such an unity of purpose would seem at first sight to imply the possibility of an egoistic synthesis, putting altruism for the time out of sight. In fact, on the one hand, the destructive or the constructive instinct, on the other, pride or vanity, are ready to acquiesce in the supremacy of the first couple, in spite of their own inherent energy, for this supremacy finds scope for their energy, though the sympathetic synthesis is better in this respect. The same arrangement might be available for women, provided that in the primary couple the maternal take the place of the sexual instinct, the last being as undeveloped in women as the maternal is in men.

But a deeper examination of this coordination strengthens the conviction of the impossibility of forming any directly personal synthesis. For, in the system supposed, there would be two instincts sharing the supremacy, instincts which are often irreconcilable, especially in men. Nearly equal in energy, the most constant inevitably prevails, were it only as presiding over the continuous gratification of our imperious physical wants. Where human foresight adequately provides for these, as with the wealthy, the sexual instinct would tend to reign supreme over the whole existence, were there not the antagonism of altruism and the intervention of society to check its demands. It would never attain a lasting preponderance, for such would soon endanger life, by the unbounded desires it
excites. Short of this however, its capricious aspirations would always be an obstacle to any decisive triumph of the instinct of conservation. The conclusion is: that our personality, if it is to be systematized, must be so by subordinating itself to our sociality, which alone can discipline the within and connect it with the without, for it alone can sanction all our instincts, suiting its rule to the nature of each.

The fundamental instinct is sanctified by the altruistic synthesis, by the entrusting to its care the general direction of the bodily life on which rests that of the brain. It is in the fullest sense amenable to discipline, by virtue of a function as definite as it is legitimate, which excess imperils. Thus we see the scale of the affections beginning and ending with a propensity which may be regulated by an appeal to itself. The centres respectively of the soul and of the body, benevolence and the instinct of self-preservation, organise happiness and health as the result of the unity which springs from their concert. But whilst each of them tends to sanction the other in the name of its own proper object, yet there can be no hesitation as to precedence, the general synthesis being only possible on condition of the second bending to the first, as alone competent to regulate the within by binding it to the without.

By accepting this subordinate position for the instinct of nutrition, we may discipline it with equal energy and respect, without any serious hesitation, whereas all merely personal motives leave room for doubt in the struggle between prudence and appetite. Physicians but rarely succeed, even as against their own inclinations, when they prescribe sobriety in the interest of health. It was solely by an appeal to an authority superior to individual judgment, that Theocracy and Catholicism obtained on this point their decided success; that it was not lasting is evidence of the inadequacy of supernatural motives. We must get rid of personality in every shape, even of the personality of an imaginary being, if we would found a powerful and enduring discipline, in the name of Humanity. Unable to bring altruism into the field against egoism, the old regime had a constant tendency to become illusory because it involved a contradiction; curbing self-interest solely by stimulating it, it left each to judge of the sacrifices to be made. The new Synthesis groups systematically around the Great Being the social motives which, even in their empirical form,
have been, since the close of the middle ages, the real source of the discipline of this instinct, a discipline which has been constantly gaining strength even in despite of the Western anarchy. Without enlarging here on explanations reserved for my treatise on Morals, I must still point out the capabilities of Positivism in regard to the discipline of the nutritive instinct, a discipline left inchoate by Theologism, from an insufficient knowledge of human nature.

The whole discipline of nutrition rests on the natural combination of two social grounds: the obligation to husband carefully the provisions which have been accumulated by the Great Being for the use of its servants viewed collectively; the duty of making the nourishment of the body subserve the function of the soul. Those who would look on themselves as the masters when they are simply the stewards of wealth, may not forget that their coarse enjoyment imposes unjustly privations upon others. If intemperance involves no evil consequences to health, it invariably disturbs the functions of the brain, especially the affective functions, but in a degree also its active and speculative functions. From these two points of view, nothing but our anarchical habits can explain, if it cannot excuse, the universal tendency to indulge appetite beyond what is requisite for or allowed by its social purpose. But the normal state must begin especially with the two classes on which it devolves to regenerate the others; for they, more than the others, ought to appreciate the degradation consequent on excess in food and have a higher respect for accumulations which exempt them from producing. Women and priests will everywhere adopt the Positive standard of sobriety, accomplishing and perfecting that which Islam attempted so admirably, the entire abandonment of wine and other physical stimulants, when alimentation has become sufficiently nutritious. Favourable alike to sound health and high self-respect, their initiative will soon be followed by a population predisposed to place happiness in the constant play of the sympathetic affections, the supremacy of which must in two ways be fostered by such a regimen.

There is no need for me to set forth the full application of this mode of viewing the subject to all the other questions which concern the instinct of self-preservation, in the gratification of which, and that directly, is incurred the larger part of our expenditure. If we meet its legitimate demands, we are the
better able to control it, in that the moderation inculcated allows us to judge more clearly of the impulses traceable to it by calling into activity our physical and moral sensibility. Judicious control however—not unwise compression—such is the dictate of Positive morality in regard to this instinct, for the compression would tend to take away from our proper value as servants of Humanity.

As for the second constituent of the principal pair of personal instincts, the preceding remarks suffice for the present to make us aware that it needs a sterner discipline, especially in the man. Useless for the preservation of the individual, in the propagation of the species the sexual instinct contributes but in an accessory degree, and even that degree is open to question. Philosophers really untrammelled by superstition ought more and more to look upon it as tending to interfere with the true purpose of the vivifying fluid. But without waiting for the realization of the utopia as to women, it is possible to effect, if not the atrophy, at any rate the inaction of this instinct, now stimulated unduly by the brain; and to attain this result with more ease than might be inferred from the ineffectual efforts of Theology. Not merely will the Positive education make all feel the defects of the instinct and raise a hope of its entire demestude, but the whole tendency of the definitive regime will be to institute a revulsive treatment of greater efficacy than the austerities of Catholicism. For the universal participation in family and public life will develop to such a degree the sympathetic instincts, that feeling, intellect, and activity will all combine to discredit and repress the most troublesome of the egoistic instincts. As we contemplate the thousands of instances of chastity found in Buddhism and Catholicism, in spite of the dangers of celibacy and of a discipline more calculated to irritate than to crush, we cannot but admit the possibility of taming an instinct of dubious character by appealing to the grand aim which it contravenes.

It were superfluous here to dwell on the direct discipline of the intermediate couple of the personal instincts, seeing that the Positive state, by its nature, favours the instinct of construction and restrains that of destruction. Notwithstanding its spontaneous energy and its natural connection with the military life, the latter was sufficiently disciplined by the education of mankind to cause no further anxiety, save as regards the repair of
the havoc caused by modern anarchy. Duelling, and even suicide, have already become so opposed to the manners and habits of the West, that in the Positive state a sufficient corrective of these two aberrations of the destructive instinct will be found in treating the bodies of those guilty of them as the bodies of murderers. A religion which devotes all our powers to the uninterrupted service of Humanity, forbids us, more forcibly than any other, ever to dispose of the life so consecrated; none but the ministers of the Great Being may take that life in exceptional cases of incurable perversity. And yet the instinct in question will always require careful watching, as it will never cease to play a part in all our operations, even the operations of our intellect; implying as they do the incessant destruction of the obstacles which impede the gradual construction of the means of action.

Now that the exigencies of our carnivorous nature are concentrated by the institution of a public service, the propensity to destroy, even when it sinks into evil speaking, may be kept in check without any direct effort, as a simple result of the general habits implanted by Positive education.

It is in the highest pair of the personal instincts that lies the great difficulty in the purification of human nature, since the ultimate regime has a peculiar tendency to stimulate in all pride and vanity. The perpetual antagonism of the two, grounded on the normal separation of the two powers, is a source of irritation rather than a basis of discipline in the case of instincts which are inseparable from the very idea of the patriciate and of the priesthood. At the same time the participation—subordinate yet permanent—of the great body of the people in political and moral government, a participation indirect in one sex and direct in the other, must at once aggravate and spread the intrinsic dangers of the over stimulation of these two instincts. But an unceasing watchfulness on the part of all may keep them within the limits prescribed by their object, Positive education teaching us that they are the exclusive attributes of the temporal or spiritual chiefs, with whom they impair happiness whilst easing their work. Again, this education, besides encouraging humility, humility in classes no less than in individuals, places in so clear a light the conditions of competence and the principles of judgment, as to lead to an instinctive rejection of pride and vanity by the body which they would discompose.
Thus we see how the altruistic discipline gives completeness and system to the purification of human nature, begun under the egoistic. Preparatory though it be, or secondary, the negative form of our moral progress will ever retain an importance disproportioned to its intrinsic efficacy, on the ground that it originates the decisive expansion of the moral power which, if not so tested, would continue inadequate, nay even doubtful whether it existed or not. Its several portions support one another, either by virtue of the contiguity of the organs or from the interdependence of the functions. Their mutuality becomes especially perceptible in the case of the principal pair, where we have already seen to what an extent sobriety facilitates chastity, though the converse be not as fully admitted, and yet it is equally true, for the need of food is in a direct ratio with that of repair of loss. But, over and above the several means of repressing personality, the essential condition of purification is the exertion of sympathy, which regulates individual existence by the family relations, and these again by the civic.

It follows that, from every point of view, the ultimate systematization of human life must consist above all in the development of altruism. No detailed explanations, however, are here needed of this paramount constituent of true morality, for the culture of our sympathies is introduced by the personal worship, and the completion of the process is an immediate consequence of the social ties, to which I shall devote the rest of this chapter. Only I must here recommend perfect spontaneity in our daily prayers, as ever indispensable for their chief purpose, any factitious or premature efforts interfering with its attainment, as they tend to conceal the evil, not to cure it.

In regard to our individual existence, in which acts are, usually, of less importance and less fixed than in domestic or civic life, I must not pass unnoticed the power it has to encourage our altruistic instincts by applying them in the regulation of all the ordinary incidents. These are often so unimportant that we have no intellectual or practical ground for deciding on our course, which the feelings alone can determine, and must determine if we are to avoid caprice, which is by its nature favourable to the worse suggestions. In these efforts known only to himself, and ennobled by their object, each may freely aspire to be more regular than the phenomena of the heavens,
as he may perfect the order he creates by availing himself of number, the earliest and most universal of human institutions, but which has not yet borne its best fruits.

Besides feeling, the discipline of the individual embraces also the intellect, but not the activity; that is essentially bound up with social life, domestic or civic, allowing, that is, for the share it has, a point previously settled, in the expression of feeling or of thought. But the mental discipline which is to complete the training of the individual, has been examined sufficiently, in the course of the preceding chapter. It condenses the intellectual capital of man, in art, in science, and in industry, into a hundred volumes, the half of which, as historical rather than dogmatical, there is little need of reading twice. Education ended, all classes, without excepting the priesthood, will confine their reading habitually to the masterpieces of poetry, which have a constant tendency to recall us to the principal field for our understanding. The scientific treatises containing the doctrine will be re-perused at times solely in order to revive the general impressions arising from the systematic noviciate, and the technical books will be consulted as occasion requires. If at any time some grave necessity call for really fresh meditations, they will always be connected with the special purpose which called for them, without increasing the abstract encyclopaedia, which should remain so condensed as to be of universal use. I have given above a decisive example of the discipline indicated, in connecting with the regime a question of fundamental importance, the various intellectual aspects of which, poetical, scientific, or political, are so blended, that it would have been out of place in our study of the doctrine.

In order now to set forth the direct systematisation of family life on the basis of the preliminary coordination of the existence of the individual, the first point to insist on is, the necessity of subordinating the domestic existence to the civic, which alone admits of complete unity.

To attain its full proportions, the altruistic synthesis can be developed only in one form; but practically two are admissible, differing in the mode of interdependence established between the two indispensable ministers of feeling. Action rules or seconds the intellect, according as the object in view is to modify the external world, or to bring into evidence the
world within. But the first mode alone is adapted to real life, the other is exclusively suited to the preparatory period, whether of the individual or of the race. Now on this point, the evolution of the West presented a grave anomaly which has a tendency to persist in the family, if its conditions are misconceived. For the normal mode was worthy presented only by Roman civilisation, when the subordination of speculation to action was inseparably connected with that of private to public life. This correlation had been completely lost sight of in the Greek movement, which with characteristic consequence, even in its utopias, proclaimed simultaneously the superiority of the political and of the contemplative life. Inheriting as it did the organisation of Rome, Catholicism in its systematisation only escaped the Greek contradiction by unduly exalting feeling at the expense alike of intelligence and activity, at the same time that it defined beatitude as speculation.

Since the end of the Middle Ages, under the combined weight of these conflicting antecedents, the intellectual movement of Western Europe presented in this respect, as in so many others, a profound discrepancy between the influence of the scientific and that of the practical impulse. The former, more in accordance with the mind of Greece than the genius of Rome, protracted under a metaphysical form the reactionary movement of Catholicism, ignoring the capital step in advance taken by the Romans, our true social ancestors, in placing action above speculation. The error was the more serious as in a certain degree in harmony with the real nature of the modern revolution, an intellectual rather than a social revolution. And yet all the time, the thinkers, especially those with utopian tendencies, accepted, nay even exaggerated, as was the wont of their Greek prototypes, the supremacy of public as compared with private life. The main cause, however, of the adhesion to this conclusion is to be found in the impulse indirectly emanating from practical life, in proportion as industry got the upper hand and the prevalent form of human action was consequently in incessant contradiction with the aspirations of pedantocrats. All the West, with the exception of the lettered classes, has undergone this continuous influence, so that the normal state, initiated by the spontaneous action of Rome, will be established in a sufficient degree, on
the recognition of the natural correlation between the superiority of action and that of the civic life. Although the habits implanted by Catholicism set themselves everywhere against this conclusion, the instinct of the proletariat has already risen above them in its aspiration after a collective existence, and the patriciate with its empirical policy will evince a similar disposition, as soon as Positivism shall remove its alarm at communism.

Nothing then, henceforward, can prevent the noble subordination of public to private life, the aspiration of Antiquity transmitted to us by Chivalry, even against the teaching of Catholicism. Yet the theory of human unity is so little understood, that I was compelled to enter on the above explanation, an explanation at once historical and dogmatical, before I could set forth the life of the family. For such is the attraction of this life, that there would be always a risk of our returning to the contemptuous attitude of Catholicism in relation to public life, were not Positivism to obviate the danger, by appealing to a truer estimate of the very feeling in which the risk originates. But the superiority of speculation to action being definitively and universally rejected, none can fail to recognise the ascendancy of the civic life, which alone gives full scope for activity, the foundation on which rests the whole existence of Humanity. The second mode of Positive unity will, however, continue to exist in the preparatory period of life, when the providence of man dispenses with action, not, however, to the prolongation of this preliminary state, even for the rich, when education issues in its proper destination, that is, in action.

This introduction enables me to expound the systematisation of the Family by the instrumentality of the Country in the name of Humanity. I must begin by completing and correcting the indications of my Social Statics as to the number of constituents in the normal family.

My theory of the family reduces them to two groups; the one consisting of the married pair, the other of their offspring, to the number usually of three. Now, the family so constituted is adequate in point of solidarity, but defective as regards continuity, such continuity as there is only connecting the present with the future, not including the past. To remedy this defect, the Positive family must admit another couple,
formed by the parents of the husband. Without this complement, the normal state would on this point fall below the level reached by the earlier and preparatory period, through the institution of the Old Men. The Family would not be in sufficient accord with the City, since its feminine element represents only the moral side of the spiritual power, its intellectual aspect imperatively requires old age to represent it. As the mother of the husband combines in her own person these two sources of religious supremacy, she will become the goddess of the Positivist family, when the conjoint influences of the ultimate regime shall have wholly extinguished disputes originating in ungrounded pretensions. Equally subjective and objective, the unity of the Family thus constituted will form as solid a basis for practical duties as for the moral conditions, as it will ensure subsistence to the aged sufficiently for them to resign voluntarily the capital they cease to administer.

With this addition, seven members are allotted to the average Positivist family, formed in this way of three constituents, representing respectively the past, the present, and the future, and allowing equally for continuity and for solidarity. But whilst sufficient for the mass of the people, this number requires a fresh addition for the directing classes, more particularly for the capitalist; the addition by incorporation of the complete and permanent servants of the family, as settled in the worship. Whatever restrictions be called for by the luxury of the rich, it would seriously interfere with the public service, if the patricians, nay even the priests, were obliged, as the proletaries are, to rely on their own families exclusively for their ordinary household arrangements.

That envy is the source of the democratic objections on this point, is evidenced by the prevalent inconsistency which denies the rich what it allows the poor, the practice of Catholicism sanctioning the servants of the clergy. Such anarchical tendencies will be easily overcome by Positivism; for Positivism, systematising the habits of the West, which are yet in full vigour in the nations which have escaped Protestantism and Deism, consecrates Domesticity as an integral part, henceforth, of the worship of Humanity.

Taking into account this supplement, the family will as a comprise ten members, in the two aristocracies which are normal state. For the accession of the new
element, if it is to be consistent with self-respect in the
domestics and stable, cannot involve their renunciation of
the leading family ties. Once secure as a general rule the
existence of the working classes, and no rich man will be able,
with rare exceptions, to find a servant voluntarily separated
from wife and child, especially as that wife and child can
assist him in his service, no less than in supplying his own
wants.

For the clergy the addition of three members is sufficient;
for the patrician family it must be doubled. For besides the
requirements of a certain ostentation, in too close connection
with command, for it to be either desirable or possible for the
normal habits to put it down, the greater extent and greater
complexity of service require such increase, which moreover will
bind the patriciate more strongly to the proletariat. Thus,
the Positive family, ordinarily of seven members, has ten in
the case of the spiritual chiefs, thirteen in that of the temporal,
nor, as a rule, are larger numbers consistent with the habits of
life and the respective positions.

The numbers of the family determined, it will be well for
completeness’ sake to point out, though only in the most impor-
tant case, the arrangement of its domicile. The French term
ménage fuses the ideas of family and house, and so points to
a universal recognition of community of abode as the result
and condition of the intimacy required for the family. It is
especially by such a common residence that we can clearly mark
the limits of the elementary association, to the exclusion of
all bonds of a strength inadequate to support the living
together.

From the preceding remarks, each of the three elements of
the proletary family requires its own separate portion of the
common apartment, over and above the withdrawing and
reception room which is usually distinct from that in which the
meals are prepared and taken. However deep their sympathies,
however identical their education, the difference of age and of
situation would prevent the desired harmony between the two
couples, the one in full activity, the other withdrawn from
active life, unless it were open to them to separate and meet at
pleasure, as also to be rid of the children. The children’s part
must be always subdivided in order to isolate the sexes, but
with no subdivision for number. Lastly, every family requires
an oratory, in which each member may properly develope his private worship, and which may serve as sanctuary for the celebration in common of the family worship. Normally then, the home of the working man consists of seven rooms of unequal size, with no useless part in an estimate which can only be deemed extravagant because in the existing anarchy the patrician is prone to neglect his duty, the plebeian to sink his self-respect.

When, by the spread of the Positive religion the conviction has become general, that family life is of paramount importance for all as the best security for public order, and the great source of private happiness, all the chiefs will accept as a standing obligation to establish it for all on a firm basis. Then the above determination, resting on indisputable grounds, will be generally held to supply a fit standard for the duties of the rich, and for the claims of the poor, in the name of the Great Being whose ministers the former are, whose agents the latter.

Remark ing that our rule assigns to the domicile a number of rooms equal to that of the members of the family, it will be easy to extend its application from the proletary to the two other classes. It is for the reader to see that in the normal state the apartment will have ten or thirteen rooms, according as the household is sacerdotal or patrician. This law gives us a clear standard of luxury, in the true sense, and the object of having such a standard is, that whilst stigmatising its excess, we may, without violation to our feelings and habits, tolerate it especially in the patriciate—in the degree suited to the average imperfection of human nature.

All the essential conceptions in the constitution of the Positive family have been sufficiently explained in the previous volumes, and the explanation has been rendered complete by these recent remarks, so that there remains only their coordination.

In effecting this coordination I rely principally on the fusion, the legitimate fusion of the two statical forms of the theory of the Family, which provisionally I disjoined, and the combination of which has been gradually prepared by our dynamical studies. Under one form the family was the basis of action, and was referred to the Country; under the other it was the source of education, and was referred to Humanity. The two modes must ultimately converge when the State
element, if it is to be consistent with self-
domestics and stable, cannot involve their re-
the leading family ties. Once secure as a ge-
existence of the working classes, and no rich man
with rare exceptions, to find a servant volun-
tary from wife and child, especially as that wife rec-
assist him in his service, no less than in supply
wants.

For the clergy the addition of three members
for the patrician family it must be doubled. For
requirements of a certain ostentation, in too close
with command, for it to be either desirable or pos-
normal habits to put it down, the greater extent
of complexity of service require such increase, which re-
bind the patriciate more strongly to the proletar-
te Positive family, ordinarily of seven members,
the case of the spiritual chiefs, thirteen in that of the
nor, as a rule, are larger numbers consistent with the
life and the respective positions.

The numbers of the family determined, it will
completeness' sake to point out, though only in the in-
tant case, the arrangement of its domicile. The Fa-
ménage fuses the ideas of family and house, and as
a universal recognition of community of abode as
and condition of the intimacy required for the fam-
ily, especially by such a common residence that we can cite
the limits of the elementary association, to the ex-
all bonds of a strength inadequate to support them
together.

From the preceding remarks, each of the three el-
the proletary family requires its own separate portio-
common apartment, over and above the withdraw-
reception room which is usually distinct from that in
meals are prepared and taken. However deep their sym-
however identical their education, the difference of sit-
situation would prevent the desired harmony between
couples, the one in full activity, the other withdraw-
active life, unless it were open to them to separate and
pleasure, as also to be rid of the children. The child-
must be always subdivided in order to isolate the se-
with no subdivision for number. Lastly, every family
receives its systematic organisation from the Church. Now the condition of such convergence is the introduction of the couple which I brought in to complete the family organism. In fact, this complement by its very nature reconciles the two forms, moral and political, of the family organisation, since the two differ only as regards the influence of the women of the family; in the one it is essentially the influence of the mother, in the other that of the wife which prevails. Uniting once for all the two forms, the religious theory of the family issues in bringing the regime into complete conformity with the worship, where the combination was already effected. But the importance of this solution demands, in the present place, a special though summary examination.

In its improved form the theory left two lacunae; it did not protract sufficiently the influence of the mother; it did not take full advantage of women as educators. These, its defects as a statical theory, naturally came into stronger relief as the dynamical investigation showed an uninterrupted growth of the ascendancy of women and of their peculiar aptitudes, such growth being a consequence of the increasing influence of civic upon domestic life.

To unite in one conception these two corrections, we may resolve them into the more accurate determination, for either sex, of what education really is in its entirety, when properly distinguished from instruction. Whilst instruction ends with the preparatory stage of life, including its complement of active training, education necessarily continues throughout the whole of our objective life, which is but one unceasing preparation for the subjective, the sole permanent existence. When our acquisitons of scientific or practical knowledge have lost all importance, for our feelings there is still both desirable and attainable a large advance, an advance, in the normal case, continuing until death, more particularly as regards our self-command. But our spontaneous progress in this respect can and should be furthered by all the influences which incessantly co-operated in our moral education. It never ceases to depend principally on the action of women, and that action again becomes more and more qualified to ameliorate us.

If we take the growth and confirmation of veneration as the expression of the grand object of our moral progress, we cannot but feel to what an extent man needs on this point the
assistance of woman. No one but our mother could discipline us whilst we were unexposed to the feelings connected with action; how much more valuable must her watchfulness be when we are habitually subjected to the temptations of business. The influence of the wife can in no degree, in this respect, take the place of the ascendancy of the mother, an ascendancy of which civilisation has increased the efficacy, by the closer union it has effected between private and public life.

Again, the feeling and conception of the Country, cannot, even for the man, become distinctly appreciable before the period of practical training, which succeeds that in which he gains his knowledge, at first instinctive, then systematic, of Humanity. Still more palpably is this the course of events for the affective sex, as women are immediately withdrawn from the influences originating in active life. Marriage alone can initiate women into civic life; it is from her husband that she gradually gains her conception of it, even without the knowledge of either. But it is not on the husband principally that reacts this slow initiation, it naturally tells most on the son. Its most valuable fruit would therefore be lost, if marriage was fated to withdraw the son from his mother's advice, when his circumstances render it more than ever necessary.

There is little ground for surprise at the tardy recognition of the importance of this last constituent of the normal family as compared with the others; it is explained if we take into account the coarse instinct which influenced man's judgment of women through the whole period of initiation. Its adjunction will constitute one of the best features of Positivism, inaugurating at length the sound theory of the female sex, by virtue of the true knowledge of human nature.

A general comparison of the first and last volumes of my religious construction, brings out, on this point, a decisive contrast; the 'General View' gives in a satisfactory form the theory of marriage; the theory of the mother remained imperfect till the present chapter. Though influenced by the thought of a guardian angel, the order adopted is essentially the expression of the spontaneous course of the human initiation, for I might have drawn from my own personal memories the venerated type of the mother.

The better to understand the definitive constitution of the family, the grand object of which is always to give full scope
for the just influence of woman upon man, we must bring before us, by a comparison of ages, the normal position assigned by that constitution, as a general rule, to each head of a family. As, commonly, he will be twenty-three years younger than his mother, seven years older than his wife, thirty years older than his daughter, about the age of fifty he will be under the constant influence of their threefold aid, urging him to good, turning him from evil. Under the combined weight of the past, the present, and the future, he grows as a citizen, having his veneration, his attachment, and his benevolence unconsciously stimulated, and from henceforward harmonised by the regime as they had been in the worship.

In this way and in this way only can the ultimate regeneration of the race, in unison with the true programme of the modern revolution, reconcile the conditions of the social existence of Rome with the tendencies of the civilization represented by Chivalry. In the two periods of childhood our mother was for us the loving personification of Humanity; in our riper years she is the venerated image of the Country, and there can be no better image of it ordinarily for each of us. When the sense of citizenship has recovered from the attacks of Catholicism, the mere change of a letter will suffice to rectify the usurpation of the male sex. The mother’s influence recalls us to public life, whilst the wife’s has a tendency to confine us to the family, from her inadequate sense of its true connection with political existence. The antagonism between the two will, as a rule, continue till the time of the mother’s death, when she becomes for ever the subjective image of Humanity, and the wife the objective personification, and as such qualified, also to represent, as she is then capable of appreciating, the Country. Without adopting the utopian scale of human longevity suggested by my spiritual father Condorcet, we must admit that in the ultimate condition of Humanity the continuous improvement of our physical and mental regime will prolong the normal duration of human life to ninety-one, or thirteen septennial periods. Now this augmentation should be sufficient to allow the influence of woman in all its three aspects to act upon the man during the whole course of his full maturity.

As for the exaggerated fear of the risks attendant on the presence in the same dwelling of the mother and the wife, they are in the main due to existing defects in the system of educa-
tion and in the family arrangements, which often give rise to
discussions impossible in the normal state. Neither having
d power or wealth, by their own act centered in the head of the
family, they can be rivals only in advice, whilst the wife adminis-
ters, the mother superintends, the common household, always
under his government. Thus is effected a proper distribution
of the consultative influence, which tends to preserve the
husband from the exclusive pressure of either, whilst not com-
pelling him to check their advice. But the most valuable
result of the distribution is that it purifies the two elements,
the intellectual and moral element, of the moderating power
always called for by the government of the family; and as
purified they become perfectly compatible. The husband's
daily worship of his mother leads him to a truer appreciation of
his wife, and thus secures her from the coarseness which is the
too frequent accompaniment of man's tenderness. On the other
hand the mother's ascendancy is strengthened by his deep
knowledge of woman's nature, the full attainment of which
requires the intimacy of married life. If, prior to the advent
of Positivism, man in his ripe age submits but with reluctance
to the mother's interference, it is that he has no sufficient sense
of the dignity of the wife.

We see thus how the entire constitution of the family is
condensed in the addition of its third normal element, which
is meant to bring the regime, as it regards the family, into
unison with the worship. With this addition we may connect
all the characteristic features of the family, as a Positive insti-
tution, already enumerated: eternal widowhood; the superin-
tendence of education by the mother; the support of woman by
man; the voluntary renunciation by women of dowries; and of
inheritance; liberty in disposing of property by will; and the
power of adoption. Each one is indispensable if man is rightly
to feel the constant influence of woman, as exerted simulta-
neously by the mother, the wife, and the daughter, with the
sister acting equally in support of the three, or in case of need
taking the place of either of the three in her peculiar relation.
Without this sevenfold security, the family life were inadequate
as the preparation for, and the support of, the action of the citi-
zen, or the devotion of the religious being. But the nature
and the object of these correlated institutions, in which the
Positive synthesis gives systematic expression to the instinctive
tendencies of Western manners, imperatively require that their adoption never be other than in the fullest sense voluntary.

Far from yielding to the indiscreet ardour of public opinion, the priesthood will be bound always to dissuade the patriciate from any enforcement by law of these seven regulations, for each would become oppressive, and at no distant period illusory, if ever it ceased to be a purely religious obligation. It is to ensure liberty in this respect that Positivism sanctions and encourages the institution of civil marriage, although in its origin, and even in its character, it is revolutionary; consequently without such sanction it could not be universal.

There is an apparent contradiction in this incorporation of civil marriage into the system, which I am bound to clear up or to anticipate; our Catholic associations leading us to see in it a mistaken concession on the part of the new spiritual power to the gradual encroachments of the old temporal power. The reproach has not been formally made, but it would in my eyes be a serious one, if I were unable completely to clear myself of it, as the sacred law of continuity obliges me to uphold or to reassert for the Positive priesthood all the powers justly claimed by former priesthods, without committing myself to any abuse of such powers. But I have given such good reasons for the sanction of civil marriage by Positivism, as the normal preliminary to the religious union, that no one, I hope, of my theocratic opponents will accuse me of losing sight in it of the Catholic or true privileges of the clergy.

Passing from this point, I avail myself of the opportunity the question offers for a juster understanding of the general relations of the two powers in society: for the norm division of the two, hitherto impracticable, has not yet been able to evoke, anywhere, the dispositions required for the habitual accord. By the statical theory of political power, these are as much as the other rests upon opinion; if unsupported by opinion it would soon lose all real authority. But each has its own proper mode of taking root in opinion, the priesthood actively, the government passively. Government can appeal only to long-established opinions, whilst the priesthood carries out those opinions to fresh consequences, just as it originally formed them. The case in question is a favourable one for appreciating this difference, for the revolutionary institution of civil marriage has, at bottom, for its sole justification th
utopia; in full agreement with the whole teaching of the past, it should serve henceforth as the ideal expression of the future. For the rest, everything tends to the conclusion that the education of the individual, from this time forward systematically conducted, will be bound to no servile reproduction, as regards the sexual instinct, of the evolution of the race, since already we see the Western nations becoming in the full sense of the word, monogamic, without ever having been polygamic.

To give clearness to the exposition of civic existence, the first step is to determine the constitution of the social milieu under its material aspect. This preliminary operation consists of two successive processes: first, the assigning their limits to the nationalities which will become the political elements of regenerate Humanity; secondly, the decomposition of each nation into industrial classes. The professional distribution of those classes belongs to my promised work on the Positive systematisation of human industry.

In the preceding volume it has been satisfactorily shown, that the formation of the great states of the Western world was a necessary consequence of the modern revolution, one destined to end with it, in accordance with the principles laid down in my Social Statics. In the following chapter, I shall explain, more especially in the case of France, the normal plan on which these factitious aggregates, even now without solid justification, will pass peaceably into free and durable states. Each of these Positive Republics should have a population of from one to three millions on a territory about equal to that of Belgium, Tuscany, Holland, Sicily, and Sardinia, &c.

In default of this decomposition, which, in an imperfect form, was realised in the Middle Ages simultaneously with the division of the two powers, our moral education would fail from there being no satisfactory intermedium between the Family and Humanity. Meant to be the bond between the closest and the most extensive of human associations, the Country can only discharge this its primary function, on condition of its being so limited in extent as to allow a real sense of the relations of citizenship. Language indicates the universal admission of this principle, when it represents the feelings of patriotism as confined to the union formed by the grouping of the rural population round one paramount city.

This original limit was only exceeded as a consequence of
the recognition of the natural correlation between the superiority of action and that of the civic life. Although the habits implanted by Catholicism set themselves everywhere against this conclusion, the instinct of the proletariat has already risen above them in its aspiration after a collective existence, and the patriciate with its empirical policy will evince a similar disposition, as soon as Positivism shall remove its alarm at communism.

Nothing then, henceforward, can prevent the noble subordination of public to private life, the aspiration of Antiquity transmitted to us by Chivalry, even against the teaching of Catholicism. Yet the theory of human unity is so little understood, that I was compelled to enter on the above explanation, an explanation at once historical and dogmatical, before I could set forth the life of the family. For such is the attraction of this life, that there would be always a risk of our returning to the contemptuous attitude of Catholicism in relation to public life, were not Positivism to obviate the danger, by appealing to a truer estimate of the very feeling in which the risk originates. But the superiority of speculation to action being definitively and universally rejected, none can fail to recognise the ascendancy of the civic life, which alone gives full scope for activity, the foundation on which rests the whole existence of Humanity. The second mode of Positive unity will, however, continue to exist in the preparatory period of life, when the providence of man dispenses with action, not, however, to the prolongation of this preliminary state, even for the rich, when education issues in its proper destination, that is, in action.

This introduction enables me to expound the systematisation of the Family by the instrumentality of the Country in the name of Humanity. I must begin by completing and correcting the indications of my Social Statics as to the number of constituents in the normal family.

My theory of the family reduces them to two groups; the one consisting of the married pair, the other of their offspring, to the number usually of three. Now, the family so constituted is adequate in point of solidarity, but defective as regards continuity, such continuity as there is only connecting the present with the future, not including the past. To remedy this defect, the Positive family must admit another couple,
its social basis the distribution of the Western territory into seventy republics, each, as an average, comprising three hundred thousand families, each of the normal size as above laid down. Adopting this basis, we have five hundred states for the whole earth, and we find the task easier of their internal distribution into industrial classes.

In reference to this second point, I congratulate myself on having ventured to propose definite numbers in the Positivist Catechism published about the middle of October, 1852. For the numbers there given have in the natural course of things been accepted, explicitly or implicitly, by the most competent judges, in regard to a point on which the special data are as yet insufficient. So supported, I do not hesitate to present the Western patriciate in the normal state as consisting of two thousand bankers, a hundred thousand merchants, two hundred thousand manufacturers, and four hundred thousand agriculturists.

Observing that the number of bankers corresponds to the number of temples of Humanity, we get a direct connection between the temporal hierarchy and the constitution of the spirituality, taking into account the habitual relations of the senior member of each presbytery with the patrician invested with its financial administration. On this scale, each banker on the average will have to meet the wants of ten thousand families, an arrangement which, as it seems to me, accords with the principle that the sphere of every office is to be as large as is compatible with direct responsibility in the functionary. The same rule is observed in the case of the lowest number, since it assigns, on an average, to each agricultural patrician a domain of five hundred hectares, an extent of cultivation to which one person can attend without strain. For the members of the two intervening classes, they seem to me to harmonise sufficiently with the law of increased condensation of industrial service, in proportion to the increase of generality and abstraction. I urge the reader to make himself familiar with this distribution as a whole by applying it to France as it actually exists, dividing, that is, each of the preceding numbers by four.

By virtue of these two operations, we can form a clear conception of the social milieu in which the Positive religion has to systematise civic life. But, as the numbers above given apply only to the patrician hierarchy, the survey, to be sufficiently
exact, requires the distribution of the proletaries also among their industrial chiefs.

Although the special data as regards this first point are wanting more than in the case of the patricians, I think I may, as a first step, allot agricultural industry a population double the amount of that required for all the town industries together. The apportioning of these latter will be clearer if I specify it for a capital, in which the number of families should be thirty times less than in the State of which it was the capital, in accordance with the actual average of France. In a nation of the normal size above given, such a capital would be formed of ten thousand households, exclusive of the patricians and priests. Of these ten thousand I assign seven thousand to manufacturers, three thousand to commerce, including, in both cases, the various intermediate agents between the capitalist and the workman. Multiply these numbers by ten, and the sum will meet the case of the nation of which it is the capital, the central government of which seems to me to require five thousand special functionaries, three fifths military, the other two fifths civil.

The abstract capital which has served as a type, has a population equivalent to that of most of the capitals of the seventeen republics into which France will break up peaceably about the end of the present century. This is the average case, but there will be many states in which the capital will admit of a population double, treble, quintuple, or even septuple of that given. The original number must be multiplied by eleven when we come to the old capitals of the political aggregations, which in some parts of the world, reproduce to a certain extent the Western type. For these voluntary associations will always remain sufficiently important to draw an exceptional population to their centres. Finally the number taken as the basis must be multiplied thirteen times for Paris, as the metropolis of mankind, in accordance with its present state, and its increase is not desirable.

These are the rates I venture to hazard in order to fix attention on an important, though in the present place a subordinate question. The number selected for the typical capital answers to the degree of concentration, in my judgment, ordinarily desirable, any notable excess involving moral and even political risks when the normal habits, and manners, are
once established. The same proportions apply, but inversely, to
the several cases of the smaller cities, the last case being the
village or the concentration of the rural community, in order
to avoid the excessive dispersion, no less than the excessive
agglomeration of population.

Summarising these hints, we must combine the two parts of
the preliminary statistical sketch here given by an estimate of
the normal proportion of plebeians to patricians. Taking each
of the five hundred republics of the world by itself, the families
of the aristocracy will be the thirtieth part of the whole number.

But, if we bear in mind the laws of the numerical constitut-
tion of the family, the workmen are only sixteen times as
numerous as the employers. Each agricultural patrician
directs thirty-five proletaries, each manufacturing seventy, each
commercial patrician sixty.

Without pressing further definite arrangements, which, as
anticipations, must have a logical, rather than a scientific,
value, I have now to delineate the public regime, beginning
with an estimate of the support it derives continually from
the private life, personal as well as family life. But no further
explanation is needed of the fundamental preparation formed
by the education, and developed in the worship; so that I may
confine myself to pointing out the influence which the system-
atisation of private existence exercises directly and continually
on that of public life.

At all times men have held a virtuous private life to be the
first guarantee of true civism, although such life might be the
offspring of mere personal prudence. At the same time that it
is easier to estimate the rules of conduct in the narrower sphere,
acts are in that sphere of less importance, and also more modi-
fiable, the result being that it offers the best test of our moral
strength, which must incessantly look to it for the renewal of
its vigour. This, the universal judgment, is in a special
degree applicable in the final state, where the systematisation
of individual existence with constant reference to Humanity
is the consequence of an assiduous culture, both objective and
subjective, of the sympathetic instincts. Each one then always
feels that the family of which he is a member, or even the class
to which that family belongs, though not an immediate organ
of the Great Being, is an indispensable element of the action
of the State, which alone is in direct relation with the eternal
whole. All individual conduct, then, becomes social in its destination, whence principally it derives its nobleness and its coherence, qualities, consequently, traceable in the most insignificant acts, which are never indifferent in view of the feelings which they indicate, or which they evoke.

The morality of the individual finds its condensation in his private worship, and should be a direct aid to his morality as a citizen, over and above its indirect influence through his domestic morality. Our three guardian angels, though drawn from the family, do not confine their action to the perfecting of that family. Their true and highest function is to guide us or to sustain us in the exertions and dangers attendant on our social existence, as was admirably felt by Chivalry, even under the counteraction of Catholicism. Thus we give reality to the fiction of Theology, that man has always by his side a superior being, lending him a benevolent assistance, judging him without illusion. All our public acts admit this intervention, and may become so many continuations of our personal worship, in a regime in which the Family is brought into constant relation with Humanity, through the intermedium of the Country.

All classes feel this influence, but the priesthood above all; as better able to appreciate it, it will connect it with the constant perfecting of the moral qualities required by its most important office. The interpreter of Humanity gains strength and dignity from feeling himself ever aided by her highest personification. Disciplining the present in the interest of the future, in the name of the past, his devotedness and his energy should be constantly rekindled by the direct invocation of the angelic ideal, which concentrates for him, by its very constitution the sum of human relations. In his secret communion with this ideal, the priest is best able to rise above the vanity, which hides from him his deficiencies, a just sense of which is encouraged by the comparison of himself with his ideal. Amidst the contests of public life, its holy influence stimulates, or calms him, by its presentation of the past, which he has to explain, and of the future which is to be his judge.

Still, whatever the influence continually exerted by private on public morality, it cannot be as direct or as efficacious as that of a rightly ordered domestic life, owing to the closer resemblance of the Family to the State, especially if it is formed on true social principles. It is in domestic life that the funda-
mental maxim: *Live for Others* begins to take practical complement: *Live without concealment*, without which it would soon become inadequate, nay even too illusory. No precautions suggested by the self-interest of metaphysical legislators will long bar the instinct of the Western nations from regarding full publicity of private conduct as the indispensable security of right civic action. The natural school for command and obedience, family life cannot answer its main purpose if withdrawn from the healthy influences of the judgment of the priesthood and even of the public. They who refuse to live openly will be justly liable to the suspicion of not really wishing to live for others. To judge of feelings we require acts; if so, the two virtues which are essential to civic life, self-devotion and veneration, must be practised daily in family life if their existence is to be recognised, the practice of them there being easier and more open to all than in public life. We must not forget, however, when we sum up social morality in the obligation of living without concealment, that it must be in subordination to the precept of living for others, though it is only times of anarchy that allow a regular parade of vicious conduct.

Quite apart from its power in this respect, domestic life is a direct support to public life, in that it gives the priesthood an enduring influence over the servant of Humanity. The education and the worship naturally give the priests access to the family, and they are often appealed to to soothe or remedy the collisions which, such is the imperfection of our nature, are inseparable from the highest ties. Their interference is the more effective, as they have a personal knowledge of all the members of the family, owing to the rule, the social value of which is on a par with the intellectual, that everyone during his years of encyclopaedic training is under the same teacher. It was to give completeness to this personal relation, by making it common to husband and wife, that I fixed seven years as the most suitable difference in age for marriage. Allow this, and the two priests to whom the two couples owed their initiation and who consecrated their union, are the better qualified to restore harmony in the family and mutual agreement, as well as to replace on a right footing the relations with the children, by invoking the common belief.

A connection of this kind, at once particular and general, ought, conversely, to be an assistance to the priesthood, by
tendencies of Western manners, imperatively require that their adoption never be other than in the fullest sense voluntary.

Far from yielding to the indiscreet ardour of public opinion, the priesthood will be bound always to dissuade the patriciate from any enforcement by law of these seven regulations, for each would become oppressive, and at no distant period illusory, if ever it ceased to be a purely religious obligation. It is to ensure liberty in this respect that Positivism sanctions and encourages the institution of civil marriage, although in its origin, and even in its character, it is revolutionary; consequently without such sanction it could not be universal.

There is an apparent contradiction in this incorporation of civil marriage into the system, which I am bound to clear up or to anticipate; our Catholic associations leading us to see in it a mistaken concession on the part of the new spiritual power to the gradual encroachments of the old temporal power. The reproach has not been formally made, but it would in my eyes be a serious one, if I were unable completely to clear myself of it, as the sacred law of continuity obliges me to uphold or to reassert for the Positive priesthood all the powers justly claimed by former priesthods, without committing myself to any abuse of such powers. But I have given such good reasons for the sanction of civil marriage by Positivism, as the normal preliminary to the religious union, that no one, I hope, of my theocratic opponents will accuse me of losing sight in it of the Catholic or true privileges of the clergy.

Passing from this point, I avail myself of the opportunity the question offers for a juster understanding of the general relations of the two powers in society: for the normal division of the two, hitherto impracticable, has not yet been able to evoke, anywhere, the dispositions required for the habitual accord. By the statical theory of political power, one as much as the other rests upon opinion; if unsupported opinion it would soon lose all real authority. But each has own proper mode of taking root in opinion, the priesthood actively, the government passively. Government can act only to long-established opinions, whilst the priesthood call out those opinions to fresh consequences, just as it conceived them. The case in question appreciating this difference, for the civil marriage has, at bottom,
theocratic character which in a confused way will attach to the
temporal power so long as the West remains unregenerated by
Positivism. It were impossible otherwise to understand, how
a subaltern and purely local magistrate becomes capable of
forming a tie which will be universally respected. The reli-
gious basis, however, of the credit he enjoys being rotten,
the institution could not endure, much less spread, were not
the Positive worship to incorporate it in a subordinate position
with itself, by the sanction it accords the magistrate as a
special assistant of the priestly. the priesthood of 

With all respect for the spontaneity in all cases of the
observance of the seven conditions required by the religious
theory of the family, the priesthood will yet be compelled to
ask for some legal measures in regard to them, most particu-
larly with reference to the age of civil marriage. All Western
codes allow too early an age, especially for women, who, by the
French law are sacrificed to the coarseness of men before their
organisation, even their physical constitution, is sufficiently
settled. The High Priest of Humanity, then, must prevail on
the several dictators to decree that the woman never marry till
she has completed her nineteenth year, not insisting on the
twenty-first, which will remain the proper age for the religious
marriage. As for the man, it will be well to prolong till
twenty-eight, the normal age for the sacrament of destination,
the veto of the father on marriage. By these two arrange-
ments, most Positivist marriages will be between women of twenty-two
and men of twenty-nine; so as to keep the disparity of seven
years, which seems the best.

With regard to the power of disposing of property by will
and to that of adoption, Western legislation requires, and in
France more than elsewhere, more profound modifications if it
is to be adapted to the religious constitution of the family.
But the very importance of these modifications must be my
justification for not touching on them in detail till the following
chapter, the chapter devoted to tracing the final transition, for
which such measures are essentially meant. In regard to the
normal state, it is enough here if I make the general remark
that adoption once disengaged from existing obstacles, will still
be subjected to precautions against mere impulses, and that the
disposal of property by will presupposes a just attention to the
interests of the natural heirs.
By a combination of the preceding observations, the ultimate systematisation of the family stands out so clearly that I may pass from it to enquire into the constitution of the state, the principal domain of Positivity. But before I enter on it, I must point out in what way the theory of the family is summarised quite naturally by a general estimate of its admissible modifications, modifications studied in detail in the third volume.

At all times thought to have as its aim the developing the influence of woman upon man, there is traceable in the constitution of the Family a continuous progress from the coarse stimulus which called it into existence, to its ideal limit in the utopia of the Virgin-Mother. Our most remote ancestors were even, nearly as the animals are, accessible to sexual desire only at certain periods. The women of Oceania even now find long stimulation necessary to arouse an ignoble appetite. Such in its earliest form is the influence of women, nor as yet, admirable as are the improvements introduced, is it regenerated. The Positive religion alone can definitively secure the triumph of a high estimate of woman, as the normal mediator between man and Humanity. The utopia of the Virgin-Mother implies in its very statement the desired regeneration, as it frees the sex from all coarse dependence, in order to reserve for it, at one and the same time, the most important physical function and the noblest moral mission. Even should this institution of the religion never be other than an ideal, yet when confronted with the point of departure it would condense the whole initiation of the race, to which we limit the dominion of an instinct doomed to extinction in the maturity of mankind.

But a sound utopia can never really be other than in a certain degree an anticipation of fact; whereas unsound ones always favour an impossible return upon the past. Thus, the anarchical reveries of Plato and of his modern imitators, on the community of property and of wives, so far from indicating real progress, only tended to the re-establishment of the collective property and the promiscuous intercourse, which are distinctive of the primitive ages. On the contrary, the admirable utopia of Henry IV., of the Quakers, and of Leibnitz, on perpetual peace in Western Europe, did but precede by about two centuries, the result of the spontaneous evolution of the state of mankind. We may hope then a like issue for the feminine
utopia; in full agreement with the whole teaching of the past, it should serve henceforth as the ideal expression of the future. For the rest, everything tends to the conclusion that the education of the individual, from this time forward systematically conducted, will be bound to no servile reproduction, as regards the sexual instinct, of the evolution of the race, since already we see the Western nations becoming in the full sense of the word, monogamic, without ever having been polygamic.

To give clearness to the exposition of civic existence, the first step is to determine the constitution of the social milieu under its material aspect. This preliminary operation consists of two successive processes: first, the assigning their limits to the nationalities which will become the political elements of regenerate Humanity; secondly, the decomposition of each nation into industrial classes. The professional distribution of these classes belongs to my promised work on the Positive systematisation of human industry.

In the preceding volume it has been satisfactorily shown, that the formation of the great states of the Western world was a necessary consequence of the modern revolution, one destined to end with it, in accordance with the principles laid down in my Social Statics. In the following chapter, I shall explain, more especially in the case of France, the normal plan on which these factitious aggregates, even now without solid justification, will pass peaceably into free and durable states. Each of these Positive Republics should have a population of from one to three millions on a territory about equal to that of Belgium, Tuscany, Holland, Sicily, and Sardinia, &c.

In default of this decomposition, which, in an imperfect form, was realised in the Middle Ages simultaneously with the division of the two powers, our moral education would fail from there being no satisfactory intermedium between the Family and Humanity. Meant to be the bond between the closest and the most extensive of human associations, the Country can only discharge this its primary function, on condition of its being so limited in extent as to allow a real sense of the relations of citizenship. Language indicates the universal admission of this principle, when it represents the feelings of patriotism as confined to the union formed by the grouping of the rural population round one paramount city.

This original limit was only exceeded as a consequence of
the compulsory incorporation which resulted from the gradual extension of Roman Conquest. In lieu thereof, the Middle Ages substituted a voluntary aggregation of nations, politically independent but spiritually connected, with a natural tendency towards an association coextensive with the race, had the faith they held in common been able to impose itself on mankind. Such an association with such a faith it is for the religion of Humanity definitively to organise, when it has triumphed over the state of anarchy, which made the temporary formation of great states in the West as indispensable as it was inevitable.

It is not possible to fix the exact limit of the Positive nation, though it may be confidently asserted that it will be larger than in the mediaeval period, when social intercourse was less general and the want of it less felt. The standard above given seems to me one which will long remain appropriate, as allowing aggregations in the degree in which concert is reconcileable with independence. As the Positive religion will have secured the general adoption of the principle of free aggregation, new decompositions or combinations may be always effected without any struggle, as the progress of society may warrant them. And although the definitive civilisation will gradually enlarge the political association, I doubt its ever being much in excess of the limit just assigned it. For the rest, the question has already lost its great importance; since the Positive regime will make government more and more spiritual, less and less temporal, thus systematising the natural progress of society.

In the political point of view, not less than in the moral, the normal decomposition of the large states is of great value, as equally favourable to order and to progress. Each of the three general elements of the sociocratic state, will always derive important advantages from it. The priesthood of Humanity will be better able to modify the government of the nation, which under these conditions will be less inclined to encroach upon the spiritual functions. But at the same time, the patricians will find greater respect paid to an authority the origin and use of which will be intelligible to all. Lastly, the proletaries will find it easier to deal with a smaller amount of oppression, and more opening for the exercise of regular control.

We must consider, then, the Positive regime as having fo:
the duty of respecting the marriage union as the universal basis of the Family which in its turn is the basis of the State. Now, this is only possible by a moral regulation of marriages, to the exclusion of legal checks; so to make the production of children a responsible function voluntarily assumed.

On this question the Positive religion has two general solutions to offer, the one radical but an hypothesis, the other real but inadequate; the two may always act in concert. As I have already sufficiently expounded them, it is enough, here, to point out their conjoint application to this great problem. The two are: the utopia as to women, and chaste marriage, the chief purpose of which I have already stated.

We should look on the former as supplying the only possible basis for a definitive systematisation of human reproduction, which, by its adoption, becomes voluntary and responsible. So long as it is not attained, the evil will never be attacked at its source; all remedies will be but palliative. But the noblest vegetative function of Humanity once duly confined to her highest organs, the rapid spread of the Positive theory of hereditary transmission will allow a gradual regulation of that function, both as to number and quality. The natural laws of these two conditions will, at the same time, have become cognisable by all, by virtue of a considerable evolution of the universal Sociocracy. The solution, however, is one which will always be limited to the higher natures, for it is essentially of a moral kind and, as such, requires the persistent combination of higher sensibility and extreme purity.

Even if realised, then, it will never entirely supersede the less important institution, alone feasible at present, and a consequence of the systematic encouragement of chastity in marriage. When the Positive faith shall have generally subdued the coarse view sanctioned by Theologism as to the nature and destination of women, this form of marriage will rapidly spread; already, prior to any theory, decisive instances proclaim its approach. A noble use of adoption will allow the completing of this exceptional form of marriage, by offering the parental relation in its purest form to those in whom the union of soul is most perfect, with the additional advantage of relieving the married couples who are in the best conditions for reproduction.

Inadequate, and inadequate because it is negative—this latter solution may even now, over and above its moral efficacy,
exact, requires the distribution of the proletaries also among their industrial chiefs.

Although the special data as regards this first point are wanting more than in the case of the patricians, I think I may, as a first step, allot agricultural industry a population double the amount of that required for all the town industries together. The apportioning of these latter will be clearer if I specify it for a capital, in which the number of families should be thirty times less than in the State of which it was the capital, in accordance with the actual average of France. In a nation of the normal size above given, such a capital would be formed of ten thousand households, exclusive of the patricians and priests. Of these ten thousand I assign seven thousand to manufacturers, three thousand to commerce, including, in both cases, the various intermediate agents between the capitalist and the workman. Multiply these numbers by ten, and the sum will meet the case of the nation of which it is the capital, the central government of which seems to me to require five thousand special functionaries, three fifths military, the other two fifths civil.

The abstract capital which has served as a type, has a population equivalent to that of most of the capitals of the seventeen republics into which France will break up peaceably about the end of the present century. This is the average case, but there will be many states in which the capital will admit of a population double, treble, quintuple, or even septuple of the given. The original number must be multiplied by eleven when we come to the old capitals of the political aggregations, which in some parts of the world, reproduce to a certain extent the Western type. For these voluntary associations will always remain sufficiently important to draw an exceptional population to their centres. Finally the number taken as the basis must be multiplied thirteen times for Paris, as the metropolis of mankind, in accordance with its present state, and its increase is not desirable.

These are the rates I venture to hazard in order to fix attention on an important, though in the present place a subordinate question. The number selected for the typical capital answers to the degree of concentration, in my judgment, ordinarily desirable, any notable excess involving moral and even political risks when the normal habits, and manners, are
once established. The same proportions apply, but inversely, to
the several cases of the smaller cities, the last case being the
village or the concentration of the rural community, in order
to avoid the excessive dispersion, no less than the excessive
agglomeration of population.

Summarising these hints, we must combine the two parts of
the preliminary statistical sketch here given by an estimate of
the normal proportion of plebeians to patricians. Taking each
of the five hundred republics of the world by itself, the families
of the aristocracy will be the thirtieth part of the whole number.

But, if we bear in mind the laws of the numerical constitu-
tion of the family, the workmen are only sixteen times as
numerous as the employers. Each agricultural patrician
directs thirty-five proletaries, each manufacturing seventy, each
commercial patrician sixty.

Without pressing further definite arrangements, which, as
expectations, must have a logical, rather than a scientific,
value, I have now to delineate the public regime, beginning
with an estimate of the support it derives continually from
the private life, personal as well as family life. But no further
explanation is needed of the fundamental preparation formed
by the education, and developed in the worship; so that I may
confining myself to pointing out the influence which the system-
atisation of private existence exercises directly and continually
on that of public life.

At all times men have held a virtuous private life to be the
first guarantee of true civism, although such life might be the
offspring of mere personal prudence. At the same time that it
is easier to estimate the rules of conduct in the narrower sphere,
acts are in that sphere of less importance, and also more modi-
fiable, the result being that it offers the best test of our moral
strength, which must incessantly look to it for the renewal of
its vigour. This, the universal judgment, is in a special
degree applicable in the final state, where the systematisation
of individual existence with constant reference to Humanity
is the consequence of an assiduous culture, both objective and
subjective, of the sympathetic instincts. Each one then always
feels that the family of which he is a member, or even the class
to which that family belongs, though not an immediate organ
of the Great Being, is an indispensable element of the action
of the State, which alone is in direct relation with the eternal
whole. All individual conduct, then, becomes social in its destination, whence principally it derives its nobleness and its coherence, qualities, consequently, traceable in the most insignificant acts, which are never indifferent in view of the feeling which they indicate, or which they evoke.

The morality of the individual finds its condensation in his private worship, and should be a direct aid to his morality as a citizen, over and above its indirect influence through his domestic morality. Our three guardian angels, though drawn from the family, do not confine their action to the perfecting of that family. Their true and highest function is to guide us or to sustain us in the exertions and dangers attendant on our social existence, as was admirably felt by Chivalry, even under the counteraction of Catholicism. Thus we give reality to the fiction of Theology, that man has always by his side a superior being, lending him a benevolent assistance, judging him without illusion. All our public acts admit this intervention, and may become so many continuations of our personal worship, in a regime in which the Family is brought into constant relation with Humanity, through the intermedium of the Country.

All classes feel this influence, but the priesthood above all; as better able to appreciate it, it will connect it with the constant perfecting of the moral qualities required by its most important office. The interpreter of Humanity gains strength and dignity from feeling himself ever aided by her highest personification. Disciplining the present in the interest of the future, in the name of the past, his devotedness and his energy should be constantly rekindled by the direct invocation of the angelic ideal, which concentrates for him, by its very constitution the sum of human relations. In his secret communion with this ideal, the priest is best able to rise above the vanity, which hides from him his deficiencies, a just sense of which is encouraged by the comparison of himself with his ideal. Amidst the contests of public life, its holy influence stimulates, or calms him, by its presentation of the past, which he has to explain, and of the future which is to be his judge.

Still, whatever the influence continually exerted by private on public morality, it cannot be as direct or as efficacious as that of a rightly ordered domestic life, owing to the closer resemblance of the Family to the State, especially if it is formed on true social principles. It is in domestic life that the funda-
mental maxim: *Live for Others* begins to take practical complement: *Live without concealment*, without which it would soon become inadequate, nay even too often illusory. No precautions suggested by the self-interest of metaphysical legislators will long bar the instinct of the Western nations from regarding full publicity of private conduct as the indispensable security of right civic action. The natural school for command and obedience, family life cannot answer its main purpose if withdrawn from the healthy influences of the judgment of the priesthood and even of the public. They who refuse to live openly will be justly liable to the suspicion of not really wishing to live for others. To judge of feelings we require acts; if so, the two virtues which are essential to civic life, self-devotion and veneration, must be practised daily in family life if their existence is to be recognised, the practice of them there being easier and more open to all than in public life. We must not forget, however, when we sum up social morality in the obligation of living without concealment, that it must be in subordination to the precept of living for others, though it is only times of anarchy that allow a regular parade of vicious conduct.

Quite apart from its power in this respect, domestic life is a direct support to public life, in that it gives the priesthood an enduring influence over the servant of Humanity. The education and the worship naturally give the priests access to the family, and they are often appealed to to soothe or remedy the collisions which, such is the imperfection of our nature, are inseparable from the highest ties. Their interference is the more effective, as they have a personal knowledge of all the members of the family, owing to the rule, the social value of which is on a par with the intellectual, that everyone during his years of encyclopædic training is under the same teacher. It was to give completeness to this personal relation, by making it common to husband and wife, that I fixed seven years as the most suitable difference in age for marriage. Allow this, and the two priests to whom the two couples owed their initiation and who consecrated their union, are the better qualified to restore harmony in the family and mutual agreement, as well as to replace on a right footing the relations with the children, by invoking the common belief.

A connection of this kind, at once particular and general, ought, conversely, to be an assistance to the priesthood, by
ensuring it, in the bosom of each family, the support of the women and of the old as against the industrial chiefs on whom the social action of the Priesthood is usually brought to bear. But to be effectual on extraordinary occasions, such aid must have been the object of habitual attention in the ordinary relations of life. Now, this implies that women encourage in themselves in due degree the true civic feeling, nobly therein imitating the Roman type, nay in the normal state surpassing it by its combination with the instinct of Chivalry. The natural tendency of the wife to absorption in the family may, not to speak of the influence of the mother, be generally overcome by an increased sense of the close connection which exists between self-devotion within the family circle and self-renunciation in public life. Even granting that the preference of Family to Country were not a mere cloak for selfishness, Positive education will predispose women to acknowledge the instability inherent in such conduct, the collective egoism impairing personal tenderness.

By virtue of this predisposition family life, in its normal developement, will be in direct connection with public life, first through the relations between the members of each family, secondly, through its daily intercourse with others, whether related or not. In such a state of things the full value will be felt of the fraternal relation, the main source of noble friendships. The influence on society of such friendships should awake the sense how important it is for Positivism to re-establish, and even to extend, the wise prohibitions by which Catholicism completed the admirable discipline instituted by the Theocracy as regards incest. Although in the case of marriage the law of widowhood of itself meets the want, yet as a purely religious ordinance it does not exempt the civil legislation from the duty of including all fraternal connections without exception in the two prohibitions which are at present limited to fraternity by birth. But the largest developement of mutual relations between Positive families will be due to adoption and domesticity, neither of which institutions will be the incorporation of merely isolated individuals, but of families, the difference in position being compensated by the identity of education.

The family relations as a whole should offer a direct and powerful aid to public life, as an instrument constantly available for the formation of public opinion. In defiance of metaphysical anarchy, the Positive faith will soon have re-
generated the Western salon, the presidency in which invariably belongs to women, but to the mother rather than to the wife. Including all ranks, adopted by all nations, especially when the sacred language shall have come into general use, these meetings, traceable in their origin to feudalism, will everywhere display their capacity to form the habitual connection between private and public life. Under the joint authority of sex and age, they will assume a moral rather than a political direction, strengthening religious principles by an application of them in detail, and that a natural application, never degenerating into pedantry. These private assemblies in which women play the principal part, cannot, it is true, supersede the public meetings of men, but they will limit such meetings to the general and, above all, the local questions which directly concern industrial action.

Such are the sources normally of public opinion, when the milieu is no longer under the dominion of journalism, the peculiar feature of the latest revolutionary phase. Its weekly addresses offer the priesthood the best means for explaining in due season the less important applications of the principles of the doctrine. When a written explanation is necessary, it will issue special placards, similar to those of Catholicism, but not with a periodical character. Concentrated on their permanent functions, the theoricians will naturally set an example to all of the respect due to the institutions of writing and printing, by using them solely for important communications, such as are meant chiefly for posterity. Freed from the influence of the literary class, be it by its Positive education, or by the incorporation of the thinkers of that class into the priesthood, the public will imitate the reserve of its guides and will look with contempt on unnecessary publications, without any attack on the liberty of exposition and discussion. Under this regime the salons will put out their full power to prepare opinion, which again will be more easily judged than when its chief organ of expression was an unreliable press. In this way it is that women should indirectly share in the current judgment of acts and persons, without any detriment to their moral mission, the daily accomplishment of which can alone prevent men from being carried away by political feeling.

The reaction of domestic on public life, common as it naturally is to all classes, should, like that of individual existence,
be most powerful in the clergy. The freely accepted supremacy of the *salon* of the presbytery will imply to all, especially to women, the social precedence of the priesthood over the patriciate. Notwithstanding their greater power and wealth, the temporal chiefs will hold it an honour to be admitted to this distinguished society, the venerable president of which unites in her own person the dignity of age and sex with the consideration attaching to the office of her son. In the capital of Humanity, the Salon of the High Priest will thus initiate throughout the world conceptions well adapted to second his synthetic influence and capable of serving in lieu of more formal communications. Spreading from presbytery to presbytery, and radiating thence by a natural process, they will be equivalent to a systematic domestic organisation of public opinion, as they will stamp an unconstrained uniformity on all the salons of the globe, a process facilitated by the progressive acceleration of all the means of communication.

As regards the patricians, the salon should strengthen their union as a hierarchy, and moderate their industrial rivalries. Its capabilities in these two respects will be most visibly shown in the salons of the bankers, the natural centres of meeting for all the industrial classes. There, each member of the supreme patriciate will create a truer appreciation of his class as the common regulator of human industry, by fraternising with dignity with all his clients, agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants, to whom his weekly receptions will always be open. Whilst admirably calculated to prepare and facilitate particular operations, these meetings will not degenerate into mere professional meetings, the safeguard lying either in the diversity of their component elements, or still more in the presence habitually of the more eminent proletaries, who will give them a more general character. Not in immediate contact with the people, as banking, the most abstract form of industry, scarcely needs any workmen, bankers worthy of their position will be conscious of the value of this personal intercourse with the class which in the normal state will look to them as its natural temporal protectors.

But, allowing its full efficacy for social purposes to the Positive salon in the case of the priest or the patrician, it is with the proletary class that the institution will habitually bear its best fruits. It supplies the plebeians the best means for
preparing, and even extending their due control over all civic concerns, under the presidency of women, which by its mere acceptance recalls them to great principles, to the suppression of incidental passions. Indispensably requisite to complete the constitution of the Sociocracy, this function would alone suffice to justify my speaking, as above, of the salon as part of the working man's apartment. Thus become a regular institution, the private meetings of the proletariat will be superior in moral dignity and political value to its public meetings, which become of secondary importance, though immediately they are so important as to account for the attention paid them in the 'General View.' The tendency to disorder of these noisy discussions, in which pride and vanity soon get the upper hand even in the higher natures, must always be a source of alarm to the patrician class; but its only way of escape is the encouragement of the institution which rejects them and fills their place.

To complete the general examination of the direct and persistent reaction of domestic on civic life, it remains for me to put forward a question of more special interest and greater importance than the preceding, the question namely of the propagation of the race.

As the necessary seat of the highest form of production, the family by it is in most intimate connection with the whole system of industrial activity, for which it supplies the agents. The paramount importance however of this function is as yet masked by the difficulties of its regulation, owing to the non-existence of right ideas on the subject and appropriate institutions. The real commencement of human education takes place in a state of brute passion with no sense of responsibility. Such being the case, it may be feared that human wisdom will never succeed in fully ordering an existence with such a beginning. Yet the success obtained in beings less modifiable than man allows the hope that the initial function may be as compatible with regular control as are its whole consequences.

We need not be surprised at the existing contrast between the importance attached to the propagation of the inferior animals and the neglect of that of man. For the rough and violent methods adopted for the former are wholly inapplicable to the latter. It was a domain which, for two reasons, was closed till the advent of Positivism, the only system capable of supplying the appropriate theories and institutions, for it alone
completes and systematises science and morality. Without normal division of the two powers, characteristic of the relig of Humanity, procreation in our race can only be regulated legal measures, and such are as ineffectual as they are unseen. It may seem premature, on scientific and moral grounds approach the subject, yet two general symptoms warn us: it will shortly demand our attention; such is the inference be drawn from the spontaneous convergence of the quest everywhere coming up as to the number and quality of children born.

A sophistical, perhaps a blameworthy theory, first drew attention of Western Europe, were it only by the indign it excited in the nations which had escaped Protestant Veiling its metaphysical and empirical character under a nish of science, it erred, scientifically, by ignoring the g law by which, throughout the series of living beings, few diminishes in proportion as the race is higher in the scale erred, practically, in that it was in direct contradiction with constant rate of increase observed in the population of West, during the thirty centuries of the great transition, unaffected by the parallel increase of general wellbeing.

Again, the hereditary transmission of the more severe diseases, and that frequently in an aggravated form, induced a general sense that it is desirable to regulate merely the quantity, but still more the quality of offspring. The Western world in modern times has been increasingly averse to the barbarous institutions which are at compensating this inevitable evil, so that the danger assumed proportions calculated to excite universal attention, proportion as the decline of Theology allowed an examin of the question. But the materialistic tendencies of men have prevented our conceiving of any remedy but one which as illusory as it is oppressive, the prohibition, viz., of marriage to all of bad constitution.

Still, in the fact that economists and physicians con their joint efforts, however discordant and irrational their may be, we have an historical indication, that the ques ripe for settlement, more especially since the advent of reigion which is destined to accomplish that settlement. difficulty is this, how to reconcile two conflicting imperious: the obligation relating to
the duty of respecting the marriage union as the universal basis of the Family which in its turn is the basis of the State. Now, this is only possible by a moral regulation of marriages, to the exclusion of legal checks; so to make the production of children a responsible function voluntarily assumed.

On this question the Positive religion has two general solutions to offer, the one radical but an hypothesis, the other real but inadequate; the two may always act in concert. As I have already sufficiently expounded them, it is enough, here, to point out their conjoint application to this great problem. The two are: the utopia as to women, and chaste marriage, the chief purpose of which I have already stated.

We should look on the former as supplying the only possible basis for a definitive systematisation of human reproduction, which, by its adoption, becomes voluntary and responsible. So long as it is not attained, the evil will never be attacked at its source; all remedies will be but palliative. But the noblest vegetative function of Humanity once duly confined to her highest organs, the rapid spread of the Positive theory of hereditary transmission will allow a gradual regulation of that function, both as to number and quality. The natural laws of these two conditions will, at the same time, have become cognisable by all, by virtue of a considerable evolution of the universal Sociocracy. The solution, however, is one which will always be limited to the higher natures, for it is essentially of a moral kind and, as such, requires the persistent combination of higher sensibility and extreme purity.

Even if realised, then, it will never entirely supersede the less important institution, alone feasible at present, and a consequence of the systematic encouragement of chastity in marriage. When the Positive faith shall have generally subdued the coarse view sanctioned by Theologism as to the nature and destination of women, this form of marriage will rapidly spread; already, prior to any theory, decisive instances proclaim its approach. A noble use of adoption will allow the completing of this exceptional form of marriage, by offering the parental relation in its purest form to those in whom the union of soul is most perfect, with the additional advantage of relieving the married couples who are in the best conditions for reproduction.

Inadequate, and inadequate because it is negative—this latter solution may, on now, over and above its moral efficacy,
lead to physical results of value by preventing the birth of children whose short life could be but a burden both to themselves and to society. As a palliative also, it foreshadows, may even prepare the way for, the grand remedy, as it draws general attention to the problem, and gives rise to partial efforts towards its solution.

Equally in either case, there will naturally be a necessity for the Positivist priesthood to intervene, to point out the end and judge of its attainment. But besides its general means of access to the sociocratic family, it will have a special introduction, with a view to its action on this point, in the body of opinions implanted by education and cultivated in the worship. That the maternal functions are social functions—this was duly if incompletely recognised by Catholicism,—Positivism stamps the truth with its definitive sanction, and the free acquiescence of the family is evidenced by its asking for and receiving the sacrament of Presentation.

The normal reaction of private life upon public life thus sufficiently explained, the next step is to lay down the plan of public life, which we do by a systematic statement first, of its fundamental object, then, of its general conditions, lastly, of its several functions in detail.

From the first point of view, the difficulty lies in determining the permanent end of the collective action in the industrial state, industry originally being necessarily individual in its character. In spite of the persistent efforts of the Theocracy,—no other system has hitherto attempted to organise labour,—it has never been able to disengage itself sufficiently from its origin. Although the institution of castes in no way recognised the anarchical division of social functions into private and public, it could not but leave industry its essentially family character, it could not make it a really civic function. In fact, for this transformation two preliminary conditions are required: the separation of the capitalists and workmen; and the formation of the industrial hierarchy. The first alone is conclusive, the second, though necessary, has no social efficacy, save in so far as it is the spontaneous complement of the first. But, by an inversion, the second only was a consideration with the Theocracy; it was unable even to inaugurate the other, in default of a free development of labour, a want traceable to the hereditary transmission of professions. Such forced inversion of the natural
order allowed no intercourse between the different castes but such as sprang from their respective employments; the organisation of industry was out of the question, whilst each producer was capitalist and workman in one.

When warlike activity emancipated the nation from the theocratic regime, a radical obstacle to industrial organisation lay in the necessity of enslaving the industrial to the soldier class in order to carry out the system of conquest. But this very subjection was ultimately to be the source of the regeneration of industry, the Western world escaping by its means the institution of castes. The true solution arose in the Middle Ages, when the change from conquest to defence had led to the gradual enfranchisement of the workmen, in the towns first, then in the country. From this point onwards, the directors of industry have become more and more distinct from the handicraftsmen, with a tendency to found a new patriciate, as a result of the progressive accumulation of productive capital. At the same time, their regular intercourse with one another has constantly led to fresh development of the industrial hierarchy, a process which culminated in the gradual advent of the class whose special function it is to systematise man’s peaceful activity.

This highest patriciate can neither enter upon nor accomplish its social mission but under the all-pervading impulsion of the Positive religion. To judge aright its need of this, it is not enough to be aware, in the general, that every merely partial synthesis is impracticable, so long as the complete synthesis be not definitively established. We must go farther, and understand, in reference to this need, the radical difference that exists between the two successive forms of human activity. In its warlike stage it is intrinsically synthetical, in its pacific stage it is as naturally analytical; the first being in direct relation with the human order, where unity is the paramount idea, whilst the second deals exclusively with the external order, and here the predominant feature is dispersion. Hence the direct tendency of soldiers to develope the state, and the long persistence of the workers in the isolation of the Family.

But if this natural difference gave the social superiority to war, during the whole course of human initiation, it will ultimately educe from the industrial existence a higher form of society. For war could only be organised on behalf of the
Country, whilst industry for its systematisation requires the idea of Humanity. All States were naturally rivals during the military period, be it that they simultaneously aimed at empire which one could only gain, or as they resisted singly the forcible incorporation which alone could secure their union. In the industrial period, on the contrary, they naturally converge, as it assigns to each an aim which may become the aim of all, as it is invariably an external aim. All alike seeking to profit by the resources the earth offers, there may be a distribution of parts between the several Republics, analogous to that by which we coordinate the several component classes of each Republic.

We thus see that peaceful activity is the natural introduction to the union of the race, which alone can give it its systematic form, whereas military society could not rise above the idea of the State. The distinction explains the ultimate superiority of the industrial condition, whilst it explains also the inevitable slowness of its triumph. Its rise has been possible only in the West, after the utter exhaustion, not merely of war, whether for conquest or defence, but also of the absolute synthesis, whether theological or metaphysical. The organisation of labour demanded: the ascendancy of the habits of peace, as alone susceptible of the universality it presupposes, and the triumph of the Positive spirit, the only basis for the coordination of industry. Such are the two claims of Positivism to exclusive competence in regard to a transformation which necessarily devolved on Sociocracy, however judiciously it had been initiated by Theocracy.

Its accomplishment demands the establishment of the universal religion, which will give systematic precedence to feeling over both intellect and activity. If in previous chapters I have shown that the theoretical class is mistaken in seeking for a purely scientific synthesis, the reader must now see that practical men are equally wrong in aiming exclusively at the discipline of industry. Neither action nor faith can be systematised without love, though the coordination of action and thought is the indispensable complement of the unity constituted by sympathy.

In its industrial form both universal and eternal, practical, as theoretic life, must look to feeling for its definitive organisation, the great outcome of the religion of Humanity. The first would degenerate into an useless accumulation of products,
chap. IV.]  THE LIFE.  283

the second into a barren collection of truths, were not both, over and above their relations with one another, subjected to the only power competent to regulate and ennoble them. Identifying happiness and duty, Positive religion places them once for all in moral improvement, the exclusive source of true unity. Under the persistent influence of that religion, all the aspects of human existence should become henceforward coherent and pure by virtue of the capital substitution of the relative for the absolute. In the last chapter, this substitution is effected for the intellect, which for the future will aid feeling by bringing faith to the support of love. We must now similarly regenerate the activity, which is more open to the process, as more social by nature. For private life the process is accomplished, and we have only to extend it to public life, the sole security for the whole discipline.

It is not enough for this, to conceive of action as equally competent with faith to be the support of love, from its completing the sense of order by that of progress. Its influence in this respect, necessary as it is, and common to all its forms, is inadequate to a satisfactory organisation of labour, which must excel that of war by substituting the union of mankind for the political society. To enable Humanity to throw off its egoistic character when getting rid of the absolute synthesis, man’s peaceful activity must become, not merely collective, but distinctly altruistic in character.

Hitherto, the only Occidentals who have made any serious effort to organise industry have been content with the endeavour to reintroduce, under a different form, the nationality characteristic of antiquity. Their patriotism was as inimical to other nations as the patriotism of ancient nations, its only aim being to substitute industrial for military dominion. Their attempts were too conflicting to allow of full development, yet they soon proved to be more oppressive than anterior conquests; these latter invariably leading to incorporation, compulsory it is true in the first instance, but subsequently accepted by free consent, whereas the former tended to destruction. Their aim was to solve the problem of collective action to the total neglect of any moral purpose, and the result at which they arrived was the retrograde one of keeping war, in the interest of industry; a result which has brought them into complete discredit after two centuries of painful exertions. In the nation, where territorial
isolation, official Protestantism, and aristocratic rule, acted in spontaneous concert so as to give an appearance of consistency to this defective form of industrial organisation, peace and liberty have already led to its abandonment.

The revolutionary crisis gave birth in the West to another attempt to solve the problem, one more vague in its character but less transient, which seems to comply with the condition of universality, whereas in reality all it does is to change the object of preference. It gained, as was to be expected, most adhesion in the central nation, aided thereto by the negative metaphysical philosophy which France alone up to the present time has applied to the work of reconstruction; the initiative throughout resting with her, by virtue of the whole of past history. But aspirations of a similar nature have already shown themselves in all the Western nations, not excepting even the nation apparently given over to the craving for industrial supremacy. The errors in question, if more respectable, must be held to be also more dangerous than the other, as they combine the organisation of labour with the regeneration of society. Hence it is incumbent on Positivism rather to give attention to their examination with the object of correction, than to aim at completing and coordinating the investigation entered on by the economists with reference to national industrialism.

The difference between the two solutions, both equally erroneous, may be reduced to this: the one transfers to the proletariat, without distinction of nation, the oppressive domination which the other sought to establish on behalf of one particular nation under exceptional conditions. Such is the only form in which it is possible for the metaphysical dogmas of the sovereignty of the people to retain a firm and dangerous hold, till such time as the Positive religion shall have succeeded in regenerating the anarchical aspirations which find in it their formula. In complete insurrection against the rich, the poor in their turn wish to be supreme; on the ground of their numbers they would be, not the basis, but the end, of all collective action. The error may wear a more social aspect than the preceding, but at bottom it is not less oppressive, since it exerts a pressure within the State instead of outside it, substituting, that is, the selfishness of a class for the selfishness of a nation. If it took this subversive form, the civism of modern times would be a contradiction in terms, since it would be the consecration of a
system of mutual industrial oppression, whereas its aspiration is to emancipate itself from that evil. To say nothing of the moral invalidity of the claim resting on mere number which is urged in justification of this new form of collective selfishness, its practical result could only be a never-ending struggle between the various constituents of the proletariat when it had triumphed over its common enemy, the patriciate. Were it then practicable, which it is not, from its anarchical nature,—a circumstance which gives it, as a theory, a longer existence,—we might confidently assert that the industrial demagogism would be even more ephemeral than national industrialism.

Treading neither path, for both equally though diversely misleading, in our organisation of human labour on the principles of universality and permanence we must ever keep in view the whole race of mankind without any exclusive preference. For the due compliance with this condition continuity must consequently take precedence of solidarity, as it did in the truly social phase of Antiquity, solidarity being purified in the normal state in that its sphere is enlarged by virtue of its better form of activity. Labour, as conquest, requires, to be rightly organised, that it be in the interest of posterity; the two cases differ only in that Humanity takes the place of the Country, as being the ultimate goal of all social existence.

Thus it is, then, that the Positive religion constructs the system of man's active life by making it subordinate to the sympathetic synthesis whose universal supremacy has already coordinated our intellectual life. Destined respectively to reveal order and develop progress, both may really consist in living for others. But the consecration to this purpose implies that the above destination always regards the future, not the present, so to avoid the deterioration of our collective existence in the direction of egoism. With this condition the intellect spontaneously complies, as speculation naturally has a distant range, whether in art or science, not as a rule bearing fruit till the succeeding generations. It is for action to become as liberal as thought by stripping itself of all selfishness in a degree unknown to its earlier and introductory forms. Begun by the instinct of Fetishism with an eye to the Family descendants, the transformation became a conscious process during the military period on behalf of the succeeding generations of Citizens, and must now learn to embrace Posterity as a whole. No being can
tionaries what they may; their estimation as individuals depending, apart from their service, on a due comparison of their classification by the priesthood and their value as members of the practical hierarchy, a comparison involving no risk to discipline.

The whole Positive regime naturally fosters in all alike devotion and veneration, by virtue of the feelings inspired respectively by the future and the past. Implanted by the education, consecrated by the worship, these subjective dispositions find, in industrial life, their outward object in women and priests, whom the patriciate and the proletariat unite in protecting and respecting. The way thus doubly prepared, the priesthood can easily recall the ministers and agents of the Great Being to the reciprocal sentiments which they should cherish in view of their joint destination. For, on comparing the two general divisions of the active class, we see that the proletariat and the patriciate, like women and priests, represent respectively the future and the past. It is for the priesthood, by its example, to breathe into both these reciprocal sentiments, for they are dispositions which its office compels it to cultivate simultaneously in itself—by its respect for the rich, by its devotion to the poor.

As regards the normal state, it were a work of supererogation to expound the inherent aptitude of the Positive religion to sanction and regulate wealth. It is only during the last phase of the transition, the subject of the next chapter, that the priesthood invested with the task of regeneration will find any serious difficulty in inspiring rich and poor, in the name of Humanity, with that respect and sense of duty which God can no longer bind upon them. In the maturity of the race we concentrate the two obligations, by attributing to the patriciate the function of will, which, as the expression of the objective life, completes the subjective.

In accordance with this view, the organisation of the true Providence must depend above all on the ministers of the Great Being; for her representatives, her interpreters, and even her agents are incompetent to impress on the direction a sufficient fixity, and without it the failure would be complete. Fatality, whether man's destiny or external necessity, were inadequate to regulate our conduct, if the will did not come in to complete the order of nature by combining command with
rangement. Now, the introduction of this new but indis-ensable element implies the permanent concert of energy and ow, a concert requiring for its due production a special lass. Misplaced everywhere else, in this class the will is the egitimate instrument for supplementing the deficiencies in the omposite and subjective constitution of the Great Being which present its originating, proprio motu, really effective decisions. The directing class, when admitted to share its supremacy, assumes a burden of responsibility commensurate with its eration. The depository of a power without which any satisfactory discipline of the wills of others would be impossible, the patriciate feels the need of discipline for its own will, more lable than any to disturbances, which, if more excusable, are more pernicious. Hence, if the patriciate is to discharge ight its office, and this is the condition alike of its happiness and duty, it must in all its commands respect the laws of Humanity, which it has only to complete, and from which comes its chief claim to the respect of all.

It follows that to regulate its action, the priesthood has only to appeal, in suitable terms, to the destination which is the ground of its existence. The various faults attendant on the possession of riches are to be judged in reference to the office of the patriciate, which may be stated as the conservation, and reproduction with increase, of the material capital of Humanity. If the statement is correct it leads us to complete and systematise the improvement Dante introduced, when his instinct led him to assign the prodigal the same punishment and the same expiation as the miser, Catholicism only con-deeming the latter. Positive morality goes farther, it disallows the equality, and definitively considers the miser superior to the prodigal; the prodigal being just as selfish as the miser in the eyes of all but his parasites, and more noxious to society, moreover less estimable from his want of the practical virtues, or of self-control. During the military period the facility of acquisition led men to confound profusion with liberality. Under the industrial regime, on the contrary, when accumu-
ation is a laborious process, motives of self-interest do not etroy the social and moral value of habits of forethought and conomy. Avarice implies discipline, and all that is required to give that discipline a better direction, whereas the

VOL. IV.
tionaries what they may; their estimation as individuals depending, apart from their service, on a due comparison of their classification by the priesthood and their value as members of the practical hierarchy, a comparison involving no risk to discipline.

The whole Positive regime naturally fosters in all alike devotion and veneration, by virtue of the feelings inspired respectively by the future and the past. Implanted by the education, consecrated by the worship, these subjective dispositions find, in industrial life, their outward object in women and priests, whom the patriciate and the proletariat unite in protecting and respecting. The way thus doubly prepared, the priesthood can easily recall the ministers and agents of the Great Being to the reciprocal sentiments which they should cherish in view of their joint destination. For, on comparing the two general divisions of the active class, we see that the proletariat and the patriciate, like women and priests, represent respectively the future and the past. It is for the priesthood, by its example, to breathe into both these reciprocal sentiments, for they are dispositions which its office compels it to cultivate simultaneously in itself—by its respect for the rich, by its devotion to the poor.

As regards the normal state, it were a work of supererogation to expound the inherent aptitude of the Positive religion to sanction and regulate wealth. It is only during the last phase of the transition, the subject of the next chapter, that the priesthood invested with the task of regeneration will find any serious difficulty in inspiring rich and poor, in the name of Humanity, with that respect and sense of duty which God can no longer bind upon them. In the maturity of the race we concentrate the two obligations, by attributing to the patriciate the function of will, which, as the expression of the objective life, completes the subjective.

In accordance with this view, the organisation of the true Providence must depend above all on the ministers of the Great Being; for her representatives, her interpreters, and even her agents are incompetent to impress on the direction a sufficient fixity, and without it the failure would be complete. Fatality, whether man's destiny or external necessity, were inadequate to regulate our conduct, if the will did not come to complete the order of nature by combining command with...
result could hardly be any very great modification in the
degree of condensation.

As for the hereditary transmission of functions and capital,
in the sociocratic sense of the term, all we have here to do is to
state more fully the fundamental law, laid down in my statical
volume, of the free choice of the successor, with the sanction of
the superior. Every functionary should nominate his successor
seven years before his retirement, in our religious system fixed
for sixty-three, that the nomination may be duly submitted to
the control of public opinion, which will be bound to treat with
respect the decision, whatever it may be. It were a waste of
time to remind the reader of the regular connection between
this act and the powers of disposing of property by will, and of
adoption.

The education and the regime of Sociocracy will, of them-
selves, in combination, inspire the proletariat with the feeling
of respect justly due to a concentration of power and wealth
which must raise the conceptions and the feelings of the patri-
crate by increasing their means and their responsibility. In
accordance with the presentiment which finds its expression
in ordinary language, their offices become charges or burdens,
inviting pity rather than envy, the true compensation being the
greater ability to serve Humanity. But the Sociocratic con-
stitution demands of the proletariat that it renounce all
violence as reactionary and anarchical. Where a struggle is
unavoidable it must be limited to the refusal to co-operate, and
in this, numbers may triumph over wealth, if their grounds of
complaint deserve the sanction of the spiritual power, the only
power which can give the requisite extension and union to the
plebeian leagues. However great the popular excitement, an
impartial and respected priesthood will as a rule obtain this
abandonment of force, on the ground of a disinterestedness
better appreciated by the inferiors than by the superiors.

Whilst the dispute is yet unembittered, the priesthood may
often by a wise action prevent an open rupture by a judicious
appeal to the conscience of the two contending parties; if that
fail, to public opinion. Conscience, the noblest and the most
efficient of moral forces, is the result of a combination in due
proportion of love and faith. Prior to the advent of the true
religion, a clear conception of conscience was unattainable, as
no account could be taken of the impulse given by sympathy,
indiscipline consequent on prodigality admits of no such transformation.

An analogous judgment is even more applicable to the two instincts of ambition, especially to pride, more excusable and more serviceable in the patrician than vanity in the theorician. So deficient in energy are the altruistic instincts, that the craving for power is, as a rule, indispensable to the formation of real strength of will. But, authority once established, the more generous impulses can be and ought to be its sufficient support; they were not strong enough to create it, but they, and they alone, can ennoble it and consolidate it.

It is in the proletary class especially that the priesthood will repress ambition, for in that class it is as fatal to happiness as to duty, allowing for cases of an exceptional aptitude for the patriciate. Habitual submission, in all cases ennobled by respect, and often originating in attachment—this is the fundamental condition of its service to society and of its self-respect. Provided the patriciate ensures them the secure position which is their due, the happiness of the proletaries should be greater than that of their chiefs; for whilst contributing as much as the patricians to the common end, they have a fuller enjoyment of family life, in harmonious connection with their existence as citizens. Protected at all times by the interval between them and the patricians from the wish to rise out of their class, they reject instinctively the instigations of envy and distrust on the subject of the concentration of wealth, a concentration indispensable for the progressive improvement of their circumstances. If Catholicism occasionally succeeded in transforming the rich so that they became poor in spirit, Positivism will often raise the poor, so that they become rich in heart, the free auxiliaries of the capitalists in the conservation of capital.

The moral attitude, however, suitable to the two organs of material Providence requires a complement in regard to both, based on the political conditions of collective action. To command with effect, the patricians have need to concentrate wealth and power as much as possible, with no other limits than those fixed by actual administration and personal responsibility. If the numbers given above for the four orders of the patriciate are rejected, they should be changed without interfering with the principle; better data only are required, and the
result could hardly be any very great modification in the degree of condensation.

As for the hereditary transmission of functions and capital, in the sociocratic sense of the term, all we have here to do is to state more fully the fundamental law, laid down in my statitical volume, of the free choice of the successor, with the sanction of the superior. Every functionary should nominate his successor seven years before his retirement, in our religious system fixed for sixty-three, that the nomination may be duly submitted to the control of public opinion, which will be bound to treat with respect the decision, whatever it may be. It were a waste of time to remind the reader of the regular connection between this act and the powers of disposing of property by will, and of adoption.

The education and the regime of Sociocracy will, of themselves, in combination, inspire the proletariat with the feeling of respect justly due to a concentration of power and wealth which must raise the conceptions and the feelings of the patriarate by increasing their means and their responsibility. In accordance with the presentiment which finds its expression in ordinary language, their offices become charges or burdens, inviting pity rather than envy, the true compensation being the greater ability to serve Humanity. But the Sociocratic constitution demands of the proletariat that it renounce all violence as reactionary and anarchical. Where a struggle is unavoidable it must be limited to the refusal to co-operate, and in this, numbers may triumph over wealth, if their grounds of complaint deserve the sanction of the spiritual power, the only power which can give the requisite extension and union to the plebeian leagues. However great the popular excitement, an impartial and respected priesthood will as a rule obtain this abandonment of force, on the ground of a disinterestedness better appreciated by the inferiors than by the superiors.

Whilst the dispute is yet unembittered, the priesthood may often by a wise action prevent an open rupture by a judicious appeal to the conscience of the two contending parties; if that fail, to public opinion. Conscience, the noblest and the most efficient of moral forces, is the result of a combination in due proportion of love and faith. Prior to the advent of the true religion, a clear conception of conscience was unattainable, as no account could be taken of the impulse given by sympathy,
which, when fairly aided by the intellect, acts as a check on bad suggestions. But its Positive theory will enable us to make a better use of it by an appropriate appeal to each of its two constituents, both equally trained in the Positive education. Yet whilst stimulating conscience, the priesthood cannot at times avoid recourse to opinion, in the family in the first instance, then to that of society. When driven to this step, it will invoke in succession the women, the elders of the family, even the children and the servants; whilst in the city the priesthood will find its natural support in the proletaries. If forced to give the blame of society its extreme form of excommunication, so effectual will be its censure by the aggregate support of these auxiliaries, that, when it is just, the guilty person will be compelled, without any attack on his wealth, to depend entirely on himself for the supply of all his wants.

Were it limited to the present or objective life, the action of the priesthood, whether on the State or on the Family, through conscience or opinion, would still be inadequate, and have a tendency to become oppressive. Its principal sphere, however, is the subjective life; there its competence is indisputable; and hence in the natural course of things it derives a supplementary resource for spreading indirectly a sound judgment of persons, by a wise employment of the sacrament of Incorporation. Yet it must not be forgotten that this final consecration demands, more than any other, perfect liberty, if it is to have its full efficiency. No one is to be subjected to the judgment of the priesthood unless at his own personal request, made when receiving the sacrament of Transformation. Nor is this personal consent sufficient; it must be ratified after his death by his family. So in most cases we avoid formal rejection, and when applied, a more decisive weight attaches to it. The full advantage of this moderation will, however, be reaped in the cases where the judgment is favourable, as it nullifies beforehand the protests raised by family vanity against the degree of honour conferred.

In the second volume, I have sufficiently pointed out the complementary legislation in aid of the religion, as against the more serious disturbances of order. The intervention of the temporal power, though constantly on the decrease, as follows from the continuous expansion of the moral discipline, will never entirely cease to be required, even as regards persons. But I
must here remind the reader of the tendency of the Positive regime to rely rather on the use of contrast than of repression, rewarding the good, that is, rather than punishing the bad. In reference to the abuse of wealth, it will prefer creating capitalists to reducing them to poverty, and therefore will extend the practice of gifts, without absolutely renouncing confiscation, even in perpetuity. This mode will become so consonant to the general feeling, that, in default of the action of government, the donations might, at need, take the shape of purely voluntary subscriptions. Still, as this supplementary action always implies some defect in the constitution of society, it requires as many precautions as confiscation. It will be seen below in what way the regular progress of the Sociocracy will of itself supersede the necessity of frequent recourse to any such extraordinary methods, applicable principally during the last phase of the transition.

More important than either is another supplementary institution of an universal character, a moral and political institution; the systematic reconstitution of chivalry, the feudal germ of which must receive careful cultivation in industrialism, allowing for modifications in practice. In Industrialism, the voluntary protectorate, as the wrongs which it repairs or obviates, will concern property rather than persons; and, as such, its organisation will be easier and on a vaster scale. Its real strength will lie in a central nucleus, a body of patrician widowers, solemnly dedicated by their own free act to the office, but not therefore ceasing to take part in industrial life, except at stated periods of retreat, in buildings set apart for the purpose, in order to rekindle their zeal by contact with the priesthood. Round them will rally, before reaching their maturity, all such as, possessed of the requisite wealth, aspire to be enrolled one day in the protecting corporation. The consecration of wealth to such an object will make all feel the great importance of respecting liberty in the employment of capital, even when its holders have no distinct function, for such may exceptionally become the most useful members of the wealthy class, if they use aright the freedom which their position gives them. The central chivalry will in general find another source of support in the elder patricians, who will often retain great influence, even after they have transferred their capital. Lastly, it will complete itself by the adjunction
of the nobler proletaries, their devotion and their energy compensating their poverty, and offering the body of voluntary protectors an alliance which ensures success.

Such an aggregate of guarantees should in general suffice to guard against the abuses to which the patriciate is liable. For the priesthood, the repression of abuse on its part neither requires nor admits of any special institution, since the power which consecrates all the others cannot be subject to any standing external control. So long as its degeneracy, however extensive, does not reach the high priest, he has the regular remedy in his power, in the substitution, in case of need, of an entirely new clergy. But, if he too, supported by the body, go wrong, then the only remedy left would be the refusal of cooperation, a remedy which can never fail, as the priesthood rests solely on conscience and opinion, and succumbs, therefore, to their adverse sentence. The patriciate would curb it sufficiently by suspending its stipend, for in cases of serious error, popular subscriptions would not replace it, unless on the supposition of a fanaticism scarcely compatible with the Positive faith, where there is enthusiasm for the doctrines rather than for the teachers.

The aims of industry and the conditions of industry having been explained, it remains for me, in order to complete the organisation of labour, to determine, first, the functions of the directors of industry, when reorganised, secondly those of its agents.

The patriciate centralises both action and nutrition, but it is the latter that will always be its principal function, and that increasingly. For, the continual reproduction of material must principally relate to provisions, notwithstanding that there is a proportionate increase of the instruments of production; for these, as less perishable, form a prominent part of the capital of man without affecting in any high degree the ordinary expenditure. In regard to this latter, we distinguish two cases, according as the maintenance allotted is public or private, a point which depends on the nature of the services rendered, according as they are general or particular. The first mode is exclusively applicable to the government spiritual and temporal equally; it is the second therefore which I have specially to examine here, for it is the mode of maintaining the families of the people, and as such is the grea
normal amount, be divided into two unequal portions; the one
fixed for each workman, whatever the work, the other propor-
tional to the product of his labour. This law is as indisputable
as that on which it rests, the necessarily gratuitous character of
all human labour in a state in which all belongs to the Great
Being, who entrusts his capital to his ministers to feed his
agents. But I must now complete its statement by venturing to
fix the normal ratio of the two portions, whereas in my second
volume it was left to the patricians to determine it. I have,
since come to feel that, for a right understanding of the prin-
ciple, the spiritual power must take the initiative and give it at
once a precise form, allowing for ulterior correction as with all
the other numerical suggestions of the present chapter. For
these reasons I do not hesitate to propose, that for each of the
thirteen months of the Positivist year, each workman receive a
salary of a hundred francs, always paid by his employer, whether
in town or country, so long as the free mutual engagement
lasts.

In towns, and towns must be the first organised, it seems to
me that this amount should, as a rule, be one third of the
whole salary, the fluctuating portion of which I estimate at
seven francs for the average day of actual work. Whilst all
rules as to the festivals observed and even the weekly rest are a
question of habits and manners, we may yet assume that the
worship will be scrupulously attended, especially by the prole-
tarics, as for them above all it is meant. If so, the above rates
give nine francs for the daily maintenance of a working family,
consisting, as has been shown, normally, of seven members.

My object in fixing this amount is to give a type, yet it
differs but little from the results often attained even in the
present anarchical condition of the West. On this point I see
no ground for any distinctions between the several branches of
industry in towns, the difference in their money returns being
properly a question for the capitalist, as the industrial hierarchy
was. The homogeneity characteristic of the proletariat will be
constantly developed and fortified by the spontaneous concurren-
tce of two influences, affecting the whole body equally, the
one intellectual, the other moral. In the first place, from the
completeness and uniformity of Positive education the workman
will have it in his power to turn with such ease to a new trade
that no serious inequality of wages can persist as between the
This ownership of the domicile besides its own direct and special value, is susceptible of an indirect influence on the heart and on the intellect, by increasing fixity of feeling and of thought by a corresponding fixity of habits. It is a confirmation and extension of the duty now too generally neglected, never capriciously to change our connection even with the humblest tradesman, so to facilitate prevision in industry. Though enforced by Positive morality, this obligation would be liable to frequent evasion, particularly on the part of the working classes, where it is of peculiar importance, were the instinct of caprice not curbed by fixity of abode.

The form adopted in towns for the working man's dwelling may further exercise a religious influence of a nature to be largely developed by the normal state in the children of Humanity. In the first place everyone thus connects his family's past with the apartment in which he was born; secondly, the fact that this apartment is an integral part of a larger building represents for him the solidarity of the city, nay even his connection with mankind. For there is an analogy between the distribution of the earth's surface among the possessors of the soil, and that of the social dwelling among the clients of the common proprietor, in whom, unless wholly unworthy, they may see the local representative of the Being to whom all belongs.

In order to complete the systematisation of the material existence of the proletaries, I have to determine the ordinary amount of the annual expenses of each family, and as a consequence the average salary of the workman who presides over it. First however, we may, by virtue of the previous explanation, strike out the rent of his dwelling, the rule being that he is owner and not occupier. The regular time for its acquisition is when the young agent of Humanity takes the sacrament of Destination, or at any rate before that of Marriage; so to provide a secure existence for the new household. The best way is a yearly payment, taken during seven years from his wages, before his expenditure reaches its full amount. Even thus, however, as a rule, the new workman will require his father's aid to enable him to become the owner of his house, such aid being usually the last instance of parental assistance.

It will suffice here if I simply restate the principle enunciated in my social Statics, which enjoins that wages, in their
normal amount, be divided into two unequal portions; the one fixed for each workman, whatever the work, the other proportional to the product of his labour. This law is as indisputable as that on which it rests, the necessarily gratuitous character of all human labour in a state in which all belongs to the Great Being, who entrusts his capital to his ministers to feed his agents. But I must now complete its statement by venturing to fix the normal ratio of the two portions, whereas in my second volume it was left to the patricians to determine it. I have, since come to feel that, for a right understanding of the principle, the spiritual power must take the initiative and give it at once a precise form, allowing for ulterior correction as with all the other numerical suggestions of the present chapter. For these reasons I do not hesitate to propose, that for each of the thirteen months of the Positivist year, each workman receive a salary of a hundred francs, always paid by his employer, whether in town or country, so long as the free mutual engagement lasts.

In towns, and towns must be the first organised, it seems to me that this amount should, as a rule, be one third of the whole salary, the fluctuating portion of which I estimate at seven francs for the average day of actual work. Whilst all rules as to the festivals observed and even the weekly rest are a question of habits and manners, we may yet assume that the worship will be scrupulously attended, especially by the proletarians, as for them above all it is meant. If so, the above rates give nine francs for the daily maintenance of a working family, consisting, as has been shown, normally, of seven members.

My object in fixing this amount is to give a type, yet it differs but little from the results often attained even in the present anarchical condition of the West. On this point I see no ground for any distinctions between the several branches of industry in towns, the difference in their money returns being properly a question for the capitalist, as the industrial hierarchy was. The homogeneity characteristic of the proletariat will be constantly developed and fortified by the spontaneous concurrence of two influences, affecting the whole body equally, the one intellectual, the other moral. In the first place, from the completeness and uniformity of Positive education the workman will have it in his power to turn with such ease to a new trade that no serious inequality of wages can persist as between the
various labourers of any given town or even of any given republic. Add to this pervading influence the improvement in the means of transport and the great increase of intercourse, and we can ultimately extend this equality wherever Positivism extends, and that has no limits but those of the habitable globe. This consequence of the identity of education and of worship, an identity perfected by similarity of habits and the universal adoption of the sacred language, is further placed on a solid footing by the direct and continual intervention of the supreme patriciate. By the exercise of active forethought on the part of its fourteen thousand bankers, there will be throughout the human planet an evenness of prices, which will be the last of the several securities justly due to the workman against the inequalities and fluctuations arising from the incompetence or the neglect of the capitalist.

In the second place, the gratuitousness of labour once adequately admitted through the agency of the Positive religion, wages, in obedience to the habits of the normal state, will be directed to their true purpose: the maintenance of the agents of the Great Being, each of whom in ordinary circumstances will have to support a household of seven members. This doctrine, which is the combination of a moral obligation with an intellectual conception, has met with no recognition hitherto, solely because the absolute synthesis was impuissant in presence of social life, even of the family, and that as a consequence of the want originally felt to develop powers without attending to their control. The morality of Theology could but preach veneration to the inferiors, leaving devotedness optional with the superiors, as the descendants or the representatives of the Gods, in accordance with the maxim naturally accepted by Antiquity: paucis nascitur humanum genus. It was reserved for a relative religion to extinguish all rights without exception by substituting throughout duties, in the name of Humanity, when on reaching his maturity man is led to discipline the forces which had their rise in his period of preparation. Then the morality of Positivism prescribes to all the servants of the Great Being alike, devotion and veneration, be it in their intercourse with one another, or in their common obligations to posterity.

Thus, the doctrine that labour is gratuitous, is an inference from, and an expression of, the social character attaching to the institution of property, under whatever form it exist; it i
always an inheritance handed down to the present by the past, with the future especially in view. Every payment is an exchange, in which the recipient should receive more than he gives; as such, payment is a purely material question and never applies to the action of man, where the only equivalent is fair reciprocity. In the normal state, the agents of the Great Being hold their wages by the same title as its interpreters hold their stipends, its ministers their incomes; that is to say, as a condition of existence and the means of action, not as the price of their labour. For the obligation to serve, it is common to all, the only difference is in the service being more or less general and direct, whilst in no case can its nature be estimated in money. This conception, as accordant with the facts of social life as with personal self-respect,—both equally ignored in the theocratic idea of property,—leads to a uniform rate of wages for all families, which, on their part, in the public interest, put their requirements as low as possible.

No difference in this respect is legitimately admissible, save such as is due to an inequality in the cost of living. This will soon resolve itself into the distinction between the denser town population and the more scattered country population, a distinction which, however improved the relations between the two, will always have an influence on prices in each case. But the disparity will be constantly on the decrease, by the tendency to equilibrium of the price of materials and that of products.

These indications, taken as a whole, should make us feel that modern utopias as to sameness of wages have in them, notwithstanding their anarchical character, a confused anticipation of the social future. Their only radical flaw is their dangerous tendency to regulate by legislation what is exclusively within the competence of moral discipline. But as they share this error at the present day with all political schools, all equally adverse to the separation of the two powers, true philosophers should view it with indulgence in the people, as the natural receptacle for vague aspirations after the normal order.

To complete this examination of the principal function of the patricians, it is necessary to draw out distinctly the practicability of giving to all workmen the maintenance above settled, an amount actually inferior to what many of them even now attain. Such uniform rate of wages is not less feasible than is an universal encyclopaedic education. The performance of
these two correlated duties of the superiors to the inferior, can alone secure the establishment of a really stable order, as substitutes for the two guarantees given, in the Middle Ages, by the protection of Feudalism and the discipline of Catholicism.

Never isolate the two bases, temporal and spiritual, of the Sociocratic regime,—in this condition lies a sufficient safeguard against the dangers, a sufficient power of overcoming the obstacles, which would meet us if we rested on one or the other exclusively. By constantly subordinating industrial reorganization to moral regeneration, it is easy to see how practicable will be the reform above traced when habits and feelings, as opinions, shall have everywhere undergone a change. For the altruistic synthesis is in the highest degree economical, since it places happiness in the progressive cultivation by all of the instincts which lead to the least outlay. An analysis, with the prospectus of the brain before us, of human expenditure will soon convince us, that in the larger part, it is undertaken to satisfy instincts which in the Positive religion are to be the object of increasing repression. Inculcating on all, in the name of happiness and duty, the keeping down the nutritive, the extinction of the sexual, instinct; making pride and vanity infirmities; altruistic morality will without difficulty procure the adoption of the habits of life consonant with the Sociocracy.

The next point is to complete our estimate of the general cost of man’s nutrition by the consideration of the expenses of the government, temporal first, then the spiritual, which as such are met not by the resources of individuals but by the public treasury.

The patrician exercises as patrician a local power, in its extent determined by his capital and credit. As, however, industrial operations are essentially of an analytical character, even in the case of bankers, this separate power of the several patricians cannot regulate the industrial existence without the general and persistent intervention of a central power, invested with the functions of direction and repression. True it is that the government of man tends to be more and more spiritual, less and less temporal, yet counsel never can entirely supersede command. Each sociocratic republic, though not exceeding in extent and population Normandy or Burgundy, requires a government properly so called—that is to say a central power, ramifying in all directions, and consolidating and developing public life. In
the absence of such a power, it would be impossible to imagination the generality of conception and the elevation of feeling requisite to ensure the due convergence of the various industrial classes. To understand the want, it is enough to remark that the most wealthy bankers, even acting in concert, would be unequal to the money business of a territory of the above extent, as is clear at present from the spontaneous formation of branches by the bank of France or of England. Still, this more general power, necessary as it is to secure the voluntary convergence of three hundred thousand industrial agents, derives valuable aid from the local magistracies, the direct creation of the patricians, on which devolves the bulk of the administration of justice and police.

Thus simplified, the government, so far as it is political, may be vested exclusively in a supreme triumvirate, emanating from the thirty bankers usually found in the republic, as above limited. Of the patricians distinguished for breadth of thought and generosity of feeling, central power appertains to the three most remarkable for these two qualities. But they may not take this position till they have received the sacrament of Maturity, the normal age for which is forty-two, so as to have given satisfactory proof of capacity and to have established their credit. When consecrating them, the High-Priest of Humanity, or his representative, their national superior, will duly point out to them that however important their action hitherto, the duties on which they are now entering require a far higher intellectual and moral elevation. Such enlargement of views and feeling is naturally confined to the priesthood, but the priesthood is bound, at any cost, to abstain from all share in command, so to maintain intact the purity of heart and intellect which the consultative office presupposes.

The number of the dictators in the normal state is determined by this consideration, that the three more special branches of industry should meet on equal terms in the government taken from the more general branch. Within the territorial limits above assigned, a banker of ability is competent ultimately to grasp the aggregate of commercial operations or of manufacturing enterprises, or even that of agricultural industry. But no single banker could embrace the three in combination with the clear mastery requisite for the central government. Normally, then, the dictatorship is vested in the three principal
bankers, respectively connected, by predilection, with agriculture, with manufactures, with commerce, not however exclusively, as their business involves habitual relations with all three departments. The three dictators are independent of one another except so far as they are bound together by the similarity of their social function and the influence upon it of a common faith. These two securities would render inexcusable any antagonism between them, for, obviated, as it is, by the difference of their administration, it could only spring from an excess of personality, which would be soon liable to the blame of the public or of the priesthood. The division of power between three would completely ensure us against their encroaching on spiritual functions; but this is a consideration, which though of very serious moment during the closing phase of the transition, need scarcely be taken into account in the normal state, the separation of the two powers being then, from every point of view, beyond the reach of attack.

Thus rooted in the confidence of the patriciate, the sociocratic triumvirate gains that of the people as a natural consequence of the constant relations, both private and public, of the bankers with the proletariat. Such connection seems at first sight inconsistent with the abstract character of the highest industry, which, as abstract, is in little need of workmen. But, from the personal ties formed in the weekly soirées, the sociocratic arrangement as to the payment of the plebeian will be always giving rise to contact between the banker and all the workmen of his district. The capitalists will in fact find it convenient to look to their bankers for the monthly payment of their workmen, thus simplifying their weekly accounts. So there will arise a periodical connection of each banker with ten thousand proletaries; the result being that the least plebeian branch of industry will have the largest amount of intercourse with the people, and though such intercourse may be in itself slight, it may be a strong support to the dictatorship taken from the class in question.

The government of the patricians, local as well as central, will be always gratuitous, its sole admissible reward being public esteem. Were one of its members to abuse his power to increase his wealth, public opinion would suffice, in default of legal authority, to drive the offender from power. But in subordination to the central government the system requires,
in addition to a special constabulary, an administrative service, with its members exclusively devoted to their duties. Herein we have the two great sources of public expenditure. The annual total for the two combined, taking the former numbers as the basis of an estimate, would, it seems to me, reach the sum of twenty millions of francs in each of the sociocratic states, as already determined. This sum will ordinarily be increased by a half in consequence of the regular institution of a system of public works, calculated to meet the evils arising from interruptions of private undertakings, and so to obviate or remedy the tendency in trades' unions to imperil industrial action. On this estimate the annual expenses of each republic will amount to thirty millions of francs, to be paid by the patriciate, allowing it the compensation it may derive from including this insignificant item in the accounts on which the rate of prices will depend.

The only point on which the sociocratic budget is now defective is the determination of the sum of the Sacerdotal income, long derived from voluntary subscriptions, as I shall explain when treating of the transition, but finally requiring an official organisation. Adopting the numbers given in the opening of the chapter, I fix this annual payment at three hundred millions of francs for the whole West, or fifteen francs for each sacerdotal household; this includes all the expenses of the two thousand temples, each with a normal congregation of seventy thousand. The result is, the addition of a sixth to the national budget, reckoning, however, in this amount the sum transmitted to the central budget of the priesthood of Humanity to meet such expenses as have a general and not a local object.

Anyone, with these data, can sum up the whole cost of nutrition which the normal patriciate has habitually to provide, by constituting it a first charge on the produce of labour when organised on a systematic plan. The temple with its ten philosophers meets the wants of ten thousand families; it represents one banker, fifty merchants, a hundred manufacturers, and two hundred agriculturists. Thus the interpreters of the Great Being are the thousandth, its ministers the thirtieth, part of its agents. The weekly and monthly expenses of the maintenance of these agents, then, with a very slight exception, constitute nearly the whole of the outlay which the patriciate has to control by a constant superintendence, both as indi-
viduals and as a government. It is able, then, to estimate the amount of increase in the annual production necessary, if the generation it directs is duly to transmit to its successor the aggregate capital it received from its predecessor, with the anticipated augmentation. The result will be the formation of a true system of statistics (the statistics of the present day are empirical and unreliable) affording a reliable view of man's industrial progress, by aid of the accounts annually published by each of the five hundred dictatorships. Their publication will at once afford the means of judging whether the expenditure of the patricians does or does not interfere with the right discharge of their functions as regards the present and the future; such judgment constituting the sole financial check on the worthy ministers of Humanity within the competence of the priesthood and the public.

We thus see how the subordination of action to nutrition is more complete in the collective than in the individual organism; the end in view becoming external, altruism supplants egoism in the direction, and forms a more perfect and less unstable unity. The view here taken sets in its true light the normal dignity of the supreme patriciate, alone competent to conceive human industry in its entirety, by the light of the theory furnished by the religion, and under the impulse of synthesis derived from the priesthood. Under these conditions, the chief function of the banker is to organise with wisdom such undertakings as deserve assistance, whilst aiding in the suppression of the less sound. Besides the money derived from the circulation of values, he will dispose of the capital placed at his command by retired patricians, and perhaps even by the savings of plebeians, in both cases freely offered in aid of his financial operations, from the wish to avoid the trouble and anxiety attendant on inadequate means. It is in my eyes a happy omen for the proximate advent of Positivism that my first hints on the function of the banker have already led to an adequate conception of that function in its full extent on the part of a young banker, whose adhesion to the true religion is as prudent as it is devoted.

I have now, as the last step required to end the delineation of civic existence, to systematise its indispensable complement, the complement, at once moral and political, which it finds in the proletariat, the sole decisive guarantee of its coherence and its dignity.
Granting the sociocratic conception of wages to remain in full force, the working classes, shielded as they are from liability to want, are in a better position than their temporal chiefs, nay even than their spiritual, for realising the grand object of the common education. Their situation is the one in which a man can best attend to his improvement and to his happiness, by a wise exercise of all the faculties which are worth cultivating, whilst he links his domestic to his citizen life through the instrumentality of the form of action most consonant to our nature. In the proletariat, more than elsewhere, is the subordination of egoism to altruism on a right footing, as circumstances there favour the repression of the former, the growth of the latter. The happy mean ought there to render easy the discipline of the nutritive instinct, and the plenitude of domestic bliss victory over the sexual. Pride and vanity, these are the instincts which the people must most exert its wisdom to check, for they can find there no social destination as in the exceptional instances above given, and so tend usually to be a source of trouble both privately and publicly. Looking on them as human infirmities, the proletary will exert himself so to shape them and limit them that they may act simply as a healthy stimulus to emulation in the discharge of his daily duties, whether as a workman or as a man. If a real vocation leads him to aspire to a share in government, either spiritual or temporal, he is aware that its necessary concentration in few hands places it out of the reach of most of those who might have a claim; he bends himself to the putting forth of his own proper value in such a degree as to deserve the only recompense accessible to all.

Unlike his chiefs, the proletary is not absorbed by his special business; as much as they, however, must he consider its right performance as the first duty of the true citizen. To feel its nobleness, he has but to consider that a concerted interruption of work would soon derange the whole economy of society. But, whilst such a cessation of action by the collective proletariat must always be open to it, in order to ensure a proper respect for its free cooperation, the proletariat will reserve this formidable power as a last resource, to meet serious and protracted violations of the sociocratic arrangements. Its possibility is destined mainly to obviate the having recourse to violence, such a step being intrinsically inconsistent with
industrial life, and yet at all times imminent, as the people has a natural propensity to surmount social difficulties by an abuse of the power of number. As a result of the whole education and regime, the peculiar power of the proletariat will be generally felt without being called into exercise. For not to dwell on the systematic remonstrances of the priesthood, the patricians will of themselves be aware that they are not the direct agents in reproducing wealth, and that, however large their capital from all sources, they would be powerless if the plebeians did not turn this instrument to account. Far from encouraging pride in the people, their sense of this truth habitually reacts with a sympathetic influence, as it tends to lead the proletaries to a juster estimate of their continuous service on behalf of posterity in the aggregate, the only legitimate object of all their labours of whatever kind.

Although it is incumbent on the proletariat to overcome its inherent tendency to neglect its special work and attend to its general function, it is still this general function which determines its character as a social element, by the contrast between the homogeneity of the plebeian and the heterogeneity of the patrician body. If the citizen is to pay, as he should pay, constant attention to the welfare of the whole, it can only be on the condition that his peculiar business do not habitually absorb him, but involve simply an easy responsibility. In the priesthood even, where the two coincide, the general function takes a special character, and so tends to interfere with the supervision of the whole by making the priesthood attach undue importance to the systematisation of abstract science. The exercise of this supervision then, a normal want, devolves on the proletariat, disengaged as it is from all prepossessions and naturally drawn towards an office involving no responsibility, and rendered easy by the limited area of the sociocratic States. Whilst listening with respect to the advice of the priesthood in regard to it, the plebeians should discharge it with complete independence, so to be able, if occasions arise, to wield it against the encroachments of the spiritual power no less than the abuses of the practical power, invoking against both the faith which all alike acknowledge.

The salons of the people, then, become the principal laboratories of public opinion not merely as the more numerous, but above all as more apt to check an authority not derived from
the people, but the misuse of which falls principally on the people. The primary condition of the right discharge of this function of control is the homogeneity of the proletariat, the way for which has been prepared by the dissolution, in the natural course of things, of all the trade associations, associations only suited to the Middle Ages. Such homogeneity, however, of the proletariat will be no obstacle to the rise of a class of workmen whose special work brings them into relation with all the others, a class therefore holding to the proletariat a position analogous to that which the bankers hold to the other capitalists.

Since the total abolition of slavery, the use of machinery has gradually allowed us to draw from the inorganic world the material forces which human beings no longer furnished. Machinery, as the general complement of the industrial organisation, grew in importance everywhere during the latest phase of the Western revolution, coincidently with the rise of the banking class, prior to which event industrial undertakings were limited in extent and deficient in permanence. In the normal state and under systematic direction, machinery is to the arts what methods are to the sciences; neither directly produces, but both become the great means of production. Of universal application, the construction of machines leads to the creation of a distinct branch of industry, in natural connection with all other branches, not merely of manufacture, but of commerce, nay even of agriculture. Banking alone is independent of it, but the character of generality which attaches to both alike should form a bond between the highest directors and the highest operatives, once let the haughtiness of the patrician and the pride of the plebeian give way to the better feelings of the normal state.

The existence and the fraternal ascendancy of this class, a class composed of the highest and least special working men, constitute a natural preservative of the homogeneity of the proletariat, the condition of its convergent action, and an obstacle to the dissolving tendency of scattered effort. But the free acceptance of its supremacy, the sole hierarchical element admissible in the popular milieu, requires to complete it at the other end of the scale, the incorporation, on suitable conditions, of an exceptional class, a class with regard to which Western feeling is as yet defective, especially in Protestant nations.
When proclaiming the gratuitousness of labour in order to organise the sociocratic existence of the proletaries, the Positive religion may not neglect those who, though in spite of the common education, are temporarily or even permanently incompetent to fulfil their own more peculiar duties. Such inability may be due to a defect in their physical, mental, or moral constitution; it may be due to some defect in the collective organism; in either case Humanity requires that these, her exceptional children, be maintained and made available, not however placed on a level with her full servants. The patriaric peace, may even the priesthood, may equally with the proletariat, furnish, in the natural course of things, recruits to this supplementary body, into which fall all who have failed either from accident or from defective organisation. Their maintenance cannot devolve on individuals, inasmuch as they contribute nothing industrially, but must in all cases rest on the free extension to them of a noble fraternity. The Protectorate is one which especially pertains to the proletariat, be it that the class is more keenly alive to circumstances more akin to its own, or rather that it has a clearer sense of the value socially of a body with such complete liberty of action.

All those, whom in our present anarchical state we stigmatise as beggars, may be as valuable members of the poorer class as the so-called leisure class is among the rich. By both, the name of parasite is deserved only if they fail to use the freedom which is their characteristic. Both, though in opposite ways, have an existence without any definite purpose, but they may equally contribute to the public welfare, by perfecting the patrician chivalry or the plebeian supervision. It were to attach a degrading importance to the reproduction of wealth to think that inability to take part in it justifies contempt or oppression. Without taking such part, with no definite duty whatever to perform, a citizen may be habitually rendering great service, he may even attain to honour after death, if he duly put to use the capacity as a citizen which is to balance his incapacity as a workman.

Thus arise, at the two extremes of the proletary body, two natural appendices, the one normal, the other exceptional, each in its own way qualified to concentrate and to complete the general supervision exercised by the body. Equally disposed to fraternise with all plebeians, and from different motives prone to
migratory habits, they will be instinctively led to a special intimacy, with the object of increasing the social influence of the proletariat, when the normal habits and feelings shall exist in any considerable extent. As the highest titles to personal consideration are, in the Positive religion, width of intellect and generosity of feeling, the most active class of the plebeians may rationally fraternise with the most passive, in spite of the discrepancy in their characters.

For the full organisation of human life it remains for me to pass from the relations between citizens to the relations of the States, so to gain a clear idea of the way in which the five hundred separate Republics of the regenerated globe constitute the universal Republic, by virtue of a concert, in all cases perfectly free. But, though their convergence, the convergence of instinct and of reason, will be the noblest result of the religion, and more than in the mediaeval period is the highest of the priesthood’s tasks, yet its explanation at present offers no serious difficulty. For their agreement rests directly on the joint supremacy of the spirit of relativity and of peaceful activity, the two foundations of the altruistic synthesis, the only synthesis of universal acceptance. All that I have to do is to characterise the continual concurrence to this end of the patriciate and proletariat with the priesthood, that priesthood aided throughout by the women and the old men. Although the human family in its entirety requires and admits only a spiritual government, with no admixture of temporal rule, unity of sympathies would be unattainable were not the influence of the practical brought to the support of the counsels of the temporal power.

Common education, common feelings, nay even common language,—with these bases, the free harmonious action of the several sociocracies of the earth still calls for the habitual intervention of the priesthood, aided by all classes, to anticipate or settle disputes, to prepare the way for or promote cooperation. Notwithstanding the universal predominance of industry and peace, and the entire abolition of war, there will always be a liability to outbreaks of national selfishness, under the form, as between nations, of monopoly as the substitute for conquest; as between classes, of the despotism of wealth or numbers. Consequently it will be often the duty of the priesthood to enforce on nations, just as much as on classes, the truth, that the
ascendancy, so universally invoked, of the social over the personal instincts can only be permanently secured by our sympathies being extended from the race. It will be necessary to proclaim that it is as indispensable constantly to subordinate the Country to Humanity, as it is to subordinate the Family to the Country. The limitation of area will support this conviction, each separate Sociocracy being thus preserved from the foolish effort to subsist by its own industry alone and to get rid of all dependence upon other nations.

Yet the checks of intellect and feeling would be inadequate in industrial difficulties, without the freely offered assistance of the supreme patriciate and of the whole proletariat. But with the additional aid of these two classes it will commonly be possible to overcome the disturbing action of a disorderly activity or ill-directed patriotism. For monopolist leanings are peculiarly proper to the capitalists who are directly engaged in industry, whether merchants, manufacturers, or even agriculturists. Bankers as a rule are exempt, owing to the extent of their operations; the proletariat from its complete homogeneity. Nay even within the limits of the popular body, I should point to the engineer class as particularly predisposed to secure the triumph of the social principle both at home and abroad, by virtue of its regular relations with all branches of industrialists.

The fourteen thousand bankers who preside over the development of the earth's resources, the millions of proletaries with whom they are in habitual contact, will enable the Pontiff to maintain, by his hundred and forty thousand organs, peace upon the planet. Sanctioning patriotism, as an indispensable intermedium between family affection and the love of mankind, the Positive religion transforms it into the persistent disposition to perfect the State. The true citizen renounces monopoly and conquest equally, and will love his country as he loves his lady, exerting himself to render his country a better servant of Humanity, without concealing from himself her shortcomings.

Nor is the establishment of peace the sole aim of the spiritual government of Humanity, it must, with the same auxiliaries, organise, systematically, concert. Exercising a constant influence upon the five hundred dictatorships, the priesthood alone can institute and maintain uniformity in legislation, especially as regards marriage and inheritance, in order to
secure complete moral similarity and to facilitate convergence in action. From it too must come the universal adoption of a suitable system of weights and measures, a natural appendix of Positive education.

From the dynamical point of view, the influence of the Church upon the State, industrially, should be directed to the perfecting industrial harmony by directing the local efforts to their best use. The continuous development of general sociocratic feeling will soon determine the true aptitude of each country as regards particular branches of agriculture or of manufactures which it should pursue. This determined, the bankers, guided by the scientific instructions of the priesthood and instinctively aided by the engineers, will give the whole system of production its right direction, to the avoidance of misdirected and duplicate efforts, so as to secure in every case the appropriate result.

The last step in the systematic direction of Human activity is the ordering of the largest relations, the relations of the human species, as a collective personality, with all the animal races amenable to discipline, with a view to making the order of things in which we live as perfect as possible.

The standing league of free agents against external necessity, the rudiment of which is traceable to the instinct of Fetishism, becomes under Positivism the chief sphere of political action in the true sense of the term, so soon as the requisite harmony has been introduced into the direction of the world. A Being external to the world, which should guide its affairs, would follow the course naturally taken by human Providence, in first perfecting the highest race, the race most susceptible of improvement. This, the basic improvement, is at the present day summarily expressed by the definitive victory of Relativism over Theologism, of peaceful industry over war. So constituted, the Great Being should inaugurate its maturity by the gradual raising of the auxiliary races which with their own consent it associated during its childhood. An imperious necessity forbids its extending its tutelary sympathy to all animal races, yet it has, at least, the satisfaction of feeling that its enemies are the enemies of its allies, and that by the destruction of its rivals in power it guarantees their existence.

Amongst the races which have been disciplined, we must distinguish between the laboratories of our food and our active...
auxiliars. The first class has long been a creation of human foresight, for without it the ruminants would have disappeared by this time under the teeth of the carnivores. But that they are so is an obligation for us, whilst submitting to the law which compels the use of animal food, to submit in a better spirit by protecting its victims as far as is consistent with our necessities. Up to the last moment, we ought with active sympathy to exert ourselves by improvements in their circumstances and by kind treatment, to make them forget the gloomy prospect their predecessors’ fate holds out. At the time of death, those on whom the terrible office devolves will do their work with the seriousness it demands, perfecting the means of destruction in order to lessen suffering. Although its encyclopaedic education prompts this class to use the opportunity to make experiments, experiments which should be disallowed by Positive morality in every other case, it will not forget to extend to the innocent the merciful treatment customary with the guilty.

For our auxiliars, the sympathy of man may and should take a more satisfactory course, improving not so much their external conditions as their nature, physical, intellectual, and moral, by the habitual encouragement of true fraternity of feeling. The herbivores will be gradually raised by the Great Being to the dignity of carnivores, so to become more active, more intelligent, nay even more devoted, as they more and more are assimilated to the direct servants of Humanity. As for the animals which are nearest the human type, both in brain and in body, it is for Humanity in its maturity to give systematic direction and expansion to its association with them,—the association of feeling and often of action, which its well-grounded instinct of sympathy led it to institute during its childhood.

The Positive Economy should always consist in the assigning to every agent the task for which it is fitted, not employing for its accomplishment forces which might be turned to a better purpose. On this principle, in Western industry we have reached the point of considering it barbarous to use men as a weight or motive power; all purely mechanical services, not merely statical but dynamical, we project out of ourselves, by the aid of a judicious employment of machines. Hence a simultaneous advance both in personal dignity and in social utility, as we can avail ourselves of the mental and moral value inseparable
from the humblest children of Humanity, but previously lost to the race and painful to the individual. Our progress however in this respect too often stops short at the substitution of animals for man, not sufficiently utilising inorganic forces. The more complete introduction of industrial machinery and its better use will have as consequences, respect for our voluntary assistants and increased use of the blind forces of nature, the vast power inherent in which should suffice us did we but know how to use it; for instance, did we know how to employ to better purpose the immense force of the tide. From the animals as from men, we should demand no merely automatic service, as opposed alike to economy and morality. When we have learnt to avail ourselves of the heart and intelligence of our allies to such a degree as to entrust them with the main superintendence of inorganic forces, we shall find a better use for the human agents thus set free, and be able to develop on a larger scale the sense of fraternity upon earth.

The double progress here indicated is one in which all classes of regenerate Humanity ought instinctively to aid, by a steady influence, at once intellectual and moral. But it more particularly concerns the priesthood and the proletariat, both alike deriving their inspiration from women. Besides the intellectual reaction of Positive education which removes from animals the ban of Theology, the sociocratic clergy, on resuming the medical functions, will be careful to include the animals in their exercise in a far more satisfactory way than was possible under the Theocracy. Taught by its example, the proletaries, the immediate directors of the league between man and the animals, will ensure the prevalence of true sympathy towards our lower brethren, without needing to insist on the services they render or to trace the close connection which exists between their habits and ours. The two extreme classes in the Sociocracy will combine to perfect, by theory and practice, the soul and the body of the races already disciplined, as also to widen the range of association, which has not been able to take a step in advance since Fetichism.

That the unity based on sympathy may attain its utmost completeness, we must be able to embrace in it even the inorganic world, in relation to which Construction must always take precedence of Destruction; never must we forget that, here too, all caprice is immoral.
The familiar knowledge of human nature will make all feel that contempt and oppression exercised on matter may extend further, may extend to the body and ultimately to the soul. Accustomed to respect products, true sociocrate will learn also to reverence materials, and thus allow full scope for the moral influences attendant on the irrevocable absorption of Fetishism in Positivism, especially when aided by the institution of subjective milieus. The external order ever suggests Humanity, for Humanity alone can know that order and improve it, Humanity therefore consecrates it as condensing it. We ought so far to ameliorate the terrestrial regime as to give us just ground for regret that the economy of the heavens is wholly beyond our intervention, so wholly that we can but use it, not correct it. Yet whilst realising all the improvements in our power, we never forget that their attainment is based on our submission to the order of nature, and that our gratitude is due to the laws of nature, as they give us a basis for action. Whilst faith reveals to us our dependence upon the whole formed by the beings we know, love gives us a sense of our dignity, as aware that the destination of our action is to modify the hierarchy with which we are connected in the common interest of its various elements. The whole wisdom of man, whether theoretical or practical, is condensed in this fundamental law: the noblest order perfects the lowest through submission to it.

The result of the whole chapter is a triumphant verification of the announcement with which it opened, of the inherent competence of the regime to fully harmonise sympathy and synthesis, the former embodied in the worship, the latter in the doctrine. The unity which sympathy gives has stood the hardest test, it has disciplined practical life, after having reduced to system our intellectual existence. Under the guidance of love, under the control of faith, action unites and strengthens the union of the two, by the development of industry in its collective mode, thus made the material groundwork of human progress, physical, intellectual, and moral.

This chapter having concluded the work of construction of the Positive religion, the next has to organise its universal acceptance.
CHAPTER V.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT, BY VIRTUE OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FUTURE WITH THE PAST;

WHENCE

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE LAST PHASE OF THE TRANSITION.

This last volume may be regarded as the systematic expansion of the fundamental formula which embodies the Positive religion. The first chapter dealt with it directly, putting it forward as a whole; of the three following each treated one of its three indispensable constituents. Its definitive acceptance becomes the particular object of this last chapter, in which the religion comes into immediate connection with the political system.

The Western revolution, as intellectual rather than social, should naturally enter on its close, at the point where the intellectual reconstruction vindicated its claim to universal applicability by embracing, for the first time, the whole range of human interests. Now, this condition is actually satisfied by the systematisation which I have just ended, and especially by the preceding chapter, where love and faith meet in action. But, to evidence its competence, and to complete its service, the religion which deduces the future from the past must direct the present, so as to bring it into unison with its source and with its destination, both objects of general conception.

It is by thus triumphing over our present anarchy, that Positivism, at one and the same time, submits to a crucial test and conquers irreversible assent. Its ascendancy must be gained by its establishment of a complete discipline in the very midst of the most entire disorder, a disorder which threatens human society with absolute disintegration. The religion which possesses such power will, by virtue of the possession, be called upon to regulate a future, in which the work of organisation will be as difficult as it is at present. In the fullest sense real, in its very essence social,
the Positive faith may be brought to bear immediately on the government of society; whereas Catholicism, as egoistic and chimerical, could not influence government till after its acceptance by individuals. The heir of five centuries of increasing disorganisation, the religion of Humanity will be universally summoned to the rescue of order and of progress, when once it is sufficiently known. Although destined to regenerate the whole of man’s existence, its first application must be to public life, as the main seat of disorder. It will inaugurate the universal morality by regulating the conduct of nations first, then that of families and individuals, but without ever failing to draw out the essential correlation of the three parts of the Positive regime.

Our aim being to order the latest phase of the transition, the first point is to judge aright the actual situation of affairs, by combining the knowledge of the previous evolution of man with the conception of his normal state as already given with sufficient accuracy. In this introduction no portion of Humanity but is concerned, yet it has more special reference to the West, for thirty centuries the seat of the gradual movement towards the regeneration of mankind.

The successive phases of our evolution all co-exist in the actual condition of man; all, however, alike giving signs of a common tendency to adopt a solution which meets the immediate wants of each, as realising aspirations both universal and persistent. After creating the family, Fetishism in its highest form as Astrology, undertook to found an universal association on the basis of a homogeneous existence regulated by a common faith. Theocracy advanced farther in the same direction, availing itself of the only belief which at that early period could enforce the due amount of subordination. Polytheism in its military form might seem to lose sight of the end but was really a movement towards it, by its system of conquest which resulted in the conquering nation’s becoming definitively the nucleus of union for the whole. The convergence was distinctly traceable under Monotheism, more particularly defensive Monotheism, with its overt aspiration after the formation of a universal society. The effort failed, but the nations have never lost the wish for, never abandoned the hope of, an association co-extensive with the race. The establishment of such an association as an intellectual conception and as a social fact—such is the issue of the revolution, which, by virtue of the
exhaustion of the established order, ensures the simultaneous triumph of a demonstrable faith, and of peaceful activity.

In regard to the common issue of the aspirations arisen during the process of education, we must distinguish between the two unequal portions of the race, demarcated by the waiting for, or the active endeavour after, this universal society. The past teaches us, that the nations, in by far the larger part, whilst in heart and intellect bent on the formation of one great human family, have one after the other given up the hope of becoming its centre. All the dispositions grounded on the various forms of the absolute synthesis have neutralised one another, the result being to concentrate the process of elaborating the common solution on that portion of the world which is the cradle of the relative religion.

On the rise and spread of Theologism, Fetishism altogether abandoned the hope of universal acceptance which marked its latest stage, Astrolatry. But the great Theocracies, which deliberately renewed the attempt, in their turn lost the initiative, in consequence of the prevalence of the military regime. Thus the two principal forms of the provisional religion became essentially passive, and have for a long time been waiting for the regeneration which they have no hope of directing. The presidency of Humanity was definitively vested in the West, under the impulse successively of the conquests of Rome, and of the defensive form of Monotheism. Catholicism and Islam alike claimed universality, and on equivalent grounds, but their claims cancelled one another, and the focus of the movement, the West, was left to work out the common solution in the only possible way, by the preparation for a relative religion to be substituted for all the absolute syntheses at once. Whilst engaged in the necessary preliminaries, the scientific and practical groundwork of this construction, the West was rendering its acceptance easier by emancipating itself, as was necessary, from the beliefs calculated to prevent the various populations from uniting with their Western centre. By tacit assent, an assent on much as on that of Theocracy and Fetishism, on the West, unshackled as it is by theoretical working out of a renovation expectediggles between the Western nations since the Age, nor their abuse in common of their
superiority over other nations, have been able to destroy this instinctive convergence, the first step to the ultimate union. So unprecedented an agreement is in all cases the result of the utter exhaustion of the previous system, combined with a defective growth of the germs of renovation. The West owes its prerogative solely to its triple transition—its intellectual, active, and lastly affective transition—which, extending throughout thirty centuries, issues, in the five latest, in the elaboration, negatively and positively, of the universal solution, a result not possible elsewhere.

Once let this mission be as fully recognised in the West as it is outside, and the Western nations will be disposed to adopt gradually the feelings, habits, and opinions consonant to its primacy in the race. But such recognition can only be the result of a triumphant spread of the doctrine which guides the reconstruction, and nowhere will that doctrine meet with greater obstacles than in the milieu which is to raise the others, for the revolutionary habits there prevalent, once a furtherance, are become a hindrance to the fulfilment of its mission. In my third volume I have clearly explained by what fatal chain of circumstances the transition in the West became more and more anarchical in character, even before it had completely lost all organic tendencies. Complete organisation has hitherto been attainable only under the Theocracy, and there it soon became adverse to progress. The effect of opposition between the two has been that progress has prevailed, but has prevailed by encouraging, side by side with a partial construction, a general revolt against the original system, the substitute for which Positivism alone offers. The character of anarchy has been strengthened in proportion as the development of the powers of man has evidenced the incompetence of the absolute synthesis to regulate them without undue compression. The revolutionary disposition, long limited to the increasing impairment of continuity, extended to solidarity on the disruption of the Catholic unity and the Feudal hierarchy.

Such a tendency was of use in furthering the inevitable transition from Theocracy to Sociocracy, so long as the process of regeneration consisted in the preparation of materials; construction at that time being impossible without destruction. But when reorganisation proper has become the urgent want, the work of demolition being complete, the revolutionary
habits interfere with their own purpose, as they set themselves against any synthesis. Thus it is that, in disposition, the more active portions of the race are not on a level with the more passive; the latter invariably expecting with confidence and resignation the construction of an order which shall embrace all, the former looking with repugnance on the indispensable conditions of such construction.

Thus the chief task of the Positive religion is to regenerate the nucleus which has prepared its way; and this accomplished, its extension to the whole will be effected without hindrance. Long destined to furnish in all cases leaders, whilst the masses remain comparatively unaffected, it must first perform this office for the milieu which gave it birth, and which is amenable from its increasing anarchy to no other discipline. In default of its guidance, the well-grounded anxiety inspired by the progressive advance of subversive tendencies, drives men provisionally to rally to retrograde beliefs, which are radically incompatible with any effective moral or even political action. But the advent of Positivism, the work of this treatise, enables those who uphold order to assume the direction of progress, and progress henceforward consists essentially in the systematic discipline of all the powers of man. The mediocrities which flourish in the existing anarchy will resume their normal subaltern position, and the government of the West will shortly be centred in those who shall know how always to reconcile renovation with conservation.

Considering the nature of the malady from which the West is suffering, it was requisite for its right treatment to begin with the comprehensive conception of human affairs, so to found the sole authority capable of guiding the present in the name of the past and in the interest of the future. Great as is the actual mental indiscipline, men will joyfully replace themselves under the yoke of their antecedents, if its resumption hold out to them a prospect of great consequents. Reassured as to progress, they will lend their aid in the construction of order, rejecting anarchy as vigorously as they reject reaction. The utterly incurable amongst the revolutionists will quietly disappear, as an anachronism rather than a source of disturbance, when once the conservative power shall be armed with a satisfactory theory. They have still, it is true, influence with the people, in show rather than in substance, and due to
a certain routine, but their inability to unite except for some negative interludes and at wider intervals, disables them from offering any effective resistance to an organic policy, however limited the number of its adherents.

The actual disposition of men's minds, a consequence of the utter exhaustion of negativism, and expressed by the irrevocable accession of the dictatorship in the central nation, allows the Positive religion to organise the transition which is to be the proper termination of the Western revolution. The political calm does but bring into relief the spiritual disorder, since nowhere does there attach to it any sense of security. Reaction and revolution are alike in discredit, and yet the incoherent amalgam of the two, in the absence of any organic teaching, still ministers as the basis of public opinion, still furnishes the official formulæ.

Rightly to understand the nature and extent of the Western disease, we must examine directly the principle of revolution, which consists in men acknowledging no other spiritual authority but their individual reason, most of all when dealing with the most important questions. This anarchical principle has become so universal amongst all Occidentals, that it rules supreme even with those who are trying to re-establish the discipline the decay of which evoked it. Men avow the conditions of competence required for the most unimportant decisions in natural philosophy, but acknowledge no obligation in the domain of moral and social phenomena.

This intellectual revolt of the individual against the race is the more dangerous, in that, an inevitable consequence of the impotence of the older beliefs, it was originally indispensable to the elaboration of the new. Had Descartes and the thinkers worthy to tread in his steps not deliberately set aside all the then recognised authorities, the ultimate reconstruction would have remained an impossibility. But such emancipation as theirs, necessary when the object was to create new convictions, is become simply anarchical in minds too weak by their own action to get rid of doubt. Such weakness renders errors inevitable, unless on the assumption of an indifference fatal to morality, when opinions are at stake which concern man's whole existence. When the demands of action drive such men to delegate the decision to others, without principles to guide them they usually misplace their confidence and the result is a more disastrous issue.
Originally it was the higher provinces of thought to which the revolt was confined, where the old discipline was more oppressive; but if it persist, it will infallibly extend to the lower, so as to endanger the aggregate of our scientific acquisitions. It would be strange if minds content to make the suggestions of their individual reason the sole basis of their moral and political convictions were to remain indefinitely submissive to scientific authority, on points of less importance and less difficulty. A sound estimate of the acceptance by the Western world of modern discoveries, shows their general adoption to have been due, most of all, to habits traceable to the previous training, in spite of the decay which had overtaken its intellectual groundwork. Suppose—the hypothesis involves, it must be allowed, a contradiction—the announcement of the earth's motion made for the first time in the full tide of revolutionary feeling, it would find it an insuperable obstacle to its reception, as opinion would be directed on a host of inconsistent amendments. The easy success often obtained by the coarsest illusions or juggleries; the revolt which already threatens even the province of Mathematics; are everywhere two opposite but convergent evidences of the urgent need, and of the difficulty, of a true discipline. Even in the scientific world, where there is still some regard paid to competence, some respect for authority, the feebleness of conclusions, consequent on the dispersion of thought, encourages a similar anarchy—the strongest evidence of which is the habitual triumph of mediocrities. This absence of direction and discipline extends to the cultivation of art, which, by nature inherently synthetic, acquiesces in the general prevalence of a degrading specialist, substance being sacrificed to form.

A doctrine of universal validity—such is the sole remedy, if the reason of the West is to be freed from its present contradictory position, in which destruction of the whole becomes more and more irreconcilable with construction in detail. Authority recognised in the lower sciences must, on due conditions, be also recognised in the higher, or the disorder in which these last are perishing will spread to the lower. On examination, however, we see that this regeneration, if it is not to be abortive, must be moral quite as much as intellectual.

After the substitution of a demonstrable faith for beliefs incapable of verification, feeling will never cease to be the

Need of an universal doctrine.

Feeling must be intro
complement of reason in regard to the majority of admissible opinions, the special proofs of which would often be inadequate to carry conviction, did not confidence come to their aid. I have put forward the institution of such a discipline as the capital result of the encyclopaedic education, which predisposes us to follow out consequences rather than to discuss principles. Suited to the normal state, even for theoricians, such habits have more value during the transition which is to usher in that state. Purely chimerical is to be held the hope aroused by an undue estimate of logical sequence, when it thinks to attain convergence under the exclusive impulse of the intellect, without the participation of the heart. Even where there is the mental ability really to appreciate demonstrations, disagreement on the most unimportant suffices to neutralise agreement on the most important points, when there is no veneration to overcome insubordination. A partial synthesis then is to be looked on as so impossible, that Positivism would have simply given a useless pabulum for intellectual exertion, had it remained a philosophy, stopping short of the full religious conception. The grave character of the existing anarchy lies chiefly in this, that whilst essentially intellectual, it has ended in derangement of the feelings.

Sole stay of the existing order, the impaired power of the feelings is particularly sensible in the case of veneration, even in private life, where attachment too often fails to conceal a defective subordination. Moreover, the harmony of the family is imperilled by differences of opinion and the intrusion of individualism. But it is in public morality that the worst change has taken place, solidarity being only recognised in relation to the most ordinary intercourse, whilst continuity is altogether ignored. Reactionists or revolutionists, all Occidentals agree in contempt of the past, in neglect of the future, looking exclusively to antagonism of material interests for any control of man's action. In reference to continuity, the great bond of Humanity, Catholicism is as much to blame as Protestantism or Deism, for it was the first to break the chain of the ages by cursing its true ancestors. The Monotheistic faith could only rise by the repudiation of authority; it was inconsistent then, when, in its turn, it tried to arrest emancipation by appealing to its priority of establishment. Positivism alone can plead all the antecedents of man, as the relative character of its synthesis
allows it to sanction all, as so many spontaneous tributaries to its systematic unity.

To secure in all cases the triumph of general over special conceptions, the subordination of the self-regarding instincts to the social feelings—these are the two services, in intimate relation the one with the other, to be rendered by the true religion in the present day. Its object now and its object in the normal state are identical, and require similar means; the only difference is that the difficulty now is greater, the difficulty of setting on foot an order which it will subsequently have only to maintain and develop. Outside of the Positive religion all is retrogradation and anarchy, morally no less than intellectually, and no reconstruction is possible but through its unity, an unity, by the nature of the case, at first confined to its founder, sole interpreter of Humanity.

The nature and difficulty of the final phase of transition thus made clear, we must at once order it for the West, whence it will spread to the race. But to effect this for the West itself, necessitates an important distinction, according as the operation concerns the central nation or the other nationalities; in regard to which latter the first point is to determine definitively the order of their regeneration, thus completing and correcting my original statements.

The determination of this order is in the main, notwithstanding the modern revolution, in correspondence with the course of Roman incorporation, allowing for the modification due to the defensive Monotheism. When the Western Republic took the place of the Empire of the West, the political centre, previously at one extremity of the system, was definitively removed to the centre, by the gradual substitution of Paris for Rome, a change accomplished before the end of the Middle Ages. The change was required to mark the indispensable transformation of a compulsory aggregation into a voluntary association. But with this modification, the constituents of the group kept their original relative position, which had gathered force from the Catholico-Feudal initiation. Round the French nationality, as centre, were grouped, first, the two southern populations by virtue of a more advanced civilization, then the two northern, which had entered later into the movement. The focus of the Western world was apparently transferred to each of these two in succession during the two centuries after
the disruption of the Catholic unity. None the less did the latest phase of the Western revolution replace as a natural consequence France in the presidency of the modern European movement.

Disturbed for a moment in consequence of the military orgy which stained the final crisis, this relative position was soon resumed, on the advent of peace as the permanent condition of Europe, under the ascendancy of the common social aspirations which had grown and spread since the close of the Middle Ages. Originating, as it could not but do, with the nation on which it devolved to work out the solution for the rest, Positivism comes to the support of its initiative by enabling it worthily to accomplish its mission, as marked out for it by the past, its mission to inaugurate the future. It is by organising on sounder bases the union of the West, the instinctive creation of the Middle Ages, that the French nation, previous to its voluntary disintegration, will convert its political centre into the religious metropolis of regenerate Humanity. The only capital, the majority of whose inhabitants are born elsewhere, will deserve its presidency of the movement by guiding the last phase of the transition with the generosity of feeling and the generality of thought demanded by so noble a destination. Free from the anarchy of parliamentarism, it will by degrees transform into a spiritual headship its political predominance, in correspondence with the growth within it of the triumphant ascendancy of the Positive religion.

Such then, definitively, is the order in which the aggregate of past history places the five constituents of the West for the adoption in succession of the normal state; the first step being its elaboration by France, then its completion by the modifications introduced by Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany. For the last three, the arrangement differs from that given in the Positive Philosophy, as also from the arrangement as altered in the 'General View.' When I have set forth the principal case, I shall in due course show, implicitly if not explicitly, the grounds on which I decide the position of each nation, when dealing with the modifying influence it exerts. The reader who would enter more deeply into the examination of this decision by a comparison of my successive attempts, should be warned that originally I did not give sufficient weight to the historical order, as determined by the preceding volume. Moreover I had attached too much importance to the progress
in industry and science, to the undervaluing the moral and social advantages of the nations which had escaped Protestantism.

I have now to enter directly on the task of ordering the transition in its latest stage and in the centre of the West. By way of preface, I must point out the general mode of introduction of the several modifications which, on a combination of the Future and the Past, I am led to suggest to the Present.

Shortly stated, the theory of the organic transition resolves itself into this: that in the creation of the definitive system the same influences must be brought to bear as it requires when fully established, the same but with a more intense action and less regularity. Thus only will the fundamental law of continuity be duly respected, and in such a way, that the obligation which is upon us to organise the present is converted into a conclusive verification of the theory by which we deduced the future from the past. We have but to apply this indisputable principle and we at once see how we are to introduce whatever measures the theory shall suggest.

In the creation of a regime, the characteristic of which is the persistent combination of peaceful industry and a demonstrable faith, the first point is to abandon every thought of procuring its ascendancy otherwise than by the free assent of the public and its leaders. Any recourse to violence would be a glaring absurdity in the introduction of a discipline which prescribes as a primary and universal obligation the entire elimination of force. Far from regretting that their doctrine is unable to acquire the popularity which would give them such a resource in conducting the transition, true Positivists will bless the circumstances which are a constant security against their degenerating into revolutionists. They may not hope to see the immediate cessation of a fruitless agitation, even in France, still less in the neighbouring nations, but they will scrupulously abstain from taking part in it, except so far as by advice they may obviate, moderate, or turn it to use. Besides that the whole system of the statical and dynamical laws of society allows success only to such innovations as are peacefully introduced, the religion of Humanity enjoins on all the servants of Humanity to respect and support her ministers, even when they are but involuntarily her ministers.

Most especially is this obligation binding for the Positive
priesthood, for, commissioned by the Great Being to reduce to system the constructive transition, that priesthood must even now prove its true competence by sanctioning the powers whose adviser it is, not abandoning, on extraordinary occasions, its power to condemn. Posterity will habitually date the establishment of the Positive regime from the epoch at which the renovating doctrine was so far complete as to admit its constant application to the conduct of States and individuals. The priests of Humanity ought, then, to consider themselves as already in the Future which they prophesy and prepare, whilst they assume towards nations and their rulers, whoever those rulers may be, an attitude as far removed from sedition as from servility.

As, in the present religious interregnum, no power can have a really normal character, Positivism should avail itself of the existing authorities, sanctioning them so far as they evince a capacity for social utility, be their origin what it may, revolutionary or retrograde. To be efficient, power must have concentration and security; the relative religion, then, will manifest its inherent superiority by consolidating powers which rest on an insecure basis and are constantly diverted from their purpose by the cares of self-preservation. In renouncing absolute doctrines, the Western nations will learn to respect all acquisitions of power or wealth, if in unison with the actual requirements of human wisdom, whatever the state of that wisdom may be, exceptional or regular, a point for which individuals in no case are responsible. Even where this rule is violated, the religion which throughout substitutes duties for rights is more concerned to utilise an existing power than to amend its wielder, so to avoid barren or agitating discussions. There should be a constant sense that, if on the one hand no power can bear fruit unless it last, on the other its permanence tends to raise it, by strengthening the social instincts at the expense of the personal impulses, without which it had not come into existence.

I have to show the special application of these general dispositions to the actual commencement of the organic transition, the transition reserved for the third generation of the present century; the exceptional century which in the history of Positivism is the analogue of that of Constantine and Theodosius in the history of Catholicism. The two preceding generations were, by the necessity of the case, the one at first revolutionary
and then reactionary, the other both revolutionary and reactionary, that is to say parliamentary. It is true, this last state seems yet to continue, in the absence of a theory in consonance with the facts, but it has undergone a radical change since the irreversible establishment of the dictatorship in France. Without waiting for the termination of the present work, I had publicly urged this concentration of power several years before it was effected. And though my advice as given in the 'General View' could in no degree contribute to the result, I feel bound to recall it as a proof of the nascent capacity of the true philosophy to initiate a sound political system. It is not improbable that this agreement of advice with the event, an agreement in no wise accidental, will be regarded by posterity as marking the unconscious opening of the constructive transition, in regard to which the spiritual power was naturally, in accordance with its nature and its destination, in advance of the temporal. The two ought now, by virtue of so capital an agreement, so far to cooperate as to inaugurate at once the transition which is to terminate the revolution begun at the close of the Middle Ages.

For this concert we must recognise two distinct forms, or two successive phases, the one spontaneous, the other systematic; according as the regenerating priesthood gives advice to a dictator unconverted to the Positive faith, or to chiefs who have adopted it. And although the latter case admits of the more distinct and more complete influence, it is from the former that the most important measures will come, measures suggested to statesmen by the theoretical power under the increasing pressure of the condition of the West. If at that time the interment of the spirituality meets with more obstacles, it remains more true to itself, as more entirely clear of temporal support, and has a more conclusive value, in that its advice can only be accepted on the ground of its perfect opportuneness.

Catholicism, as an absolute system, could not act upon the political leaders till it had converted them. Positivism, as a relative system, requires no such preliminary. Looking upon all earlier beliefs as having converged towards its own, it is the more bound to apply the same conception to its judgment of contemporary opinions. In the eyes of the priesthood of Humanity all men are, and at the present day more than ever, instinctive Positivists at various stages of their evolution, all
that is wanting being completeness. To modify public life, Positivism is content if the course of events have thrown up a paramount and responsible will.

The condition is to a certain extent fulfilled in France, since the advent of the dictatorship, as that dispenses the organic doctrine from being laid before assemblies, whose constant tendency it is, even when reactionary, to perpetuate the revolutionary state. The dogmas of Theology or Metaphysics being at the present day discredited, the temporal power can find guidance only in a sceptical empiricism. Although the absence of principles tends to leave the path open to the ascendancy of egoism, it cannot entirely neutralise the altruistic reaction which is a rapid consequence of the possession of great power. In fact the very want must be painful to those who are by it often obliged to invoke the aid of opinions which they despise, and which moreover they know are generally given up. It is matter, then, for little surprise that the infant dictatorship has not yet assumed its proper attitude, in the absence of a theory which might enlighten whilst sanctioning it. But its actual defects can be no indication of dislike for a doctrine, which, free from all temporal ambition, is ready to consolidate and encourage the exercise of an indispensable authority, in whomsoever vested. Without aiming at his conversion, the suggestions of Positivism may enlighten the chief who overcame parliamentary anarchy; especially if, listening to my respectful invitation, he adapt his government to the Republican attitude which France has irrevocably taken for the last two generations.

Its aptness to modify political action without having put an end to the religious interregnum—this must be held to be one of the greatest privileges conferred on Positivism by the relativity which is its characteristic. It is in this way more than in any other that it will triumph over the empiricism of a sceptical milieux, which, whatever its indifference to the future, cannot turn with contempt from the solutions offered by Positivism of present difficulties. The more eminent the position, the more will its occupier, from his anxiety about those difficulties, be led to appreciate the only theory which at the present day offers practical guidance. Without converting, then, either the public or its leaders, Positivism is enabled by its fundamental reality and its complete adaptation to present
needs, to gain such a limited amount of ascendancy as is required to institute the final transition, and that without any consciousness of it on the part of the chief cooperators in the movement. Had it not this competence, so complex is the change, that it would require more than the generation which I persist in believing sufficient for its accomplishment in the West; by virtue of which its ulterior and consequent extension to the race will ask only an equal time, as I shall explain later.

To inaugurate the transition, all that is wanted is to reconcile once for all dictatorial government and liberty, in accordance with the philosophical wish of Hobbes, unconsciously achieved by Frederic. Positivism succeeds in this by accepting both conditions in their full consequences, showing at the same time the correlation of the two. Could the dictatorship of Danton have lasted till the peace he had fixed as its limit, its progressive character would have involved the removal, in due course, of a compression only justified by the defence of the Republic. When the military orgy was over and with it any real reaction, the refusal of full liberty was owing mainly to the weakness of the central power under the parliamentary regime, a regime incompatible with intellectual and moral regeneration. But the definitive triumph of the dictatorial principle in a state of things in which social questions are recognised as undeniably paramount, must, at no distant period, determine the unalterable acceptance of the complete spiritual liberty without which any reconstruction would be impossible.

Entire liberty of exposition, may even of discussion, is indispensable as a permanent security against the danger, a danger always imminent, of a dictatorship of a purely empirical character degenerating into a retrograde tyranny. And yet the actual state of things, where order is more at stake than progress, should of itself preclude anxiety on this head, by imposing the conviction that a real retrogradation is impossible, when those who call for it do so only as an obstacle to anarchy. Complete however as is the discredit attaching to the revolutionary spirit, the certainty that the negative state will persist so long as the religious interregnum lasts, ought to lead to liberty of opinion as the means of overcoming a solvent scepticism. Necessary as the foundation of the normal state, with a view to constitute a solid basis for its division of the two
that is wanting being completeness. To modify public life, Positivism is content if the course of events have thrown up a paramount and responsible will.

The condition is to a certain extent fulfilled in France, since the advent of the dictatorship, as that dispenses the organic doctrine from being laid before assemblies, whose constant tendency it is, even when reactionary, to perpetuate the revolutionary state. The dogmas of Theology or Metaphysics being at the present day discredited, the temporal power can find guidance only in a sceptical empiricism. Although the absence of principles tends to leave the path open to the ascendancy of egoism, it cannot entirely neutralise the altruistic reaction which is a rapid consequence of the possession of great power. In fact the very want must be painful to those who are by it often obliged to invoke the aid of opinions which they despise, and which moreover they know are generally given up. It is matter, then, for little surprise that the infant dictatorship has not yet assumed its proper attitude, in the absence of a theory which might enlighten whilst sanctioning it. But its actual defects can be no indication of dislike for a doctrine, which, free from all temporal ambition, is ready to consolidate and encourage the exercise of an indispensable authority, in whomsoever vested. Without aiming at his conversion, the suggestions of Positivism may enlighten the chief who overcame parliamentary anarchy; especially if, listening to my respectful invitation, he adapt his government to the Republican attitude which France has irrevocably taken for the last two generations.

Its aptness to modify political action without having put an end to the religious interregnum—this must be held to be one of the greatest privileges conferred on Positivism by the relativity which is its characteristic. It is in this way more than in any other that it will triumph over the empiricism of a sceptical milieu, which, whatever its indifference to the future, cannot turn with contempt from the solutions offered by Positivism of present difficulties. The more eminent the position, the more will its occupier, from his anxiety about those difficulties, be led to appreciate the only theory which at the present day offers practical guidance. Without converting, then, either the public or its leaders, Positivism is enabled by its fundamental reality and its complete adaptation to present
needs, to gain such a limited amount of ascendancy as is required to institute the final transition, and that without any consciousness of it on the part of the chief cooperators in the movement. Had it not this competence, so complex is the change, that it would require more than the generation which I persist in believing sufficient for its accomplishment in the West; by virtue of which its ulterior and consequent extension to the race will ask only an equal time, as I shall explain later.

To inaugurate the transition, all that is wanted is to reconcile once for all dictatorial government and liberty, in accordance with the philosophical wish of Hobbes, unconsciously achieved by Frederic. Positivism succeeds in this by accepting both conditions in their full consequences, showing at the same time the correlation of the two. Could the dictatorship of Danton have lasted till the peace he had fixed as its limit, its progressive character would have involved the removal, in due course, of a compression only justified by the defence of the Republic. When the military orgy was over and with it any real reaction, the refusal of full liberty was owing mainly to the weakness of the central power under the parliamentary regime, a regime incompatible with intellectual and moral regeneration. But the definitive triumph of the dictatorial principle in a state of things in which social questions are recognised as undeniably paramount, must, at no distant period, determine the unalterable acceptance of the complete spiritual liberty without which any reconstruction would be impossible.

Entire liberty of exposition, nay even of discussion, is indispensable as a permanent security against the danger, a danger always imminent, of a dictatorship of a purely empirical character degenerating into a retrograde tyranny. And yet the actual state of things, where order is more at stake than progress, should of itself preclude anxiety on this head, by imposing the conviction that a real retrogradation is impossible, when those who call for it do so only as an obstacle to anarchy. Complete however as is the discredit attaching to the revolutionary spirit, the certainty that the negative state will persist so long as the religious interregnum lasts, ought to lead to liberty of opinion as the means of overcoming a solvent scepticism. Necessary as the foundation of the normal state, with a view to constitute a solid basis for its division of the two
superiority over other nations, have been able to destroy this instinctive convergence, the first step to the ultimate union. So unprecedented an agreement is in all cases the result of the utter exhaustion of the previous system, combined with a defective growth of the germs of renovation. The West owes its prerogative solely to its triple transition—its intellectual, active, and lastly affective transition—which, extending throughout thirty centuries, issues, in the five latest, in the elaboration, negatively and positively, of the universal solution, a result not possible elsewhere.

Once let this mission be as fully recognised in the West as it is outside, and the Western nations will be disposed to adopt gradually the feelings, habits, and opinions consonant to its primacy in the race. But such recognition can only be the result of a triumphant spread of the doctrine which guides the reconstruction, and nowhere will that doctrine meet with greater obstacles than in the milieu which is to raise the others, for the revolutionary habits there prevalent, once a furtherance, are become a hindrance to the fulfilment of its mission. In my third volume I have clearly explained by what fatal chain of circumstances the transition in the West became more and more anarchical in character, even before it had completely lost all organic tendencies. Complete organisation has hitherto been attainable only under the Theocracy, and there it soon became adverse to progress. The effect of opposition between the two has been that progress has prevailed, but has prevailed by encouraging, side by side with a partial construction, a general revolt against the original system, the substitute for which Positivism alone offers. The character of anarchy has been strengthened in proportion as the developement of the powers of man has evidenced the incompetence of the absolute synthesis to regulate them without undue compression. The revolutionary disposition, long limited to the increasing impairment of continuity, extended to solidarity on the disruption of the Catholic unity and the Feudal hierarchy.

Such a tendency was of use in furthering the inevitable transition from Theocracy to Sociocracy, so long as the process of regeneration consisted in the preparation of materials; construction at that time being impossible without destruction. But when reorganisation proper has become the urgent want, the work of demolition being complete, the revolutionary
habits interfere with their own purpose, as they set themselves against any synthesis. Thus it is that, in disposition, the more active portions of the race are not on a level with the more passive; the latter invariably expecting with confidence and resignation the construction of an order which shall embrace all, the former looking with repugnance on the indispensable conditions of such construction.

Thus the chief task of the Positive religion is to regenerate the nucleus which has prepared its way; and this accomplished, its extension to the whole will be effected without hindrance. Long destined to furnish in all cases leaders, whilst the masses remain comparatively unaffected, it must first perform this office for the milieu which gave it birth, and which is amenable from its increasing anarchy to no other discipline. In default of its guidance, the well-grounded anxiety inspired by the progressive advance of subversive tendencies, drives men provisionally to rally to retrograde beliefs, which are radically incompatible with any effective moral or even political action. But the advent of Positivism, the work of this treatise, enables those who uphold order to assume the direction of progress, and progress henceforward consists essentially in the systematic discipline of all the powers of man. The mediocrity which flourish in the existing anarchy will resume their normal subaltern position, and the government of the West will shortly be centred in those who shall know how always to reconcile renovation with conservation.

Considering the nature of the malady from which the West is suffering, it was requisite for its right treatment to begin with the comprehensive conception of human affairs, so to found the sole authority capable of guiding the present in the name of the past and in the interest of the future. Great as is the actual mental indiscipline, men will joyfully replace themselves under the yoke of their antecedents, if its resumption hold out to them a prospect of great consequents. Reassured as to progress, they will lend their aid in the construction of order, rejecting anarchy as vigorously as they reject reaction. The utterly incurable amongst the revolutionists will quietly disappear, as an anachronism rather than a source of disturbance, when once the conservative power shall be armed with a satisfactory theory. They have still, it is true, influence with the people, in show rather than in substance, and due to
of all grants, that is, to the clergy, metaphysicians, or science. As the temporal power has unreservedly abandoned all claim to any spiritual supremacy, so better to discharge its own civil functions, it ought always to hand over the reorganization of opinions and feelings to the free competition of the doctrines able to accomplish the task. If, when tried by this test, the Positive religion satisfactorily establishes its intellectual and moral superiority, then to it will be entrusted, as part of its regular duty, the direction of the common education, without, however, reestablishing an oppressive monopoly in its favour, a point already distinctly stated. Till then, the clergy of Positivism must, after the example of its founder, depend entirely on the voluntary contributions of its private adherents. Nay, it is most desirable that this introductory arrangement continue during the whole duration of the organic transition, first in the West, then throughout the world, as a fuller guarantee for the independence and the dignity of the priesthood, under these conditions respected by the wealthy, beloved by the poor. But whilst applying this rule to the religion which is to terminate the modern revolution, it must hold good also for the religions which by their weakness and errors occasioned and perverted the final crisis. In default of this impartiality, the dictatorship would remain anarchical and reactionary in character, as it is intrinsically during its empirical stage, when Positivism alone can transform it.

Left incomplete by the school of Danton, the complete abolition of the intellectual budget must now be effected, not on economical grounds, but as a result and a condition, with all due regard for the parties interested. Such priests or professors as have attained maturity, and therefore cannot adopt a new career, will retain their official salary, as, if withdrawn, private contributions would but rarely replace it. Access to a better position must be made easy to the rest, by continuing their actual salary for seven years, allowing for exceptional cases of personal unworthiness, or of the office held being a mere abuse. In such a measure, the sole object at which the dictatorship should aim, is the withdrawal of the national sanction from an anarchical or retrograde teaching, to which, taught by the past, we may not entrust the future. This condition implies that all the corporations engaged in this teaching, theological, metaphysical, and even scientific, lose all official
character, but without in any way being disturbed, if they avail themselves of the liberty of meeting accorded to all without exception.

Were Catholicism as powerful as it claims to be, it would, under such circumstances, be in a position largely to increase its ascendancy, by proving that its apparent influence is not due to the legal protection, which it has long been wont to invoke in any difficulty. Some of its defenders, even ecclesiastics, have indeed proposed its temporal independence as a means of spiritual renovation, in the spirit of confidence naturally given by a doctrine esteemed competent to command the intellects and hearts of men. The Christian clergy, however, has not welcomed these temporary illusions of individuals, from a deep sense of its intellectual and social decline. The religion which allowed the rise of the Western revolution cannot be called in to close it; if appealed to, it can only be as a provisional protest against anarchy, prior to the advent of a really organic doctrine. Since its reestablishment as the official religion, triumphant Catholicism with the immense resources at its disposal has disciplined fewer anarchists than nascent Positivism. As true as it is that spiritual supremacy is beyond the reach of temporal prohibitions, so true is it that it is impossible ever to reestablish the authority from which all others must proceed. On these grounds it is that the more clear-sighted priests look on the withdrawal of all State support as likely to reduce their body to the fourth of its actual numbers, not to speak of the destruction of all ecclesiastical discipline involved in the measure, such discipline at present resting mainly on property considerations.

Let them, however, accept with dignity the inevitable, and the last remnants of the mediaeval priesthood may still maintain a noble attitude, may still be of real use. In the necessary suppression of that priesthood, none of the rancorously feeling will be at work, which inspired our revolutionary ancestors, whether atheists or theists. Positivism in presence of expiring Catholicism feels not as the jealous rival, but as the legitimate heir, who, to uphold the law of continuity on which he rests for his titles, needs the sanction of his predecessor. I here unhesitatingly renew the engagement, publicly made in my lectures, to subscribe annually a hundred francs to the Catholic fund, so soon as I shall have induced the dictatorship to suppress the
Catholic budget. All true Positivists will follow my example and aid me in protecting the representatives of the provisional spirituality against the revolutionary oppression instigated by the jealousy of metaphysicians. This possibly may be the ground on which, in the first instance, I shall be admitted into the temple of the Virgin Mother, that I may obtain in the name of Humanity that respectful toleration of his nobler interpreters, which God can no longer enforce from sceptics. It is a grave interest for Positivism to encourage universally the moral cultivation of our nature, which in its most belated form is, at the present day, preferable to the entire abandonment usual with Occidentals, even when their emancipation has been most happily effected.

In the very beginning of the organic transition, a system of mean hypocrisy will, under the impulse of relativity, be changed for one of honourable forbearance towards the several relics of the mediaeval religion. The French dictatorship, never otherwise than sceptical in character, should now take the lead in this transformation; a conclusive precedent for which we have set by the incomparable Frederic in the full vigour of the anti-religious movement. Under the increasing pressure of our social condition, French statesmen were always saved from becoming both anarchical and retrograde; except when a mixture of Germanism and Anglomania made them eclectic or parliamentarians. But as mere empirics they are driven at present to invoke, by turns, anarchy or reaction, as a check one on the other, according as they are in opposition or in office. Still, even without becoming Positivists, the relative religion may make them so far rightly estimate the wants of their time as to adopt a bearing as clear of falsehood as of detraction.

Whilst in due measure including all the débris of Western Monotheism, the management advocated, whether it rest on instinct or on reason, cannot accord to all without distinction an equal respect. It must be proportioned to the greatness and duration of the several churches, the two standards by which we estimate their intellectual and still more their social value. It follows that Catholicism, even as Jesuitism, must take the first place in any sound comparative estimate of the moribund churches, for Catholicism, as it always recalls the fundamental division of the two powers, presents us with the last form of Theo-
logism which can in any true sense be called organic. In their breach of Catholic unity, the northern nations of Western Europe, with a vague sense that they were tending to anarchy, exerted themselves to arrest the process of emancipation at the particular point they themselves had reached. The consequence is, that, at the present day, we have different degrees of religious decomposition, requiring a different degree of respect from the philosopher and the statesman, according as each phase has retained more or less of the old intellectual and moral discipline. It would however usually be a waste of time to distinguish any but two general cases: the Protestantism which has preserved episcopacy, and that which adopted presbyterianism. For the future, we should relegate to the last rank of theologians Deists, Pantheists, and Atheists; all alike incompetent for union or for discipline, they have never been able to form a church, and lost any useful function with the century of destruction.

The official reestablishment of the University was the worst mistake of Bonaparte; metaphysical corporations, if less costly, being more noxious and less discredited than the clergy. A dictator of energy, disregarding their noisy opposition, may, at the present day, suppress their grants, without awakening any resistance in support of an institution which is a source of degradation and corruption. The whole of modern history teaches us to see in the abolition of the University the consequence and complement of the abolition of the Parliamentary regime, for the latter drew its recruits, as did journalism, from the colleges, the constant nursery of our philosophical and political agitators.

Answering no deep want, the University of France is, more than any clergy, dependent on the protection of the State, and could find no substitute for it in voluntary support. Take away its budget and its monopoly, and its collective existence is gone, whatever the attraction apparently still lingering in the study of words and entities. As for the special schools, they might all disappear at once, all but the veterinary schools, without really interfering either with the public service or the wants of individuals. Farther on, I shall explain the substitute offered in the second phase of the organic transition, with the object of strengthening and developing such germs of reconstruction as they contain in reference to general education; the existence of the said germs constituting at all times their chief
usefulness. But it is important that the freedom of teaching be proved to exist by the large increase of private undertakings, subject to a purely moral surveillance on the part of the dictatorship, through the agency of the police, more enlightened and less oppressive in its action than the judicial body. The quasi-monastic schools, at all times and under all forms noxious, will hardly pass away before the termination of the Western transition, for it is impossible without its aid to secure the general recognition of home education as superior to public instruction. The government, however, without in any way hampering private educational institutions, ought never to encourage a practice which is an evidence of, and a stimulus to, the neglect by the modern family of its first duty.

Besides substituting, as explained below, the Positive School for the whole mass of special schools, the dictatorial power in France will prepare the way for the priesthood to regenerate the common education by extending and improving primary instruction. This instruction, cleared of all the puerilities of literature and metaphysics no less than of all alloy of Theology, will become purely scientific, esthetic, and above all moral, by virtue of the simultaneous cultivation of arithmetic, singing, and drawing, together with reading and writing. But the universal extension of this preliminary instruction should nowise exempt the corporation of primary instructors from the general suppression of pedagogic associations, which it presents in their worst form, both intellectually and socially, as it devotes itself to the most futile of the three classical rudiments. In primary instruction more than anywhere, it is important to secure full liberty, by instituting, for the state-paid masterships, an honourable competition, the competitors being in the main ill-assorted proletaries. In giving the office its full range and due security, its occupants will be warned that it is provisional, as being an encroachment on the normal function of the mother, a function for which she will be qualified by the end of the Western transition.

I have now to explain the final step in the suppression of the intellectual budget; to examine, that is, the indispensable withdrawal of all grants in aid of science and scientific societies, from which the dictatorship of Danton had wisely delivered us. Although this element in the threefold reaction is less burdensome than the preceding ones, it has really been a greater clog
on the regeneration of the West, as it corrupts directly its source in the intelligence. Neither the clergy, nor even the University, equal the Institute, and still more the Academy of Sciences in misleading the youth of France, by turning it from the synthetical and sympathetic dispositions which its actual mission demands.

A survey of the general intellectual movement during the first half of the nineteenth century is enough to show the evil influence exercised upon it by a corporation, as retrograde as it is anarchical, on which I refer the reader to my Positive Philosophy. When Danton abolished it, it had just lost, in consequence of the rise of Chemistry, its temporary usefulness, such usefulness, in the nature of things, being limited to the rise and growth of Cosmology, and more particularly to the development of Celestial Mechanics. Since its reestablishment, its routine preference for analysis has been in a high degree detrimental to Biology, for the genius of Biology is properly synthetical, and it has therefore been compelled to form itself outside of the official precinct, where Bichat, Broussais, and Gall were never admitted. The degeneracy of the Academy would be sufficiently clear from the division between two of the office which was the main source of its credit, the society being compelled to appoint two half-Fontenelles as it could not tolerate a Condorcet. Had the dictatorial government been more clear-sighted, it would have mitigated the intellectual and moral evils of this corporation by protecting the rival the physicians established, although the easier and more advantageous plan would have been to suppress both. In the face of experience, it is impossible now to hesitate as to the absolute extinction of these organized insurrections of mediocrity against superior genius, provided that in withdrawing their salaries the dictatorship leaves these scientific clubs full liberty. Indispensable, however, as is their abolition, it involves a measure of compensation, a provision for the pecuniary assistance they indirectly furnish to men of real intellectual value, at present lost amid the nobodies whom they serve to screen.

Without requiring of artists, savants, or men of erudition, that they should hold useless or worse than useless offices, offices created principally for the support of their first occupants, the organic transition will see the beginnings of the institution of pensioners, the dictatorship for a time acting for the priesthood.
on this point. The great Colbert, with the noble aid of the
brothers Perrault, originated this plan, and for a long time, at
small cost, it seconded the career of men of true talent, seldom
degenerating into a protection of intriguing or servile medi-
crity. To give it its full extension, I propose the foundation
of twenty annuities of twelve thousand francs (480l.), forty of
six thousand, eighty of three thousand. These last would,
originally, be granted for seven years, but might be continued
till the first vacancy in the class above, where the experiment
had not been a failure. The two others would always be for
life, except where there was persistent misconduct; and promo-
tion would depend solely on seniority, though the government
might nominate directly to the first class, so long as its numbers
were not full. If besides this, the government bore the cost of
publication of works of art and science, it would give a more
wholesome and less expensive protection than that now afforded
by the academical system. Although these pensions are to be
shared by men of distinction in the West with those of genuine
celebrity in France, I could hardly venture at the present day
to name twenty names worthy of the highest pension, even
were I to include those who require no pecuniary assistance.

The full statement of the system of measures which is to
ensure complete spiritual liberty, the combination of which with
the dictatorial government is the foundation of the organic
transition, requires me to explain the necessity of abolishing so
called literary property.

Though it is useless at present to expect of theoricians the
attitude which their social function demands, we must yet pro-
mote the natural tendency to it, by depriving venality of a fac-
titious protection in which mediocrity alone finds its account.
The sole inconsistency of the dictatorship of Danton, this pro-
tection of literature is so discredited that no resistance deserving
of respect would be aroused by its suppression, provided due
notice were given. The decree which shall proclaim the return
to the normal state in this respect should limit to seven years
the present privileges of authors, warning them that then they
will cease.

It would be a fit complement to this declaration, if the
government engaged to meet the cost of printing works of value,
when their authors publicly announced their resolution not to
sell them. As a final token of confidence in the author, a con-
fidence of an ennobling tendency, it would leave him, as in the
normal state, the free distribution of his work, with the excep-
tion of the copies reserved for the public libraries. Any fraud,
however, on his part or through his agents, must be sternly
checked by the complete withdrawal of the national munificence
on the third offence. Thus invested with a social character, the
writer of merit would keep in his own hands and have fuller
scope for the control of his publications, in which at present he
is hampered by the interference of the bookseller, whom the
venality of authors gives a function which in no way appertains
to him. The author ought always, on his own moral responsi-
bility, to regulate the distribution of his works, he alone being
competent to judge where they are rightly placed, and he is
more prone to exaggerate, than to underrate the demand for
them.

On a review of the system of measures here indicated as
belonging to the initial phase of the organic transition, it is
evident that their great object is to perfect and consolidate the
dictatorial government by shaping its character into conformity
with its destination. By the establishment of peace in Europe,
the reaction which inevitably followed the revolution lost much
of its intensity. Its justification having lain in the revolutionary
spirit, it now confined itself to fettering spiritual freedom, the
freedom of thought and of utterance, by a combination of direct
restraint with the reestablishment, as government institutions, of
all the effete corporations abolished by Danton in his dictatorship.
Now that Positivism renders it possible to overcome by regular
means the subversive tendencies, order ought not to continue
reactionary, progress being no longer revolutionary. A system
which is, in the fullest sense of the term, constructive, offers the
conservatives that which they have ever sought, the reconcile-
ment of Order and Progress, whilst it stigmatizes as an anach-
ronism those whom the government represses as mere agitators.
Under these circumstances, the dictatorship may attain the degree
of consistency and extension it requires, by making its attitude
definitively an attitude of progress; the first step being the
entire abandonment of all spiritual claims in order to concen-
trate itself on its temporal functions. Such is the leading aim
of the suite of measures above set forth; in them we have a
real substitute for the monarchy, in harmony with the essential
requirements of the actual republican order.
Once disengaged from an empirical and retrograde policy, the dictatorial government can, and ought to, assert its legitimate supremacy, by emancipating itself from parliamentary forms, whereas it now tolerates them in substance. Be it inconsistency or hypocrisy, the concession, a heavy burden on the finances, and one which from the beginning I never hesitated to blame, carries with it moral dangers by awakening the hope of reviving a policy which, thoroughly unpopular as it is, yet meets with sympathy in the less advanced politicians.

The subtle metaphysical distinction between laws and decrees was invented, by the legists of the Dantonian school, as a means of escape from the tendencies to anarchy inherent in the demagogic constitution, under cover of which the revolutionary government arose. This reason no longer exists, and the dictatorial government, become progressive, ought to take a nobler and freer course, assume, that is, on its sole responsibility, full temporal power, unimpaired by any childish or foolish formalities. The only political assembly to be retained should have no voice in legislation, but, sitting once in three years, it should devote the first month of its session to voting the budget as a whole, the two others to a revision of the accounts of the past. It should be a purely financial assembly, composed of three deputies from each department, one representing the agricultural, one the manufacturing, the third the commercial population of the department, its industrial population that is. The function of deputy should be always gratuitous, but occasionally, by voluntary subscriptions, poor men may be entrusted with an office naturally devolving on the wealthy.

At the triennial election, we must treat the latest form of the disease under which the West is suffering, by modifying in two ways universal suffrage, after first putting an end to one of the revolutionary inconsistencies, by making twenty-eight, not twenty-one, the age of full citizenship. In the first place, each vote should be completely public, in order that its due responsibility may attach to the revolutionary process by which the inferiors appoint their superiors. In the second place, by the system of delegation, each individual up to the moment of the election may name another to vote for him, thus concentrating the suffrage without any sense of personal annoyance. The arrangement, the mere development and regularisation of a natural custom, will soon throw up, from the ranks of the people,
leaders really in possession of its political confidence, leaders deserving the attention of the dictator. Under the combined operation of these two modifications, the unhealthy revolutionary state will peaceably disappear, in proportion as the spiritual reorganisation shall make intelligible the conditions of competence, and shall inspire the sense that concentration of power is desirable.

By this plan, we reduce within its narrowest limits the only influence of a thoroughly abnormal character which by the existing anarchy we are compelled to incorporate with the government of the transition. As, step by step, the leading features of the normal state become visible, under the teaching of the directing doctrine, the contrast between them and the actual state will lessen the dangers of the transitional regime whilst the definitive order is yet out of our reach. Whilst bowing to necessity in the restriction imposed on the temporal dictatorship by the triennial vote of the taxes, it will be felt that the distrust which is reasonable in a time of disorder should be laid aside in the normal state, the control of public opinion being then adequate.

To aid our examination of the first phase of the organic transition, we proceed to state the motto which characterises and the act which is to inaugurate it.

Of the five successors of Danton in the dictatorship, Louis Napoleon alone has originated a sentence really adapted to the wants of the situation: *To destroy you must replace.* Suggested by the apparent resurrection of what seemed extinct, this admirable maxim is an embodiment of the truth that a revolution to be decisive must be organic. But it is only philosophical wisdom that can confirm and fertilise practical experience, the keenest insight of which is no security against inconsistency. The sentence quoted has remained barren, or nearly so, with its author, and become really effective only when incorporated, and on good grounds, into Positivism. Two years have passed since the actual head of the government judiciously suppressed an anarchical motto, but as yet he has offered us no substitute. This unexpected inconsistency, and that five years after the publication of the normal formula, is a fresh instance of the truth of the maxim in question. It renders France liable to the revival of the revolutionary motto, not forgotten in spite of a century of disuse, owing to the absence of any substitute.
The omission should teach the dictatorship how important it is to adopt the formula Order and Progress, the only systematic expression of the persistent aims of all conservatives ever since the outbreak of the great crisis. The rise of a general formula indicates that the time is come when human wisdom, definitively placed at the social point of view, exerts itself to understand the whole round of human wants, with a view to their appropriate satisfaction. Our revolutionary predecessors alone could fulfil this condition, after their own fashion; later movements in a counter-direction have always been powerless in presence of the fundamental question, and have therefore confined themselves to a protest against the anarchical tendencies of the French revolution. As they could construct nothing, the several phases of reaction have remained destitute of motto, hymn, and emblem. When the parliamentary government had lasted for half a generation, in the hour of danger there arose, as a spontaneous growth, an empirical motto expressing the protest of the bourgeoisie against the anarchy which was ever imminent. But the formula, whilst pointing by instinct to certain conditions and certain existing deficiencies, never received the sanction of government, and the class which voluntarily adopted it failed in maintaining it, so paralysing to any initiative is the reactionary attitude. Self-contradictory as is the revolutionary motto, it reappeared without hindrance as the only adequate expression hitherto of a crisis, the termination of which must be sought, not in protests against its conduct, but in its guidance to its destination.

A general formula is always connected with the advent of a new order, and to have its full efficacy it must be at once a clear aperçu and a characteristic condensation of the synthesis it represents. The political motto of Positivism answers both these conditions, when I proclaimed it in my lectures of 1847, five years after the complete publication of my philosophical treatise, the social destination of which it expresses. It has been now satisfactorily tested and will soon have overcome the prejudices of the revolutionist and the reactionist, when the policy of the government is such as to make it worthy of such a symbol.

The guarantee offered by the motto should be strengthened by an act of peculiar significance, in which the dictatorial power, now altered in spirit, will complete its inauguration of
the constructive transition by repudiating an ill-omened connection. By nobly taking the lead in the repression by the Western Powers of a military encroachment, the present dictator brings out more clearly the contradiction involved in the sanction given by France to a similar aberration in the past. The noble pledge of a decidedly pacific policy thus given should, then, be followed up by the voluntary execution of the formal decree of Europe as to the tomb of Bonaparte, the violation of which was due to weakness on the part of both the governments concerned. The grave at St. Helena is more fitting for the military dictator than the burial of a parvenu amidst the crowd of French kings. The irrefragable announcement of a sound policy, internal as well as external—the reversal of this act would gain in dignity and significance if accomplished by the actual chief of the French nation.

As a consequence of such a manifestation, the metropolis of Humanity should purify itself of a monument of oppression, inconsistent with a neighbourhoood, which recalls the establishment of permanent peace. For the parody of Trajan’s column should be substituted a noble statue of Charlemagne, the incomparable founder of the Western Republic. The great Emperor, the highest type of the Middle Ages, has nowhere yet been visibly presented, and the act of cultus thus paid to him will inaugurate the transition on which devolves the preparation of the future by the glorification of the past. If the insulting column, when broken up, does not furnish sufficient materials for the monument of union, the deficiency, met by a recourse to other similar sources, will be soon made up by the voluntary contributions of the Western world. When our brothers of whatever Western nation shall pass through the Rue Charlemagne and the Rue de la Paix to La place Occidentale, there to pay their homage to the most eminent precursor of the civilization of mankind, the feeling will arise, that they too in their respective countries should follow the example it was for France to give, and atone for the anarchy in which all have taken part.

These suggestions lead me on to close my introductory survey of the organic transition by an exposition of the direct efforts made by the priesthood which is to regenerate; efforts aiming at the preparation of the normal state and the reconstruction of the West by a worthy glorification of the past.
As the very essence of the revolutionary principle consists in the breach of continuity, it devolves upon Positivism at the present day to begin its social action by systematising public commemoration, which is misapprehended by all existing schools equally. For this reason, without waiting for the termination of the present work, I took pains to inaugurate the organic transition by the construction of the *Positivist Calendar*; its triumphant success attests the reasonableness of this initial step. In the very first edition published in 1849 I explained that the calendar was a provisional institution, destined for the present exceptional century, to serve as an introduction to the abstract worship of Humanity, the nature and plan of which I even then indicated, in perfect agreement with their fuller development, as given in this volume.

For the concrete glorification of the Great Being, I take the highest individual types of the preliminary period, and arrange them in three ranks, monthly, weekly and daily, beginning with the initial Theocracy and ending with the early beginnings of the final crisis. In this scheme Fetichism alone is without its commemoration, Fetichism never having been able to throw up any names. But the definitive amalgamation of Fetichism with Positivism will be so clearly indicated in the festivals of the organic transition, that its enforced omission can lead to no unjust depreciation of the indispensable commencement of the whole human evolution.

For each degree of our ideal presentation of the past, the chronological order removes all uncertainty as to the position of any given type; so that the festivals might in all cases serve as dates. But such use of them I have always left optional, except in reference to the first degree; there the best servants of the Great Being find their highest honour in giving names to the thirteen months of the Positivist year. As early as the second edition of the Calendar, published in 1850, in a separate pamphlet, I introduced the indispensable nomenclature, now definitively consecrated by use. Its success leads me to give an answer now to the question raised in the second chapter of this volume, as to the ultimate names of the Positive months, for which I think I ought to adopt those given them for the transition. Although concrete, the nomenclature is yet so general in its character as to be adapted to the abstract worship, in which latter I have even used it for the days of the
week, in order to restore the familiar sense of the most important instance of continuity.

The case is different for the Positive era, which, until the close of the organic transition, must be dated from the beginning of the French Revolution; it being important that all Occidentals should have a ready measure of its course. The incomparable assembly which guided the Republican outbreak made a serious mistake on this point, from its not recognizing what posterity has recognized, that the Republic really began with the taking of the Bastille by the people of Paris. I have restored, then, the custom adopted by its predecessor, on this single point instinctively its superior, by virtue of an irresistible impulse; that predecessor, moreover, respecting the traditional arrangement of the Western year, from a presentiment of the reasons for it, as given in the second chapter of this volume.

But the normal state cannot adhere to an era which recalls an anarchical explosion, soon followed by a long reaction. And yet the future were not satisfactorily connected with the past, if the opening date of the ultimate chronology of the world be not fixed in this exceptional century. To comply with both conditions, it is enough if we place the Positive era at the beginning of the organic transition, the work reserved for the last of the three generations which intervene between the extinction of Theologism and the establishment of Positivism. Chronologically, this gives us the year 1855 as our starting point; sociologically a well-marked point, as we have in it the striking coexistence of a definitive dictatorship with the complete construction of the Religion of Humanity. The provisional and the ultimate era, then, of the Positivist Calendar must differ by two thirds of a century; a difference which facilitates our habitual comparison of the present with the future or the past.

Were the object of this system of commemoration purely intellectual, we might stop at the two first degrees, as conjointly offering a sufficient presentation of the philosophy of history, so far at least as regards the Western transition as a whole. After having, in the first month, glorified all the theocratic ties of the human Family, each subsequent monthly type marks a phase of man's education or an essential aspect of a phase. The four weekly types, in subordination to the monthly type, are above all meant to be the representatives of
the principal modes or degrees of the phase of evolution with which they are connected, and which through them becomes clear. So complemented, the succession of the thirteen monthly types forms an adequate idealization of the whole past. The two series, as the basis of our system of commemoration, will ever be an integral part of the normal worship in the three months it devotes to history, as these sixty-five names are almost all employed in the concrete development of the abstract festivals, as may be seen by reference to the conspectus of Sociolatry.

Important as it is to impress, by means of art, on the Western mind the general conception of the past, the main destination of the historical calendar is yet a moral one; to revive, that is, the sense of continuity everywhere in profound decay. To the children of revolution who turn to the future in contempt of the past, the priesthood of Humanity steps forward to proclaim the Great Being by the honour it pays to its best servants. Therefore it is that the concrete worship should be instituted on such a scale, that the veneration due to our ancestors may issue in devotion to our posterity. The past has been misjudged, and its pressure should at the present day be made sensible by a multiplication of individual connections, to be condensed later when continuity is firmly established. The expansion is no less desirable on another ground; it may help to overcome the selfishness of theological and the individualism of metaphysical belief, by awakening in all the noble desire of honourable incorporation with the supreme existence. For these reasons it is, that the Western commemoration should at present include daily types, always arranged in chronological order, but chosen indifferently from the precursors, rivals, and successors of the weekly type. I was thus led, from the very beginning, to make the concrete worship still more complete, by adopting for certain days secondary names, to be substituted for their principals in leap years.

It is solely in reference to these secondary names, distinguished by italics in the Calendar (see below), that I have occasionally profitéd by the judicious observations not unfrequently made to me during the last five years, with a view to improving the Western calendar, by addition or substitution. The result of this gradual amelioration is that, as a construction, it leaves me no regret on the score of omission, though I hold
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ÉSAR</th>
<th>1st MONTH</th>
<th>SAIN'T PAUL</th>
<th>VIIETH MONTH</th>
<th>CHARLEMAGNE</th>
<th>SEVENTH MONTH</th>
<th>PRÉFAL CIVILIZATION</th>
<th>FEUDAL CIVILIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. St. Cyprian</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Otho the Great, Henry the Fowler</td>
<td>2. Otho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. St. Ambrose</td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Villiers</td>
<td>5. Villiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. St. Augustin</td>
<td>7. ALFRED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Constantine</td>
<td>8. Charles Martel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14. HILDEBRAND</td>
<td>14. Bayard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15. St. Benedict</td>
<td>15. St. Leo the Great, Leo IV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17. St. Isidore of Seville</td>
<td>17. Peter the Hermit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18. St. Augustine</td>
<td>18. Roger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27. St. Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>27. St. Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29. St. Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>29. St. Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ÉRIC</th>
<th>13TH MONTH</th>
<th>BICHAT</th>
<th>MODERN SCIENCE</th>
<th>FESTIVAL OF HOLY WOMEN</th>
<th>FESTIVAL OF ALL THE DEAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ÉRIC</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Copernicus</td>
<td>Tycho Brahe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Kepler</td>
<td>Galileo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Huygens</td>
<td>Huygens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. James Bernoulli, John Bernoulli</td>
<td>Newton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Bradley</td>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Volta</td>
<td>Volta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. GALILEO</td>
<td>Galileo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Vieda</td>
<td>Vieda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Wallis</td>
<td>Wallis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Clairaut</td>
<td>Clairaut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Rümel</td>
<td>Rümel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. D'Alembert, Daniel Bernoulli</td>
<td>Newton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13. Lagrange</td>
<td>Lagrange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14. NEWTON</td>
<td>Newton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15. Bergmann</td>
<td>Bergmann</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16. Priestley</td>
<td>Priestley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17. Cavendish</td>
<td>Cavendish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18. Guyton Marceau</td>
<td>Marceau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19. Berthollet</td>
<td>Berthollet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20. Boucher</td>
<td>Boucher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21. LABOISIER</td>
<td>Laboisier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22. Harvey</td>
<td>Harvey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23. Hooke</td>
<td>Hooke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24. Linnaeus</td>
<td>Linnaeus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25. Haller</td>
<td>Haller</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26. Lamarck</td>
<td>Lamarck</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27. Blaise Pascal</td>
<td>Pascal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28. GALL</td>
<td>GALL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Calendar. The names in Italic are those of the persons who,
myself bound to carefully examine any new proposals, provided they be not purely negative in character. I alone as yet am at the Western point of view, and I am sufficiently clear of partiality towards France to judge all distinguished names whatsoever through the veil of national illusions.

A comparison of the Calendar with the preceding volume brings out clearly the inevitable defects of the concrete worship, its inability, viz., to embrace the larger portion of man's educational stage. Not only is it unable on the grounds already assigned to include Fetishism, it pays but scanty honour to the Theocracy, the highest types of the Theocracy being lost to us, in consequence of the admirable self-denial which was characteristic of the system; and the result is that I have been driven to incorporate in the first month some collective commemorations and even some purely mythical names. Throughout the remainder of the Calendar, the number of the festivals is seldom in proportion to the importance of the phase; so that a synoptical table, the main object of which is to place before us the Western transition as a whole, fails as a comparison of its principal phases. It gives three months to the intellectual movement of Greece, whilst Roman civilization is condensed into one, and half even of that concerns what is but indirectly a preparation for it. If two months are really sufficient to idealize the nine centuries of the Middle Ages, the evolution of modern times would seem not to deserve six. Of the five constituents of the Western world, the Spanish type receives but scant honour; for the superiority of Spain, admirable as it is, is a superiority in feeling, and as such cannot be adequately appreciated when we are commemorating the development of intellect and activity. These various defects may be, it is true, in great measure, remedied by the wisdom of its interpreters, still they are inseparable from the concrete worship, and its function therefore is simply to prepare the existing generation for the abstract glorification of the past.

This enumeration of the inevitable shortcomings of the historical calendar would be incomplete, if we omitted to remark that, in it, intellectual or practical services naturally are of more weight than moral desert, our object being to understand aright the development of the powers of man at a time when the discipline of those powers was impossible. The calendar is not meant to give us examples of conduct; for
such, in any large numbers, we must wait for the normal state; its purpose is to call us back from anarchy—to subordination to the past, through the honouring the individual instruments of the progress achieved by the race. Although the list should, after the transition, serve invariably in our choice of baptismal names, that is to say, when it has received its full completeness, this is a use of it which will always require the intervention of the priesthood, if we would avoid undesirable patrons. Even in classifying the intellectual types, in some instances I have been obliged to look to the results attained rather than to individual merit, such results mainly depending on their circumstances, in some cases favourable to their vocation, in others adverse. Of the six thinkers ranked under Bacon, three were in my judgment his superiors, but their superiority lacked the opportunity to evince itself by their giving as great an impulse as Bacon gave to the intellectual progress; the contrast is similar between Lagrange and Newton.

Such is the spirit in which the calendar is to be studied and taught, as a summing up the whole commemoration of the past. Though almost entirely devoted to the vast transition through which the Western world had to pass from Theocracy to Sociocracy, it may be looked upon in the present day as representing the whole initiation of mankind, the issue of which is furnished us by this transition. The instinct of continuity was not really impaired, save in these thirty centuries, and as a termination of them, Positivism recalls the Western nations, increasingly revolutionary, to the normal attitude of the Theocrats and the Fetishists, its aim being the union of the race. Putting aside the fact that the general plan of the historical calendar indicates by itself its purely provisional intention, there are details in the construction which directly announce as proximate the advent of the normal cultus; I allude to the abstract character of the two festivals with which it ends. For the last day of the year and the additional day in leap years are the same festivals as those which stand last in the Conspectus of Sociolatry.

So I am led on to complete my exposition by two explanations which are indispensable to a clear comparison of the transitional worship in its actual state with its previous state in former editions, that in the Positivist Catechism included.¹

¹ That is to say, in the first French edition. In the second and in the English translation it stands as in the present volume.
A feeling of kindness, a feeling quite undeserved, prompted my recommendation of a specious proposal to consecrate the days of the week to the several fundamental ties of human society. Not only, however, is the plan not adapted for the normal state, where the months perform this office, but it would be useless during the transition, when we have only to consider public festivals; the personal worship, and the domestic sacraments having already attained their definitive state. The abortive attempt will leave no other trace but the touching series of prayers to which it gave occasion; the author, a true Positivist, will disengage them from this connection and distinguish them by their several objects, adhering to the established names.

A more important explanation regards the day devoted to reprobation, which from the 'General View' passed into all the editions of the Calendar, having been introduced into my lectures. I was led to a capital modification of it by the objections of a lady; subsequently the honourable remonstrance of a British Positivist has led me to reflect and on reflection entirely to abandon the idea. I had always so far seen the exceptional character of the institution as to limit it to the first four bisextile years of the organic transition. But on sifting more thoroughly the reasons assigned for this limitation, I decided not to divert the complementary day from its normal destination, as given above. Recognizing the danger of any regular cultivation of the feelings of hatred even when indignation is most legitimate, we must especially avoid any stimulus to these feelings in a milieu prone to criticism, and in which Positivism aims at reestablishing veneration. Rulers, whose misconduct is traceable in the main to an ill-governed desire for celebrity, find their best punishment in oblivion, the more effective by contrast with the honour paid to the higher types. A ceremony specially devoted to reproval would risk, with an incompetent public, the misapplication of the principles on which we should be compelled to ground our condemnation.

The types which occupy the greater portion of the historical calendar are such as to suggest to the priesthood which presides over the reconstruction, the completing the institution by proposing a system of reading in unison with the organic transition. Poets, philosophers, men of science—these form the majority in the list of the names commemorated, and the public in honour-
ing them naturally wishes to know their works, works not in all cases fit for its use. Again, it might be thought that all authors excluded from this provisional cultus are undeserving of perusal, whereas this would be often unjust, in some cases a positive evil. To avoid mistakes, either the reading works we should not, or the omission of those we should, read, it is necessary to regulate a propensity which has become both excessive and universal, and to do this we must add, as a complement to the roll of famous names, the list of the books which deserve to live. This is the aim of the Appendix to the present volume: with some modifications, it is a reproduction of the Catalogue inserted in the preface of the Positivist Catechism; a separate edition appeared in October 1851.

In this provisional collection of a hundred and fifty volumes, more or less in constant use,—a step towards the normal condensation of the intellectual treasures of Humanity in a hundred volumes formed on system,—we must distinguish the poetical and moral works, as alone adapted for habitual reading. If, amongst these, we confine ourselves to the real master works, the organic transition will be greatly facilitated by our familiar intercourse with the highest types of the preparatory life of Humanity. The conclusive test of experience induces me to recommend above all the daily reading of the sublime, if incomplete, effort of Â Kempis and the incomparable epic of Dante. More than seven years have passed since I have read each morning a chapter of the one, each evening a canto of the other, never ceasing to find beauties previously unseen, never ceasing to reap new fruits, intellectual or moral. To say nothing of the positive advantages of a habit which ever reminds us of the great object of all human meditation, it has the negative advantage of keeping us from useless or bad books, whilst it offers the best corrective of such reading. Till such time as Positivism, invoking Humanity, work out the moral and political synthesis attempted by Catholicism in the name of God, the mystical condensation of the medieval religion will serve as our daily guide in the study and improvement of our nature. As a monument of the past, this unrivalled composition (I am happy to think that I have already increased its use by true believers) must have a value for our most distant successors; but independently of such value, it is even at present ranked among our sacred books.

If we treat the Positivist Library as the natural complement...
of the historical calendar, we use it and judge it in accordance with the synthetical conception, the dynamical character, and the provisional destination of the more important table. Both lists are peculiar to the West, both are provisional, both equally stand in need of revision and completion to fit them for universal adoption as definitive institutions. Both speak to the undisciplined in intellect and in morals, and accordingly we must judge of their efficacy, not by this or that partial result, but on a general survey of the impressions of synthesis and sympathy their habitual use conveys. Their services during the transition will secure them a certain subaltern value in the normal state, when the sacerdotal functions, of which they are the rudimentary form, shall be in full and regular action. The Library, in a modified form, will then continue to guide our reading; and the Calendar, then complete, will always serve as a basis for our choice of baptismal names.

Calendar and Library—by the aid of the two, the priesthood of Humanity will lay the groundwork of its ascendency over the living by its judgment of the dead, during the first phase of the organic transition. It discharged this function freely,—an office which everything tends to assist, which nothing can prevent—prior to the advent of the dictatorship, to the advent, that is, of the political condition of its social efficacy. The scale of its exercise will be enlarged so soon as liberty in matters of opinion is sufficiently secured, not waiting for the adoption of the three subsidiary measures which are to ensure it against retrogression. Nevertheless, the direct influence of the Positive clergy in the reorganisation of society will not be felt, till the attitude of the government correspond fully to the real condition of things, break, that is, with the falsehood which involves the sanction of three spiritual powers in a sceptical society. But whenever, by the complete suppression of the spiritual budget—theological, metaphysical, and scientific—the way is cleared for the recognition of the persistent need of a spiritual reorganisation, the religion of Humanity will evoke a general sense of its capacity to terminate the great Revolution. Whilst it enunciates definitively the fundamental problem, this measure of enfranchisement supplies, moreover, the only means of its practical solution, on a large scale, by the open growth of the Positive worship, at present destitute of material resources, which the law reserves for the deposed faiths. And although
in abolishing the ecclesiastical budget the Catholic churches must be always respected, their disuse in the natural course of things, in proportion as the real decay of the belated belief stands revealed, will peacefully transfer to Positivism some temples worthy of the Great Being.

Naturally devoted to the worship,—for the adoption of the worship will precede that of the doctrine, still more that of the regime,—the first phase of the constructive transition will institute, on some scale or other, the three modes or essential degrees of that worship. Private worship, and even the social sacraments—these have already begun for true believers, never to disappear, as their introduction needs only individual conversions, and is unaffected by public considerations. As the dictatorial regime gradually arouses a general sense of the necessity for moral reorganisation, the vacillating or the fallen will come asking from the worship of Humanity the consolations and the protection which the decrepit beliefs can no longer give them. More particularly will this be the case in the ties of domestic life, most of all in reference to marriage, where the weakness of Theology discloses the inadequacy of the mere civil union. Some decisive instances already show that, under a deep sense of the moral deficiencies in their sceptical milieu, there are some who are disposed to strengthen their union by the voluntary promise of eternal widowhood, an engagement incompatible with the fallen creeds.

In view of the approaching increase of Positivist marriages, I address myself to a point on which I have often been consulted, the difficulty, namely, as to mixed marriages, unknown ultimately in the normal state, but the commonest case during the organic transition. Positivism alone can sanction such marriages without inconsistency by virtue of its invariable relativity, this enabling it to look upon all the anterior beliefs, without exception, as so many preparations for the demonstrable faith. It will use such marriages as an honourable means of propagating its worship, not merely with the several Monotheists, but with the Polytheists, and even the Fetichists.

Mixed marriages must be allowed only under two general conditions, lest we weaken the just ascendancy of the definitive religion by hopeless efforts, often issuing in permanent discord. First of all, the expectation of conversion must be entertained only in reference to the sex which is most susceptible of modifi-
cation, the sex in which attachment to the old forms of worship
most deserves respect, as determined mainly by the wants of the
heart, in opposition to the suggestions of the intellect. Posi-
tivism will, in a higher degree than Catholicism, avail itself of
the influence of woman, but at the same time it will uphold
more firmly the dignity of man, by confining to the husband
the office of teacher, which is unbecoming in the wife. Con-
jugal harmony would be gravely imperilled, were the wife to
look to marriage for conversion when she had failed to effect it
previously. Whereas the man, as a rule, may hope gradually
to bring over to the Positive faith a companion who is naturally
predisposed to accept intellectual guidance, within fair limits,
and still more to feel, as it should be felt, the moral superiority
of the true religion.

So regarded, mixed marriage is allowable in the case of any
Positivist sufficiently emancipated from previous religions to be
able to take a passive part in the ceremonies of such re-
ligions, without any pretence of adhesion. More than once I
have urged true believers freely to give so fair a proof of their
personal deference and their respect for the institutions of
their country. But this initiative of the man should be met by
a corresponding action on the part of the woman; she should
consent, that is, to take in the temple of Humanity the formal
engagement of Positivist widowhood. Such an amount of
adhesion to the universal religion is consistent, for the time,
with an harmonious union, whilst it leaves a near prospect of
complete conversion, one in which the heart will assist the in-
tellect to feel the indivisibility of the true faith. If the woman
refuse this concession, the priesthood cannot sanction the
marriage, and the man must put it off till the condition be ac-
cepted, so avoiding a struggle of which the issue is uncertain,
and which would be as fatal to happiness as to selfrespect. In
the present state of the Western world, when the older faith
cannot really inspire a fanatical adherence, such a persistent
refusal would imply the hope of obtaining undue power, a hope
but ill-veiled by the pretext that it is impossible to renounce
a former worship. Such a ground is an illusion in Monotheists,
for their ancestors must at one time or another have abandoned
the religion of their fathers; it is respectable only in the case
of Polytheist or Fetishist women, and with them the widowhood
of Positivism will be always welcome.
Whatever the shape the mixed marriage assume, one thing is clear, there must be no compromise of the Positivist rule, that the mother has the superintendence of the education of the children of both sexes. In belief the wife may be behindhand, but that does not prevent her being, by virtue of her moral superiority, more qualified than the husband to preside over education, so far as it is given within the family, and even to superintend the public instruction, so that in it the intellect may be subordinated to the heart. No true Positivist will ever interfere with this function; be it from a sound estimate of the part really played by the intellect in human education; be it that his strong conviction of the superiority of his faith makes him hope that it will ultimately prevail by its own intrinsic merit.

The first two degrees of the worship of Humanity ought then, even in the present day, to take their normal shape, the milieu only having power to hamper or promote a development which is beyond its control. The case is different in regard to the system of public festivals; and yet in default of such a system the Positive religion cannot adequately discharge its social function, nor even establish on a solid footing its power over the individual and the family. The complement is one which demands more complete conversions and in larger numbers than is feasible during the whole of the constructive transition. I was thus led to construct a public worship specially adapted to the final stage of preparation, aiming at no other results than the encouragement of our tendencies to synthesis and sympathy by the establishment of the fundamental doctrine of continuity. Nevertheless, the system of festivals organized by the Western calendar issues in two ceremonies of an abstract nature, which, as such, prefigure the normal cultus.

That the indication may not be inadequate, we must add two festivals of a typical kind and standing in close connection; the one in full agreement with the synopsis of Sociolatry, whilst in the other the inevitable admixture of a provisional element is no obstacle to our fully realizing what it will finally be, may even serves to connect it better with the past. The first addition requires no explanation here, as it is simply the immediate celebration of the arch-festival, the festival of the Great Being, sufficiently described in the second chapter of this volume. So
ripe is the time for it, that I proposed it as early as 1848, in the separate edition of the 'General View,' having previously stated it in my public lectures in 1847; and the success of the proposal has appeared in manifestations of increasing significance, lacking only publicity. For the last seven years, the true believers have inaugurated the Positivist year by coming of their own accord in a body to offer their homage to the founder of the religion of Humanity, recognized by them as the systematic interpreter of the Great Being. Completed, as it soon was, by the presence of women, this spontaneous action, the introduction of the only universal festival of which the present state of disorder admits, will become a solemnity of a decisive character when a public temple shall be open for its celebration.

As for the second additional festival, a distinct explanation is here imperative. Its object is to lay a foundation for the adoration, the collective adoration, of the representatives of Humanity, by instituting the abstract worship of woman, through the medium of the public festival of the Virgin-Mother, a festival in which the organic transition will incorporate the best condensation of the Middle Ages. By adhering to the day appointed by Catholicism, the true believers will naturally awake in their Catholic brethren a sense of the power inherent in the relative religion to preserve and allow full growth to all the germs emanating from the absolute faiths. In this festival Socialolatry will reconcile the three Monotheisms, by pointing out to Christian hearts the founder of Islam choosing the eminent Jewess as the highest type of the sex when initiating its just worship. This festival, about the middle of the year, will be the complement of that which marks its beginning, when the habitual use of the historical calendar shall have effected a sufficient recognition of the Virgin-Mother as the spontaneous idealization of Humanity.

I avail myself of this close connection to introduce one last elucidation of the feminine utopia, which enters into all parts of this volume, and is most fully set forth in the preceding chapter.

A satisfactory institution of the worship of woman is out of the question so long as the idea of maternity is incompatible with purity. Hence it was that Chivalry welcomed and carried out to its full consequences the Catholic fiction in which idealiza-
tion endeavoured to supply the deficiencies of reality. To feel how far the unparalleled charm of the mystical type of woman is due to feudal tenderness rather than to Christian faith, we have only to compare its large acceptance in the West with its failure in Byzantine Christianity, in spite of the identity of doctrine. So far from heralding the universal ascendency of Catholicism, the worship of the Crusaders pointed to the inward exhaustion of European Monotheism, for from that time forward there was a tendency to substitute the Virgin for God, a tendency which has become fact with the Catholics of Southern Europe. As an irrefragable proof of the antagonism between the two, we may remark the coincidence, constantly becoming more evident, of the acceptance of the mystery of the Virgin-Mother, with the decay of intellectual belief in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, the true embodiment of the religion of St. Paul. During the century which preceded the Crusades, the doctrine of the Eucharist occasioned a marked expression of doubts; doubts which have grown stronger ever since, keeping pace with the modifications introduced into the Catholic synthesis by the sympathetic conclusions of Chivalry. No doctrine admitting two condensations, however compatible they may seem, the new mode of summing up Catholicism was an indication of the instinctive tendency of the Western world towards the only worship which can in an equal degree satisfy either sex.

Place in direct juxtaposition the worship of the Virgin-Mother by the West, and the worship of Humanity by man-kind, and we see the fundamental affinity of the two by virtue of which the one is the unconscious preliminary of the other. For the Great Being is a realization of the feminine utopia in that it needs no external agency for its fecundation. Dreamers and charlatans are even now endeavouring, the first to smooth the way for the adoption of the new worship, the charlatan to delay the death of the old, by an effort to unite Humanity to God. But such endeavours, due to the increasing influence of Positivism, can be attended with no serious danger, as it is the literary class alone,—a class falling more and more into discredit,—which can fail to recognize the radical incompatibility of the relative and the absolute. This is how Positivism realises the Utopia of the Middle Ages, by presenting all the members of the great family as the offspring of a spouseless mother. On the basis of this conception, the worship of the transitional
period will, from the very beginning, definitively systematise, and by systematising, give its full effect to the unconscious transformation, which, since the twelfth century, has been the growing aspiration of the Southern nations, and that more than ever since the outbreak of Protestantism. At the same time the feminine Utopia becomes an inseparable part of the Positive religion, for all whose heart enables them to use it subjectively, without waiting till it is an objective fact.

Such is the aggregate of the institutions characteristic of the first phase of the organic transition, the period in which the priesthood of Humanity elaborates the regeneration of the West by establishing the worship of the Great Being, whilst the dictatorship, purely empirical in character, maintains the requisite political tranquillity. As yet unable to conceive a type of order different from that which is passing away, the temporal government is guided by its circumstances to respect a spiritual power which it considers competent to overcome the intellectual anarchy. Free scope, in public and in private, thus given to Positivism, it should manifest such a power of construction as gradually to effect either the spontaneous conversion of the older statesmen or the deliberate installation of fresh ones. This is how the opening period of the final transition will be a preparation for its decisive form, in proportion as the natural course of events of all kinds shall present the religion of Humanity as the only religion which can terminate the Western revolution. It was incumbent on me to bring first into contrast the two extreme phases, to the exclusion of the mean, but having done so, it is necessary now to acknowledge the necessity of intercalating an intermediate phase, in which the dictatorial power, though not Positivist, has yet adopted irrevocably an attitude of progress.

This intermediate phase is more akin to the first than to the third; so that it might be accomplished under the same ruler if he could be so far modified. In a sceptical society, the change is one not beyond the limit of advance possible in a real statesman during the period of mature manhood. Were the example of a philosopher of avail in the case, I might venture to cite my own public life, with its two distinct careers, distinct and yet connected, the one philosophical, the other religious, succeeding one another in legitimate succession, without any necessity for two different thinkers, as had been at
first supposed. The practician, it is true, cannot change to the same extent, but the difference between the two modes of the dictatorial government is so much slighter as to justify my quoting my own precedent. The actual head of the French nation seems to me, then, capable of presiding over the central as well as over the initial phase of the organic transition, if he adopt my proposal, before mentioned, and place his government formally in unison with the real condition of things, thus turning to good account the unexampled acclaim of his power.

With regard to the last phase, one, be it remembered, longer in duration than the two others together, the prolongation of his power would be inexpedient, though there ought not to be any breach of continuity between the last and the preceding phases, as I shall shortly explain. In fact, the dictatorship, hitherto monocratic, now becomes a triumvirate, as was pointed out in the 'General View,' and is to be further explained below. By this capital change, the preparatory government is brought, to a considerable degree, into harmony with the normal regime, the regime explained in the preceding chapter, and the change is coincident with the conversion of the governors to the reconstructive doctrine of Positivism, in default of which conversion the triumviral form would give rise to dangerous struggles.

In this way the organic transition, in appearance one and indivisible, breaks up, by two divisions, into three successive phases, the serial succession of which phases forms a progression, in its first portion instinctive, then systematic, towards the complete regeneration of the West. All three equally resting on the combination of temporal concentration and spiritual liberty, they have their points of difference, both political and religious. During the two first, the Positive priesthood directs its special attention to the introduction, first, of the worship, then of the doctrine, under a monocratic dictatorship, at the outset originally retrograde or rather stationary, but subsequently progressive; in the last phase the priesthood works out the regime in concert with the triumvirate, which is the characteristic feature of that period.

On this general plan I have now to explain the second phase, for the conception of which we required the previous conception of the two extremes, in obedience to the fifteenth law of the First Philosophy. Resembling the preceding politi-
ally rather than religiously, its temporal aspect takes precedence here of its spiritual.

So viewed, the mean phase of the organic transition will see the dictatorial government, now unquestionably progressive, carry out its policy by three correlated measures, up to this time impracticable, although they are but the completion of the policy of the first period. The most decisive is the definitive suppression of the French army, the substitute for which is eighty thousand gendarmes, a number sufficient for the due maintenance of order, both in public and as between individuals. This indispensable transformation,—a precedent soon followed throughout the West,—will inaugurate everywhere and for ever a policy of progress and of peace, not to speak of its twofold reaction upon industry. Its direct advantages will, however, at the outset, have a set-off, financially, in the obligation to extend to military, the rules of indemnization already laid down for civil, offices of more questionable utility. Compensation to the private soldiers is uncalled for, as they have long had no other wish but to leave a service which is alien to modern feeling, so that the only class to be considered would be the superior officers; the increase of the gendarmerie, naturally with suitable appointments, supplying a legitimate opening for the subalterns.

To complete the statement, a distinction must be made for the artillery (including under the term the engineers) and the navy, as both require a difficult apprenticeship, and, what is more, costly materials. Still, the special schools for the two services must be included in the suppression of the whole scientific budget; they are, at bottom, no advantage to the corps, which long did without them, any more than to the gendarmerie, which never suffered from this incubus on just promotion. Reducing the two special arms to the fourth of their actual amount, it is necessary at once to retain their distinct organisation and make them a substantive part of the normal militia, in which the military character is duly subordinated to the peaceful function, on foreign as well as on home service.

Such a constabulary, military and naval, will suffice to guarantee order in Western Europe, when the decisive result of the present war shall have put an end to the disquiet, whether sincere or otherwise, inspired by the retrograde attitude of the abortive Monotheists. For France henceforth ought to abandon
all precautions as against its immediate neighbours; their oppressive military establishments being maintained chiefly as barriers against her; and they will everywhere fall as soon as by the suppression of its army France takes away what has long been a just cause of alarm. Supposing a reactionary coalition again to interfere with its noble effort to solve the problem of human regeneration, a special appeal on the part of the government of the transition would suffice to ensure its independence, as by virtue of the whole past invested with the initiative of reconstruction.

At home, the military force proposed would also be adequate, notwithstanding the prolongation of anarchy in matters of opinion, for, while treble the existing amount, it is double of that specified, in the preceding chapter, for the normal state. The condition, however, of its efficiency is the absolute suppression of the national guard, a force always at variance with modern feeling, seldom of real use in earlier troubles, and become an element of disorder now that the great Revolution is in full career. Unable, at least in France, either to exclude or to admit the proletary class, the national guard is at present a political danger without any social compensation. In fact, socially, its tendency is in direct opposition with the essential conditions of industrial reorganisation, a reorganisation in which there is no place for the bourgeoisie, hostile as it is equally to patrician and to plebeian. Its military conclaves act also as a check upon the regeneration of opinion, for the bourgeoisie has now, for some time, been the main seat of metaphysical empiricism and of sceptical egoism, evils which require a solitary treatment, and such treatment these assemblies always disturb.

Eighty thousand gendarmes, if the only armed force, can really maintain order in France in all disturbances whatsoever, if they avail themselves to the full of the peculiar advantages of an armed force at once voluntary and disciplined, every member of which deserves confidence and accepts responsibility. The gendarmerie, as the police, has its origin in industrial existence, and is intimately bound up with that existence, by virtue of the profoundly social character of its service, a service as independent as it is useful, and always compatible with family life. Compulsory enlistment has never been needed for the gendarmerie; its members are soldiers, but soldiers regenerated by the enduring sense of duty and selfrespect. During the
whole course of the modern revolution, the force rose by its own
merits in public opinion, especially in France, side by side with
the growing alienation of public feeling from the army properly
so called. Since the developement of the final crisis, their re-
publican instinct has connected the gendarmes more and more
closely with the successful issue of a reconstruction, the aim of
which is to secure the general prevalence of a social judgment.
Such objections as at the present day may be urged with ap-
parent justice against this constabulary, have in reality no force
as against its constitution in itself, and had their source solely
in the general political retrogradation. Under a really pro-
gressive dictator, the force, as was seen under Danton, will be
able to give the proper assistance to the government without
degrading itself by services which are not required when the
executive is in no fear of public opinion.

The decisive step just explained would have been premature
in the preceding phase; the retrograde attitude of the govern-
ment at that time precluding such an amount of trust in the
dispositions of the people, too anarchical to tolerate a regime
which was an object of suspicion. But, in the second stage of
the organic transition, the dictator’s attitude has become pro-
gressive, and the popularity attaching to it as such is not
weakened by the vagueness of its aspirations. Under these
conditions, a force which, originally, would have at times failed
in maintaining public order, may keep down factious attempts,
and even restrain the disturbances of society caused by the in-
decision natural to a policy in which feeling endeavours to
supply the place of reason. Inadequate as against a real insur-
rection, the Positivist military force will suffice to quell riots;
and from riots it is important that the dictatorial regime should
be guaranteed, otherwise its action is fettered by the necessity
of concessions to popular prejudices. And although, in the
present transitional state, we are liable to troubles of a more
general kind, no military precautions should be taken against
them, and for this reason, that the government may find, in the
sense that it must and can anticipate such troubles by a wise
policy, a control and a guidance not to be found in its vague
doctrines.

Thus it is that the intermediate phase of the organic
transition will fulfil the hopes that have arisen everywhere, and
in France above all, during the last forty years, as a consequence
of the establishment of peace in the West. Solemnly promised, at the close of the extraordinary orgy in which the military instinct had revelled, the final transformation of the army into a gendarmerie was time after time adjourned on the ground of foreign complications and internal disquiet. But, at the period now in question, both grounds are so far removed, that the dictatorship may without danger gratify the universal wish by fulfilling the promise, and the measure will be the best assurance of its progressive tendencies.

This transformation of the army into a gendarmerie leads, in the middle period of the organic transition, to two complementary measures, of capital importance, the one relating to external, the other to internal affairs.

In the first place, to mark the definitive adoption of a thoroughly pacific policy, there must be a noble restoration of Algeria to the Arabs. Not merely is the continuance of our dominion impossible after the suppression of the French army, but it is radically incompatible with any reorganisation of society. That act of oppression was begun and carried on, at great cost, in order to rekindle the warlike feeling; to cultivate outside France a ferocious temper to be used in France; above all to corrupt the French nation, in order to divert it from social objects by interesting it in a retrograde tyranny. The policy was the more blameable in Louis Philippe, the least estimable of the five French dictators, in that when it was in his power to reject, and make reparation for, the wrong of his predecessor, he made it his own, not from conviction but in order to conciliate prejudices which might easily have been thwarted. But, over and above the general grounds on which the act of restoration has always been desirable, the present remarkable episode in our policy ought to hasten its accomplishment; evincing, as it does, the contradiction involved in a policy which upholds, to the south of the Ottoman empire, a process of spoliation which is resisted on its northern frontier. The accomplishment of this act of justice need not in any way, it may be as well to say, be hampered by consideration for our colonial establishment in Algeria, consideration quite undeserved, as that establishment rests on no solid basis, and has never been anything but a feeble compensation for numerous iniquities. If the sceptical adventurers who will be handed over to the generosity of the Mussulman had had any serious intention of
forming part of the Arab people, they would have adopted Islam, not cherished the hope, the futile and culpable hope, of gaining a triumph for Catholicism.

At home, this second phase advances the organic transition, industrially, by authorising the coalitions of the workmen as fully as those of the masters. These inevitable leagues require nothing, on either side, in the way of legal interference but the firm repression of violence towards those who refuse to join them. Under this single condition, the continuous growth of these antagonist organisations is as useful in the preparation of the Normal State as in its consolidation. For thus only can be brought home to both sides by experience, the need of a constant conciliation, the systematic direction of which is vested in the priesthood of Humanity. The experience of England has, it is true, taught us the defects and the dangers of these contests, so long as they are confined exclusively to material interests, but they will be an assistance in the reorganisation of industry when the Positive religion shall regulate their management.

With these two measures to supplement the abolition of the French army, the dictatorial government in its progressive stage will complete its guidance of the second period of the organic transition, by the introduction of two institutions, one political, the other moral, in a special sense preparatory of the last phase.

It should be, even then, an object to qualify Paris, in the next century, to take its place as the metropolis of the West; and for this to reduce its political ascendancy over the provinces of France, now crushed under an excessive centralization. This reform, generally and ardently desired, was always promised by the retrograde party but never effected; its inability to accomplish it arising from its not having the progressive policy indispensable for the change, if it were not to interfere with the social mission of France. Its accomplishment appertains to the true conservatives, when Positivism shall have produced upon them the impression in detail which must precede their conversion to its general doctrine.

In my systematisation of the organic transition, I met these legitimate objections to the present system by the division of France into seventeen separate governments,—intendencies,—each on an average comprising five departments, grouped, as far as possible, on a comprehensive survey of their local affinities.
The governors, in all cases appointed and removed by the central power, will be authorised to decide most of the administrative questions now settled at Paris; and each, governing his capital, will name the prefects of the subordinate towns. For the better understanding of this measure, the principal object of which I shall shortly explain, and which will serve as a type for the other Western nations, I feel bound here to give in detail the division of France, arranged according to the populousness of the capitals.

Schedule of the Seventeen French Governments.

5. Rouen . . (Eure, Seine-Inférieure, Calvados, Orne, Manche).
8. Lille . . (Oise, Somme, Aisne, Pas-de-Calais, Nord).
15. Clermont . . (Loire, Ardèche, Puy-de-Dôme, Cantal, Haute-Loire, Lozère).
17. Rochefort . . (Vienne, Deux-Sèvres, Vendée, Charente-Inférieure, Charente).

From the religious point of view, the middle period of the organic transition will be the complement of the first, so far as regards the general adhesion then given to the fundamental principle of Positivism, by superadding its moral device to its political formula, still however without any change in the French flag. In adopting the formula, Order and Progress,
the first phase expressed the decided determination to end the modern revolutionary movement by the entire reconciliation of the two ideas, a fusion unanimously called for since the outbreak of the final crisis. In the second phase, the true nature of the regeneration of the West is brought more prominently into view, by the announcement that the solution must be in its origin a moral solution; this is done by the formal acceptance of the law, *Live for others*. Then, and not till then, will women become an element, as they should be, in the movement of modern times; they are outside of it and alien to it, even after it has become constructive, so long as it embraces only the intellect and the action of man without bringing both alike under the control of feeling. The combination of the two mottoes will place the political in direct connection with the moral reorganisation, so preparing the way for the thoroughly religious character which is to mark the latest phase of the Western transition.

I am thus brought to the point at which, to complete the ordering of the intermediate phase, it is necessary to trace the progress of Positivism during its course.

Though this is the period in which the true religion must enlarge its sway so as to include the doctrine in addition to the worship, without as yet embracing the regime, the priesthood in its work of regeneration even now, and that opportunely, enters on an extension of the system of abstract festivals, which was begun during the first period by the festivals of Humanity, of Women, and of the Dead. These characteristic solemnities, with a judicious admixture of concrete types, will receive an addition in a fourth annual festival,—suggested by the development of the antagonism between the industrial classes, itself a result of the popular unions,—a festival which, while in every respect adapted to the transitional, may form part of the normal, state. The introduction, towards the end of the summer, of the Festival of Machinery by the Positive priesthood, will be an effort on its part to anticipate and to mitigate all industrial disputes by honouring the main foundation of peaceful activity. Our systematic sanction of the spontaneous Fetishism of the race will allow us to idealize these admirable instruments, which give to labour its productiveness, to the labourer his true dignity. The festival in their honour will have a direct tendency to introduce everywhere the normal
manner, as being a corrective of the popular errors which, owing to our existing anarchy, reappear on every fresh extension of the power of machinery. It will show in the strongest light the need there is to discipline human activity, as its unchecked career soon involves a contradiction, in the utter opposition between the end and the means. The festival of machines will encourage a brotherly subordination on the part of all the working classes to the class which is marked out as the normal leader, socially speaking, of the proletariat.

Important, however, as, in a special point of view, is this expansion of the abstract worship, it is the establishment, on a large scale, of schools for the encyclopaedic education that will be the spiritual characteristic of the second phase, a phase essentially concerned with the doctrine; this measure I have now to explain.

The abolition of the triple theoretical budget will bring about the general recognition of the necessity and the feasibility of reorganising public instruction. It will be impossible then not to see, how completely the state of the Western world is adverse to all theological or metaphysical teaching—how favourable it is to all Positive tendencies. At the same time, the spread of subversive Utopias will reveal the true nature of the evil from which we are suffering, whereas it is now masked by the various material palliatives. The conclusive evidence of more than one contest will dispose all enlightened and honest conservatives to recognize in the Religion of Humanity the only power capable of disciplining the minds of men. Its aid will soon be in such high esteem as to inspire statesmen not merely with habitual respect for its counsels, but with the desire actively to contribute to its adoption by society.

The impulse thus given will act on the dictatorial government, before it become Positivist, and lead it to prepare for the development of the true priesthood and the renovation of public education by founding schools, analogous in character to the schools of the normal state, the general type of which will be then familiar. Such schools will of necessity have mainly a philosophical result, but the ground on which the government founds them must be that they are to educate the various services which remain under its control. Their connection with these services, calculated as it is moreover to obviate or correct scientific vagueness of purpose, is as legiti-
mate in the organic transition as it was in the last phase of the revolution. It foreshadows, in the cases where it applies, the general connection between the systematisation of practical life and the encyclopædic training. Far from regretting that the Positive School is not destined by the dictatorial government to recruit the new priesthood, we ought to congratulate ourselves on our escape from such a violation of true principles in reference to the spiritual reorganisation. It has ever been my endeavour to make it felt, that the Positive education, common to all, should suffice for all, the clergy not excepted, allowing for the special preparation which is always a matter of free individual exertion. And yet notwithstanding, the transitional schools, destined to initiate the movement for the complete renovation of public instruction, will naturally be peculiarly advantageous to the free corporation which presides over that movement.

To ensure the efficiency of these schools, in their particular as in their general objects, it is important to preserve them from the corrupting influence of monopoly, the ruin hitherto of all such institutions. The empirical limitation, and the irrational intermingling of the abstract sciences; the entire absence of publicity; evils constantly magnified by the academical system, these causes combined in the irremediable failure of a school which since its reestablishment has been constantly deteriorating. But the degradation of the Polytechnic school (its name sounds ironical), its intellectual no less than its moral degeneracy, was due, above all, to the fatal mistake of its illustrious founders, who thought to ensure its success by giving it a privilege which has made it at once retrograde and anarchical.

Enlightened by this blunder, the dictator will shun conferring any monopoly on the nursery for rightly trained minds which is to take the place of this abortive institution and all its adjuncts. The various services for which the Positive school offers a training will always be recruited by open competition; the only advantage of its pupils in such competition will be its better teaching, and this will not unfrequently be counterbalanced in their competitors by natural abilities and favourable circumstances. It is by this more than anything else, that its establishment will be a decisive prelude to the systematic remodelling of general education, as distinguished
from all special objects. For exactness' sake in regard to this
fundamental condition, it is necessary at this point to explain
how we reconcile,—and we are bound to reconcile,—a judicious
application of the principle of competition with due respect for
the prerogative of the dictatorship. The universal adoption of
the competitive method is only possible if limited to the lower
grade, where, far from hampering the government, it affords a
better choice and preserves it from all pressure. But, thus
introduced, its agents must owe all promotion to their actual
services, without having to stand a contest which is as illus-
ory as it is degrading where there is a direct test for the
functionaries. In all cases the intermediate grade will be
reached by seniority, allowing for individual exceptions; and
the highest grade will be a matter of free choice, such choice,
in case of need, not limited to the department actually con-
cerned.

Meant for all branches of the public service, the Positive
school will yet exert its formative powers most particularly on
behalf of those which are most able to facilitate the transi-
tion of the West; systematically directing, that is, justice,
diplomacy, and administration. The judicial functions must
ultimately, under better conditions than in the Middle Ages
and in Antiquity, be resumed by the industrial patriciate as
its normal appendage; but they will continue to give rise to a
special class till such time as the chiefs of industry have risen
to their true position. This special body, which, since the
Roman prætors, has been, as a matter of history, connected with
the spontaneous growth of a purely human morality, will
welcome the extinction of empirical and declamatory institu-
tions, and the substitution in their place of schools, in which
profane science leads up to sacred science, as a preparation for
the direct professional training of magistrates worthy of the
name. Diplomatists, as the judges, had their origin in the
confusion of the two powers during the modern revolutionary
period, but they are, to a greater degree than the judges, pre-
disposed to second the impulse of the religion which is to end
it. Weary alike of scepticism and hypocrisy, they have so far
tested the inadequacy of purely political measures as to be
ready to welcome a moral regeneration, the offspring of a
synthesis which will honour their services and extend them,
hough ulteriorly it extinguishes the profession. But it is
the administrative service which is the most qualified to sympathise with Positivism, for the regime which it proclaims not only does not suppress the class, but will raise it in the estimation of the patricians, as their permanent auxiliary in the discharge of their political functions. These modest and laborious servants, on whom rests at the present day the uninterrupted maintenance of public order in the midst of spiritual disorder, well deserve the infusion of new power they will get, when they draw from the Positive schools, by free competition, the recruits they want, as sub-prefects, commissioners of police, and clerks.

After all however, both from the general and the special point of view, it is the physicians who will be most benefited by the institution, as having, since we shook off the yoke of Theocracy, become, more and more, the natural precursors of the Sociocratic priesthood. The tendency of modern science to degenerate into academical pedantry shocks at once their social aspirations and their predisposition to synthesis, as it transfers to the cosmologists, and more especially to the geometricians, that leadership in science, which, as the result of the Middle Ages, normally devolved on the biologists. More fully emancipated, more progressive than any other class, the physicians, though a provisional class, alone knew how to use aright the just censure of Molière, being stimulated by it to shake off the fetters of Metaphysics and literature, with the result of becoming the best support of nascent Positivism. Though I have always spoken freely of the materialism and the venality of the profession, I always found there valuable sympathies with the Positive teaching, as a doctrine which raises its social importance and its scientific independence by incorporating its function into those of the priesthood of Humanity. In this historical judgment, it is not solely nor even chiefly the pure biologists that I have in view; they are already too deteriorated by the academical indiscipline to be qualified for hearty cooperation in the work of mental and moral reorganisation. I have more confidence in the higher order of practitioners, whose apparent contempt of medical theories is but the expression of their instinctive sense of the futility of partial syntheses. At bottom, they are the most predisposed of all to promote the regeneration of their profession, one in
which the higher minds have constantly to strive against imminent degradation.

Such considerations as these led me, when planning the transitional institution of Positive schools, to treat them as especially meant for the medical profession in the ordinary sense of the term. Such schools may act directly on the doctors, on whom the government confers a legal status by entrusting them with a sanitary office, such trust justifying it in exacting certain intellectual and moral conditions. The intellectual guarantee will be a consequence of their encyclopedic training, the type of which is given in the Positive school; to satisfy the moral will consist in their formally renouncing all private practice, in order to devote themselves properly to the service of the public, such service of course to be suitably remunerated. Three grades in succession, determined, as in other cases, by competition, seniority, and choice, will receive annual salaries of three thousand, six thousand, and twelve thousand francs, the same scale as the priesthood. To encourage hierarchical subordination in a class which, in its own nature, is averse to discipline, each functionary will superintend the practice, whether it be the treatment of persons or the service of public health, of the two physicians beneath him in rank who shall be specially attached to him. Hospitals are an institution exclusively adapted to the Middle Ages and destined to disappear utterly, in proportion as the increase of material comfort, coinciding with increased selfrespect in the working classes, shall allow us to substitute for a degrading assistance the careful attention of the family. But the change must be gradual, and it is desirable to further it by establishing on a large scale, during the whole course of the transitional period, public physicians with the duty of directing gratuitously the medical treatment of patients at their own homes.

To complete the regeneration of the medical profession we must rid it of a mischievous monopoly, and of alien assistants. The legal privilege conferred by the doctor’s degree really only benefits the charlatan from whom it apparently protects the public, whereas there is no real protection for it against the practical consequences of our intellectual anarchy, aggravated as it is by ignorance and credulity. This legal sanction is the main support of an useless course of instruction, which would ere this have fallen into discredit, were it not for this
power of conferring a monopoly of medical advice. At issue alike with the dignity of the priesthood and with spiritual freedom, the rule is a clog at once on the affectionate care of women and the generosity of the patrician class. But whilst we put an end to this oppressive influence at headquarters, we must not respect it in the subalterns, with whom its evils are often increased by superstition and hypocrisy. Involved in the general suppression of the ecclesiastical budget, the corporations, above all those of women, on which the reactionary movement conferred the monopoly of nursing, will thus lose, without hope of recovery, a privilege of which all physicians feel the inconveniences, both in public and private life. If any one wishes to devote himself to the service of the sick, for a time or for a permanence, he should be able to do so freely, without joining or being dependent on any brotherhood or sisterhood, where pride and vanity are fostered under the cloak of a self-devotion more apparent than real.

The destination of the Positive schools during the transition having been sufficiently explained, we must give the general plan of their organisation, which will most differ from that of the normal state in that the pupils are secluded during the three years of their encyclopaedic noviciate. This exceptional measure rests on the necessity of withdrawing a picked body of young men from the influences of the sceptical and corrupt milieu which they are to be one great means of regenerating. If magistrates, diplomats, administrators, and above all physicians are to become, by training, the auxiliaries or precursors of the Positive priesthood, it is allimportant that during their intellectual and moral instruction they be not exposed to the disturbing influences of such milieu. But the risks of the scholastic cloister-life will be diminished by the age of the pupils, an age allowing in all cases the previous careful cultivation of the domestic affections, none being admitted till after the completion of their twentieth year. A competent governor, usually chosen from the, retired practitioners, will make it his especial aim to encourage in the school the continual subordination of the intellect to the heart, in view of a social mission with no alloy of monopoly, with the further aid derived from the diversity of callings and classes.

The better to attain the grand object of the institution, it is urgent that the French nation, which is to bear the whole ex-
pense, should use it to evidence the Occidental character of its action, by throwing it open within due limits to each of its immediate neighbours. During the whole of their existence, however, and it has a natural limit in the organic transition, the schools must not admit candidates from nations not included in the advanced guard of Humanity, a restriction intended to preserve the homogeneous character requisite for their success. But, as the instruction will always be public, the Eastern populations may be represented by out-pupils, most frequently volunteers, but at times specially nominated in accordance with the wishes of the government whose subjects they are.

There is no reason to fear that the want of a direct social mission will isolate the other pupils from the French, in such a way as to diminish energy and the continuity of exertions, from a disparity in zeal in two groups of invariably equal numbers. The non-existence of any monopoly places both on an equality of uncertainty in reference to their future career, any claims they may have being derived exclusively from an education and a reputation which they share in common. As the particular grounds on which the encyclopedic institution rests for its justification are of universal application, the pupils from the other Western nations, admitted, educated, and judged in the same way as the French, will turn to as good purpose as these last their final diploma.

To give freer play to the intellectual and moral influences of such intermixture of the nations, the French candidates are to know two Western languages, one Southern, the other Northern, and all the pupils will be bound to acquire by their own efforts, during their noviciate of three years, the Western languages they do not know. This regulation includes also the two sources of Western unity, as a consequence of the obligation to bring with them a knowledge of Latin and to acquire that of Greek. By putting the heavier pressure on the nation, which least recognises the common duty, to make it learn the languages of its neighbours, the law will be a wholesome stimulus to it to promote the formation of one universal language, a process at once spontaneous and systematic.

Considering the nature and aim of the Positive school, its normal type must be established at Paris, a hundred French candidates being annually admitted, with twenty-five from each of the other populations, Italian, Spanish, British and German.
At no great interval, however, the central dictatorial government should form a similar school in each provincial capital, with half the above numbers, but in all cases with a total of the Western pupils equal to the total of the French. The permanent need of unity of direction and of discipline in these seventeen nurseries will naturally induce the executive power to entrust their government and the choice of all their functionaries to the head of the Positive priesthood, alone competent to the task. The first recognition by the State of the High Priest of Humanity will consequently be in his quality of Director-General of the Positive schools. By discharging the office gratuitously, he will maintain the independence which his nomination to this post implies and facilitates, not letting himself be drawn by any seduction to depend for his subsistence on aught but the voluntary contributions of the true believers.

I may here dispense with any explanations as to the encyclopaedic teaching, the only difference between the transitional and the final state, in regard to it, being the reduction of the noviciate to three years, each year devoted to one of the three pairs of abstract sciences. The last year alone will have three courses of lectures, the object being that Biology and Sociology may lead up to and end in Morals, first as science, then as art. Each of the seven courses, which are always in succession, never simultaneous, will consist, as in the normal state, of forty lectures, three a week, with a month for preparation and examination between the two subjects of each year, so as to leave three months’ vacation after devoting ten weeks to the final examinations. But in the last year it will be necessary to have four lectures in the week, and to suppress the usual interval, for which there is not the same necessity, as the period of leaving is at hand. In regard to the first pair of sciences, the exceptional duplication of lectures is not necessary, owing to the knowledge previously acquired by the candidates, who are bound to know all the theories of geometry and mechanics which are fairly independent of the transcendental calculus. The better to ensure the synthetical character of the teaching, the courses of lectures, which begin each year after the festival of Humanity, will be preceded, in the case of the new students, by seven lectures on the First Philosophy. The great guarantee, however, that the teaching will not degenerate into mere academical pedantry, will, as in the normal state, be the obli-
gation on each professor to take the same pupils through the seven phases of their noviciate.

The professors by this arrangement being reduced to three, provision may be made for their choice, at the very beginning of the organic transition, by watching the essays at philosophical instruction of the people which will follow quite naturally on the abolition of the theoretical budget. If, against all probability, professors of a really encyclopedic capacity are not thrown up in this way, even for Paris, during the second phase, the Pontiff would urge the dictator to adjourn the creation of the school till such time as this fundamental condition were satisfactorily met. On its fulfilment must mainly depend the extension of the Positive schools to the several provinces, by availing ourselves of the best products of the central school.

As the teaching will occupy less time during the first two years, the professors of those two years will divide between them the examinations of those who are leaving, examinations on the three courses of the last year and, besides this, on the whole of their preceding studies, to be conducted with the same publicity as the lectures. But the examinations at the end of each of the two first years, and all the intermediate examinations, at which all pupils and the public will always be allowed to be present, require two special functionaries, each of the two examining the same pupils both years. Besides these examiners, to ensure success in study and to superintend the moral conduct, there must be two inspectors, on whom devolves the duty of questioning in public the three divisions, once a week, on the lectures of the preceding months, including the knowledge they brought with them at their admission, which is now revised from a philosophical point of view. Every Positive School, then, will require only seven scientific teachers, appointed as elsewhere by competition, seniority, and selection, with the salaries of three thousand, six thousand, and twelve thousand francs per annum—the scale of the priesthood. All must reside within the establishment, for the better performance of their office, as much a moral as an intellectual office, and the better to deserve the personal respect which their functions exact. 'No one of them may have any employment besides his post in the establishment, not even the two inspectors, when once definitively installed after three years of probation. It is desirable to introduce also, during the transition, the same
conditions of age as for the Positivist clergy, conferring the three degrees in teaching at twenty-eight, thirty-five, and forty-two, with individual exceptions, rarer at this time than in the final state.

The schools are, in the main, schools for scientific teaching, yet it is essential to persevere in the esthetic culture of the period before admission; for at their admission the candidates will have given proof of sufficient familiarity with singing and drawing. For these two arts a master from without will be required, with an income of nine thousand francs and the obligation to have no other engagement. These functionaries will have to direct and judge the graduated exercises, both active and passive, in the three divisions, the music master in winter, the drawing master in summer; and besides this, their main duty will consist in giving one weekly lecture to each group throughout the duration of the scientific lectures. The teaching on these subjects may be made more philosophical in character than any other, as it may introduce the study, both historically and dogmatically, of the language of music and the plastic arts. It will cultivate the sense of unity, statical and dynamical unity, by showing the dependence of the special arts of sound and of form on their common source in poetry, so tempering wisely by idealisation the intrinsic dryness of scientific abstraction.

To secure the full efficiency, intellectual and social, of the Positive schools, it is most important that the admission of candidates be so managed as that every guarantee be taken against the waste of the very considerable funds they will require, when established on a scale in accordance with the wants of the transitional period. Though the gratuitousness which is inseparable from the encyclopaedic instruction must, in the normal state, apply in all cases whatsoever, yet here, efforts, made at proportionately greater cost, will, at first, be limited to such as are capable of actively promoting the systematic regeneration of the West. There must therefore be a careful selection of them from all ranks in the five advanced populations, and the selection must be made by seven officers appointed for the purpose, they too named by the director-general of the Positive schools, and each receiving an income of twelve thousand francs.

It must be their duty to give two successive judgments, the
one of admissibility, the other for admission, the first in the spring, the second in the autumn. For the first, the French candidate has simply to repair to the capital of his province, the candidates of the other Western nations to Rome, Madrid, London, or Vienna, according to their country, European or colonial. After having divided amongst themselves the examination of Paris, the seven judges will take between them the four national capitals and the sixteen provincial capitals in order to pronounce on the admissibility of candidates, the tests being first a written, then an oral, examination in science, combined with exercises in art and testimonials of moral conduct. They will reject without examination candidates after three failures, so avoiding, as far as possible, useless attempts and ill-considered efforts. The provisional candidates so chosen will repair to Paris, at the expense of the French nation, there to undergo the examination for admission, three months after they have been declared admissible. The seven judges will divide this examination between them, each classifying the candidates he examines only so far as is necessary for the final decision, thus avoiding all mischievous emulation. On the termination of their several decisions, the seven will meet to complete their work, by naming the particular school out of the seventeen, which each of the candidates chosen is to join, in order to begin, at the winter solstice, his encyclopedic education.

It were well to place the preceding scheme before us as a whole, by summarising the extent of the organisation I have explained, and its cost. Each Positive school requires only eleven officers; two being practical: the governor invested with the general control of the whole; the steward on whom rests the business arrangements. If we assign these two, incomes of twenty thousand and eight thousand francs, we see, on reference to the other salaries, that a hundred thousand francs yearly suffice for the officials of each establishment, allowing a satisfactory payment to each. Estimating the annual expense of each scholar at a thousand francs, the seventeen schools together, at their full complement of five thousand students, will cost seven millions of francs (280,000£) and require two hundred functionaries, including the judges of admission. Such is the cost of an institution which is to supply, each year, for the different services in France nine hundred well-trained members, and distributes the same
number of rightly cultivated minds among the four adjacent
nations, at an expense for each noviciate of four thousand francs.

The professional complement of the institution should in
all cases be practice, under the superintendence of the chief
concerned, not requiring from him any teaching properly so
called. This rule must apply even in the case of the medical
body, in reference to which all who appreciate the above institu-
tion will not regret the existing schools, hopelessly deteriorated,
even in France, by ontology or materialism. Doctors may be
formed everywhere, as they are in England, by practice well
directed, especially when they have duly passed through the
encyclopedic curriculum, and no other at the present day de-
serves the protection of the government, given with a view to
the creation of the definitive order.

For such a preparation hospitals may be quite dispensed
with; yet as the institution is to subsist till the end of the
Western transition, we must turn to use its latest form, by
connecting it with the professional training in medicine of
those who adopt that profession after their systematic education.
The pupils of the Positive schools who aspire to be physicians
will form pairs, each pair receiving, during three years, clinical
instruction from one of the four physicians of the second grade
attached to the hospital. An allowance of fifteen hundred
francs yearly will provide for the maintenance of the candidate
during this noviciate, at the end of which his position must
depend on the open competition by which he is to enter the
public health service.

His practical studies during the above period will be
systematised chiefly by the reflections suggested by well-
directed reading, under the general impulse of the theories of
Biology. But, as an aid, he will have the explanations regularly
given by the three other functionaries of the hospital. During
his first year of clinical teaching, one of the two ordinary physi-
cians will treat, once a week, of the diseases of organic life, in
a series of forty lectures methodically arranged. Similarly, his
colleague will examine, in the following year, the diseases of
animal life properly so called. On the basis of these two series,
the senior physician will devote the last year to the explanation
of brain diseases and general pathology.

I am thus brought to the last point in the complete ap-
preciation of the Positive school, the description, that is, of the
latest form of this provisional institution, the hospital, an
institution which, wisely reorganised, may do good service,
prior to the adoption of the normal practice towards which it is
to be a step. Seven physicians carefully chosen, and above
money considerations, will be devoted exclusively to the hospi-
tal, each treating forty cases in addition to the gratuitous
advice given weekly by the physicians of the second grade to
out-patients. The direction is to centre wholly in the prin-
cipal physician, his residence and his office being on the ground
floor, whilst his six assistants occupy an adjoining house. The
hospital will be in three storeys, each storey with seven wards,
with no communication between the wards except by a com-
mon corridor, spacious enough to serve as a walk for the
convalescents who are unable to go down into the garden.
Each ward is to be broken up into thirteen rooms by fixed
partitions, with a window for each of the thirteen.

The chief town of each province (or intendancy) will have
three hospitals thus arranged, so providing for the separate treat-
ment of the sexes, and of children and old men. The depart-
ment of public health will be placed, for the whole of France,
under the control of the Director-General of the Positive
schools, with complete independence of the government, except
as to the expenses. This extension of the prerogative he enjoys
in regard to instruction will betoken the ultimate position of
the medical function as an appendage to the priesthood of
Humanity.

By such a regime, the principal abuses now existing are set
aside at once, more particularly post-mortem examinations, in
regard to which in the present anarchical state of Western
Europe unworthy advantage is taken of the poverty of the prole-
tery. The dissection of the human body, a practice coeval
with the modern revolution, ought by this time to have done
its work of preparation. But, if five centuries of ill-directed
efforts are not sufficient, Positivism will enforce an universal
respect for the dignity of the poor, which Catholicism in its
decline was unable to protect. In the hospital, as elsewhere,
none will be subject to the outrage of an autopsy without his own
free consent, ratified subsequently by his family. Physicians
must have but a feeble conviction of the necessity of such
examination, for those who most loudly advocate it seldom
direct their own bodies to be submitted to it.
Among the physicians supplied by the Positive school, the normal feeling on the subject will soon spring up, under the influence of the habits formed by their encyclopædic education, an education in which the rational use of induction and deduction will dispense with observations as irrational as they are immoral. I congratulate myself on having gone through all my studies in Biology without ever lowering my dignity as a philosopher by shedding the blood of man, or even of any animal. The condition will involve less difficulty for those who henceforward will be taught systematically what I was obliged to teach myself.

It were superfluous here to examine in equal detail the other public careers for which the Positive school will supply qualified occupants. The professional noviciate required for each will be equally achievable in three years, on a system of preparation analogous to the one given in the case of the medical profession. By open competition, the aspirant, after completing his education, will find himself everywhere in possession of a noble function, by the munificence of the French nation, on reaching the normal age for the sacrament of Destination, and he will present himself of his own accord to receive that sacrament from the new clergy which is forming.

To complete our examination of the influence of Positivism as a system of doctrine, during the second phase of the organic transition, it remains to place before the reader three special institutions, one technical in its character, the second scientific, the third esthetical.

I made an exception above in favour of veterinary schools, exempting them from the suppression which, by the abolition of the scientific budget, will be the fate of all the provisional establishments thrown up, in France more than elsewhere, during the latest stage of the revolution of the West. These veterinary schools may, in fact, promote not only the regeneration of the common instruction, but the adoption of the normal habits, if reorganised on system and so connected with the Positive school, the model on which they will be formed. Each provincial capital will have a veterinary institute with three professors, always in relation with the same pupils, and teaching them, in three years, the treatment, first of the carnivores, secondly of the herbivores, lastly of the ruminants. After having thus dealt with all the mammalia
which are useful to man,—the dog, the horse, and the ox being taken as types,—the final course of lectures should complete the subject by treating on a similar plan the whole remainder of the animal kingdom. It will pay special attention to the birds susceptible of domestication, then to the other useful vertebrates, followed by some invertebrates, nor should the lecturer fail to include in his teaching the pathology of the commoner vegetables. Such a course of instruction, at once practical and theoretical, requires, in this case too, the seclusion of the pupils, which is further justified by the need there is to form in them the normal state of feeling as regards the auxiliary races. Under the influence of the true religion, the three professors will have but little difficulty in implanting the sense of the nobility of a career directly consecrated to the furtherance of the most important branch of human policy, that in which the Great Being presides over the everdying coalition of living powers against death.

To reap the full benefit of these institutions, they must be maintained on a large scale and with a sound organisation during the whole course of their temporary existence, co-extensive with that of the Positive schools. Each receives annually fifty candidates, chosen by the three professors after a scientific examination, only dispensed with where the candidate has passed satisfactorily through the encyclopaedic schools. Their internal arrangements, in all essential points identical with those of these latter, should be such as to ensure a successful result, and require consequently seven functionaries for teaching, besides the governor and the administrator. The three grades in the hierarchy of teachers should have the same salaries as the corresponding ones in the Positive school and the normal hospital, the veterinary institute being a combination of both types. Again, it is important, here also, to place the whole of these establishments under the direction of the High Priest of Humanity, thus more clearly indicating and more fully carrying out their great object, intellectually as well as socially. His presiding influence will ensure in the school a constant respect for the dignity of life, even in the lowest auxiliaries of the Great Being, and will train the minds of the class best adapted for the sound propagation of Positivism among the proletaries, by even at this point placing the veterinaries in connection with the engineers. These are the conditions
which will strongly incline the dictatorial government, in its progressive stage, to consolidate the institution, by the creation of state appointments for the separate treatment of the useful animals, posts analogous to those occupied by the normal physicians, and the holders chosen, as they are, by open competition.

In the second place, the suppression of the chairs of literature, and literary corporations, involves an analogous attention to philological studies during the whole course of the organic transition. That there may be a systematic furtherance of the spontaneous process in the formation of an universal language, the dictator ought to devolve on the pontiff the superintendence of a special school of Philology, for which an institution at Paris will suffice. Three professors will, in three years, bring under the notice of non-resident pupils, attached in all cases to the same professor throughout their course, first the Fetichist languages, then the Polytheistic, lastly the Monotheistic, the prominent characteristics of which are, respectively, feeling, imagination, and reason. The conditions of admission should be, a sufficient knowledge of the seven Western languages, already familiar to the students drawn from the Positive school. As in such studies it is judicious practice, rather than teaching, to which we should look, the public course of lectures is, for each year, reduced to forty, in as many weeks; the great aim of the professor being to set forth clearly the step by step introduction of the universal language. Still, the three functionaries deserve incomes of twelve thousand francs, as being also directors of the central library, the library with which we begin the process of weeding out the accumulations of literature, which have already become of more harm than use. As destined, above all, to aid in the elaboration of the Positive language, and to this end modifying the most poetical of existing languages by the most philosophical, without neglecting any of the influences of the past, the philological school will help forward the organic transition by facilitating the transformation of diplomats into missionaries.

Thirdly and lastly I have to treat of the Western Theatre, to be established on such principles, as that, throughout the period of reorganisation, it may throw a lustre on the last days of an institution suited exclusively to the modern anarchy.
Its development, equally as a public and a private institution, during the last phase of the Western revolution, is a strong proof of the powerlessness of Catholicism, in its decline, to curb the revolutionary spirit, its most justifiable censures stimulating rather than conquering that spirit. It is for Positivism finally to suppress the theatre, as an institution at once irrational and immoral; and it will do so by reorganising the common education, and by founding, by Sociolatry, a system of festivals calculated to bring unprofitable satisfactions into contempt. Since reading has become so general that all can enjoy by themselves the master works of dramatic literature, the protection given to theatrical representations is solely an encouragement to mediocrity, and the factitious support in no way conceals the fact of their instinctive abandonment. For musical compositions alone would a public representation remain indispensable, were it not that the Positive worship, in a higher degree than in the Middle Ages and in Antiquity, offered a legitimate sphere for musical genius by incorporating it with the priesthood.

Nevertheless, during the last generation of this exceptional century, theatrical representations, under due regulation, may promote the advent of the universal education and of the normal form of existence. The repertory of each of the five Western nations supplies a sufficient number of masterpieces, dramatic or musical, to allow of one performance a week throughout the year, without ever condescending to secondary works and without a too frequent recurrence of the great works. The order in the week, in accordance with the classification of Sociology, will familiarise all Western Europe with the more eminent productions of the French nation and of its four sister nations, the Italian, the Spanish, the British and the German. In the capital of each intendency, the Western theatre will bring together, five times a week, all classes, to enjoy gratuitously the great dramatic productions, not more than two representations of each to be given in the course of the year. In withdrawing its other grants, the dictatorial government will act on the rich to induce them not to shrink, from pride, from mingling with the poor, for we must not concentrate on the poor the higher pleasures any more than the higher studies. Acting in concert with the Positive schools, the Western theatres will everywhere be an assistance in spreading the kindred languages, in
fostering national sympathies, and in extinguishing national prejudices. They too are under the direction of the Pontiff of Humanity, and will confirm the teaching of the worship as to the character of the Positive priesthood, that it is poetical no less than philosophical, and as such it will soon be called upon, in regard to the public museums, to take the place of oppressive or useless regulations.

Such is the system of provisional institutions, representing the influence of Positivism, as a body of doctrine, during the second phase of the organic transition, when the dictatorial government has taken a progressive attitude but without ceasing to be sceptical. If we combine this its spiritual influence with the practical measures by which I signalized the opening of the intermediate phase, we can appreciate the remarkable modification introduced into the situation of the West, so far as concerns the nation invested with the initiative of regeneration. On the other hand, if we compare this double series of improvements with the picture of the normal state, we feel to what an extent the final transition, in the second phase, still falls short of a really constructive character, a character exclusively reserved for its final phase.

During the two first, the adoption respectively of the two mottoes,—the political and the moral,—characteristic of the Western Republic, is equivalent rather to the statement of an appropriate programme than to a satisfactory solution. The first is the expression of the fundamental combination which is to close the revolution; the other points out the necessary source of this combination, but cannot effect it. Were this the permanent state, the only result of the two formulae would be a more vivid sense of the indispensable conditions, not the supplying the leading deficiencies. In a word, the French people would continue to oscillate between anarchy and reaction, as it has done since the opening of the present century. In contradiction with the spirit of the new mottoes, the attitude of the dictatorship would be a constant source of uneasiness to the people by its excessive attention to order, of alarm to the patricians by its aspirations after progress.

Whether it remain hypocritical or become liberal, scepticism is ever unable to construct. In spite of the universal desire to eliminate all caprice, that of the people and that of God equally, law can only take the place of will, under the condition of a

Yet the second phase is not, any more than the first, truly organic.

The adoption successively of the two mottoes offers a programme rather than a solution.

Scepticism can construct nothing.
perpetual invocation of Humanity. Both principles, that of anarchy and of retrogression, will continue to coexist so long as the transition has not taken an essentially religious character, if not in the less advanced mass of mankind, at any rate in all the more chosen spirits.

An examination in detail of the two first phases, first from the temporal then from the spiritual point of view, confirms the conviction of their defectiveness. By the suppression of the theoretic budget and the standing army, it would seem that the French nation was moving towards the American type, the most prominent representative of the anarchy of the West. The spiritual movement is less incomplete, as not essentially persisting in mere negation, still it is indecisive owing to a deficiency of system in its advance. The development of the Positive worship under the first phase, by the aid of the historical calendar, wants the full religious character, as its public festivals, even when abstract, have not private worship for their basis. In the intermediate phase, the institution of Positive schools and their various adjuncts does not represent a direct reorganisation of the common education, though indirectly it may be a preparation for this regeneration by renovating the leading professions.

A revolution which, in all its main features, is intellectual, would seem, by the nature of the case, destined to indefinite prolongation, so long as it is not avowedly under the guidance of that theory to which the whole of the past promises success. Till such time as the central dictatorship adopt the religion of Positivism, an internal conflict of principles, and indecision, will continue to be the characteristic of our Western movement. All parties equally will continue to misjudge the nature of the modern revolution; they will only agree in adopting a political treatment for a disease which is spiritual. The revolutionary party, in especial, is liable to this reproach, for, instead of seeing in the effete of their own doctrines a reason for embracing Positivism, it leads them to aim directly at a political reconstruction, and subordinate to that aim the moral regeneration which should preside over such reconstruction. The retrograde party is less behindhand, for it recognizes the spiritual anarchy; but it too is in a false position, owing to the weakness of its doctrine, which inclines them to base the reconstruction of belief upon compression by force.
The point, then, to which I have brought the final transition is this: that in its leading features the actual situation remains unchanged, though many valuable if insufficient improvements have been introduced. Hence it is evident that the last generation of the exceptional century can be truly organic only in its third phase, the period which I have now to examine.

The great distinction between it and the two others is, that in it the dictator professes Positivism, not merely respects it or assists it. Though the milieu continue sceptical, the government, without infringing liberty, avowedly moves towards the universal ascendency of the religion of Humanity; consequently the regime of that religion is placed on the same footing of supremacy as its doctrine and its worship. A doctrine, the essential characteristic of which is its applicability to the government of society, cannot excite strong and effective sympathies when men shrink from applying it directly to its principal destination, whilst all the time they admit the danger or the futility of the other beliefs. If then a really organic character is to attach to the direction of affairs in the West, there must be no other discrepancy in the provisional attitude of the government, but that between its religious advance and the sceptical state of the public. This should be the distinctive character of the phase which I am now to organise, one of longer duration than the two others together, as destined to issue in the definitive order. For the sake of precision, I venture to express the comparison in a numerical form; assigning seven years to the first stage of the organic transition, five to the second, twenty-one to the third. It is in this way that the philosophy of history, after beginning with the explanation of centuries, and then passing to generations, in its latest development, under the impulse of a practical need, ends by demarcating the three ages of one exceptional generation.

The peculiar mark of the last phase of the organic transition should be found in the definitive substitution of a triumvirate acting on system for the empirical and sceptical dictator who was the natural director of the two others. The primary object of so necessary a change is to instil, even at this early period, a presentiment as to what should be the normal form of the temporal government, as explained in the preceding chapter. The three chiefs of the Preparatory Government cannot, it is true, as yet, wear the definitive character ulteriorly attaching to the
sociocratic dictatorship, but they should approach it as nearly as is possible in so provisional a position of affairs. Their plurality following a monocracy,—in its earlier stage a conservative, in its later a progressive, monocracy—this of itself announces that the temporal power must of necessity be divided. The capital importance of this indication is enhanced by the contrast naturally presented by the spiritual authority; for this latter, long concentrated in the founder of the Religion of Humanity, will perhaps not be upheld by a competent clergy till towards the middle of the period under consideration.

But besides this legitimate reason for the change, the accession to power of the Positivist triumvirate will be a consequence of an exceptional requirement, which admits of no hesitation. Whilst taking the place of the monarchy, the central dictatorship retains, since the outbreak of the ultimate crisis, the confusion of the two powers which has been on the increase during the whole course of the Western revolution. Usurpation of the functions of the spiritual by the temporal power,—be it in the name of revolution or of reaction—perpetuates both alike, and is a direct rejection of the fundamental principle of modern civilization. Now, it is in the substitution of the triumvirate for the dictator that lies the only decisive guarantee of the purely temporal character which the government has been induced to assume during the two preliminary phases of the organic transition. Antecedents and prejudices—both equally being adverse to the renunciation by the temporal power of spiritual authority, such renunciation will always remain incomplete or precarious, so long as it has it in its power to revoke a concession which, by the nature of the case, must at first be a purely voluntary act. Another Frederic might, for a time, by his attitude, be a security against this particular danger, but there would be nothing to preclude its opposite, the more dangerous usurpation involved in the attempt to secure by law the ascendancy of the Positive religion, without waiting for the conversion of the milieu. Error, in this direction, an error in which instinct and system concur, is the more serious, in that, so long as the government of the French nation is vested in a single chief, it is the High Priest of Humanity who more than any one would seem to be deserving of so high an office.

The directing power once finally divided, the two opposite
forms of usurpation become both equally impossible. Spiritual authority is, by virtue of its synthetical character, incompatible with a plurality of organs, notwithstanding the precedents of councils and academies, ever revolutionary if not completely subordinate. It is on this ground that the spiritual head can no longer accept a fragment of empire than the industrial chiefs can absorb the function of consultation, a function always indivisible, as requiring a grasp of the whole, such as no committee can have.

The division of the temporal power finds, then, its justification, in reference to internal government, in the combined demands of order and progress; whilst, in reference to external affairs, it offers a satisfactory guarantee for the maintenance of peace in Western Europe. Not to dwell on the deviation into militarism which marked the opening of the nineteenth century, the West could not, without grave disquietude, see the dictatorship in France remain monocratic in form, when once its progressive attitude had conferred on it a real popularity. In the absence of an aristocracy strong enough to prevent the misdirection of so great a power, the adjacent nations would justly feel alarmed, and the personal character of the ruler would be unable entirely to dissipate such alarm. Whereas, on the contrary, the non-existence of such an aristocracy becomes a security for tranquillity when a triumvirate is in power, for such a government, however great its popularity, must always lack the consistency and the continuity inherent in the policy of a senate. The three rulers of France, if convergent, would be so only by virtue of their common adhesion to the Positive faith, and this faith prescribes respect for the independence of the West quite as much as respect for spiritual liberty, both in the name of their social mission.

We see thus, how the installation of a triumvirate in France is an announcement and a guarantee of the political supremacy of Positivism at the opening of the last phase of the organic transition. Had the three leaders not openly embraced the religion of Humanity, their quarrels would involve France in disorder, perhaps in bloodshed; or, as an alternative, the division of power would be a delusion. On the other hand, the division ensures the independence of the Positivist priesthood, and proclaims the decided superiority of the moral movement over political agitation. It is in this way that the organic
transition will move forwards to its normal result, putting forward most unmistakeably the religious character of the Western revolution, hitherto masked by social contests, as well at home as abroad. The form of government, then, adapted to the ultimate state is also the one best suited to the provisional, so that the passage from the one to the other may be in a true sense gradual, in accordance with the basic law of continuity both in thought and action.

As it is the special mission of Positivism to secure the fuller triumph of this law, it will protect it against any infringement when once it has the direction of the social movement. A fitting opportunity for its exemplification is the passage,—a step so momentous,—from the monocratic dictatorship to the systematic triumvirate, the installation of which is incompatible with all violence, as contrary to its organic mission. In a sceptical milieu, a milieu if not hostile, at least indifferent, to the regenerating faith, we may not conceive of the change as wrought otherwise than by the voluntary initiative of the dictator, when alive to its necessity. Since he has already changed so far as to become, and that sincerely, progressive, there is no reason why he should not, without being completely Positivist, so far correctly estimate the general conditions of the phase which has for its immediate object the terminating the Western revolution. If he have the will, the dictator has nothing to do but to use his plenary power to introduce in due form this indispensable change, thus earning an undying glory, and escaping the blame which attaches to all fruitless resistance to the laws of Humanity.

The transformation should be peacefully effected through a last modification of the ministerial system, an institution dating from the second phase of the modern revolutionary movement, when the monarchy, especially in France, lost its power to wield the dictatorship it had recently obtained. The royal initiative became more and more limited to the choice or dismissal of the leading men—by the force of our statement more than one—between whom were divided the office of government, in accordance with the difference in the services required. Such a distribution of power is involved in the activity of modern times by its nature, which is essentially analytical; and it acted as a natural guarantee of the division of the two powers, allowing, as it did, political unity only as a result of a common
THE TRANSITION.

391

doctrine, the representative of which doctrine was the official dictator. Since the outbreak of the French revolution, the dangers have been such as always to call for one central will, and the definitive submission of parliamentary anarchy to that will. But such condensation of power, necessary as it is at present for the maintenance of order, has no real justification but in the weakness of the prevailing doctrine, which can only supply formulae, not suggestions for our guidance. The power of Positivism to direct society once adequately recognised, it will be seen that a demonstrable faith constitutes, between the several political chiefs, a more complete and stable bond than that offered by one paramount will, ever liable as it is to vacillation as a natural result of its scepticism. Under these conditions the provisional institution of ministers will merge its functions in the systematic triumvirate, which it substitutes, by a peaceful process, for an empirical dictator.

A common doctrine as the basis of common political action,—the necessity of this, if more pronounced in the normal state, holds primarily for all the phases of the preliminary regime, not merely under the Theocracy, but also after the development of military activity. War is by nature synthetical in character, and yet it was not war but religion that was, at all times, the bond of union with the Roman patriciate, and the imperial dictatorship inherited it. Under this aspect Theologism and Positivism differ only, in that the first allows the temporal chiefs to be the representatives of the directing synthesis, whilst the second confines this function exclusively to the spiritual chiefs. Therefore it is that the temporal dictatorship, if it remain monocratic, must continue to be retrograde; it will aim, that is, at spiritual authority, and it can only apply for such to the older faith. If it assume a progressive character by renouncing this futile claim, then its natural policy is to complete the change by raising its ministers into governors proper, so to avouch quite openly their practical or industrial character, the natural corrective of previous aberrations.

Still it must be kept in mind that in modern times the constitution of the temporal power forbids excessive dispersion no less than an extreme condensation. The irreversible abolition of the parliamentary regime should have, as its proximate result, a diminution in the number of departments, the multiplication of which was solely due to a desire to offer more openings for
restless ambition. All need of such a concession being removed by the progressive attitude of the government, it will be felt that three ministers are all that it requires, each holding three of the present offices.

In effecting this concentration, with the view of facilitating the peaceful advent of the systematic triumvirate, it is desirable to pave the way, as far as possible, for the normal regime, by bringing into relief, even now, the industrial character of the temporal government as finally constituted. The three ministers who are to survive should share amongst them the departments of industry; the minister of the interior taking agriculture, the minister of finance manufacture, the minister of foreign affairs commerce. As, however, the sole object of this distribution at that time is to give, by anticipation, a juster idea of the normal constitution of the temporal power, it need involve no change in the names at present used; they will still be the best till the close of the organic transition.

With the first ministry, the great distinctive attribution of which is the police, we must combine the actual department of justice, and that of public instruction, now confined, as we have seen, to the primary schools, except as regards the superintendence of private establishments. The second ministry will absorb the management of public works, a branch of administration which ought soon to become purely financial, when the suppression of all special corporations shall have led to a greater degree of freedom in their execution. Lastly, the third ministry will annex all the duties, military, naval, or colonial, which remain after the transformation of the army into a constabulary.

Such is the concentration of ministerial functions which will prepare the peaceful advent of the systematic triumvirate, when the progressive dictator shall be sufficiently amenable to the counsels of Positivism. He will make the change easier by giving his three ministers the title of governors, as more in accordance with their duties, and susceptible of indefinite continuance. After a sufficient trial of the ministers he has selected, he will inaugurate the latest phase of the organic transition by transferring to them the dictatorial government of France, thus definitively vested not in one but in a number.

The change is such as to require that Positivism have so far modified its sceptical milieu, as to enable it to throw up
three statesmen in whom the supreme ruler may place entire confidence. Destined as they are to be the first holders of offices which will give them the power, allowing for exceptions, of choosing their successors, their own nomination can at first be due solely to the free suggestion of the pontiff of Humanity, who alone is competent to propose them to the noble dictator. This exceptional initiative, the first really decisive manifestation of the social power of the priesthood of Positivism, should, as much as possible, foreshadow the normal regime, by its conforming to the systematic distribution of the industrial functions. We may at present hope soon to find, among French bankers, a competent minister of foreign affairs. But as, for the ministry of the interior, it is not yet possible to comply with the normal conditions, we must place in it an agricultural patrician, one shown by his previous life to have the nobility of thought and feeling so important an office requires. For the direction of the finances, the most important branch of administration so long as the transition lasts, on the same principle we should seek for a minister amongst the manufacturing capitalists, were it not that their intellectual and moral state prescribes a serious modification. More than the others deteriorated by empiricism and egoism, as is seen by its more marked leaning to oppressive monopolies, the political incapacity of this class will compel the progressive dictator to choose one of their workmen to be entrusted with the most important department.

This admission of a proletary to a place in the systematic triumvirate is the only really great anomaly imposed on the preparatory government. But it has such solid justification in the conditions of the moment, that it should awaken no alarm in sincere and clear-sighted conservatives, not even if it were found desirable to extend it to the two other departments. As the classes which in the normal state are to govern, are at present, in heart and mind, unequal to such charge, our only resource is to find in personal merit a guarantee which social position does not as yet provide. Now, looking to the whole history of the past in modern times, it is amongst proletaries that are most likely to be found, in largest proportion, men really fitted for political power by their wide range of thought and their generosity of feeling. The whole difficulty lies in the bringing them forward acceptably, when, under the
guidance of a truly organic doctrine, the dictator has made his selection. Their accession to power under these conditions, without any demagogic influences, can in no wise encourage the tendency to declassment, inasmuch as it is avowedly an anomaly made necessary by the transitional state of things. Suppose it definitive, and it would at once be seen to involve a contradiction; for plebeians, to become chiefs, must abandon the position to which they owe their intellectual and moral claims; whilst, in obtaining power, patricians are in keeping with themselves.

Over and above their individual value, the proletary ministers will bring to the preparatory government the aid of their class, at once from a negative and positive point of view. Their accession offers a powerful security against demagogues; for they, always sprung from the bourgeoisie and the literary bourgeoisie in particular, will thus find superiors in the very class on which their ambition leans for support. Not only will the people not assist them, it will place them in presence of invincible competitors, by putting in power the best organs of the proletariat, and, as such, qualified to throw discredit upon rhetoricians and sophists by the mere force of contrast. But the chief reaction of this anomaly is the assistance it gives in regenerating the patrician body; it will lead, that is, the capitalists to feel what are the intellectual and moral conditions of the power normally vested in their class. Instead of separating the proletariat from the patriciate, the temporary accession of the higher types of the working classes will bring the poor and rich into union, with the aim of eliminating the bourgeoisie, as the main seat of Western anarchy.

Such is the peaceful process by which the preparatory government should be installed in France, at the opening of the last phase of the organic transition. For several years I have been working at the choice of persons, so to have it in my power duly to discharge my function of adviser, when the dictator shall be sensible of the value of philosophical suggestions, inherently free from all admixture of ambition. Applying to the judgment of persons principles tested in the estimate of events, I hope to find men able to obtain the confidence of the dictator and the public, and to find them amongst the practicals whom Positivism has already regenerated. When
complete and definitive, I shall in due time announce my choice, in order that a careful examination may render easier and simpler their free acceptance. In the normal state the action of the Positive priesthood will be limited to the sanction of governors chosen by their predecessors; during the transition it should turn to account the authority it derives from general assent, by proposing for inauguration those on whom it will devolve to name their successors.

Sociocratic continuity cannot as yet wholly supersede the principle of election, the substitute, and more completely so as time advanced, for the theocratic continuity. But it were well to nullify as much as possible this subversive practice, especially as regards the highest governors, whose duty it will be, subsequently, to choose at their discretion all the government functionaries. Though a triumvir cannot, on retirement, name unconditionally his successor, he may always propose him to the seventeen electors chosen by universal suffrage; such suffrage in this case, as in that of the financial assembly, to be modified by delegation and publicity.

The citizens of Paris, grouped according to the provinces in which they were born, will name these seventeen special delegates, who will pronounce upon the choice proposed. If they accept the choice, the decision of the metropolis will be submitted to the provinces for ratification, the provinces being represented by the sixteen capitals, ten of which at least must confirm the decision by universal suffrage. If the choice is rejected, the triumvir will be bound to submit a second name to the same electors, who will only take the initiative in case of a second rejection.

Any arbitrary limit of time is out of place, where the power rests upon confidence and is guaranteed by responsibility. Yet there must always be some means of removing, peacefully, unworthy governors, supposing them to take no account of just blame, and so not to withdraw when they should. To reconcile the two wants, the electoral system just described may be brought into play for a judgment on the successor of the governor to be removed, such successor to be named by the industrial capitalist with whom originates the accusation, an accusation approved by nineteen other Parisian capitalists. To avoid haste and passion, the nomination, always with the statement of some definite grievances and with the signatures of its twenty
supporters—must not be legally valid till it has been twice placarded, at three months' interval. The discussion before the vote, and the possibility that the triumvir attacked may be continued in office, will as a general rule lead either to the withdrawal of an accusation which is the subject of general blame, or to the seasonable retirement from office of the person incriminated.

I must here pause a moment in my exposition of the Preparatory Government, in order to preserve the memory of two incidents, of a nature to strengthen our just confidence in the popular instinct when not misled by metaphysical influences. My original conception in 1848 on the mode of eliminating mischievous governors, involved, in spite of myself, larger concessions to revolutionary prejudices than the one here given. However I was soon able to act on my natural instinct, thanks to the noble wisdom of two proletaries, worthy associates of mine in the Positivist Society, before which I laid the whole conception of the organic transition. The capital amendment, the rejection, that is to say, of any purely negative blame, the compelling the accuser to offer a substitute, came from the plebeian statesman to whom Positivism owes the luminous aphorism: *Work can never be wanting*. Another workman subsequently struck out, with equal originality and modesty, the happy idea of confining the power of legal accusation to the capitalist class.

As the last point in estimating the degree of social ascendancy attained by Positivism, if it is to be competent to establish aright the Preparatory Government, the obligation to adopt the system as a whole must be limited to those offices which are of a strictly political character. Were the triumvirs alone adherents of the regenerative faith, their ordinary action would be hampered by the indifference or hostility of their chief subordinates, even supposing these last to be simply sceptical. But it is as unnecessary as it is impracticable to go further, and require the conversion of such agents as are strictly administrative, for they are always predisposed to propagate the impulse they receive, and which is independent of them. The only preference of such agents, as a body, for the Positivist dictatorship will be due to their sense of greater security in their offices, with a more honourable service. Then, their just promotion will not be stopped by the reservation of the higher administrative posts
for political adventurers, thrown up by parliamentary anarchy or servile obsequiousness to a dynasty.

Reduced to the utmost, the obligation of complete adhesion to the prevailing doctrine may be confined to the two services, foreign and domestic, which are in immediate dependence on the triumvirate. If the nine ambassadors and the seventeen intendants are true Positivists, their aid will suffice for the Preparatory Government to organize on a proper footing its administrative services, whatever the belief of its agents, assuming them to be zealous and competent. The office of sub-prefect, may even of prefect, stripped of its present semblance of political power, will be filled habitually by men chosen by the governors of their respective provinces from the class of special administrators.

So concentrated in twenty-nine statesmen, the political direction of France may really fall to Positivism at the period above assigned, at the beginning, that is, of the last phase of the organic transition. In the course of the twelve previous years, the Positivist doctrine ought to gain influence, to a degree which it would be difficult to estimate, prior to its making its way into the milieu most in consonance with its immediate destination, one mainly concerning the governors of society. For it is they whom Positivism comes forward to rescue from the pressure which is the necessary consequence of their scepticism, now that the prevalent need of society is, definitively, reconstruction. In all the West, and in France above all, statesmen are obliged to court by turns, and at times together, revolution and reaction, because they have not the convictions which would enable them to triumph over both. It is to Positivism they will owe the full realization of what has hitherto been a barren though constant wish,—ever since the explosion of the French Revolution,—the combination of Order and Progress. Positivism alone can enable them to regain their personal selfrespect and to give free play to their social action, as no longer compelled to appear to hold views in unison with the belated state of those whom it is their object to guide. Openly invested, in the name of Humanity, with the necessary power, they will appreciate, in the plenitude of public life, the holy aphorism suggested, naturally, by private life to her who is my eternal companion: What pleasures can carry it over those of devotion to the welfare of others?
Weary of a scepticism daily more and more at variance with the actual conditions of the West, minds of the higher order cherish in secret the aspiration of freeing themselves from its degrading and paralysing influence, in order to devote themselves, more than at any other time, to the regeneration of the race. But they cannot attain purity and elevation save under the guidance of the faith which claims to regulate the present in the name of the future as deduced from the past. The time is not distant when Positivism will have rallied to itself such men, so far as to enable them to obtain an honourable ascendancy, in a world where, from the absence of complete convictions, there can be no strong resistance to a systematic action.

Then at once will disappear the anomaly which at present exists, the anomaly, namely, by which certain natures seem in exclusive possession of the practical virtues, especially energy and perseverance, the commonest of the attributes of man, since they are found in all the animals which are in any real sense active. The apparent rarity of these qualities is one of the most striking features of our modern anarchy, where the absence of convictions leads to irresolution. Its tendency to neutralize devotion and courage is seen most active in the highest natures, as they can find no fitting sphere except in public life, and public life has become, in the absence of a religion, the privileged appurtenance of vulgar ambitions. When the Positive faith shall raise and league together those who are born to command, it will be seen, more than ever, how superior are the qualities of the intellect, and still more of the heart, to those of the character, these latter being rarely absent when there is a well-defined and consistent purpose. So will disappear of itself the singular error now prevailing, of confounding energy with cruelty, an error due to our not having the opportunity of observing the full development of energy in men capable of applying it, in the pursuit of great objects, with settled and complete convictions.

Three successive instances, in the last hundred years, have given conclusive evidence that the tendency—and a growing tendency—of things in the West, is to give political supremacy, in France, to any doctrine, if even provisionally adapted to the mission of regeneration with which it is invested. Twenty years after the publication of the Encyclopædia the last holder
of the monarchical dictatorship confided the government of France to the Encyclopaedists, socially represented by the Economists. At the opening of the final crisis, the Republicans were less numerous than the Positivists are now; notwithstanding, in four years they became masters, and that without any large increase of their numbers. Far from being due to the insurrection which manifested it, this consequence of the then situation of France would have been reached earlier, had the convulsion been prevented according to the hypothesis indicated at the end of my third volume. Lastly, when, on the reestablishment of peace in Europe, the necessity of combining Order with Progress was generally recognised, eclecticism, as apparently meeting the want, was dominant under various forms during the greater part of the Parliamentary generation, and that in spite of the fact that the number of Eclectics was small to a proverb.

This concourse of examples is so much the more conclusive, in that, in all three cases, the doctrines, though the only ones then acceptable, could in no sense comply with the fundamental conditions. This being so, they strengthen our confident anticipations of the advent of Positivism to power, anticipations suggested by its peculiar competence to direct Society. The age in which any great thing seems hopeless, such is the intellectual and moral anarchy, this age promises those who labour worthily in the cause of the renovating Faith unparalleled satisfactions, as the aim we set before us is also without parallel.

I have sufficiently treated the constitution, and the advent to power, of the Positivist triumvirate; and I may now describe its general course, on an examination, first, of its rule of conduct, then, of its most important measure.

In the last phase of the organic transition, the proximate termination of the Western revolution will be announced by raising, at its commencement, the normal standard, with all the emblems which accompany it, for the statement of which in detail I refer to the ‘General View.’ The two characteristic mottoes have, it is true, been already adopted; yet their adoption, one after the other, was the expression rather of a wish than of a principle, so long as the attitude of the dictatorial government could be but in imperfect unison with them. But when Positivism, after modifying the policy, succeeds in
changing the form of the government, the two formulas take the character of a definitive programme, the triumph of which is shown in the change of colour; a change which, without any breach of continuity, disclaims all connection with revolution. At this juncture comes the third motto of the normal regime: *Live without concealment*, the complement of the other pair, as supplying the practical condensation of the system, the system, at once moral and political, which is now adopted finally and for ever. Meant more particularly for public life, this last symbol is peculiarly appropriate as the device for the French coins; this enunciation on them of the means dispensing with a statement of the principle and the result, between which it is the indispensible connection.

To see the full bearing of such a formula, we must keep in view, that its adoption by the government marks the rise of a systematic policy, otherwise the motto were but the announce- ment of a moral purpose, not of a political determination. Although the mediæval period nobly asserted it in private life, it was unable to extend it duly to public; this, in spite of the aspirations of Chivalry, continued to rest mainly upon mystery and intrigue. Without ignoring the evil feelings which had a share in this result, we are bound to assign as its principal ground, the impossibility of living openly when the future is dark and opinion uncertain. The device, then, is an indication of the decisive acceptance of a doctrine capable of giving systematic expression both to political previsions and to the public judgments. As this twofold systematization is the mark of the ultimate regeneration, its special announcement should be the formula appropriate to human activity, although it draws its greatest value as a symbol from its capacity of representing the symbols which relate to intellect and feeling.

Sign and condition of synthesis in thought as of loyalty in action—the rule is as suitable for the Positive spirituality as for the pacific temporality. Prior to formulating it, I had always instinctively acted on it, from the very first steps I took, the better to prepare the minds of men for my concep- tions, and to perfect those conceptions by the results of their statement, by their influence whether in connection with others or upon myself. I have never ceased to congratulate myself on the practice, though it has often exposed me, either to mistaken objections or to dishonest plagiarism. But its widest
application is in political action, for there the results are more
definite and more immediate, and consequently, public dis-
cussion may be of greater assistance in the execution and
correction of plans, or even in purifying motives. Hence it
is, that the Positivist triumvirate will evidence the thoroughly
organic character of the third phase of the final transition by
its invariable habit of announcing all its measures in time to
allow of their examination by all.

Two, three, or six months, according to the urgency and
importance of the case,—these intervals have always appeared
to me, on this head, to meet all fair requirements. Adopting
the judicious extension of the principle suggested by one of
the most eminent of my theoretic disciples, these intervals
must be observed as much for nominations and dismissals as
for abstract resolutions, in order to give security to functionaries
and to avoid intrigues. They are of sufficient length to enable
the whole of the West, the colonies inclusive, to take part
in the free expression of opinion to which the dictatorial
government of France nobly appeals; the slightest actions of that
government now being of importance to mankind as connected
with its high mission. The triumvirs will thus be disen-
cumbered of their legal advisers,—a source of embarrassment as
of expense,—their administrative services being better dis-
charged by a remoulded bureaucracy. But the practice must
never be allowed to impair the independence of the governors
or their responsibility, the groundwork of both being always
a noble character. Not only is it open to them to act against
the aggregate opinion, even supposing it unanimous, but, in
case of need, they will not hesitate to decide without waiting
for its expression, taking of course the risk of legal accusation to
which such conduct exposes them. To ensure the fuller applica-
tion of the Positivist rule, each triumvir will decide alone, on
measures as on men, whenever his own department alone is
concerned.

The solemn inauguration of this course of action will be the
important proclamation, at the beginning of the last phase, of
the chief measure of the Preparatory Government, viz., the
political disregregation of France by the transformation of the
intendancies into republics. Although this measure, as the
outcome of the whole organic transition, must mark its con-
clusion, the prospective familiarity with it will be indicative

(1) Its chief
measure.
The Intend-
ancies be-
come Re-
publics.

VOL. IV.
of the new human providence which judiciously modifies its destinies whilst consciously accepting them. Far from weakening the central dictatorship, such an announcement will strengthen its rational ascendancy, as supplying sounder reasons for the measures necessitated by this great transformation, the habitual prospect of which will be a guide to both government and people in the development of the provisional regime.

Such dismemberments have been frequent during the long course of the education of mankind, but never without giving rise to serious catastrophes, from the impossibility of clearly foreseeing and directing them. It must, then, be looked upon as a decisive triumph, both for the science and the art of politics, this faculty of peaceably effecting the most important of all dismemberments, after a wise recognition of its necessity, in connection with the whole system of statical and dynamical laws which govern society in its normal state.

In my second volume I satisfactorily established the fundamental principle, that for a free and lasting association the condition is the voluntary grouping of a certain number of towns, with their respective country districts, around a city which has risen to the rank of a capital. This law, one of whose importance the Middle Ages had a just sense, and without which the Country cannot link, in any true sense, the Family to Humanity, presides, in the preceding chapter, over the normal division of the Earth into Sociocracies on the scale of the French intendancies. All the reasons for such limitation in the ultimate state have greater validity at its introduction, from the time that the systematic development of the religion of Humanity has removed the only justification of later anomalies. As a guarantee of order and of progress internally, the break up of the greater states ought in all cases to be welcomed, and in equal degree, by the priesthood which it emancipates, the patriciate which it raises, the proletariat for which it makes room. Externally, it ensures general peace by making invasion impossible, even before the other Western nations have acted on the example of France, for it is the concentration of France that alone is formidable and, as such, constitutes a special obligation on her to initiate the new policy. Her mission of regeneration ought to do away with all hesitation as to the measure, for her political decomposition becomes the basis of her religious presidency, the bequest of the whole past—especially
past. If we give the word Catholicism its etymological acceptance, applicable only to Positivism, the revolution of the West is simply the substitution of the Catholicism of Paris for that of Rome, when Paris shall be merely the spiritual capital of Humanity.

This holy city cannot even become the religious centre of the French territory, so long as it is not properly purified by renouncing its temporal domination, the retention of which would raise a fear lest there should be an oppressive combination of the two powers. Sadly as the grand result of the mediæval period has suffered from modern anarchy, Metaphysics have yet never been able to prevent the general instinct from feeling the growing opportuneness of the division of the two powers, as more in harmony with our existence than with that of our ancestors. And in the alarm lest it be set aside we have the latent source of the instinctive antipathies, nay even of the idle jealousies, often felt by the provinces of France in regard to the spiritual leadership of Paris; they feel themselves threatened with an indefinite consecration of the political tyranny by which they are at present hampered.

It is, then, for the most centralised nation, in the name of its human mission, to set a decisive example of a peaceful decomposition, an example which will soon find imitators everywhere, were it only as a consequence of the catastrophes caused elsewhere by obstinate adherence to routine. Not passing, here, beyond the limits of the West, I point to American independence as having, in the last century, irrevocably initiated the steady movement towards the decomposition of the great states. One might even go farther back to the Dutch revolution, were it not that the political significance of that event is modified by its religious character. But when we see the separation for ever of two populations, united by language and by faith, not to speak of their common and not remote origin, no one can be mistaken as to the real source of the political disruption. It was natural that the verification of the law of cities should have its first instance in the case of the colonies, and they have given it additional confirmation in South America, notwithstanding the greater closeness of the connection with the mother country both in religion and politics. Without waiting for the extension of the process, in these two typical cases, by the inevitable break-up of the secondary nationalities they have formed,
nationalities in their turn of exorbitant dimensions, all statesmen should even now forecast its spread to the European states. If so, instead of vain regrets, all should prepare to submit with decorum to this destiny, above all in France, as invested with the initiative of regeneration, an initiative which precludes such regrets.

At the beginning of the final crisis, there was a dim sense of this fatality in the party which was least mistaken as to the true character of the Western revolution, its essentially intellectual character. But in its aspiration after the normal disgregation of France, it was wrong by a century as to its epoch, nor can we blame the terrible punishment of its mistake, when we consider the guilty vanity which made it set itself, so mistaken, against a defence as necessary as it was difficult. When the heroism, however empirical, of its two opponents had secured the independence of the French nation, it soon became possible to estimate duly the merit of the Girondist anticipation, by virtue of the disappearance, in the natural course of things, of the main justification for a provisional concentration. The peace of Europe has strengthened the tendency in this direction by removing as well the fear of invasion from without, as the dread of coalitions within its limits. So it is, that I can judge quietly, with the perfect freedom of the true philosopher, a premature political conception, which cost my spiritual Father, Condorcet, his life, on the groundless suspicion that he approved of it.

As a step to the gradual adoption of this great change, the Positivist triumvirate should allow the Intendants, when tested by seven years' right exercise of power, the choice of their successors, who will on this plan be more identified with the population they are to govern. Each Intendancy should be made into an independent republic, as soon as it complies with the religious conditions of political emancipation, not waiting till the other provinces have also earned their independence, the essence of which is the substitution of local triumvirs for the intendant. Before the general accomplishment of this change, it will have already attained its great object as regards the organic transition in its totality; be it by purifying the attitude of Paris as the spiritual capital, be it by putting an end to the perturbing power of ambition, the great stimulus to which lay in the centralisation.
It remains for me now to explain at length the course, as a political and religious movement, of the principal phase of the organic transition, the phase, that is, the leading features of which are given in the two measures just explained. Its very predominance, however, renders it impossible for its exposition to be on a scale proportionate to that allotted to the two preliminary modes; which, be it remembered, are of more immediate interest and derive less light from the normal type. In order then not to injure at once this explanation and the whole survey of the transition, I feel that it will be better to adjourn it till the time be fully ripe for it. If events support the numbers given in this chapter, and if my career takes its natural course, I will devote a special course of lectures in 1862 to this great problem, at the opening, that is, of the second or intermediate phase, after I have written all the works I have promised. Coinciding with the two decisive decrees for changing the army into a gendarmerie, and for founding the Positive school, this oral teaching will be repeated twice, at the interval of a year, and with such improvements as may be found desirable, thus carrying us on to the opening of the final phase. For the present, I must limit myself, on this point, to such particular remarks as may give a character of completeness to the general outline I have sketched of the political and religious features of the principal period of transition, that in which Positivism inspires the policy of the government. For the political development and the spiritual movement, we must distinguish between the hints here given, according as they refer to the internal organisation or to the external influence of the central nation.

From the very beginning of the third phase, the admission of the proletaries into the Preparatory Government should stamp its character on the home policy of the Positivist dictatorship, by reducing the public expenditure and by methodising the punishment of political offences. As, by that time, the compensations granted to the priests and the officers will have expired, the poor will find means of retrenchment beyond what the rich could even conceive; for a triumvirate of an energetic and progressive character will be strong enough adequately to remunerate all services without multiplying its agents. An allowance daily of a hundred, a hundred and fifty, or two hundred francs to the intendants, ambassadors, or governors, will
proclaim to all the definitive adoption of the noble simplicity temporarily introduced by the dictatorship of Danton. In this way, without overburdening the finances, it will be possible to develop, on a large scale, a system of public works, more needed at this period than in the normal state, as we have to prevent or to compensate the interruptions of industrial operations, and as it is necessary to secure the performance of services of immediate necessity in the midst of the disturbances arising from the trades' unions. At the same time, the triumvirate will, on its own direct responsibility, take the necessary measures for the repression of political offences, short of the punishment of death, then inadmissible from the non-existence of the convictions which could alone legitimise it. Not sheltering itself behind tribunals—tribunals as incompetent as they are irresponsible—the Preparatory Government will proclaim in the normal mode the proscriptions it shall judge required, and will know how to carry them into effect after a public hearing of the accused by one of its members. The sentence may simply be one of exclusion from civic functions, or it may add banishment at times with the further penalty of confiscation; in either case it will offer guarantees of its justice and moderation of a higher kind than are compatible with illusory and degrading formalities.

Extermination
of the
Bourgeoisie.

Looked at as a whole, the domestic policy of the systematic dictatorship will have as its great object the renovation of the patriciate by eliminating the bourgeoisie, which is a barrier between it and the proletariat. But the removal of this obstacle to union requires the persistent aid of two movements, correlated and yet opposed, the one negative, the other positive: the extinction of literateurs and lawyers; the transformation of the small capitalists. All the metaphysical classes fostered by the Western revolution, are destined ultimately to disappear; on the contrary, the subaltern chiefs of industry as now constituted, will in the majority of instances become valuable workmen, in some instances real patricians.

Of Lawyers.

Journalism and literature will pass away, in the natural course of things, as a consequence of spiritual liberty, and the entire abolition of the theoretic budget; but until the close of the transition the great nucleus of the metaphysicians will survive them; as the services of the various legislators will still be needed, although in a decreasing extent. In regard to the best
class, the suppression of all trials for opinions or political action, the extension of arbitration and industrial courts, will allow of the reduction and simplification of the judicial positions, the more eminent occupants of which will have been regenerated by Positivism. By the suppression of the schools of law, the special education of barristers will have been limited to a practical apprenticeship, and the class will gradually disappear when deprived of its monopoly of defence, thus, in a more favourable state of things, carrying into effect the noble attempt of the Dantonian jurists.

These two reforms will give us the means of improving the administration and the police by availing ourselves of the knowledge and the training of the unemployed lawyers. Still the great question for the transition policy will be the regeneration of the Positive portion of the existing bourgeoisie. The concentration of wealth, and the transformation of the greater number of the smaller employers into simple workmen—these will be results, in the main, of the natural laws of industrial existence; which existence in a more disturbed milieu tends more rapidly in their direction, such a milieu only suitable to great strength. And yet the spontaneous movement may be aided by a wise intervention, with the aim, principally, of anticipating or remedying the disasters incident to it. The intervention consists, on the one hand, in the removal of all the checks emanating from a revolutionary legislation, on the other hand, in the due development of the system of industrial endowments.

An eminent economist, (M. Dunoyer), rising superior to the prejudices of negativism, has proposed to abolish the factitious equality of properties, and the restoration of the full freedom of bequest. In theory, it is true, he remains individualist, but in his tendencies he is unconsciously sociocratic; so that Positivism can adopt his views and give them systematic expression and completeness. In particular I feel bound to accept the amendment he proposes, which is to adhere to the existing law in cases of intestacy, though I do not think the case as common as he does. There is an advantage in this restriction, in that it allows the natural tendency towards a concentration of inherited properties to manifest itself freely, as soon as Positivism has propagated the conviction, more particularly in France, that large fortunes are eminently desirable. But the aggregate reaction of freedom of bequest would be found insufficient, if
adoption is still left as difficult a process as our legislation makes it. When we set it, too, free from artificial impediments, we must merely retain for it, as for the other, the precautions calculated to obviate haste, with its frequent sequel of vain regret, as also the unjust neglect of the natural heirs. To avoid as far as possible both these evils and yet not to fetter a liberty which is indispensable, it is sufficient if we restrict the power in both cases, by attaching to it the obligation of complete publicity, seven years before the formal execution of the resolution.

Whatever the efficacy of this first mode of the concentration of wealth, it is on the second that we must more rely at present, inversely to the normal order, because the one depends especially upon private habits and feelings, the latter on the intervention of the state. A million of francs judiciously employed in each Intendancy to found industrial fortunes, under the full responsibility of the triumvirate, in each of the twenty-one years of the last phase, would give a sufficient impulse to the regeneration of the French patriciate. Directly and indirectly the measure would have its influence, but the indirect would be the greater, as it would check the wealthy who misused their wealth by the contrast with the new patricians thus created, who will never shrink from the examination, under due conditions, of their industrial administration. Positivism prides itself on having amongst its disciples an eminent practician, who, on the basis of a sound scientific education, is struggling, as devotedly as wisely, with the difficulties thrown in his way by his want of sufficient capital to improve to the full his land. Similar instances are already sufficiently numerous to indicate to what extent a systematic interference may aid the natural process of renovating industrial existence, by evoking in the nobler patricians the habits and feelings suitable to Sociocracy, even before the end of the transition.

I may not reckon confiscation amongst the means of hastening this result, although it may seem peculiarly appropriate, looking to the subversive aspirations which are now in their full course. It is in the normal state only, and then in great moderation, that confiscation, which is but the extension of a power inherent in society, will be applicable; when the habits and feelings of all classes of society shall be so regulated as to obviate the chief abuses to which it is liable. During the transition, it is desirable to limit the use of confiscation and
make it a political punishment, needed for the repression of disturbances, caused either by individuals or by masses, and traceable to the various influences which will oppose the reorganisation of Western society. Were we to attempt at once to employ it as against a bad use of wealth, there is no principle on which to control the action of feelings which, even when honourable, and not, as they too generally are, tainted with envy, would yet imperil the security which is indispensable for property. All we have to do is, to develop with prudence *legal interdiction*, or, restraint of abuse of property, and use aright the facilities afforded us by political confiscation, to promote the introduction of the normal dwelling for the proletary class, by making it easy to sell houses in apartments.

To gain a clear idea of the foreign policy of the French triumvirate, I must distinguish its relations with its immediate neighbours from its relations with nations outside the West, in the sociological sense of the term. For the former, the Positivist dictatorial government requires six ambassadors, avowedly accredited to the populations of Italy, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, Spanish America, and Anglo-Saxon America, with the object of promoting the common work of renovation. These ambassadors will never be in hostility to the governments, but yet not in exclusive communication with them, as not having yet become the true leaders of their respective nations. The political missionaries of French Positivism will make it their primary object to prevent any mistaken imitation of the initiative of France and any premature adoption of its leading results. Conservative in a high degree, they will make all feel that the agitation due to Metaphysics and the scepticism engendered by egoism are, for the future, the only real obstacles to the satisfactory accomplishment of the Western revolution. Whilst encouraging the natural tendency towards subordination to the metropolis of the race, they will pave the way for the necessary decomposition of the overgrown national aggregates, by appealing to the noble wisdom which will prevail in France. More especially will they exert themselves to terminate, by suitable means, all oppression as between the several constituents of the Western republic, and this by a free appeal to the public opinion of the country which exercises the oppression.

Prior to the commencement of the final phase, the progressive dictator, the immediate predecessor of the French triumvirate,
had already set a decisive example of such a policy by restoring Algeria to the Arabs. For the voluntary renunciation of dominion over a non-western people brings into clearer relief the shame attaching to the dominion over a portion of the West. Still, the Preparatory Government will be bound to avoid an inconsistency which might be a clog upon its fraternal diplomacy, by proclaiming the independence of Corsica, may even of the French colonies, before the decomposition of France proper.

Outside the West, the only states to which the Positivist triumvirate should send ambassadors are the monotheistic states, Turkey first, then Russia, lastly Persia. The first object of these embassies should be to encourage the growing feeling of fraternity, which, since the close of the Middle Ages, connects the two civilisations respectively formed by Catholicism and Islam, both equally amenable to the influences of Chivalry, even beyond the limits of the Roman world. Such legitimate preference of Turkey however must not in any degree interfere with the attention due to the abortive Monotheism of Russia, whenever the directors of the Byzantine faith are capable of following the noble example set them by the Mussulman chiefs of subordination to the metropolis of mankind. In this, its second class of foreign relations, it is the governments that the central triumvirate principally addresses, for now they are at the head of their respective nations, and those nations are not accessible directly to French diplomacy, the interval between them being too wide. On the same grounds we appoint purely commercial agents, when we get beyond the monotheistic world; though Positivism will be more powerful to modify the Polytheistic nations and above all the Fetishist; but it will have this power as a purely spiritual influence, to be explained later.

These hints sufficing at present to explain the policy of the triumvirate during the last phase of the organic transition, we must point out, on a similar plan, that of the Positive priesthood, with a special reference to the case of France.

Incorporated as an integral constituent of the French regime, Positivism must put forth its power—the conclusive test of its superiority—to overcome the existing anarchy, with a view to pave the way for the definitive adoption of sociocratic habits. Its influence, an influence of a directly organic character, should have two special results; first, the consolidation of the government, then of property; thus following the natural course of
the inroad of revolution during the two preceding phases, an inroad of more violence in proportion as liberty of opinion and expression brought into clearer light the malady of the West.

The government is the most urgent and the most capital point, inasmuch as it is in reference to it that the anarchical tendencies are developed with frightful unanimity. Any one can now verify the fact, that it is the rich rather than the poor who at the present day are in opposition to government, and yet on it depends their safety. I venture to affirm that true Positivists, and true Positivists alone, are at the present day habitually animated with a sincere and disinterested respect for the temporal government, in whosoever hands vested. It is not unbecoming in me to add, that the founder of the Religion of Humanity, even before his complete emancipation from negativism, respected all the successive governments of France during the last forty years. But this disposition to order would naturally long be confined to true believers, who if they would regenerate the world, must first themselves have overcome the habits of revolution, and to do this must have ended by substituting a dogmatic belief for their preliminary scepticism. During the first phase of the final period of transition, Positivism cannot possibly inspire the Conservatives with a sufficient confidence, as not being yet completely disencumbered of the revolutionary environment which was of necessity its cradle. And although, in the second phase, the government recognises its value so far as to entrust it with the reorganisation of public instruction, it is not till the third that it directly invokes its aid against the full tide of anarchy.

The worthy interpreter of the Great Being, the Positive priesthood will enforce, on all, respect for its ministers, in spite of the real imperfections of their origin and their conduct. The action of the Religion of Humanity will not be limited to the true believers, but will lead all sincere friends of social progress to recognise the fact, that the public functionaries are, as a rule, the best class, both in heart and intellect, in the present disorderly state. Positivism frees them, once for all, from a degrading hypocrisy and calls them to the guidance of the world, in the name of the Great Being, on condition of substituting devotedness for devotion. Nay, it will ensure them respect when as yet unconverted, by representing them as alone placed at the social point of view, before which mere personal
impulses soon disappear, if the tenure of power is sufficiently prolonged. As all the criticisms of them are really referable to an unreasonable comparison of them with the definitive standard, the relative spirit of Positivism will put an end to sophistical censures, by limiting the comparison to the several coexisting classes.

Qualified, by its entire renunciation both of wealth and power, to vindicate equally the one and the other, the true priesthood will enforce general respect for the rich, having first taught them to respect the great. The task devolving on the third phase will naturally be, the conversion on a decisive scale of all wealth to a sociocratic form, a conversion of which we have a direct foreshadowing in the Middle Ages, and even a preliminary in the spontaneous change of Allodia into fiefs. Previous to this first step, which has hitherto been misapprehended, property never lost its theocratic character; a character gradually changed, but never remodelled, during the Græco-Roman transition. Whereas the last phase of the defensive period of Monotheism introduced throughout Western Europe the principle needed for its regeneration, as far as was possible under a doctrine which was incapable of consecrating feeling and of systematising action. Throughout the course of the Western revolution, the state of modern society, owing to opposite vices in the rich and the poor, has simultaneously strengthened the need for consolidating property by its regulation, and shown more forcibly the nullity of the older sanction.

In the present time, it is to Humanity that we must turn to give wealth, in whatever form it exists, that fundamental basis of security which cannot henceforward be derived from God. In vain have the prevalent official Metaphysics endeavoured to confer on property a sanction independent of both sources, by their assertion of individualism, a doctrine as retrograde as it is anarchical. The so-called rights it invokes will have entirely disappeared before the fuller growth of social impulses, earlier than the end of the two preliminary phases of the organic transition. In the third phase, a new power will be in the ascendant, a power as disinterested as it is systematic, and will guarantee the material basis of society, equally in danger at present from its defenders and assailants. Whilst satisfying the aspirations after reconstruction to a degree impossible so long as they remained simply destructive, the irre-
versible division of the two powers will implant a general conviction, that if there is to be a moral discipline of property it must be on condition of its political inviolability. Not confining its protection to those proprietors who recognise that they hold it as a fief of Humanity, the Positive religion will teach respect for all alodial properties whatsoever, by showing that the worst specimens of the wealthy class cooperate, even against their will, in the conservation of the capital of Humanity. That capital is by its nature perishable, and for its preservation active and constant attention is needed; in this attention consists the principal function of the proprietor, whatever be the flaws in his administration, and, allowing for individual exceptions, his responsibility is in all cases purely a moral responsibility.

This brings me, in order to complete my present remarks on the conservative influence of Positivism, to the mention of the inevitable struggle it will have with Communism, the latest embodiment, in a really honourable and dangerous form, of all the revolutionary instincts. Its first victory will be over the anarchical attitude of the rich towards the great; this gained, the religion of Humanity will consecrate the larger portion of the final transition to the transformation or destruction of the feelings which, till then, will have more and more raised the poor against the rich. Its triumph in this last respect will be a conclusive sign of the near approach of the normal state, proving, as it does, that the relative synthesis, already recognised as superior for the worship and the doctrine, is equally adapted to the life, which has suffered under all forms of the absolute synthesis.

For success in this struggle with Communism, there are required, successively, two systematic operations, with the object, respectively, of curbing the Western anarchy in its two forms, between which the distinction is profound, though hitherto they have been erroneously confounded; the first form being that which it takes in towns, the second, in the country.

It is the first exclusively, the more honourable and the more dangerous form, to which the term communism, properly so called, applies, especially as regards the plebeians, and it is with them that it exercises a real influence. Positivism is the better able to regenerate, in the name of the Great Being, the proletariat of the towns, in that the error in their case is confined to
the intellect and does not vitiate their feelings. The priesthood of Humanity, stating the social problem in a broader and more systematic form,—the problem which now finds no presentment but in communism,—will gradually secure the acceptance of its normal solution, after it has shown the inconsistencies involved in the utopia of anarchy. When there is complete liberty, the revolutionary teachers will be unable to mask impotence by persecution, so that the Religion of Humanity will soon convince the better proletaries that they have been in error in their disjunction of the two ideas, the concentration of materials and their appropriation. The latter is the invariable condition of the former, especially when the accumulations are by their nature perishable, and, as such, require for their preservation distinct and responsible agents, who cannot perform their office unless they have full security, the sole source of true activity.

Whilst Communism in the towns attaches too great importance to the concentration of wealth, the anarchy of the country, implicating the feelings in the disorder of the intellect, with equal, perhaps greater injury to the feelings, urges to absolute individualism, the means being the indefinite division of the highest property, the land. The want of a distinct name for this latter error can alone account for its being constantly confounded with the opposite utopia; it is a want which will soon be supplied, such will be inevitably the advance of the latest form under which the West can tolerate the subversive tendencies, traceable, and in the same form, even as far back as the Roman period. This extreme of anarchy will find its preachers in the teachers of the primary schools, predisposed, by the sciolist popularising of scientific knowledge, to avail themselves of their position to veil under an appearance of system the sophisms of the country population. By the conversion, however, to Positivism of the better communists, particularly from the mechanicians, the Positivist priesthood will gain a natural supply of valuable auxiliaries in its critical struggle on behalf of solidarity, not less in danger than continuity. I think with pleasure that, by urging the encouragement of veterinary schools, I have, during the second phase, prepared a body of assistants qualified more than any other to promote, during the third phase, the triumph of the true believers over the anarchical dispositions of the rural districts.

Although, at this period, the attention of the priesthood will
naturally be absorbed by the regime, it will be led by that very regime to perfect the abstract portion of the transitional worship, by the addition of three social festivals to the festival which succeeded the three moral ones. The three will be annual, and introduced successively, with the interval of a year between them, during the first third of the last phase; the first in honour of the Press, the second of the Post, the third of the Police.

Preeminently popular though it be, the first could not previously be introduced without danger, for the services of the Press were as yet of too questionable a character. Essentially an institution of the normal state, it does not deserve the sanction of religion, till it has been fully purified from the revolutionary character which it displayed during the Western revolution. Journalism and literature must become extinct at their centre, before Sociolaty can be justified in paying honour to the institution which, by the power it confers on reflection to surmount impulse, enables us to organise an appeal to the public opinion of mankind.

This first festival will incline the French nation to institute a second, in honour of the admirable system of communications, then completed, which is destined to develope and consolidate writing, now become universal. From the establishment of public messengers up to the introduction of the two forms of telegraph, the Positive system of worship must give artistic expression to all the modes or stages of the Post, the institution parallel to the press, and, equally with the press, connected with the most eminent type of modern royalty. There can be no better culture of social feeling than the annual idealization of the concurrence of all human powers in developing the intercommunications of all members of the great human family.

Duly prepared by these two festivals, the instinct of society will, in the third, give a conclusive evidence of its regeneration, by honouring an institution which is at once more important and less appreciated than the other two. Though France should justly pride itself on its Police, this valuable creation of the monarchical dictatorship is as yet more rightly judged by the other nations of the West. But the sociocratic habits and feelings will then have been so far formed as that the priesthood of Humanity may glorify, when remodelled, an institution, which, at all times animated by a spirit untrammelled by unwise
prejudices, unostentatiously protects both individuals and society.

Thus we see how, notwithstanding the conflicts incidental to the regime, the Sociolatry of the transitional period will be completed, towards the middle of the preparatory generation, by the adoption of seven festivals adapted to give an idea of the abstract worship during the prevalence of the concrete. Although more particularly meant for the transition, the four last may be incorporated as accessories into the ultimate system, to which the three first are a direct introduction.

With a view to completeness in my sketch of the religious policy of the third phase, it remains to consider it in reference to external affairs. Of this however we shall be better able to judge later, when we come to examine the peculiar modifications of the Positive transition in the four Western groups, and even amongst the other races of men. For the present I need only point to the rise, the rise in succession of two institutions, the one normal, the other provisional, by the aid of which the Pontiff of Humanity will be enabled gradually to organise into a system the unsystematic propagation of the French movement.

The first is the institution of the Positive Chivalry, an institution most needed in the transition, though not then capable of so regular a constitution as under the final regime. So ripe is the transition for it, that even now its formation has begun on a decisive scale, though unperceived even by those who cooperate in it. The infamous persecution originating with the most degraded portion of my opponents justly gave rise to the sacerdotal fund, as a species of collective patronage of my individual existence. At no distant period, the systematic extension of this spontaneous protectorate will show men that the germs of chivalry have not been stifled by our modern anarchy.

More indispensable now than in the normal state, for the priesthood of Positivism, the Western proletariat, and the affective sex, this voluntary guardianship will shortly bring into concert its three elements, described in the preceding chapter.

For the second of the two, I must here remind the reader of the provisional committee, first mentioned, in 1842, in my Philosophy, and more completely explained at the end of the 'General View,' or introduction to my present construction. Though prior in order of conception, I must now place it after the chivalry; as its historical function cannot be rightly judged
till Positivism in France is mainly concerned with external questions, whilst the former institution is quite as much concerned with internal. Nevertheless, there will be seen to be a natural connection between the two institutions; since the Positive committee will be taken from the noblest knights, when the generosity which is their characteristic is directly upheld by eminence in intellect or conduct.

Such are the various aparçus, on the spiritual and temporal order, which have their place here as a preparation for the completer statement to be given in 1862, in a course of lectures on the organic transition. I may now sum up the whole preceding exposition, by contrasting it—it is a strongly marked contrast—as it now stands complete, with the original sketch. Under the influence of a republican movement, an influence, which if an irregular was a generous one, I conceived in 1848: first, the Preparatory Government, following the clear indications of my lectures in 1847; then, the Positive School; lastly the Positive Calendar. The 'General View,' written during the oral exposition of these three institutions, bears lasting traces of the course pursued, the exact opposite of my present course. Now, when so contrasted, we may note the profound reality, nay even the perfect opportuneness of a social creation, which, suggested by the present, issues in a decisive application of the construction of the future on the basis of the past.

I have now to put the finishing stroke to my last chapter by describing, first, the modifications to be simultaneously introduced into the organic transition by the four constituents of the West; secondly, the mode of its extension, in succession, to the Monotheistic, Polytheistic, and Fetishist populations. These two movements, complementary of the French movement, though they began before the nineteenth or exceptional century, cannot take their definitive character till such time as, by the installation of a permanent and systematic dictatorial government, the initiative of France shall have received its full development.

Though bound, in the primary case of France, to set forth in detail the organic transition, I have always presented it as, in all essential features, common to all the constituents of the West, in accordance with the intimate connection of France with them, universally recognised at the opening of the French revolution. At the point we have reached, we can verify the assertion,
that each of the leading characteristics, in the temporal or spiritual order, of the three successive stages of the movement of transition, is as applicable to the whole West as to its central nation. The full liberty of thought and utterance consequent on the abolition of the spiritual budget; the substitution of a constabulary for the army; even the accession to power of a systematic triumvirate;—these measures are in all cases alike indispensable. And the identity becomes still more evident in the spiritual transition; for there, the growth of the historical worship; the establishment of Positive schools; and the triumph of Positivism over Communism;—these are equally applicable to all the Western nations. The same holds good of the normal decomposition of the larger states, a measure which implies both these series of successive changes. For the seven decisive steps, the French nation is invested, as the result of the whole past, with an initiative calculated to relieve its four neighbours of the necessity of repeating the process of transition; its results are all they need appropriate. But their adoption of them can in no case be a purely passive process; and therefore I must describe the modifications which, in the natural course of things, it will everywhere involve; modifications by which each constituent will contribute its particular improvement to the general result.

In every extension of the principal movement, the priesthood which presides over the regeneration, aided by the Positive committee, will make it its great object to reconcile two conditions of equal importance: a proper subordination to the central operation; and a wise respect for national differences. Such differences must be made to promote the object of the Western effort, which is meant for mankind, by the development of the peculiar capacities of each nation. But the movement in each must always be subordinated to the initiatory movement, and that by an act of voluntary deference, in all cases in agreement with the order of reorganisation laid down in the opening of the present chapter, as a deduction from the whole of the last volume.

In this order, the Italian nation is represented as the first to join the movement of reorganisation, which it is peculiarly qualified to aid as an esthetic development. The predispositions requisite for this mission are the more likely to prevail, in that they amount simply to the giving due prominence to
the principal features of the Italian situation, misconceived by
the literary class alone. Although the population of Italy is
more clear than any other of military habits and feelings, its
spiritual guides have never ceased to regret its ancient domina-
tion, nay, to dream of its return, and its universality. Rightly
viewed, the political decomposition of Italy brings it nearer to
the normal state, whereas they aim at its unity, as retrograde as
it is anarchical, incompatible too with the necessary degree of
independence. But it will not be difficult for Positivism to
overcome these errors, as not rooted in popular feeling, by a
direct appeal to the instincts of Humanity, more imperfectly
represented in Italy than elsewhere. Whilst delivering Italy
from the yoke of the stranger, it will maintain throughout the
degree of independence demanded by the aggregate of local
conditions. It will put an end to all factitious state-unions as
oppressive, particularly such as by their plural name sufficiently
indicate their heterogeneous character, the great instance being
the confused group formed, in the north of Italy, by the union
of five discordant states.

The preliminary conditions fairly satisfied, the population of
Italy will soon be in a position to renounce a separate unity,
the better to fulfil its high function as an eminent contributor
to the progress of uniting mankind. Its language will become the
common language of all nations, by virtue of its superiority in
poetry and in music, and inasmuch as, socially, it is clear of all
propagation by oppressive means. This privilege of Italy, already
proclaimed by Positivism, is the direct tie which connects her feelings with the advent of the renovating faith, a
work in which each of her sons may aid, if he substitute the
development of his intellectual and moral nature for political
agitation.

Over and above this general contribution, Italy must give a
special one to the advancement of the organic transition; it
should complete the concrete worship of Humanity by an
esthetic creation. Its main contribution will be an epic poem
of an unprecedented order, the presentation of the close of the
Western revolution, as the incomparable composition of Dante
presided over its commencement. The language destined to
universality will perfect its claims by thus completing its repre-
sentation of the modern movement, the latest phase of the vast
preparation which step by step was to substitute Sociocracy for Theocracy.

After a sufficient practice of the historical worship, there will be felt, and most keenly in Italy, the want of a poetic embodiment of the past. Foreseeing this want, I am led to describe here the poem which is to meet it; which it is not for me to write, but to which I have already endeavoured to call public attention in the course of lectures described in the preface of the last volume. The composition, as it seems to me, ought, about the middle of the organic transition, to come from an Italian, a pupil of the Positive school, and so having his artistic genius adequately trained by the encyclopædic education given in that school.

The ideal expression of the philosophy of history, the poem of Humanity will picture in succession all the phases of the preparatory life of the race, up to the advent of the final state. The ordering of this epic, as a work of art, is founded on the cerebral crisis described at the end of the first chapter of the last volume,—the crisis in which I first rapidly descended the sociological scale and then slowly reasceded. Thus was performed, following the course of the ages, a double journey, the equivalent of the single journey of Dante through the various worlds. But a journey such as his, purely statical, and as such precluding any retracing of his steps, could offer no contrasts to be compared with those presented by the comparison, in my dynamical journey, of the three months of descent with the five of ascent. My forthcoming work will unfold the subjective laws which fix thirteen, a trebly prime number, as the proper number of cantos for any systematic epic—but, meanwhile, its adoption may, in the present case, be determined on social grounds.

The introductory canto is statical in character, as the ideal representation of the cerebral unity, disorder in which shows itself in retrogradation, when the disturbance of our sympathies vitiates our synthesis; carrying us back, that is, from laws to causes. Then, in three cantos, we have the descent of the intellectual and moral nature from the relative to the absolute, first in its monotheistic, then in its polytheistic, lastly in its fetishist stage, with a constant aspiration towards complete harmony, but without the power of attaining it. In the eight following cantos, the heart and the intellect reascend, by a grad-
ual course, towards Positive unity, as elaborated by the successive efforts of Fetishism, Astrolatry, Theocracy, the intellectual development of Greece, the social Polytheism of Rome, the defensive Monotheism, Feudal civilisation, and the movement of Modern times. Finally, in the thirteenth canto, is idealised man's normal existence, at once affective, contemplative, and practical, with equal reference to the race and to the individual. This concluding portion, however, must not be amplified further, lest it interfere with the essentially dynamical character of the epic of the transition, so reserving for the future the stational poem—which that future alone can call into existence.

By such a production, the genius of Italy, whilst still maintaining, and justly, the preeminence which it assigns to art over science, will perfect its own education by becoming systematic, in entire conformity with its aptitude for synthesis, an aptitude which, as yet, it has been unable adequately to display. So decisive a creation, destined to evoke in all the enthusiasm required for the inauguration of the true human providence, ought, at the same time, to give the universal language the only qualities in which it is now deficient. It is in this way that Positivism, at the present day, devolves on the Italian constituent of the West a high intellectual and social mission, one which touches the normal state no less than the whole of the final transition, a mission which it alone can accomplish. Under the impulse thus given, the most artistic of the nations ought at length to reap the choicest fruits of its admirable culture of art, a culture often hitherto judged excessive, simply because it had not reached its true goal. In proportion as the Positive religion spreads the conviction, that the ultimate spirituaty wears a poetical rather than a philosophical character, it will be felt that the Italians are, from this point of view, the people the most predisposed for synthesis through sympathy.

It is from the dim consciousness of its superiority in this respect, as well as from the interest inspired by a nation which has been often the oppressed, never the oppressor, that the claims of Italy to the second place in the Western world are more freely admitted than is the initiative of France. Apart from these two first cases, the classification of the sister nations is open to some doubt, a doubt I have myself felt, and one which it is important to remove, because the origin of it, in the
moral nature as well as in the intellect, involves a more serious question than its consequences. The dogma of equality, the ordinary veil of the instinct of domination, is not less revolutionary as between nations than it is in individuals; between nations it acts more strongly as a dissuasive to habitual cooperation. Called, by the whole course of human destinies, to guide the regeneration of the race, the Western nations must begin by setting persistently an example of a noble intersubordination, in the name, always, of their common mission. We may remark here, as in all other cases of the classification of men, that the most advanced are also the most disposed to second the action of the centre. But this tendency were insufficient, if each constituent were willing only to accept the common president, whilst disallowing the precedence of the nation immediately above it in rank. Although their participation in the organic transition must shortly become simultaneous, we must clear up all uncertainty as to their hierarchical arrangement, for it is to serve as the universal type of all voluntary aggregations, in which liberty has full play but without equality.

Allowing too much weight to intellectual and industrial considerations, in my first classification I assigned to Spain the lowest rank in the Western world. Later, on moral and social grounds, I was induced to place her above the northern couple, the position she occupied before the eruption of Protestantism. This decision finds support in the admirable readiness of the most energetic and most persevering of Western nations to acquiesce in the indispensable presidency of France. But the pontiff of Humanity, clear of all national prejudices, may not allot Spain, however eminent, a higher place, though she is not as willing to accept the precedence of Italy as she is the initiative of France. This minor injustice on the part of Spain is due, partly to the disturbing influence of past associations, mainly, however, to the noble consciousness of her soundest claims. In no other Western nation have we so just an appreciation, both in the family and in the state, of the female sex; in no other Western nation have we such a sense of fraternity without any impairment of subordination; nowhere else so enforced an incorporation of the servants into the family. Valid, however, as these titles are, as against the two northern constituents of the West, and valid as they would be even as
against France, were it not that by its central position it is
taken out of the comparison, they are not valid as against Italy,
which is on a level with Spain in these respects, allowance made
for its antecedents.

If it compare itself with the protestant nations, the Spanish
people is justified in asserting its moral and social superiority,
a superiority in no wise neutralised by its inferiority in thought
and in industry. Positivism ratifies its judgment, showing that
the deficiency of the Iberic population may be soon supplied
under an appropriate stimulus, whereas those of the other Occi-
dentals require a slow and difficult reformation. But from this
statement Italy must be excepted, as, in her case, if the claims
which she has in common with Spain are less evidently justified,
it is due mainly to her aggregate antecedents in more recent
times, not so favourable as in Spain to the development of
civic feeling. Her slight inferiority in this respect is more
than compensated by her preeminence in art, combined with
her incontestable superiority in speculation and action. Even
under the moral and social aspect, Spain should recognise
the precedence of Italy, with her hands clean of colonisation,
and more completely clear of all barbarous customs, were it
only by virtue of her military inferiority, an effect of the
absence of political centralisation. Errors in policy on the
subject of temporal unity are, in Italy, confined to the literary
class, whereas in Spain they are more widely spread and more
tenaciously held, though not to the point of being really
popular, as is shown by the fact that the retrograde party has
gained credit by its opposition to them. Nevertheless, the
colonial possessions of Spain are the great source of the de-
terioration of the Spanish character, for her colonisation, as
more systematically conducted than that of any other nation,
implanted an oppressive disposition which is yet sufficiently
strong to mar her cooperation—her indispensable cooperation—
with the West in its mission.

These hints, when combined, suffice to justify the rank de-
finitively assigned by Positivism to Spain, immediately after
France and Italy, in the ultimate reconstruction of the family
which is in the van of Humanity. I could not but dwell most
on the most difficult point in a classification which, like every
normal arrangement, will summarise the general comparative
estimate of the groups classified. Whereas the hierarchy of the
two protestant nations will merely require the explicit correction of the order originally stated.

Accepting the decision just given, I have here to indicate the special contribution of Spain to the Western effort of construction, special as distinct from the general influence which she will naturally exert upon it. Her proper part is, most especially, to promote the organic transition by the voluntary adjunction of the only clergy which in Western Europe is capable of aiding the movement.

When the suppression of the spiritual budget shall allow the free emergence of the real tendencies of things, I hope shortly to be able to rally to Positivism one in a hundred of the French priests, who are now kept down under a discipline which is rather temporal than spiritual. But I think I may then calculate on a larger result in the Spanish priesthood, better placed than any other for a sound estimate of the universal degradation of the spiritual power. A clergy in its position cannot take a hostile attitude, it cannot even remain neutral, as regards the advent of the only doctrine competent to raise the dignity of the priesthood, on certain intellectual and moral conditions, which it may soon fulfil.

It has always been with regret that I have watched the extinction of the Catholic organism without being able to utilise, for the final transition, the ruins of a hierarchy which it took so much time and effort to construct, for which its real services were but a slight return. But after many attempts to connect it with the renovation which hitherto it has in vain rejected, I have been gradually compelled to abandon all hope of transforming the French priesthood, its leaders being incapable of compliance with the conditions of such transformation. Positivism must never hope for more than occasional recruits from its ranks, when the pressure of the Episcopacy is to a considerable-degree lightened. Still their aid will be valuable; for by their antecedents they are prepared to uphold more firmly the supremacy of Morals, as also to feel greater respect for the normal discipline, which they will be able honourably to reconcile with the scientific instruction at present lacking. The above remarks apply also to the Italian priesthood; for as a body it is irredeemable, owing to the apathy of the lower and the corruption of the higher clergy, the latter clinging to spiritual independence solely as a condition of temporal power. As for the
several protestant clergies, their greater political degradation, the more systematic character of their hypocrisy, alienate them more completely from a spirituality more hostile to Metaphysics than to Theology. Such a spirituality can expect a welcome only from those who, having no state support, really possess a certain religious authority, supposing that their personal worth preserves them from the deteriorating influence which frequently attends on voluntary support in an insurrectionary society.

By this process of exclusion, we arrive at the Iberian priesthood as the only one capable of aiding Positivism in the general conduct of the organic transition. It appears to me really capable of welcoming the regenerative faith, when once fairly adopted by the French dictatorship. For its chiefs have preserved a sufficient superiority over their own body and even their nation, to qualify them for presiding over a transformation calculated to place on a sound basis their authority, an authority already impaired though not destroyed. From a philosophical point of view, their power should show itself in the gradual substitution of the encyclopaedic instruction for the studies recognised by Theology. Under the religious aspect, it may transform the worship of the Virgin into an adoration of Humanity.

But legitimate as these hopes may be as regards the clergy of the peninsula, they seem to me in an especial degree justified in regard to the Spanish and Portuguese settlements in America. In Spain, the influence of the Papacy may impede the regeneration of the priesthood, if not by direct influence,—an influence long more extinct in Spain than elsewhere—at any rate by the indirect ascendency conferred on it by popular feeling. It is otherwise in America; there the power of the Papacy has been a derivative from the power of the monarchy, the real creator and upholder of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Since the Catholic colonies gained their independence, the influence of Rome is, as a natural consequence, uprooted there. Although the temporal rulers as yet have but an uncertain tenure, by the nature of the case they have inherited the ecclesiastical prerogatives of the royal government. These dictators on sufferance must, though with a purely empirical policy, be more prone to respect the independence of a priesthood which is the only deeply-rooted institution in such populations as they
They will welcome the Positivist conception of marriage.

It is the more calculated to make its way there, in that it gives systematic expression to tendencies which, everywhere instinctive, in Iberian America are more than usually powerful, as in unison with the whole social feeling. The Positivist law of marriage for the priesthood appeals especially to the clergy, as relieving them from the corrupting action of celibacy whilst not exposing them to the degradation inflicted on them by Protestantism. So long as the doctrine professed sanctions an ignoble estimate of women, it is by licence alone, however contradictory to their vows, that priests can escape the isolation which is held up universally as the type of Christian perfection. It is the exclusive privilege of Positivism to place the marriage of priests on its right footing, by establishing the true theory of human nature and the normal union of the sexes. In its regime, marriage will be enjoined on the priesthood as a special guarantee of moral improvement, instead of degenerating into a degrading concession to appetites which religion ought in all cases to repress.

Enlarge this view and we can realise how greatly the organic transition will be facilitated in the society constituted by the Spanish and Portuguese colonisation in America, or even in Oceania. For the dispositions which are peculiarly favourable to the political and religious ascendency of Positivism prevail there equally in the temporal as in the spiritual order. Preserved by the course of events from the parliamentary regime, even when France was yet subject to it, the Republics there founded will move by a direct path towards Sociocracy, so soon as their monocratic dictators shall transform themselves into systematic triumvirates. The army will easily become a constabulary, when all anxiety on the score of invasion has finally disappeared. The abolition of the spiritual budget—this, it is true, is a question of serious difficulty, but the necessity for this provisional measure ceases in a society which has escaped universities and academies, if the priesthood by its regeneration offer full security for liberty of opinion and speech.

Before I consider the two other constituents of the Western world, I must briefly correct my original error as to the order
in which they will reach the final state. In opposition with the whole of past history, I placed England below Germany, though I had allowed the superiority of the English governing classes, because I attached too much weight to the allpervading deterioration due to the national isolation. I have since come to see that Germany more justly deserves reproach on this head, for she oppresses Western nations who are more advanced than herself, whilst the dominion of England is in the main external to the West and affects belated populations. Setting aside the anomaly relating to art properly so called, the comparison of the two nations in action, speculation, and poetry justifies the precedence of England, and this is supported by her superiority as an industrial society. Of all Occidentals, the Germans are the least removed from the military regime, and from the theologicometaphysical state; so that they will be the last to reach the common goal of the modern revolution, a conclusion indicated by their inferior participation in the training given by Rome and Feudalism.

An indirect verification of this direct conclusion may be found by comparing the reception of Positivism in the two countries; in Germany it has hitherto been ignored; in England it meets with more appreciation than in France, at least as a philosophy. This contrast appears to me the more decisive, inasmuch as, to appreciate Positivism, the English had to make a noble effort to overcome the repugnance justly excited by my first classification of the constituents of the West. And although the religion of Humanity is destined shortly to be more popular in the South than in the North, the welcome given in England to its philosophical basis seems to me conclusive in the case of a doctrine which primarily addresses itself to the higher order of minds.

The fourth element of the West, besides its general cooperation, should bring, as its special contribution to the perfecting of the organic transition, the staid and regular movement which is unattainable elsewhere. Of all the débris of the older temporality, the British aristocracy alone seems to me capable of transforming itself so as to be competent to direct the national reorganisation, thus preserved from the stormy irregularities which will occur in the remainder of the West. The hope corresponds to that which I even now indicated, in reference to the spirituality of Christendom, in the
case of the Iberian priesthood, the remoulding of which seems to me more difficult and less prepared.

To give definiteness to this hope, we must direct our attention more particularly to the last phase of the transition as a political movement; the two others will be easy in England, as will be the three stages of the spiritual transition. The Positivist triumvirate, in due time, must obtain in England as in other countries; but in England it may do so without passing through the temporary anomaly which in the rest of the Western world is inevitable, owing to the degeneracy of the old patriciate and the incompetence of the new. If the British aristocracy accept the proper modifications, it will avoid the transient supremacy of the proletariat, and will have the unparalleled honour of directing, in an orderly movement, the formation and installation of the normal state.

However difficult, the change is one which cannot but seem possible, if we consider the changes already accepted by the English aristocracy, the ablest patriciate the world has seen since the Roman senate. After frankly acquiescing, as a final result, in the establishment of peace as the permanent condition of Europe, it has wholly abandoned the policy based upon war with the aim of hindering the inevitable spread of the Republican movement. This implies that it has resigned itself to the overcoming by appropriate methods communism or socialism, the last shape worn by the revolutionary instinct, and a more dangerous shape than the Jacobinism so dreaded at first. In spite of the over-confidence which the governing classes of England place in material remedies, from their want of a political theory, they cannot conceal from themselves that the malady is essentially cerebral and, as such, imperiously demands an intellectual and moral treatment. Too clear-sighted to look to Theology for this treatment, the decay of belief being the primary source of the disorder, they will be soon led to feel the power of Positivism to direct society, as a natural consequence of their actual recognition of its superiority as a philosophy.

In vain do the literary classes in England, more than elsewhere, strive to confine the new philosophy to its purely intellectual function. Their efforts, prompted by self-interest, will fail against an indivisible synthesis, nor will they long prevent the statesmen of England from forming a true estimate of Positivism, especially as a social power. The struggle once
openly begun in France between it and communism, it will rivet their attention in a degree beyond any possible anticipation at present. They will see in it the sole legitimate source of a policy competent to obviate or overcome a crisis at home, which, if left to take its natural course, would be more stormy in England than anywhere. It is not likely that the conditions attached to this political regeneration will excite repugnance in them, for what are those conditions but the substitution in regard to the existing spirituality of a system of management for a system of hypocrisy?

Patricians of their stamp cannot but deeply lament the necessity which obliges them, sceptics as they are, to bend to a degrading theological system, a system which subjects them to the dominion of the very people whose rulers they deem themselves. From the false position in which their doubt places them, they can be extricated only by the adoption of real religious convictions, but by such convictions they will become as superior to their environment in heart and in character as they already are in intellect. So raised, they will be enabled, to their own eternal honour, to the great good of their people, and even of the whole world, to avail themselves, to the full, of the more striking advantages of their exceptional position, neutralised hitherto by their empirical conservatism. If, on the other hand, their conversion is too long delayed, they will be outstripped by the élite of the British proletariat, led by its own unaided studies, to be shortly systematised by Positivism, to place in power, by an irresistible effort, the legitimate successors of Cromwell. The democratic revolution of the seventeenth century failed, it is true, for it had no theory to direct it and the circumstances were unfavourable, but it has left in the noblest English spirits imperishable germs, even now on the eve of maturity. Compression at home, the diversion afforded abroad, both alike have lost their power to keep down tendencies, which have as a groundwork the whole of the past, and which would be sure of ultimate victory, even if the English evolution were to run its course in isolation. They must soon become resistsless, when the advent of the proletariat in France to the systematic dictatorship shall appeal forcibly to the popular sympathy throughout Europe.

If it would avoid a democratic revolution by a sociocratic evolution, the English aristocracy must revise its external no
less than its internal policy. In the first place, it must sweep away the last symptoms of a disposition to oppression as regards the other Western nations, more particularly by putting an end to the insulting anomaly which subjects to England a city of Andalusia. I have the more hope of witnessing at an early period this evidence of a definitively fraternal policy, in that, when I urged the measure, in the name of Humanity, in my public lectures in 1849, an English Positivist told me that the opinion had been spontaneously broached by an English manufacturer. The indication is valuable as showing the peaceable growth of a true Occidental policy, the general adoption of such policy to be secured by the new diplomacy through a noble appeal to the nation which holds Gibraltar. It is, however, principally with reference to the populations outside the West, that there is needed a complete change in the domination of England; for the partial benefits it confers, even when most palpable, are not sufficient to cancel the general sense of oppression. Not to dwell on the truth that material interests are not the highest, for nations any more than for individuals, the legitimate satisfaction of those interests in no case requires a corrupting supremacy, the tendency of which is to perpetuate war in the name of industry. When regenerated by Positivism the English aristocracy will become thoroughly industrial, and will rest its preponderating foreign influence solely on its skilful use of its wealth, when all the Western nations will eagerly assist it, the better to serve Humanity.

This summary view of the reform which the existing foreign and domestic policy of the British constituent both requires and admits, really applies to it in its full sociological comprehension, to the Anglo-Saxon world, that is, and especially to the United States of America. They have thrown off their political connection with England, but they cannot break their filial connection, the intellectual and moral tradition which binds them, so that they have recourse to it for the names of their towns, even, in a greater degree than was the case with the Arabs in Spain. Whilst however we enlarge to this extent the scope of our previous remarks, one general modification of them is needed, otherwise they would seem inapplicable, or their application might mislead.

The peculiar form of colonisation establishes a permanent difference between the North and the South of America, as
regards their respective relations with the parent states. Catholicism and royalty directed on system the colonial movement of the Spanish and Portuguese, hence it adhered in the aggregate to its antecedents; it even allowed, as I have just shown, a better development of the great characteristics of their social state. Whereas the British colonisation, originating as it did in individual efforts under the sanction of Protestantism, weakened the social traditions, and the more so, in that the colonists were principally the persecuted and rebels. On both forms alike rests the grave blot of slavery, the enslaving of the race in which affection predominates; but this monstrous institution places the two in strong contrast, showing the extent to which their inadequate discipline, whether spiritual or temporal, lowers Protestants in relation to Catholics. The same difference reappears from whatever side we approach the subject, and owing to it, the British Americans are the most anarchical of all Western nations, because they have encouraged the defects and repressed the excellences of the English type.

Still, their particular form of degeneracy should be no insuperable obstacle to Positivism in availing itself of the advantages of their situation, so that they, after their manner, may aid in the general construction of the final state, which, as a political movement, is of easier introduction in America than anywhere else. The grand difficulty there is connected with the spiritual transition, in reference even to the doctrine, but still more to the worship: for the latter, our system of commemoration accords ill with a nation without antecedents; for the former, the Positive school is a stumbling-block to the metaphysical spirit there in the ascendant, though with a varnish of encyclopædism. But the uneasiness which is felt as to their political condition will, at no distant period, ensure the adoption of an indivisible synthesis; its aid against communism was duly invoked by the eminent American whose premature loss I had to regret in the preface to the preceding volume. Even as it is, the spontaneous spread of Positivism in America offers a vague confirmation of the more precise evidence of his appeal; so that we may see, to what an extent the representatives in America of the British aristocracy may use the special advantages of their position in the furtherance of the organic transition. Without a standing army, without an established church, the American statesmen can have no empirical illusions as to
the value of material remedies; and they are thus better qualified to diagnose aright the disease under which the West is suffering; in particular they are prepared to accept the inevitable disgregation of all factitious aggregations.

Still, to whatever degree the British leaders can be transformed, especially in England, it is certain that the fourth element of the West will require, equally with the others, for its reorganisation, an extraordinary intervention on the part of the proletariat. The transfer of political power to the working classes may not be as indispensable provisionally, there as elsewhere, as a means of raising the capitalist, yet the nobler patricians will at any rate need the aid of the plebeians to place the central power in its due position. The necessity of abolishing the parliamentary regime in its proper home will involve difficulties, which, without the help of the people, would be insurmountable; there being no other power able to eradicate the organised hypocrisy inseparable from English constitutionalism.

In proceeding to the last and most heterogeneous constituent of the Western world, the first point is to distinguish between Germany and its two chief appendages, the links sociologically between Germany and England, industrial Holland and aristocratic Sweden. These two nations, though opposed to one another, are yet brought together by the circumstance that they are both superior, with an equivalent superiority, industrial or political, to the German world; both, too, equally accept subordination to France as the centre of the West. Were the German group as a whole at the level of these two outlying portions, it would deserve the rank which I originally assigned it in the collective advance of the élite of Humanity. The two may have an influence for good on the organic transition far beyond what their material power might seem to promise, and such, that they may regain the social consideration deserved by their services and their excellences. In advance of Germany from the time that they created their admirable country, and by its creation nobly submitted to the law of fixity of habitation; always the least selfish of the Western nations in the midst of the great political struggles; the Dutch have developed in a higher form the industrial state and have been more successful in avoiding its concomitant evils. As for the Swedish aristocracy, though its reform is of less importance for the West than that of the English, it is easier, from its system of hypocrisy being
less organised, as not connected in Sweden with national isolation. As the Italians, the Scandinavians have remained untainted by colonisation, and would be therefore morally superior to the Batavians; were it not that the latter, besides having attained a higher culture, especially a higher esthetic culture, ordered their colonies more systematically than the English, more liberally than the Spaniards.

It was necessary, at the outset, to put aside these two noble exceptions, if we were to estimate aright the organic transition in the case of Germany, the true character of which will thus be less obscured by heterogeneous elements. The ultimate period of preparation is as much a necessity for Germany as for the others, and from both points of view the process presents more difficulties in Germany, difficulties which have but a slight set off in its special advantages. Still the satisfactory incorporation of the fifth element is a condition which we cannot elude in the reconstruction of the West,—its necessary reconstruction—the decisive step from which we pass to the regeneration of mankind.

Although the Positive religion is fated to meet with more obstacles and less support in Germany than anywhere else, it will be most hampered by the influential classes, influential for a time, that is, which are the peculiar growth of the modern revolution. Nay more, it is from the metaphysicians and them only that comes the great opposition to the acceptance of an organisation; for the German legisit are more available than those of other countries as useful assistants in the movement of reconstruction. But the disease of ontology, inherent in Protestantism, has gradually acquired so extensive and so firm a hold on the German nation, as to make the success of Positivism in Germany the greatest triumph of the system.

Of all Western nations, the French have always been, and are at the present day more than ever, the least affected by litterateurs and metaphysicians, and this owing to the two safeguards furnished, under the royal dictatorship, by their social aspirations and their scientific tendencies. Such influence as the two classes have had, has been less noxious in France than elsewhere, and more in conformity with the national dispositions, by virtue of the demand there was for their services in preparing and inaugurating the great Revolution. In Italy, the excellence as well as the precocity of its poetic developement
swelled the number of its literary class, lowered its character, and gave it a widespread popularity, a popularity however not so representative of the national tendencies. In Spain, an equivalent result was brought about by its deficiency industrially and scientifically, notwithstanding that the monarchy held dictatorial power, and, it must not be forgotten, had a stronger hold upon the legislators. The English mind is averse to Metaphysics, yet in point of fact, they are, through Anglicanism, in possession of the ecclesiastical budget; on the condition that they support the existing system of hypocrisy, promoted by most English literateurs ever when dissenters, tacitly at least, and to the abandonment of the cause of the proletariat. The state of Germany gives them less official importance but greater spiritual power, but at the same time it makes them worse representatives of the popular dispositions. Yet the influence they have gained is questionable and precarious, as they are denied equally the legal income of the English literary class, and the voluntary contributions which maintain their American rivals.

Guided by these two indications, Positivism is warranted in appealing simultaneously to the rulers of Germany and to its popular masses to set aside the misty obstacle which alone prevents it from penetrating to the German world and securing its appropriate cooperation in the organic transition. I venture to say that the new philosophy is not less known there than elsewhere; for my earliest works, so far back as 1825, were fully appreciated by certain eminent literary men, and besides there has been the stimulus due to its favourable reception in Holland. The same influences, however, which in its own home have so greatly retarded the growth of Positivism, still impede it in Germany, notwithstanding its contact with England. the effect of such contact being neutralised by the unceasing vigilance of theontologists. Nevertheless, the course of the movement, intellectually and socially, in the West, will not be long in overriding these partial obstacles, as it evidences the powerlessness of the doctrine of Metaphysics, and the need of the true religion. Positivism will be, in Germany more than elsewhere, the defender of order, the organ of progress, in proportion as leaders and followers alike, as they watch the oscillation between anarchy and reaction, come to feel the necessity of shaking off the yoke of Metaphysics, the only aggravation of the natural fluctuations.
Over and above their decline as a philosophical sect, metaphysicians are already in discredit in Germany from their social incapacity, as specially displayed during the democratical agitation. Their governments justly reproach them with being the principal fomenters of the most dangerous communism; the people should reproach them with prolonging the oppression of Italy, by impelling Germany to take an attitude of isolation and domination. The culture of the fine arts, even where Protestantism prevails, is so strong a bond of sympathy between Italy and Germany, that Positivism will honourably put an end to the monstrosity of German rule in Italy, by delivering the German nation from the sophisms of its pedantocrats. Under this form will first appear the direct appeal of the Religion of Humanity to the proletariat of Germany, the political intervention of which will be shortly as necessary in the interests of order as of progress, there being no other power competent to triumph decisively over the subversive agencies at work. And yet it will be from the Statesmen that will come the first welcome of Positivism, on the ground of its power of organisation; for their position raises them above the cloudy influence which turns the people from the renovating faith.

All the provisional institutions, which throughout the West are to mark its temporal reorganisation as a political movement, will find ready comprehension in Germany, when the religion of Humanity is able to reach it in any considerable extent. The great difficulties will be in the spiritual domain, not as regards the regime, nor even as regards the doctrine, but in relation to the worship. The Germans will early appreciate the Positivist triumvirate as the only security against an inroad of communism; and the Positivist school will easily take the place of the metaphysical Universities. But the regenerating faith will find great obstacles to overcome in introducing the worship of the past in a milieu deficient in antecedents. Such a milieu may have the sense of solidarity, allowing for some exaggeration due to the national tendency to mistake vagueness for depth. For continuity, the conditions of German history make its full appreciation difficult, the German nation not tracing further back than ten centuries. Almost alien to the Roman incorporation, and only late subjected to the training of Catholic-feudalism, Germany has not received even the intellectual development of Greece through the normal channel, whilst its connec-
tion with the Theocracy rests only on a confused tradition of the rudimentary Theocracy of Scandinavia.

In confirmation of this view, we have the scanty welcome of the historical calendar in Germany, whereas in the rest of the West the institution is beginning to be popular. The difference is one hardly explicable by its not sufficiently satisfying German vanity; for the pride of Spain has acquiesced in the synopsis, though Spain has fewer representatives than any other Western nation. The opposition is traceable mainly to the tight fetters which press in Germany on the historical intelligence and sense, in spite of the cultivation in detail of an useless erudition and of vague conceptions on the philosophy of history.

Be the national difficulties however what they may, the intellectual and moral influences at work will have power sufficient to spread the concrete worship of Humanity in Germany, and that independently of the reaction of the other nations upon it. Moreover we may count on the special aptitude of the German nation for the abstract worship, the form which is ultimately to prevail, and which in its normal rudiments, will, during the transition, be combined with the historical commemorations. This decisive expansion of the Western worship is foreshadowed by the welcome it meets from the two appendices of Germany, from Holland and from Scandinavia, countries better prepared by their antecedents for the adoption of the Positive system of commemoration.

This leads me to condense the considerations here offered on the last period of the Western transition, by instituting a festival fitted to denote its termination in principle. The whole temporal and spiritual construction reserved for the last generation of the nineteenth century, has, as its grand object, the reconstruction, in a better form than in the Middle Ages, of the Western Republic, its reconstruction on the basis of the Positive faith, accepted as supreme by the metropolis of Humanity. The visible presentation of this result,—the decisive guarantee of the regeneration of mankind,—must be the completion of the concrete worship of Humanity by the solemn installation of her highest organs in the central temple of the Goddess of the Crusades. Adopting a proper cenotaph only in cases of necessity, we must in all others, induce, as a fraternal act, the several nations to resign the possession of their noble dead, to receive higher honour in the chief seat of the Religion of Humanity.
was entitled to refuse repentant Florence the tomb of Dante; but Paris, purified from all temporal sway and become the centre of the ultimate spirituality, will obtain the relics of the incomparable poet, and, in succession, the other treasures for which it alone is the proper place. Their solemn and splendid transfer to the Holy City will prepare Western Europe for the unprecedented ceremony which is to mark the definitive advent of the demonstrable faith, and of peaceful activity under the guidance of that faith. If the founder of the religion of Humanity reach the great age of Fontenelle or of Hobbes, the crowning act of his career will be the inauguration of the worship—the abstract and concrete worship—of the Great Being, surrounded by deputations from all the elements of the West.

The transition in its most important portion thus accomplished, and its accomplishment coinciding with the end of the exceptional century, the West so reorganised may, in the next generation, secure the gradual triumph of the Positive faith, whilst it carries over the world the flag of Man's Future. At first sight it would seem that one generation must be insufficient for the extension to the race of the final religion, but two general arguments combine to show that such success is warranted by the whole system of sociological laws.

In definitive unison, in noble governance,—both union and governance due to the religion of Humanity,—the Western nations will exercise on the world a decisive influence, free as they will be from discord, free too from designs of oppression. For, as their expansion without was coincident with their internal disorder, it has hitherto lacked both the completeness and nobleness of which it is susceptible. Their empirical attempts to obtain conversions, attempts which were an illusion for themselves, an oppression for others, were besides irreconcilable with the dissensions of men who came to preach a religion which claimed universality whilst disputing with one another for an ascendancy which was rather temporal than spiritual. Quite otherwise will it be, when a faith in the truest sense common, a faith acceptable by all, shall preside over the expansion of the regenerated West, its intellectual and social communication of itself, with no other aim but to aid the spontaneous convergence towards the normal state of Humanity. The various forms of Monotheism having completely neutralised each other, the nations which believed in them turn elsewhere for the uni-
versatility which they vainly proclaimed. Amidst the theocratic nations the same disposition prevails; they reject ephemeral sects and instinctively aspire after the definitive faith, as the general outcome of the preparatory process on which the West has been engaged for the last thirty centuries. Finally, the Fetishist nations will welcome with gratitude a religion which, whilst it delivers them from tyrannical attempts, stamps with its approbation their beliefs, as the indispensable cradle and the normal complement of the human synthesis.

Apart from these spontaneous tendencies to the adoption by the race of the solution elaborated by the West, we must take into account the power there lies in Positivism to gain the assent of the governors prior to its acceptance by the governed. Qualified as it is, by its very nature, to undertake the government of the world, the Religion of Humanity asks in each case solely for the conversion of the chiefs, everywhere at present predisposed to substitute an organic synthesis for effete creeds. Ill-guided as has been, hitherto, the intercourse of the Western nations with the other branches of the human family, it has in an empirical way led to relations which, under right guidance, will rapidly propagate a solution which is the object of general expectation.

If we combine these last considerations with the preceding, we shall feel that one generation ought to be enough to enable the new West to secure the acceptance of its faith by the spiritual and temporal leaders of the nations. In naming a much longer period, as I did in the 'General View,' I had in view the final adoption of the universal religion by the populations those leaders govern. This result will in all cases be slow of attainment; meantime, the conversion of the higher minds may always remove, as in the West, the main source of disturbance, the invariable origin of which is the exhaustion of the old beliefs and the apparent hopelessness of a substitute.

It is this propagation of the transition to the populations which the West is to direct, during the second generation of the normal period, as France was called to preside over the transition of the West in the last generation of the exceptional century. The preponderance of Paris will be more marked in this later process than in the earlier, but it will have a different character. Claiming no longer any temporal power, the city of the Western tombs will move in direct course towards that
presidency of mankind which the Religion of Humanity gives it. It is by giving its fullest extension to the concrete worship that the Positive priesthood must organise at Paris the complementary transition, in which political action will be simply the assistant of philosophy and poetry now irrevocably identified. For this it will be sufficient to develope in an appropriate manner the germs of Islam, of Polytheism, nay even of Fetichism, which I have placed at the very opening of the historical calendar, and gradually to introduce most of the abstract festivals, hardly more than rudiments during the principal transition.

This direction implies that the general transition is normally decomposable into three successive phases, analogous, though not numerically equal, to the phases of the Western transition. From the point of view now presented, I consider a period of seven years as sufficient for the action of the regenerate West to tell upon the monotheistic East. The other two phases will each require thirteen years for the satisfactory affiliation, to the metropolis of Humanity, first of the Polytheistic nations, then of the Fetichist. But, whilst from their dependence they cannot but be successive, the three parts of this secondary transition ought to be laboured at simultaneously, even during the second half of the Western or principal transition. Before its complete accomplishment, diplomats and missionaries, availing themselves in every case of the natural course of events, will have developed the direct affinities which exist between Positivism and every other form of human existence.

In each phase of this secondary transition, we must allow for three distinct stages, the analogues of those offered by the transition of the West, when we group, taking France as the centre, the Catholic world and the Protestant world, each as a whole, around France. Although in these three stages, just as in the secondary transition as a whole, we proceed with our action simultaneously, the full results can never be reached but in succession—as was seen to hold good of the principal transition. Classification being naturally of more importance when the objects classified are more distinct, it is in it that lies the great difficulty of the sociological question which remains for me to solve. There is no room for hesitance in regard to the general transition when we limit ourselves to its three stages of
Monotheism, Polytheism, and Fetichism. But when we come to deal with the three subdivisions of each of them, it naturally appears more difficult at present to classify them than it was to classify the three cases of the Western transition, the French, the Catholic, and the Protestant, though the distinctions between these latter are less marked.

Taking the first phase of the complementary transition, I unhesitatingly solve the problem by representing the Positive regeneration as destined to prevail first in Turkey, then in Russia, lastly in Persia. This classification, which, as in every other case, sums up the comparisons to which it relates, follows from the conclusions we reached in the last volume, on the monotheistic or last of the three intermediate stages between Theocracy and Socioocracy. All I have now to do is, to systematise the historical theory of Islam, a theory thus seen to issue from the whole past, particularly from its modern period.

When I created, as I did in my fundamental work, the philosophy of history, it could not possibly at once attain the precision or the completeness requisite for a satisfactory estimate of the Monotheism of the East. I ought besides to confess that, unwittingly, I at that time shared in the prejudices against Islam derived from Catholic sources, and which involuntarily spread even in the most emancipated minds, the great Diderot not excepted. To these two sources I trace the radically mistaken judgment which I originally passed on the social influence of Islam, as well in the East as in the West of the Roman world. But the preceding volume shows distinctly, that my definitive view of the two Monotheisms is, that they contributed equally, each in its way, to the completion of the education of mankind. The two transient synthases, shaped, the earlier by St. Paul, the later by Mohammed, differ not in their object; and if both equally are exhausted, both, though in different ways, are qualified to aid the advent of the final religion, a just presentiment of which is traceable in the noblest organs of the Great Being.

I regard the two systems as destined respectively to rule the two great sections of the Roman world, on which sections it devolved to elaborate, first, the intellectual, then the social movement. Though united under the banner of Monotheism, it was the second section alone which could carry on to its full effect the rudimentary effort at separation of the two powers,
the end aimed at in the theological concentration and the source of its peculiar doctrinal characteristics. But the failure of Byzantinism as a social system, the natural result of the whole antecedents of Greece, compelled the true Catholicism to call itself Roman, and by so doing early to raise a presentiment, by the contradiction the term involved, that its claims to universality were in the last resort invalid.

It was under the influence of this contrast, quite sensible in the first phase of the Middle Ages, that Mohammed founded the Monotheism adapted for the governors, by consolidating the fusion of the two powers; as St. Paul had founded the Monotheism of the governed on the separation of the two. The aim of both is to regulate human life, on the basis of the whole earlier advance of man; the means adopted, in the one case, the discipline of command, in the other that of obedience. They were suited, then, to the respective wants of the two portions, the intellectual and social portions, of the world incorporated into one whole by the Roman Empire. Just as the Latins, at all times amenable to discipline, stood in need of an independent priesthood, competent to secure the just sway of universal morality over the active will; so the Greeks, who never had been disciplined, stood in need of an energetic concentration, such as Islam alone could systematically organise. I do not hesitate to look on the Moslems as the natural successors of the Romans in the government of the Greek nation; sacrificed as that population has been to the culture of the intellect, it will never be able to guide itself until regenerated by Positivism.

In the mission thus assigned it we have the only possible explanation of the aggregate intellectual and social characteristics of Islam, forming, as it did, a nation of patricians to rule, through its imperial Monotheism, those whom the Roman senate absorbed into its social Polytheism. As well suited to the East as the defensive Monotheism was to the West, it presupposed a conquered population, as the other did a people capable of discipline. In this empirical division, however, of the Roman world between the two, long contests were an inevitable incident, contests naturally originating with the more active and more concentrated faith. Equilibrium became possible only then, when the crusades had taught the Catholic world the impossibility of overcoming a more perfect form of belief; and
had diverted Islam from the conquest of the West. Hence arose, before the end of the first period of modern history, a tacit but decisive compromise, which reduced to order the latest phase of man’s preparation, by leaving the Mussulmen to settle themselves firmly in the Greek world, to the entire disregard of the Byzantine appeals for Latin support.

This instinctive agreement marks the true beginning of conservative diplomacy, which ordinarily is made to date only from the disruption of Catholicism, on an untenable view of the Western revolution. More and more strengthened by the whole course of subsequent events, the division has resulted in the Turks becoming more thoroughly an integral part of the Western system than the Greeks ever could have been. But at the same time, by its dispelling, once for all, all hopes, on either side, of a true universality, this concurrent settlement has gradually made manifest the equal exhaustion of the two Monotheisms, the Monotheism of defence and the Monotheism of Empire, both, though in different ways, destined to prepare the way for Positivism.

If we would give greater precision to this judgment, we must consider the Turkish government as in all essential respects adapted to the wants of Eastern Europe, though, on empirical grounds, opinion would confine it to Western Asia. The Positive transition must be far advanced before we can conceive of the Greeks as without the Turks, any more than the Turks without the Greeks, the Turks not being competent to feed, the Greeks to govern, themselves. But whilst this theory rectifies a mistaken policy, the errors of which are now generally recognised, it is introduced here, to show at once the danger and the impossibility of prolonging the existence of the two Monotheisms. They cannot stand alone and they cannot combine, so that, great as is the tolerance—the necessary tolerance—of the ruling faith, they must both equally be expecting the universal ascendency of the Positive religion, which in their various ways they concurred in preparing. It is, however, from the Turks more especially that there will come cooperation in furtherance of the organic transition, for they are more predisposed than the Greeks to second a doctrine, which, for the present, addresses itself to the governors as Islam did, whilst it effects the division of the two powers more completely than Catholicism.

We must, then, think of Turkey, as beginning, under the
impulse of the West, the complementary transition, which, in the course of one generation, is to succeed the primary transition directed by France with no other guide but Humanity. But the historical theory of Islam leads equally to the conclusion, that Persia will be the last of the Monotheistic nations to join in the organic transition. For the Mussulmen of the East differ radically from those of the West, in that they have not had, as the latter, an exceptional mission, the task singularly congenial to the conquering faith, of governing populations unsusceptible of discipline. In the absence of this vocation, one limited to the Greek portion of the Roman world, Islam in Persia became at once oppressive and subversive, so as to foster its natural defects, while the Turks generally managed to turn them. It is true, that in Persia, a substitute for the task of governing the Greeks seems offered by the care, on a large scale, of a population sacrificed to the premature advent of Monotheism, as Greece had been to the exclusive culture of the intellect. The two cases, however, never really corresponded, in consequence of the unavoidable dispersion which is characteristic of the Jews since the fall of Polytheism. The unfortunate race missed, through its blind obstinacy, its single opportunity of regaining its nationality, when it rejected the noble advances of the great Mohammed, who might have become the Messiah of their vain expectations.

By the fifteenth law of the first philosophy, it is little to be wondered at, that I thus place in close connection the remarks bearing on the two extreme forms of Eastern Monotheism, before describing the position of Russia, the representative of the modern development of the intermediate form. When the adoption of Byzantinism had neutralised the Eastern Scandinavians, as the Western had been disciplined by their adoption of Catholicism, the former would be sure to retain some of their aspirations after conquest, which had been debarred their natural course. Their Monotheism, however, was as little able to arouse enthusiasm as to inspire discipline; its doctrinal system being constructed to divide the two powers, its regime leading to their fusion. Hence a radical contradiction, one which should at once and the same time dispel the anxiety of Europe, and concentrate the attention of Asia. The three forms of Eastern Monotheism are destined simultaneously to pass under the sociological law, by which factitious aggregates are to be
decomposed as a natural process; and this even before France has nobly introduced system into this change among the Monotheists of the West. Notwithstanding this destiny, the storms occasioned by its empirical accomplishment will be naturally more dangerous and more immediate in Russia than in Turkey or even in Persia, as Russia is far more heterogeneous in composition, and its heterogeneity is of a more disturbing character. To remedy, as far as possible, the aberrations attendant on an ill-directed empirical policy, the autocratic government of this confused agglomeration of nations should make its policy dependent on the sociological position of Russia, following Turkey, that is, as in closer relations with the Western world.

My course of lectures, fixed for 1862, on the whole organic transition, will be the proper occasion for expanding as they deserve the preceding remarks; at present I must limit myself to the general conception, a conception embodied in the classification of the Monotheisms. This first phase of the secondary transition enables us to foretaste the spiritual and temporal advantages, which are in reserve for the belated populations, approaching, as they will do, by a systematic process, the normal state, the natural outcome of the evolution of the West. In reference to the most important case, Turkey, the fusion in Islam of the two powers may be looked upon as calculated to facilitate for the Turks the establishment of a religion which addresses itself primarily to the upper classes. The concentration of wealth in Turkey will be a further aid in the introduction of the sociocratic regime, as there will be none of the hindrances arising from the intermediate position of the bourgeoisie in the West, between the patriciate and the proletariat. In the lectures above announced, these various considerations, over and above their own direct purpose, will throw light upon the Western movement, the several branches of which will, though in a less degree, admit of similar comparisons. Adapted to meet the wants of the latest phase of the central transition, such teaching is still more needed when the scale becomes larger, the divisions more marked. Above all I must look to those lectures for the full explanation of the two last instances of the regeneration of mankind, only the most summary statement being here admissible, though in regard to them our intervention may be more thorough and more efficacious.

In the initial phase of the secondary transition we have only
the influence of the West to look to for aid. In the second phase, we have the additional assistance of the influence of the already regenerated Monotheists upon the polytheistic nations, with whom they are more peculiarly connected. Islam, in particular, possesses an aptitude for this, as, reducing command to a system, it enjoins toleration of all nations that have any law, be that law what it may. And, although the dominion of the Mussulmen, in the main, is exclusively adapted to the Greeks, their empire in India was less of a disturbing element than that of the Western Monotheists. More skilful in incorporating themselves with theocratic populations, their relations with them, when no longer supreme, remain more favourable to the advent of the Religion of Humanity than those of the passing Englishmen.

Whoever be the Western apostles, Turks, and, still more, Persians, who preach the new faith to the Polytheistic nations, the system which must always guide them in its introduction is that of a fusion of doctrines. In the principal transition, the Western institutions which are meant to facilitate it, concern only the worship and the regime, because the intellectual preparation of the West, both negative and positive, is such as to allow of the direct introduction of the fundamental doctrine of Positivism. The same holds good of the first phase of the complementary transition, Islam, by virtue of the simplicity of its faith, requiring no intellectual modification. But when we come to the Theocracies, we feel the need of completing our general conception of the organic transition, by introducing into it the intermediate element. Then, besides the worship and the regime which at first were all that required modifying, we must institute a provisional doctrine, by its nature qualified to transform Polytheism into Positivism without any intervention of Monotheism.

For this I must idealise the encyclopaedic hierarchy, first however contracting it within due limits. And, although either of the two ternary arrangements is available for our object, we must select that in which the vital order forms the indispensable link between the inorganic and the human order. Hence we form the conception of three goddesses, the representatives respectively of Materiality, Vitality, and Humanity. Whilst, from the objective point of view, the three by their harmony express the economy of the world, from the subjective,
that harmony is in agreement with the constitution of the brain. For the phenomena of the first class, in consequence of the greater regularity which they owe to their greater simplicity, are suggestive of the intellect, in particular, by the idea of order; those of the second, point to progress through action; those of the third, build union on the foundation of love.

Such is the legitimate limit of contraction for the synthesis of Theology, if the object be the distinct display of its powers as a philosophy, without really taking into account its efficacy as a political direction. The real destination of Monotheism was social; and it was oppressive to the intellect as devoting it to vague speculations, where there could be no satisfactory presentation of the great variety of phenomena. Nor is the presentation satisfactory even when we reduce Polytheism to its binary form, a form not more adapted to the wants of our intellect than to those of our moral nature. But the ternary form, a threefold causality, meets the demands of Theology, for the Positive spirit, though more analytical than Theology, employs habitually the three progressive terms which answer to this threefold causation. By substituting goddesses for gods, we sanction the legitimate preeminence of women, without clashing with our instinctive tendencies, clearly indicated by the gender of the word cause. The peculiar character of each goddess, and even her ideal conception, may be easily determined by the nature of her attributes. Whilst the three preserve their independence, their relations to one another should embody, ideally, the real subordination of the phenomena they represent, a subordination at once objective and subjective, on the principle of decrease of simplicity and increase of dignity.

This trinity of philosophical creation may without difficulty be engrafted upon the several Polytheisms, on that of India especially, the object being to prepare the way for the ultimate establishment of Positivism. Whilst giving the tendencies to synthesis as complete a satisfaction as is compatible with Theology, it will excite a stronger desire for the purely subjective unity, engendered by the substitution of laws for causes, when in the growth of Positive conceptions we reach the only universal point of view, a point inaccessible to any absolute doctrine. Adapted to the generation which succeeds that for which I formed the concrete worship, this provisional faith may
last as long as shall be required for the reorganisation of the
different intellectual states of the several nations, thus prepared
to receive the encyclopedic training of the normal state. In the
evolution of the West, social reasons made Monotheism a
necessity, otherwise such a condensation of Polytheism would
have been more favourable to the advent of the final philosophy.
In this way, then, the nations which have remained theocratic
may find compensation for the delay, in passing more easily
than all the other theological believers, through the common
transition, by the aid of a dogmatic creation which adapts to
their use the analytical process, for the synthetic result of which
they are waiting.

On a comparison of the several cases which properly belong
to the second phase of the subsidiary transition, our sociological
theory dispels all uncertainty as to their classification, the past
being a pledge of the future. As in the preceding phase, so
here, it is in agreement with the order of their respective
distance, locally; from the West. For Positivism must first re-
generate the Polytheists of India, then of China, lastly those of
Japan.

Although it will act simultaneously on the three, whether
through the direct agency of the West, or indirectly through
the Mussulman, it is impossible to doubt but that the Theocracy
which has suffered the least from time will be the most open to
the regenerative process. Besides my lectures on this subject,
I must refer to the preceding volume for explanations, inconsis-
tent with the limits of my present sketch, to show the latent
predisposition of the Brahmins in favour of the faith which will
restore their social position whilst perfecting their moral nature
and their mental organisation. I have announced already that
the Positive priesthood would shortly be recruited by the adjunc-
tion of a very small portion of the Catholic clergy; I may now
state that the theocratic caste is already disposed, at the fitting
time, to furnish a much larger contingent. Positivism will
deliver it from the oppression of the temporal power to which it
has been subjected for twenty centuries, an oppression which it
bows to more and more without ever losing its consciousness of
its spiritual superiority, and the hope of seeing it definitively
reestablished. Such a restoration, it is true, demands its com-
plete renunciation of command and even of property, but the
systematic guardians of human order will not be slow to accept
conditions imposed in the name of their social mission and of their individual dignity.

Positivism offers, then, to the regenerate Brahmins the re-organisation of the Brahminical body, but it offers them besides, and nothing else does, the gratification of the noble wish they have ever cherished to free their theocratic country from all foreign dominion. Appealing in fitting terms to the English nation, it will peaceably remove a yoke which, under whatever veil of illusion, justly inspires more antipathy than that of the Mussulmen. As it will have rendered this service prior to the introduction of the Positive faith in its true form, that faith will be readily welcomed as the consequence of the provisional doctrine, the great object of instituting that doctrine being to enable the Brahmins who have become Positivists to modify their theocratic milieu.

In this way it is, that Sociocracy should, in the earlier years of the next century, incorporate directly with itself the best upholders of Theocracy, as realising their invincible aspirations after an universal religion, by the preeminence it assigns to morality in its synthesis. By their adjunction, the speculative or intellectual portion of the race will, in all its branches, be subject to the regenerating faith, for it will have extended its sway over the Polytheistic complement of that portion.

The inferiority of the two other theocratic states must not be regarded as a direct consequence of a difference of race. It is due, principally, to the profound disturbance introduced into the caste system by the success of a mistaken effort at reform which failed in the country where it began. When driven from India, Bouddhism was most successful in China, where the adoption of the examination system tended to change the Theocracy into a Pedantocracy, thus realising, as far as was possible, the dream of the Greek literateurs and their modern imitators.

The degeneration is one which throws great obstacles in the way of the intellectual and social ascendency of a religion more hostile to Metaphysics than to Theology. Its introduction, however, into China will be mainly facilitated by practical considerations, whereas, in India, it will appeal to speculative tendencies. In disorganising the predominant caste, the Bouddhist revolution favoured the growth of industry, in accordance so far with the nature of the active race. As in the West, so in China, industry allows of direct contact between the Positive faith and
the popular reason. Yet, even in China, the Religion of Humanity must, at first, be best suited to the rulers, not merely the temporal rulers, but also to the spiritual guides, provided that it rightly avail itself of the local conditions. The metaphysical aberration cannot but be displeasing to the better Mandarins, interfering as it does with the full exertion of their legitimate action on society. First overcoming the empirical habits traceable to the excessive prominence of practical questions, they will welcome the only doctrine competent to direct systematically the activity of man.

The like dispositions, and with a stronger hold, are entertained by the rulers of Japan, emancipated from Theocracy by their military development, as was the West, whilst they have avoided the danger of Pedantocracy, essentially a Chinese error. And yet I believe the Japanese to be less prepared than the Chinese for the acceptance of Positivism, considering the lower degree to which industrial existence has been developed. Although less tainted by Metaphysics, they have kept more of the habits and feelings of the theocratic state, the change from them having been more recent; this is evidenced by their isolation as a nation, the more striking from its being as it were in daily contrast with the emigrations of the Chinese. Hence it is, that the most eastern portion of the Polytheistic world will be most difficult of access to the religion of Humanity. Still, its relative character will allow of partial contacts there, so soon as the Japanese chiefs shall distinguish the Positive faith from the various Western creeds which cause them a just anxiety. The synthesis which comes forward to effect the normal division of the two powers, is in direct congruity with the society most disturbed by their fusion. Such a milieu must early appreciate the power Positivism has, to systematise its instinctive preference of action to contemplation and the persistent subordination of all special forms of activity to a paramount morality.

Such is the method on which, as a result of all the previous preparatory processes, first in the emancipated portion of mankind, then in the monotheistic, the polytheistic world will be regenerated during the intermediate phase of the secondary transition; the world, that is, which comprises, with its various appendages, the half of the human race. The movement of universal reconstruction, which has already passed from the speculative to the active race, will have only, then, to reach the
affective, the sociological characteristic of which is its adherence to Fetichism.

In treating this, the last complement of the organic transition, enough that the whole preceding volume points to the competence of Positivism to deal directly with the question, ulterior explanations being reserved for my special course. Where there is incomplete intellectual emancipation, it is likely that the case of the affective race may appear to present almost insuperable difficulties, but the really regenerate in soul may even now feel that it will shortly offer the highest triumph of the true faith. The failure of Monotheistic, may even of Polytheistic, efforts to modify the Fetichists, will but place in a stronger light the capacity of the most systematic of syntheses to incorporate with itself the most spontaneous.

The whole difficulty, intellectual and moral, of the transition of mankind is necessarily in Theologism, since it has to disappear entirely. Whereas, the sociological theory, with which my readers are now familiar, shows that Fetichism, sanctioned by Positivism, may enter into direct combination with it, without imposing any great changes either on the heart or on the intellect. The first step, alike in the search after causes and in the study of laws, the spontaneous mode of the fictitious synthesis does not originate the absolute philosophy; that really dates its reign from the introduction of indirect causality. And however inevitable this second mode was in the primary evolution, when we can direct the process of initiation, we may overleap it, if the mental development, whether of the individual or of the society, be duly systematised. For it is not difficult to turn the mind from causes when we reveal laws; a reduction of the general rectification of the Fetichist logic into the distinguishing properly activity from life. From the moral point of view, the passage is easier still, since all that Positivism does, is to adopt on system the superiority of the heart to the intellect, which was made by the instinct of Fetichism the permanent basis of the human synthesis. The assimilation by imagination of the external to the human order is indispensable, if the definitive religion is to complete our conceptions and develop our emotions, nor does any risk attend the process if we bear constantly in mind its essentially subjective character.

From the political point of view, the Positive regeneration of the Fetichist nations does not offer greater difficulties than
under the intellectual or moral aspect. In the original evolution, Theocracy was absolutely indispensable; and the subsequent military transition with its three stages was also necessary for the West; but it is only in regard to the original evolution that there are imperative reasons for such a course, for it could not otherwise be the preparation for the final state. But when that state is once definitively established in any single centre, its extension to the race requires, in no case, a repetition of the phases proper to the primary movement. The deficiency, socially, of the Fetishists, relating as it does to their inadequate development of public life, may be remedied by their direct acceptance of the peaceful form of activity under the control of the demonstrable faith, without any theocratic or military preliminaries. This systematic fusion of the primordial with the definitive form of existence has had its way so prepared, that it will be easiest to realise in the case of the oldest Fetishism, where the Religion of Humanity will not have even to modify a priesthood, beyond any other, susceptible of transformation.

The last phase of the complementary transition, as the two others, offers three independent cases, ranked again by their distance, locally, from the Western centre, so that we deal with the Fetishists first in Africa, then in America, lastly in Oceania. But as in the first phase, so here also, we must treat the two extremes first, the middle last, as there is an analogous, and even more strongly marked, confusion between the tendency of the people itself and the influence exercised on it from without.

Ending once for all a proselytism which is a mockery and a disturbance, Positivism will initiate Africa—the great seat of Fetishism—into the only religion capable of fully appreciating the affective race and binding it by proper ties to the two others. This is the final step towards our realising the extent to which Turkey should assist France in the systematic propagation of the complementary transition. For the Mussulmen, when regenerate, will be better qualified than the apostles of the West, to convert Africa, especially central Africa, their habits giving them an easier access and leading to greater results. The moral barriers of which the principal Fetishist nations wisely avail themselves in addition to their local isolation, will fall, the moment that the central civilisation presents itself in a form which they can assimilate. As the great satisfaction of the Africans is in domestic life, the aptitude of the new civilisation
to develop that life will be a direct inducement to them to welcome it, when no longer in dread of stupid or culpable attempts. Preserved from the military regime by their defective state-organisation and their territorial isolation, they will be quick in adopting a peaceful activity which must never be other than free, and which the religion of Humanity subordinates to its moral end. Where astrolatry prevails, the greater extent and order of the societies will smooth the advent of the new doctrine, provided that its apostles know how to use and to respect the local priesthood, better prepared than any other for Positivism.

The intercourse of the Oceanians with the West is of a much later date than that of the Africans, but it has been on a greater scale, from their not being isolated, and it has been more fraught with disturbance from the absence of discipline. The tribes visited by Cook are now scarcely to be recognised, and are rapidly tending to extinction from physical and moral degradation, unless Positivism succeeds, while it is yet time, in rousing all emancipated thinkers to reprobate the interference of all theologists of whatever order. But the priesthood of Humanity will soon lead the public mind of the West to feel, that irreconcilable religions, each discredited at its own proper centre, cannot but be wholly incapable of propagating the central civilisation, more particularly amongst the Fetishists. Besides that commercial or other ordinary intercourse is in itself less disturbing, it will improve in proportion as the internal reorganisation of the several states acts as a dissuasive to European expansion, during the inevitable break-up of the colonial system which has already begun for all the Western nations. There is ground, then, for my hope that the religion of Humanity will have gained a decisive ascendancy in time to prevent the extinction by a natural process of the Fetishists of Oceania, and that the tribes thus saved will, in the name of the Great Being, take their part in the right management of its planetary home.

There remains for me only to explain the most difficult case in the whole secondary transition, that, viz., which concerns the gravest of the anomalies originating in the Western revolution, the examination of the Positive regeneration in regard to the American Fetishists. Their habitation of itself sufficiently indicates the position, so sadly exceptional, of the greater number, sprung as they are from the principal centre of the
affective race and transplanted to America by a monstrous policy, to repair a horrible depopulation. Although Catholicism was the first instrument of this European crime, it is Protestantism that must bear the greatest blame for its extension and aggravation. As far as it is possible to do so, Positivism is competent to make compensation for the aberrations of theologians, and it does so by enforcing a just appreciation of the oppressed, by exposing the sophisms of the oppressor. Adopting the decisive aphorism, which came into use at the opening of the French Revolution, it shows how irreconcilable is the regeneration of the West with the existence of this monstrous institution, even for nations who have been passive in the matter.

Leaving out of the question the sociological theory of the human races, the philosophy of history enables us to brand with reprobation this anomaly, as directly contrary to the normal destination of slavery, which is only tolerable as the subjection of the labourer to the warrior. Hence, while in Antiquity slavery aided the progress both of the master and the slave, by bringing them into closer contact, its unnatural modern form degrades both by separating them. This is why the cessation, in the natural course of the slave trade was sufficient to transform a right the slavery of Antiquity, whilst the systematic prohibition of that trade has hitherto only aggravated the slavery of modern times.

Though the anomaly is one which can come to no good end, the priesthood of Humanity will prepare the élite of the West to facilitate its inevitable extinction, by a right use and due extension of the particular centre which the oppressed race has courageously vindicated for itself. In expiation of the crime which for the last three centuries has stained indirectly or directly the whole West, the West Indian Archipelago must, with suitable indemnities, be given up to the free descendants of the transplanted Africans. There their own spontaneous efforts, already felt in Hayti, the centre of their freedom, to clear their Fetishism from the alloy of Theology, will enable Positivism to effect their regeneration more satisfactorily than that of their brothers in Oceania, by a larger introduction of Western influence.

Thus, after devoting the greater part of this chapter to France, as the typical case of the final transition, I have charac-
terised the thirteen successive stages of its extension, to the other nations of Western Europe, to the nations who are yet in the theological state, and to the Fetishist nations. As no one of its important applications is excluded, I have submitted to a conclusive and necessary test the determination of the future as based on the explanation of the past, in order to prove that the Religion of Humanity is competent to direct the present. The whole range of human affairs thus grasped in one conception, the reign of Humanity is inaugurated; for it lies in this, above all, that it systematises a progress beyond the reach of the syntheses which could embrace a part only of time and space.
GENERAL CONCLUSION OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

The presentation of the normal state and of its universal acceptance—with this we complete the Positive synthesis whose foundations were laid, in the two preceding volumes, in the study of the human order and its evolution,—an evolution at once inevitable and indispensable—such study resting on the unity proclaimed in the first volume. Each of the five chapters constructed in the present volume is an essential contribution to the direct creation of the relative harmony. Its subjective origin is a consequence, in the first chapter, of the fundamental theory of the Great Being, a theory which finds immediate expression in the conception, first of the Religion of Humanity, then of the normal existence of mankind. The paramount importance of feeling,—such is always the foundation of Positive unity; but it may take one of two forms in succession, according to the relative position of thought and action as the ministers of affection. I devoted the second chapter to the most direct form of the consensus, that in which action confines itself to helping the intelligence to express emotion; the form required for the period of our education and for the system of human worship; in the former of which the wants of life are not suffered to press on us; in the latter, for the time they are suspended. This done, the two next chapters establish the most complete unity, as they subordinate thought to action in order to modify the external necessities of our condition; in such a way as always to keep sympathy in accord with synthesis. Lastly, the concluding chapter consolidates this harmonious system, by proving its peculiar competence to be the immediate guide of the several nations in their action, and consequently of all individuals whatsoever.

Whatever the objective aim of this present volume, it is from its subjective appreciation above all that must flow its efficacy as a religious work. Looked at as a whole, the picture
it constructs, the conception of a state of things which as yet cannot be, displays, on a large scale, with irresistible evidence the capacity of our cerebral system for reflecting the universal order. A necessary consequence of that dependence of the subjective on the objective which lies at the root of all our existence, this power manifests itself at the very earliest beginning of the upward movement of Humanity, in the development of rational prevision, such prevision step by step embracing more and more complex phenomena. The simplest astronomical calculation presents a marvellous coincidence between the actual chain of operations within us and the future succession of events without us. Such a result, under whatever fictitious synthesis, must, at all times, have foreshadowed the inevitable advent of the true harmony, since in such result man is in union with the world without, becoming the mirror of that world, when law is substituted for cause. But whatever the value attaching to the continuous enlargement of this faculty, it cannot determine the definitive renovation of the human understanding so long as it does not extend to the most important and the most critical order of phenomena. Thus judged, the volume but now ended is the principal portion of the religious construction which it completes, for in it the brain shows itself not less able to reflect the human than the external order, and that by virtue of the invariability common to both.

The demonstration of this power is a consequence, as at present, from the concurrence in the general of the two elaborations of unequal length, which in succession occupy the concluding volume, both uniformly under the guidance of the fundamental principle laid down at its opening. However satisfactorily the three chapters between the first and last may have delineated the three capital aspects of the normal existence, if the result at which they arrive is to be conclusive, it can only be by supplying us with the direct representation of its acceptance by the race. Thus, the reality of the conception of the future is a consequence, on the one hand, of its being deduced from the past, the general explanation of which past is irrefragable; and, on the other hand, of its enabling us to understand and regulate the present.

In this way it is, that the Positive synthesis takes definitive possession of its last and chief domain, the mastery over which were incomplete, were the theory of the human order confined
to determining its nature and its preparation without understanding its ulterior development. His failure on this decisive point proved the inadequacy of the attempt made by my eminent precursor, Condorcet, to lay the foundations of Sociology. My success on the same point, in this volume, ought to be a proof that the essential conditions have been satisfactorily complied with as regards the two systems of statical and dynamical laws which serve as the basis of the achievement.

Thus directly linked to the universal order, Humanity finds herself altogether emancipated from the imaginary guardianship which during the period of her initiation was her instinctive substitute for an external guide. She definitively inaugurates her all-embracing providence by applying the whole body of the laws, statical and dynamical, which she obeys, to the understanding, in the general, her future and the transition which is necessary to introduce that future. This step taken, her priesthood is enabled to reduce to system the real life of man, acting on an interpretation of her into which no caprice nor indistinctness ever enter, with no need for any revelation. Such is the type, after which, each well-cultivated brain attains as completely the faculty of imaging the world in reference to the most complex as in reference to the simplest phenomena. If at any time, in application, a more detailed and more exact prevision is requisite, it will be accessible, then as now, with minds so prepared. For the inward operations of such understandings are as much in agreement with the outward course of moral and social events as with that of vital or inorganic phenomena. Traceable in rudiment to the earliest beginnings of man's initiation, the subordination of the subjective to the objective has now reached such completeness, that they who systematically exemplify it become, of necessity, the advisers of all, in an existence which they alone grasp in its true fulness.

Viewed, then, as an intellectual creation, the construction proper to this volume satisfies the external condition of real unity by completing the process by which man is linked to the world. But, viewed as a moral creation, it is as conclusive for the internal condition, since it makes synthesis a direct result of sympathy. In it, feeling is shown to be more qualified to regulate the intellect, nay, even the activity, than had been asserted in the 'General View,' the introduction to the religious construction here terminated. In it, all speculations are directed
to the support of universal love, the only power which can give them system, sanction, and discipline. In it again, from the same source is drawn the general ordering of practical life, the most trivial acts of which become as noble as they are coherent by their influence on affection. Thus made the general regulator, not merely of the worship, but also of the doctrine and of the regime, the instinct of sympathy has given full proof of its capacity for synthesis. So we see the close of the treatise on Sociology realise, beyond all hope, the promises of its opening, in that it develops the only form of harmony which at one and the same time meets all the wants of human nature under all its manifold aspects.

Such result is in equal conformity with the principle of the relative synthesis and with its purpose, since the intellectual and moral order constitute the domain of Positivism. The absolute synthesis made human phenomena the special object of its attention, yet it was unequal to any systematic conception of them, because it was unable ever to place itself at the social point of view. As incapable of representing composite existence as it was of sanctioning the feelings to which that existence owes its origin, whatever social value it had, it drew not from the capabilities of its doctrine, but from the instinct of its priesthood, so long as that priesthood was progressive. The explanations of Theology were confined to the external world quite as much as those of Fetishism, and they tended to become even more illusory than those of Fetishism as regards the intellectual and moral world, by exaggerating the importance of man and not recognising his subordination to matter. Hence the study of the sacred sciences could appertain only to Positivism, though it could not enter into possession till it had reorganised the profane sciences, by the gradual substitution of laws for causes. But however slow of accomplishment, this advent it is which marks the true commencement of the normal existence of the Great Being, an existence previously hampered by the intellectual obstacle of a fictitious faith, by the moral obstacle of a destructive activity. At the present time we may look upon the minority of Humanity as definitively ended, since the full conception of the final state has been formed, as is shown by the contemporaneous and correlated development of sociological prevision and of allcomprehending love, as substitutes for Theology and war.
GENERAL CONCLUSION.

Condense to the utmost the general estimate of this volume, and it resolves itself into the decision which perfects the constitution of the religion; the decision, that is, to place the worship before the doctrine, in accordance with an ever-recurring wish, realisable by Positivism alone. Such a step in advance is the culminating point in, and is characteristic of, the formation of the relative unity, the gradual outcome of the three preceding volumes. After establishing the doctrine on which the whole system rests, the first deduced therefrom, by the subjective method, the systematisation of Positive logic, applying that method directly in the capital construction of the cerebral theory. This done, it was possible, in the second volume, to institute the universal synthesis, on the basis of the scientific supremacy of Morals, and to regulate its application to social questions by laying the foundations for the normal separation of the two powers. The third condensed the philosophy of history in the final amalgamation of the two states which stand, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of man’s education,—by the direct combination of Fetishism with Positivism. Still the religious series would have remained incomplete, had the doctrine maintained its precedence over the worship, a precedence irreconcilable with the subordination of intellect to feeling. It is this seventh and last step which naturally sums up the decisive creation of Positive unity in a simple transposition, the whole of the concluding volume amply proving the power both for synthesis and sympathy of such transposition.
CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE WORK OF THE
SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY.

To appreciate as a whole the religious construction in the four
volumes now ended, it should be connected with my lectures of
1847, lectures of capital importance, as in them, on my moral re-
generation, there arose, by a gradual process, the true synthesis.
It was but a first outline, of an essentially dogmatic character,
but it contained, not merely the substance of the 'General View,'
but also all the germs of the concluding volume. In 1848, my
teaching became mainly historical and in this form it was re-
peated three years, according to the programme given in the
preface to the third volume. I have not gone on with it since
the publication of my first volume, but still it gave occasion, by
anticipation, to the decisive elaboration of the great leading
conceptions, statical or dynamical, peculiar to the several por-
tions of the present work. Such is, unquestionably, the filiation
which links my whole religious construction to the angelic im-
pulse which was destined to make me feel in its full force the
true source of Positive unity.

As early as 1845, I saw in its true light, under this holy
influence, my whole career; I saw that its second half had to
transform philosophy into religion, as its first had changed
science into philosophy. So was coordinated the series of
efforts which had been the spontaneous outgrowth of my original
attempt to proceed directly with the regeneration of society.
The smaller works, reprinted as appendices to this treatise, show
how, with the aim of reconstructing the spiritual power, I was
gradually led to the prior formation of a philosophical theory
capable of inspiring fixed convictions which all might share.
This foundation once laid by the creation of Sociology, I felt
that it was inadequate as a means of spiritual reorganisation
unless duly completed by comprehending feeling no less than
the intellect and the activity. Hence I undertook the present
work to base the universal synthesis on Morals as paramount, in
theory as in practice; giving systematic expression, that is, to
the wisdom of Theocracy and of Catholicism by the aid of all
the knowledge acquired by man.

The close connection between the two phases of my mission
lies in the obligation, if Positive unity is to be efficient and
durable, to make it complete. Scientific theories are inadequate
and precarious if not colligated in a philosophy; on the same
ground, that philosophy must be subordinated to the moral
principle, whence and whence only we can get the subjective
synthesis, which is by its very nature indivisible. It is in the
spiritual order above all that the remark applies, though it
originate in the external order, that every isolated construction
is unstable. Although the absolute synthesis never embraced
the practical existence of man, and never was anything but
unsatisfactory to his intelligence, its capacity to satisfy his
emotional nature insured its empire, so long as his progress in
action and speculation was not directly counter to it. But the
relative unity cannot exist without being complete; for the last
advance of Positivity is its entry into the only domain which
can bind together and discipline all the other sciences.

This enlargement of the sphere of Positivism has nothing
accidental in it; on the contrary, it is the result of the continuous
upward movement of the scientific spirit, from the simplest
phenomena to the most complex. The causality of Fetishism
began the study of the physical order, and the causality of
Theology entered on that of the moral order. But not till the
substitution of laws for causes was it possible to enter on the
study of the intellectual or social order, the link needed to
connect the two others. When, after a sufficient preparation,
this new and decisive step was taken, the consequence followed
speedily, that the whole of man's real knowledge was summed
up in the dogma of Humanity, the demonstration of its reality
being drawn from our whole collective existence, and most espe-
cially from that existence under its dynamical aspect. Now, it
was inevitable that such a condensation should at once raise the
conviction of the necessary correlation between the satisfaction
of our intellectual, and the satisfaction of our moral, wants.
It was enough if the soul were so stirred as to feel that the Great
Being to whom we refer all our acts and thoughts is eminently
qualified to form also the centre of our affections. Then of itself
arose complete unity, hitherto unattainable, and with its rise ends the initiation of man, as it implies the irreversible substitution of the relative for the absolute.

No attractions, however, either intellectual or moral, of this new synthesis, could have insured its triumph, had it not been, by its constitution, in relation with the social purpose which had evoked it. The Positive religion has not merely to regenerate the training of the mind, equally from the scientific and aesthetic point of view, which is being degraded and destroyed by the increasing indiscipline of the present day. Its chief mission is other, and concerns directly the existence of society, deeply imperilled, at the very centre of its reorganisation, by the utter exhaustion of the kingdom of God, for which no substitute is possible but the ascendancy of Humanity. This mission is but the expression in a new form, under an irresistible impulse, of the great primary consciousness of the indivisibility of the whole problem; the indivisibility which, characteristic of all vitality, is most characteristic of the highest existence, and develops with the development of that existence. When the empirical wisdom of practical men aims at mere political reconstruction apart from the spiritual, it becomes more irrational and more disturbing than the empiricism of the theoreticians, when it exerts itself to organise science apart from philosophy, or philosophy apart from religion.

Its connection with this social purpose qualifies Positivism to overcome all the resistance, unconscious or concerted, which it will naturally meet. For it alone can in each case use the language appropriate to the case, appealing alternately to the wants of the intellect and the exigencies of society, in the name at once of order and of progress, the sole possible combination of which it accomplishes. Long centred in its founder, it inspired him, by virtue of this plenary comprehensiveness, with unshaken confidence in its proximate triumph in a sceptical milieu, for in such a milieu disunion neutralises all resistance to organic impulses, if sufficiently systematic. But the isolation of the founder ceased even before the philosophy issued in the religion, and more particularly at the time when the relative synthesis was really complete; without waiting for the termination of the work which accomplishes that synthesis. Already Positivists are justified in looking on themselves as destined, at no distant period, to sway the metropolis of Humanity with a greater power
CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE WORK. 463

than the Encyclopædist in the last century; for the difficulties have grown and the doctrine is more calculated to meet them.

In the midst of the construction now ended, this conviction suggested the decisive proclamation, in which I condensed my course of lectures and which I thence transferred to the Catechism, the small work announced as intended for the propagation of the religion. I repeat it here, so duly to connect the memorable utterance with its principal source: 'In the name of the past, in the interest of the future, the theoretical and practical servants of Humanity come forward to claim as their due the general direction of this world; their object being directly to construct the true Providence, moral, intellectual, and material, excluding for ever from political supremacy all the various servants of God, Catholic, Protestant, or Deist, as at once belated and an element of disturbance.' This language, ratified by the tacit assent, these two years past, of the different parties of the West, indicates, and even assists, the irresistible advent of the regenerating doctrine, the only doctrine which is exempt from all need of concession, as alone able to be always just, by virtue of its plenary comprehensiveness.

Positivism alone is susceptible of true universality, and unites in itself the opposite excellences of the two Monotheisms its precursors, for it surpasses Catholicism in its adaptation to the subject whom it raises, whilst it surpasses Islamism in the support it gives to the just power of the ruler. Its true disciples stand forth in relation to both, as the sole representatives of the two subjective portions of Humanity to its objective portion, at present in blind revolt against its masters and its judges. The Religion of Humanity will teach the conservatives of the West how revolutionary they are; since Catholicism, when in the ascendant, broke the continuity of the race; when in decay, extended its baneful social influence even to solidarity. With Mussulmen, the true believers will avail themselves of a more favourable disposition as regards the aggregate of human bonds, by setting forth the capacity of Positivism to satisfy the aspirations of Islam. Throughout the world, it will bring the demands of progress into complete unison with the requirements of order, representing the ultimate regeneration as consisting in the discipline of the forces evoked during the period of preparation.

Its inherent superiority in presence of all other tendencies,
In theory, Positivism prefers Synthetic Spirituality to Analytical Materialism. In practice, it prefers re-troverssion to anarchy.

Substituting judicious respect for a degrading hypocrisy, Positivism, which finds its application primarily and especially in public life, undertakes to free the rulers from the oppression which their scepticism involves, now that reconstruction and not demolition is the order of the day. Such of them as are gifted with a real superiority must in secret sigh over their inability, in the absence of convictions, to attain power without lowering their dignity by pandering to anarchical or retrograde beliefs which they do not and cannot share. The founder of the Religion of Humanity stands alone, at the present time, in the East as in the West, in never having made even tacitly, any degrading concession, during forty years of an active existence is constant opposition to the reigning opinions.

The privilege was naturally long confined to him exclusively, but is only so far exceptional, as originating in a time when the intellectual and moral disorder presses heavily upon all genuine elevation. It is not in politics only, nor even chiefly, that we trace the tendency, as at present, to raise mediocrity above merit, owing to the absence of all regulation and calm. The ephemeral leaders of science or of art offer habitually a more deplorable spectacle than the political leaders, for with the latter, the greater importance and greater definiteness of their office is more intolerant of incompetence and irresponsibility.

In this vexed milieu, Positivism comes forward to rally the higher natures more satisfactorily, than encyclopaedism, in the last century, clubbed together the stronger intellects. Placing them at the general point of view in regard to human affairs, a point hitherto never within reach, it does not shrink from urging them to take the government of a world into which they alone bring the requisite degree of synthesis and sympathy. Be their rank, nay, their sex, what it may, they stand nobly leagued
CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE WORK

465
together, with a mission of unparalleled grandeur, one which allows them the noble expansion of all their powers, whilst it disengages them at once and for ever from an intolerable oppression.

It is true that this mission has a tendency to encourage the opposite evil, the development of presumption, often to a startling extent, a fault with which, these thirty years, I have heard most of my disciples charged and with justice. Their error, however, is usually due solely to their deficient religious growth; they have lingered too long on the philosophical introduction, and been led thereby to exaggerate their intellectual advantages, to the neglect of the great purpose they should subserve. True Positivists, who always 'make their moral being their prime care,' are soon led to feel how sadly they fall short of their mission, a mission not of their instituting, one which any contempt imperils, though it require, within proper limits, an instinct of superiority.

That this confidence may never degenerate into presumption, it must rest on the satisfactory fulfilment of the several conditions prescribed for all who habitually take part in the work of organisation. Such fulfilment exacts from the theorists the synthetical disposition in its completeness, for without it they cannot at all times grasp the sum of human affairs. The generality of thought thus systematically formed gives them an irresistible influence in each particular case, necessarily dependent on the universal order, of which they thus become the sole interpreters. But synthesis requires more than the encyclopaedic preparation, its existence and its continuance are impossible without sympathy; so that the intellectual conditions are found to be inseparable from the moral obligations. Theoricians who should make light of these latter would be the more blameable in that the correlation of the two is a fundamental dogma of Positivism, as a consequence of the true theory of unity. If theologians are justly suspected, at the present day, of moral inferiority because they persist in denying the existence in man's nature of the benevolent instincts, the faith which adopts innate altruism leaves its disciples without excuse if they hold in slight esteem the cultivation of the affections. Not to dwell on the fact that such culture may be, more than any other, common to all Positivists, it is on it that

VOL. IV.   H N
they mainly depend, and this holds good even of theorists, for their ascendancy.

The habits and feelings of the normal state, as described in this treatise, may begin even now on a decisive scale, among true believers, more particularly as regards private life. Complete Positivists need not wait for the full accomplishment of the transition which they ought to guide, they may at once recommend their religion by exemplifying in themselves the moral improvement to which it ensures, irrevocably, the supremacy. The first evidence of their faith should be that it makes them more sober and more chaste, in order to gain, over and above such and such particular good results, the power of understanding better and turning to greater use the general reaction of the body upon the brain. But, whilst they conquer the chief constituent of egoism in a direct struggle, it is indirectly, in the main, that they should combat their whole personality, by the persistent encouragement, that is, of the three sympathetic instincts. For this they have, first, the aids offered them by domestic life, where alone is fostered the right estimate of woman; and besides, this perfecting of their nature may always be a result of the daily practice of private worship, now completely in the power of the higher natures. It is in this secret intercourse with the best representatives of the Great Being that each Positivist should even now cement the unity which he will spread around him. This moral culture renders easier and more effective the discharge of all other duties, public as well as private duties, at all times referred to Humanity.

To modify public life in an equal degree is not possible, swayed as it is by an undisciplined milieu; but here the Positivists should at once manifest the moral efficacy of their belief by fulfilling better than their various opponents, the special obligations of their several professions. In their relations with society they can always set a decisive example of brotherly feeling to one another, of veneration of all for their head. Outside their own body, their habitual attitude should be one of goodwill and protection, as towards the reactionist or even the revolutionist, both but rarely responsible for their degradation, which is generally traceable to the insuperable difficulties of their position.

A designation, already current in the West, a fact of great weight, will before long acquire its full force with Positivists, as
expressing their general attitude in a disorderly milieu; it is the term *emancipated*. That force has hitherto been latent, for the name could only be applied to the persistent sceptic, who is, as such, powerless in a period where reconstruction is the dominant need. Nay, worse than powerless, he is involved in contradiction, for his position denies him genuine emancipation, as he is compelled to flatter by turns the conflicting errors from which he deems himself freed. Quite other is the result when the most thoroughly emancipated are seen to be also the most definite in their convictions, provided that they prove the power of those convictions by setting a constant example of complete discipline. Then, in accordance with the full acceptation of the term, they ought habitually to wield as regards their undisciplined milieu, sceptics or theologians alike, a protective influence imperatively required during the whole of the organic transition.

So rises an empire from which the world can only free itself by doing as its noble leaders have done, regenerating itself that is; those leaders being ever ready to put an end in due form to an extraordinary ascendancy, when it is no longer necessary to the advent of the normal state. When the empirical conservatives, recognising their powerlessness in the presence of anarchy, shall have handed over the government to the Positivists, as alone competent to meet Communism, the Western World will have undergone a radical transformation. The most complete—the most active faith will distinguish its chiefs, negation or doubt will become, as retrogradation is, the symbol or the justification of political inferiority.

But, to gain and to hold such ascendancy, Positivists must at once form a habit of individual exertion; otherwise, however superior their doctrine, they will remain as much below their mission as were the Encyclopædists when formerly invested with power. To them Humanity entrusts at the present day the defence of her fundamental institutions, not less imperilled by the appeal to God than by tendencies of a directly revolutionary character. It is for Positivism to make the poor the basis for the sole honourable and solid guarantee of wealth, implanting in all a just estimate of the concentration of material wealth and its security as indispensable to its social function. Without giving its sanction to wrongful acquisitions, Positivism will lay the greatest stress on the right use of power.
of whatever order, adjourning to a future time discussions which could only disturb the present. Nor is it merely in reference to the family and property that Positivists should show their power of organisation; they must extend it to the government, though not as yet in their hands. When the most completely emancipated shall be the most highly disciplined in presence of all authority, it will come home to the routine conservatives how inconsistent and dangerous is their habitual disposition to carp blindly at the power on which their safety depends. Such are the moral and intellectual dispositions by which all Positivists will concur to smooth the way for their regenerative action and will deserve the ascendancy which that action demands, by perpetually combining love with faith on the basis of activity.

Difficult these conditions may appear, but difficult only to minds yet strange to the Religion of Humanity. Its true believers have already felt the charm for the individual of social precepts when fully obeyed. Beside their own inherent attraction for the intellect and the moral nature, synthesis and sympathy support one another by constituting the true unity, always and everywhere the object of men's search, and henceforth unattainable except in Positivism. The coordination of the within by love, the binding it to the without by faith, this gives the soul calm without apathy, the true constituent of happiness, and moreover the guarantee of health, as each one feels himself in his proper relation to the Great Being who protects all. Become more self-devoted, more energetic, and at the same time less egoistic, Positivists will find in the conditions imposed by Humanity a permanent source of unrivalled satisfactions, whilst still struggling with the anarchy which they have to overcome.

Nevertheless, at the present day, the destiny is one suited only to the higher natures, and the primary object should be to bring forward such natures in the teeth of the existing disorder, which pushes into the highest place those whose true position would be as subalterns. But difficult as the elimination may be, the faith which imposes it as a necessity enables us to perform it successfully, by furnishing us with principles of judgment. And although the absence of quiet hampers us in their application, such application will before long enable us to unite all who are worthy of supremacy, by a judicious estimate of per-
sonal merit, in spite of the obstacles due to circumstances, and even to education.

To facilitate the formation and growth of this nucleus, on which depends for the future the regeneration of the West, I am bound to recommend that it be not recruited from those who are leaders or abettors of the present agitation. My best disciples, both theoricians and practicians, will come from that portion of society which hitherto has been passive, though not really indifferent, but passive from a dim consciousness of the incompetence of all opinions in vogue to deal with the problem in its full completeness. Above all, we must abandon all hope of any really efficient assistance from the class which at present provisionally intervenes between thinkers and the public, with the sole object of hindering the spread of the truth, which it formerly preached. Ever powerless to construct, the literate have their place only in destruction, and to their share in that they owed their temporary possession of spiritual ascendancy. Their instinct of anarchy makes them more adverse to Positivism than to Theologism, from their natural dislike to a discipline from which they cannot escape and to which they will not submit. They cannot be judges, for his superiors alone can judge any one; they think it beneath them to be mere reporters, so they always mingle their own views with the conceptions they undertake to transmit. One of the most intelligent of their number, one too of the best disposed, could not even quote my verse on the cerebral organisation without introducing an important change for the worse.

The danger attaching to such interference compels me to include in the preceding judgment the three literary men, who in England first, and then in France, have hitherto honourably aided in the propagation of Positivism. A celebrated logician was the first to proclaim the intellectual superiority of the new philosophy, especially from the point of view of method. He was soon followed by the able writer, who, living in the centre of the regeneration, was more successful in mastering, in its entirety, the conception of a mission which was as much social as intellectual, and which he relieved from a concerted silence. Then came the young Hellenist, who had the sagacity, in writing the History of Philosophy, to order it with constant reference to the inevitable advent of Positivism. But although the three justly added to their own importance by
popularising the new doctrine, we may verify, even for writers of such exceptional ability, the impotence of the literary world as regards the production of true apostles of the regenerative faith.

All three, with some partial affinities for the doctrine, affinities so strong as to seem conclusive, ultimately proved unable to shake off the influence of their Protestant origin and revolutionary habits. After nobly introducing Positivism to the knowledge of the public, the first early invented the tactics by which, ignoring the indivisibility of my synthesis, the attempt is made to establish a contradiction between my philosophical creation and my religious construction. The second, some months after I had proclaimed him my chief colleague, left the Positive Society, because he could not recognise, in the dictatorial crisis, the spontaneous preparation for the systematic triumvirate to which he had given his distinct adhesion. Though the least incomplete of the three, the third offered a still more deplorable example than the others of the inherent inconsequence of literateurs, by his definitive adhesion to the most despicable of all the systems of theological hypocrisy. This threefold verification of a natural incompatibility is the more conclusive warning to me not to count on auxiliaries from the literary class, in that Positivism was calculated at first to awaken sympathies in some exceptional cases in the milieu most adverse to its supremacy.

We must wait then till the religion of Humanity has formed organs for its propagation amongst its true disciples; this will be when the whole exposition of it in its fundamental outline shall have become sufficiently familiar. But we may confidently affirm that such aid will not fail the faith which is beyond all others calculated to impel to concert without compromising independence. In one admirable exception we have already an indication of the normal cooperation; I allude to the work of a distinguished lady who might have claimed to judge, but nobly limited herself to the function of reporter, discharging it with unparalleled success.

Till such time as Positivism finds complete organs, I am compelled to adjourn the accomplishment of a duty which I have stated to be incumbent on all leaders, when they have reached my age. The sacred law of continuity enjoins the founder of the true religion, more than any succeeding Pontiff, to name in time his successor, so that by the due influence of
opinion his choice may be corrected, or the acceptance of that successor be facilitated. But the preceding remarks dispense with my explaining why it is that I must still adjourn this duty, though it has twice inspired me with premature hopes. Not as yet able to find a successor, nor even a colleague, I declare that if I died without finding one, the growth of Positivism would be sounder if it relied on the free exertions of my true disciples, than under an incompetent chief. But it is permitted to me to hope that the completion of my religious construction will soon bring forward some one who may be acceptable, or, at any rate, that it will make impossible the acceptance of any literateur.

In terminating this great work, it is but natural that I should repeat the announcement with which the Philosophie Positive concludes, relative to the proper work of my second life. Of the four compositions which I had then to announce I have now accomplished, in seven years, the most vast, the most difficult, and the most important. The three others have been sufficiently described in the third chapter of this volume to make any recurrence to the subject unnecessary. Thus, before the normal period of retirement, I now enter upon a last seven years of full intellectual activity, the results of which should be: in 1856, the System of Positive Logic, or, Treatise of Mathematical Philosophy; in 1859, the System of Positive Morals, or, Treatise of General Education; and in 1861, the System of Positive Industry, or, Treatise of the Combined Action of Humanity upon her Planet. Such a body of works forms a complementary construction equivalent in extent to that just accomplished. Though less difficult and less important, it were to be regretted if death or extreme poverty prevented my fulfilling a promise, formally stated so early as 1822, in the small treatise which is the groundwork of all my subsequent writings. I am bound, then, to regard the present work as the basis of an indispensable complement, applying to myself the motto happily applied to Cæsar, a motto as suitable for the competent theorican as the great man of action:

Nil actum reputans si quid superesse taret agendum.

Deeming nought done whilst aught remained to do.

Lucan, Pharsalia, ii. 658.
FINAL INVOCATION.

(SEE DEDICATION TO VOLUME I.)

Non è l'affezion mia tanto profonda
Che basti a render voi grazia per grazia.
Dante, Par. iv. 192.

LIVE FOR OTHERS. LIVE OPENLY.

PARIS: Monday, 9 Dante, 66. (24 July, 1854.)

NOBLE AND TENDER-HEARTED LADY, MY PATRONESS AND EXEMPLAR,

Eight years have passed since in gratitude, in regret, and in resignation I offered to thy sacred memory an exceptional dedication, in the middle of the year of mourning, though it could not be published till five years later. What I now write is still more alien to general custom, but it will excite less surprise, for it is the termination of a construction, the chief phases of which justify, and with increasing force, such an act of homage. Perhaps thereby I may originate a new practice, a complementary institution, which will, with the public sanction, henceforth enhance the effect of the dedication proper, when worthy of any elaboration involving a succession of efforts.

The involuntary delay in the publication of my original tribute was fortunately not without a compensation, in that it at once drew the sympathy of the nobler minds, as during the preceding three years the 'General View' had been preparing them to ratify the consecration therein announced. An analogous result is more certain now, when I here complete the holy dedication, the justice of which all competent readers have fully accepted. In the present state of mental indiscipline, this fourth volume will frequently be read, at first at any rate, when there is no acquaintance with the three others. But it suffices to justify this final homage, which will soon recall attention to the dedication of the first volume. As more systematic than either of the others, it brings into stronger relief the correlation between synthesis and sympathy, and it is to thee I owe its acceptance as a paramount influence.
Each of the seven essential steps in my construction of a religion has its own distinct trace of the angelic influence acknowledged at its opening. Thy aid is undeniable in regard to the three which are distinctive of the first volume, though it be adequately recognised only for the first of the three. My fundamental work, the Philosophie, revealed beyond dispute the composite and continuous existence which sways with increasing power the course of the world. It had even gradually reached the point of proclaiming the supremacy of the heart over the intellect, as the only source, spontaneous or systematic, of human unity. The Great Being thus revealed in its nature and destination, it was enough, to render it possible to create the universal religion, that a holy love should adequately familiarise me with the basic principle in which my first life was seen to issue. So it was that the dogma of Humanity arose, on the first anniversary of the fatal event which separated us, in the decisive course of lectures from which this whole treatise springs. All who justly appreciate the filiation here traced must now acknowledge that it should be carried farther back, so as to extend to the dedication, which, a few months before, gave their first formal expression to all the germs of the subsequent progress.

That thy participation in the two steps which mark the second half of the first volume is less felt, is only because they have not yet become as familiar to most of my disciples. When I introduced the name Positivist, the public, in its empiricism and scepticism, judged it to be as contradictory as it was strange. In thirty years I have so raised it, that it is now sought, as a pledge of order no less than of progress, by many who do not satisfy its main conditions. Of the seven meanings which it combines, the last—and fully to feel this last I was incapable without thee—is the least appreciated, though it be the most decisive, as bearing directly on the sole source of true unity. Those who most fully recognise the necessary interdependence of six of the characteristics of the Positive spirit, at once real, useful, certain, exact, organic, and even relative, have not gone so far in their regeneration as to link its intellectual claims to the moral signification of the term. But, though I still am the only one in whom Positive, thanks to thee, has become equivalent to sympathetic, I doubt not but that all my true disciples will soon follow me so far under the
irresistible impulse of the synthesis but now ended. Then the Western revolution, as a whole, will find, in familiar use, its condensed expression in the complete regeneration of a fundamental term, henceforth destined to connote the highest morality, whilst retaining the advantages attaching to its originally material connotation.

As foreshadowing this result I may appeal to the growing appreciation of the two complementary steps of the first volume, intellectual steps it is true, but yet evidencing directly the emotional source of the true synthesis. The systematisation of the Positive logic, by virtue of the definitive adoption of the subjective method, gives form and expression to the whole of the influence on my intellect of thy holy ascendancy. How without thee should I have duly felt that feeling alone can combine images with signs to elaborate thought, in such a way as to bring into direct connection the instinct of Fetichism and the reason of Positivism? When once it is rightly understood that thou hadst as large a share in the second step of religious Positivism as in the first, there will be little delay in tracing thy influence on the third. My construction of the cerebral theory is so intimately bound up with the institution of the subjective method, that all who by sympathy are qualified for true synthesis will feel that thy aid was indispensable in a creation which has in it more of the feminine than the masculine element.

It is at this point that begins the increasing divergence between the Positivists, who style themselves intellectual, without being more intelligent, and the complete, that is to say, the religious Positivists. Although the majority of the former limit their adhesion to my philosophy, some have already advanced so far as to accept the dogma of Humanity, the connection of which with the whole of Sociology is hidden only to the sophist. Their acceptance, however, as purely intellectual, bears no fruit for them; it is not able to form the starting point for further advance, in default of a moral impulse. Hence it is that these abortive Positivists have found fault with my dedication, taxing it with sentimental exaggeration, and I doubt not that the present invocation will clash still more with their feelings, on the same ground. In their estimate of the subjective method and of the cerebral theory they differ but little from the thinkers who are so belated as to reject as ontological or mystical the dogmas of Humanity, whilst admitting Sociology.
Wherever there has been a just sense of the rational interconnection of the three steps which form the progression proper to my first volume, there will be no difficulty in appreciating the four other stages of religious Positivism. More particularly is the process easy in the case of the two gone through in the second volume, and principally of that one which, as occupying the centre of the regeneration by sympathy, will early be regarded as the most decisive of all. In assigning, at the opening of my social statics, the highest place in the encyclopædia to Morals, even as compared with Sociology, I systematically placed my religious construction higher than my philosophical creation, which is its groundwork, in obedience to the true theory of unity. The influence of woman, and of such influence it was for thee to offer me the highest type, appears unmistakably in this advance, the best distinction between social and intellectual Positivism. Nor is it more possible to contest thy cooperation in the next step,—in close connection with the last,—which completes my second volume by basing the Sociocracy on the normal division of the two powers, a division which was familiar to thee, owing to thy Catholic instincts, in spite of the disturbing influences of scepticism.

With difficulty should I have brought thee, with thy extreme modesty, to acknowledge the large share thou hadst in the whole of the third volume, for its province is the most remote from thy own special education. But had we been able to accomplish the noble wish thou spontaneously didst express to me, to study history synthetically, thou wouldst now feel how greatly thou aidedst me in the systematisation of my dynamical conceptions. It would be enough for thee to understand that the historical synthesis necessarily finds its condensed expression in the establishment of a direct connection between the two extreme terms of man's initiation, Fetishism and Positivism. The admirable canzone which I have repeated every morning, these last nine years, is as characteristic an utterance of Fetishist poetry as thy sacred novel presfigures Positive idealisation. Under so spontaneous a form of cooperation, thou couldst not have refused to accept thy involuntary share in my construction of the philosophy of history, though it is an influence not as yet recognised even by the best of my disciples.

None will question thy influence in regard to the seventh step, which in this volume closes the regular upward ascent of
religious Positivism, by its removal of the serious discrepancies I left in it last year. Had it been permitted thee to contemplate the best fruits of thy eternal ascendency, thou wouldst on thy own promptings have pointed out to me the threefold dissonance which, perceived but late, was yet recognised in time to preserve this last volume from the peculiar defect of the Catechism. Though all my true disciples at once accepted the systematic determination which led me to place definitively the worship before the doctrine, no one of them could so completely rise above the empiricism of Theology and scepticism as to suggest the change. But, with thee, sympathy would have so aided synthesis that the improvement would have been realised even in the Catechism, the holy work in which thy cooperation was purely subjective. Not having thy help, I was near missing this final step, which, as condensing my whole religious development, will be naturally a greater shock to incomplete Positivists than were its six predecessors.

Thus, we see how the examination in detail of thy intimate cooperation in each phase of my religious construction issues in establishing more conclusively the fatal difference there is between subjective participation and objective assistance. Several years must elapse before Positivism, at length complete by virtue of the present work, pass from the most philosophical to the most poetical nation, there to receive its ideal expression, the decisive step in the progress and the only one beyond my power to take. The interval was to have been thine, that in it thou mightest prepare the way for the final acceptance of a religion, which is esthetic rather than scientific, by the formal sanction and intervention of the sex best qualified by sympathy for the state of synthesis.

The moral superiority of woman, with its legitimate complement derived from her social existence, enables her to move directly towards the unity which results from a gradual incorporation with Humanity. With women synthesis may remain unsystematic without detriment to their proper mission, a mission which, as never ambiguous and always with an immediate aim, transforms each act and each thought into a special development of the true worship, under the persistent stimulation of affection. Whereas the practical and intellectual duties of man prevent him from condensing the Positive religion in its fundamental constituent. Compelled to construct a
systematic synthesis that he may submit himself to the universal order, submit better and modify it more largely, he is diverted from the cultivation of the within by the effort he makes to connect it with the without. He neglects the end in the too constant consideration of the means, and so exhausts his intellect, and even his activity on fruitless or disturbing efforts, whilst love, ever tending to the good, chooses, amidst the number of appreciable relations, those only which can ameliorate us. When a sound estimate of human knowledge prevents the philosopher from being puffed up, nothing keeps him from drying up, owing to the fatal isolation without which the weakness of our understanding would defeat his philosophic meditations. Ever imminent, this deterioration cannot be overcome but by the due intervention, objective or subjective, of woman, aided by the esthetic culture which is naturally connected with such intervention.

He who was commissioned by the Great Being to institute the true religion by systematising Positive morality, even he could not but verify the law in his own person; for the mental contention involved in his labours counteracted the sympathetic influence which was the natural result of their synthetic character. Here, when completing the constitution of the true unity, I feel an inexpressible satisfaction at being able to contemplate directly its affective source without detriment to a construction which must benefit others more than myself. But this reward would have been more efficacious had it been given me to make thee whilst yet living a sharer in it, however highly I may estimate the nascent appreciation of 'the noble lady whose memory is cherished and venerated by all my true disciples.' This harmony of mind and heart becomes the best condensation of a construction, the most characteristic feature of which is the elaboration of the true theory of the affective sex. As representative of this bond, it were enough to bring together thy most remarkable sayings, adding to them the only one I have not quoted, and which will be considered the most touching when the occasion of it is known: 'The bad are often more in need of pity than the good.'

Reduced to a subjective identification with thee, as the result of one incomparable year of objective union, I have at any rate turned it to the best account, by availing myself to the full of the advantages attaching to its immutability. To
my public life not less than to my private life, may I apply the language which, for several years, has been a part of my daily prayers. 'Notwithstanding our separation, my last state surpasses all that I could hope, or even dream, before I knew thee.' Our love, which was always holy, made me first chaste, then sober; and the purification of these two instincts, fostered by thy subjective influence, enabled me the better to overcome the other self-regarding instincts, by the constant encouragement of the three instincts of sympathy. Thou wouldst perhaps still persist in reproaching me for endangering, by too great kindness and self-abandonment, a personal ascendancy, so may have easily acquired by an artful reserve. And yet I cannot regret this disposition of mine, calculated as it is to promote my main usefulness, in accordance with the aptness thou attributedst to me of becoming all things to all men, an aptness more appropriate in the founder of Relativism than in the founder of Catholicism. To thee I owe it that I have returned to the holy regime of the Middle Ages, that I have devoted, that is, for the last eight years, the first hour of each day to the direct culture of the better feelings of human nature. Evident as regards my moral, nay even my intellectual growth, the renovation extends even to my physical condition, equally with the others exempt from the ordinary forewarnings of old age, notwithstanding the laboriousness of my career, the prolongation of which will be thy doing.

In this holy patronage, thou wilt be always assisted by the unrivalled help of her whom thy great soul recognised as its worthy sister, in her who since thy death has so fully deserved the happiness which thou didst dream of for us three. Over and above its practical services, the family which she guides offers me daily a salutary spectacle, proving to what an extent the least cultivated may enjoy, under all forms, what thou calledst the pleasures of devotion to others. I am thus led to feel more deeply how dignity, happiness, and even health reside in unity, as in the impairment of unity lie our chief diseases, moral, intellectual, or physical. Thy simple-hearted companion revives, unknown to herself, my systematic tendency to judge acts and thoughts with special reference to their source in, or their influence upon, the affections, these naturally engaging her attention as a mother and a wife. Vowed equally with myself to moral cultivation, the frequent superiority of her empirical
suggestions leads me to a sounder estimate of woman's nature, and is the objective complement of thy subjective action upon me, for my personal improvement, as a man and as a citizen.

She, as thou, never was in personal contact with the venerable mother who failed, in spite of her zeal and her capacity, adequately to educate my heart; but as my adopted daughter she daily joins with me and with thee in my just adoration of her holy and unhappy memory. Thus placed under the threefold patronage which I have shown to be normal for each true believer, I have now so far set forth its constant influence on my public life as to warrant me in here asking posterity to connect it directly with my own immortality. These five years I daily complete my morning prayers with this resolution: 'I will venture to end my religious construction by an open injunction to my disciples of both sexes to obtain for me one day, as the principal reward of my services, my solemn interment in the midst of you three, in the name of the Great Being, with whom we shall be for ever incorporated.'

In this formal expression of my characteristic wish, I hope, in accordance with our faith, by a noble publicity to facilitate its attainment, for such publicity will allow not merely a truer sense of its reasonableness, but also an easier victory over any opposition. Supposing the venerable remains already dispersed, owing to Christian neglect, it will be enough that a noble cenotaph be attached to our tomb as in the case of my latest patroness.

The reward I here claim is one too well adapted to express the nature and manifest the ascendancy of the religion of Humanity to be denied me, even if it were to follow immediately upon the publication in its entirety of this holy treatise. Already thy angelic influence is appreciated so far that higher souls, even from across the seas, sympathise with my continuous adoration of thee. This just extension of my inadequate gratitude will shortly penetrate more deeply and spread more widely under the impulse of this last and most decisive volume. Thanks to the noble confidence of thy aged father, the painter's skill has been able to form a sweet image of thee after the sketch by thy mother. It is perhaps destined before long to be, to my disciples, the best emblem of the Great Being, the systematisation of whose worship was effected under thy holy influence.
The same pre-eminent patronage which directed the great work of my second life must preside over the three works which remain to complete it. I shall give a special appreciation of this its latest service, when I dedicate the most important of the three to her who, in my earliest childhood, implanted in me an instinctive anticipation of true morality. This complementary labour ended, my last publication will be, in ten years, the discharge of my solemn promise as to our holy correspondence, to be preceded by thy life and even by my own. But feeling, which alone consecrates everything, will perhaps justify me in ending my second life in the body by venturing on a sketch of the third, the full development of which is denied me by the sum of the imperative conditions under which we live, though I feel its true character. After passing by a normal course from my philosophical foundation to my religious construction, it would be well, by an exceptional effort, to complete the latter by the poetical creation which alone will be able to procure for it universal ascendency. Irreconcilable with the laws of bodily life, such completeness of accomplishment is sufficiently in unison with the laws of cerebral life, for me to have been able to conceive and propose the eminent composition which I may not execute. Whilst renouncing any fruitless attempt, I yet hope to complete the volume which concerns us by an outline of a poem, in thirteen cantos, on the second life which that volume explains in me through thee.

I must end this final invocation by referring to its true source an utterance in which the founder of the Positive religion completes the presentment of the normal manners, by throwing private acts open to the inspection and interference, under proper conditions, of the public. Over and above the general duty of proclaiming in time our last wishes, there is a special reason why at fifty-seven I here state three resolutions, which cannot be carried into effect without the voluntary aid of all Positivists.

1st. The body of my adherents will continue the annuity of two thousand francs mentioned in my fourth Circular, in order that I may discharge, up to its natural termination, the obligation incurred in my youth by my only really grave fault.

2nd. An annuity of fifteen hundred francs shall be set apart, by the gratitude of the true believers, for the adopted daughter who, for the last thirteen years, has devoted to me her inestimable services.
3rd. This eminent proletary will keep, for my successor, in its actual state and at the cost of the universal church, the sacred residence in which was conceived and worked out the creation of the Positivist religion, and in which the sacred rites of that religion will continue to be celebrated till the acquisition of a temple.

So soon as this volume is sufficiently known, I will communicate directly to each of my thirteen executors the minor arrangements necessary to ensure the execution of these three resolutions.

My actions, my thoughts, and my feelings, all equally centre around her who presides over my second life, that life in which, now for eight years, there has been growing an unexampled harmony between the conduct of private and that of public life. When my love was sufficiently purified, I saw thee nobly accept my plan of legal adoption, which only failed through the catastrophe which befell us. Since thy influence has become exclusively subjective, veneration has more and more prevailed over attachment, without diverting me from benevolence, the culture of which has been constant through my just efforts to spread a right estimate of an angel who passed unknown. If this fusion of all the feelings of man for woman appear to involve a contradiction, it is only because of the coarseness of man's impulses. Anticipated in poetry and in religion, it authorises me to conclude this final invocation by combining the address and the wish, so amply characteristic, which I repeat aloud every morning, borrowing from the two sublime interpreters of the Middle Ages:

Vergine-Madre, figlia del tuo figlio,
Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te!

END OF THE FOURTH AND LAST VOLUME.
APPENDIX

TO

THE FOURTH VOLUME.

(See page 351.)

POSITIVIST LIBRARY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY VOLUMES.

I. POETRY (THIRTY VOLUMES).

The Iliad and the Odyssey, in one volume, without any note.
Æschylus, with the King.—Edipus of Sophocles, and Aristophanes, do.
Pindar and Theocritus, with Daphnis and Chloe, do.
Plautus and Terence, do.
Virgil, Horace (selections from), and Lucan, do.
Ovid, Tibullus, and Juvenal, do.
Fabliaux du Moyen Âge, collected by Legrand d’Aussy.
Dante, Ariosto, Tasso, and Petrarch (selections), in Italian, in one volume.
Select plays of Metastasio and Alberni, do.
I promessi Spose, Manzoni, do.
Don Quixote and Las Novelas, Cervantes, in Spanish, in one volume.
Teatro Español escogido, ed. Don José Segundo Flores, do.
Romancero Español escogido, with the Cid, do.
Select plays of Pierre Corneille.
Molière.
Select plays of Racine and Voltaire, in one volume.
La Fontaine, Fables, with some from Lamotte and Florian.
Gil Blas, Le Sage.
The Princess of Cleves. Paul and Virginia. The Last Abencerrage. To form one volume.
The Martyrs, Chateaubriand.
Select plays of Shakespeare.
Paradise Lost and Lyrical Poems, Milton.
Robinson Crusoe and the Vicar of Wakefield, in one volume.
Tom Jones, Fielding, in English, or Chéron’s translation.

112
APPENDIX TO

Select works of Byron. Don Juan in particular to be suppressed.
Select works of Goethe.
The Arabian Nights.

II. SCIENCE (THIRTY VOLUMES).

The Arithmetic of Condorcet. The Algebra and Geometry of Clairaut, the Trigonometry of Lacroix or Legendre (all in one volume).
The Analytical Geometry of Auguste Comte, preceded by the Geometry of Descartes.
The Statics of Poinsot, with all his Memoirs on Mechanics.
Lectures on Analysis by Navier, preceded by the Reflections on the Infinitesimal Calculus of Carnot.
Lectures on Mechanics by Navier, followed by the Essay on Equilibrium and Motion of Carnot.
The Theory of Functions, Lagrange.
The Popular Astronomy of Auguste Comte, followed by the Worlds of Fontenelle.
Mechanical Physics, by Fischer, with Biot's Comments.
The Chemistry of Lavoisier.
The Chemical Statics of Berthollet.
The Elements of Chemistry, Thomas Graham.
Manual of Anatomy, Meckel.
The General Anatomy of Bichat, preceded by his Treatise on Life and Death.
The first volume of Blainville on the Organisation of Animals.
The Physiology of Richerand with Bérand's notes.
Systematic Essay on Biology by Segond; also his Treatise on General Anatomy.
The New Elements of the Science of Man, Barthez (2nd ed. 1806).
The Zoological Philosophy of Lamarck.
Natural History, by Duméril.
Guglielmini on the Nature of Rivers (in Italian).
The Discourses on the Nature of Animals of Buffon.
The Art of Prolonging Human Life, by Hufeland, preceded by the Treatise on Air, Water, and Places by Hippocrates, and followed by Cornaro's work on Sobriety (all in one volume).
The History of Chronic Inflammations, by Brousais, preceded by his Propositions of Medicine, and by the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, in Latin, without commentary.
The Panegyrics on Savans, by Fontenelle and Condorcet.

III. HISTORY (SIXTY VOLUMES).

Abridgment of Universal Geography, Malte Brun.
Geographical Dictionary, Rienzi.
The Voyages of Cook. The Travels of Chardin.
The History of the French Revolution, Mignet.
Age of Louis XIV., Voltaire.
Memoirs of Madame de Motteville.
Political Testament of Richelieu, and the Life of Cromwell (these in one volume).
Davila, History of the Civil Wars in France (in Italian).
The Memoirs of Benvenuto Cellini (in Italian).
Memoirs of Philippe de Commines.
Abridgment of the History of France, Bossuet.
Revolutions of Italy, Denina.
Abridgment of the History of Spain, Ascargorta.
History of Charles V., Robertson.
History of the Middle Ages, Hallam.
Ecclesiastical History, Fleury.
History of the Decline and Fall of Rome, Gibbon.
Tacitus (translator, Dureau de la Malle).
Herodotus and Thucydides (to form one volume).
Plutarch’s Lives (translator, Dacier).
Cæsar’s Commentaries, and Arrian’s Alexander (to form one volume).
The Travels of Anacharsis, Barthélemy.
The History of Art in Antiquity, Winckelmann.
Memoirs on Music, Grétry.

IV. SYNTHESIS (THIRTY VOLUMES).

The Politics and Ethics of Aristotle (in one volume).
The Bible.
The Koran.
The City of God, St. Augustine.
The Imitation of Jesus Christ, in the original, and the verse translation of Corneille.
The Catechism of Montpellier, preceded by the Exposition of the Catholic Doctrine by Bossuet, and followed by the Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount by St. Augustine.
The History of Protestant Variations, Bossuet.
The Discourse on Method of Descartes, preceded by Bacon’s Novum Organon, and followed by Diderot’s Interpretation of Nature.
Select Thoughts of Cicero, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Pascal, and Vauvenargues, followed by Madame de Lambert’s Advice of a Mother.
Duclos, Considerations on Manners.
The Discourse on Universal History by Bossuet, followed by the Sketch of Human Progress by Condorcet.
Treatise of the Pope, De Maistre, preceded by Policy drawn from Holy Writ, Bossuet.
The Philosophical Essays of Hume, preceded by the two dissertations
APPENDIX TO THE FOURTH VOLUME.


AUGUSTE COMTE, 10 Rue Moncey-le-Prince.

END OF THE APPENDIX TO THE FOURTH AND LAST VOLUME.
GENERAL TABLE OF THE SUBJECTS

CONTAINED IN

THE SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY.

FIRST VOLUME (JULY 1851).

CONTAINING THE 'GENERAL VIEW' AND THE INTRODUCTORY PRINCIPLES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>xxxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complement of the Dedication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Lucie, a novel</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Letter on Social Commemoration</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pensées d'une fleur, Canzona</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>xlvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introductory Remarks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Intellectual Character of Positivism</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Social Aspect of Positivism</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Action of Positivism on the People</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Influence of Positivism on Women</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Relation of Positivism to Art</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion. The Religion of Humanity</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTRODUCTORY PRINCIPLES.

**Scientific and Logical.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indication</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. General Indications</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Cosmology: Indirect introduction, mainly Analytic</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Biology: Direct, naturally Synthetic</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX TO FIRST VOLUME.—FUNERAL DISCOURSE ON BLAINVILLE. 505
SECOND VOLUME (MAY 1852).

CONTAINING SOCIAL STATICS, OR THE ABSTRACT THEORY OF HUMAN ORDER.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Preface and its Appendices see vol. iv.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General Theory of Religion, or the Positive Theory of Human Unity</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The Problem of Human Life, or Positive Theory of Property</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111. Positive Theory of the Human Family</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111. Positive Theory of Human Language</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11111. Positive Theory of the Social Organism</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111111. Positive Theory of Social Existence, systematised by the Priesthood</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1111111. Positive Theory of the General Limits of Variation in the order of Human Society</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIRD VOLUME (AUGUST 1853).

CONTAINING SOCIAL DYNAMICS, OR THE GENERAL THEORY OF HUMAN PROGRESS.

Philosophy of History.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix to Preface: 1. Syllabus of a course of Philosophical Lectures on the General History of Humanity</td>
<td>xxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Letter to the Czar Nicholas</td>
<td>xxiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Letter to Reschid Pacha</td>
<td>xli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Theory of Human Evolution, or General Laws of Intellectual and Social Progress</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Positive Theory of the Age of Fetishism, or General Account of the Spontaneous Régime of Humanity</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111. Positive Theory of the Theocratic State, or General Account of Conservative Polytheism</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111. Positive Theory of the Greek Elaboration, or General Account of Intellectual Polytheism</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11111. Positive Theory of the Roman Incorporation, or General Account of Social Polytheism</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111111. Positive Theory of the Catholic Feudal Transition, or General Account of Defensive Monotheism</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111111. Positive Theory of the Western Revolution, or General Account of the twofold Modern Movement</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Conclusion of the Third Volume</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOURTH AND LAST VOLUME (August 1854).

CONTAINING THE SYNTHETICAL PRESENTATION OF THE FUTURE OF MAN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface, with that of Vol. II. and its three appendices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The Fundamental Theory of the Great Being, whence a Con- spectus of the Religion of the race, and of its existence in the Normal State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. General View of the Affective Life, or Definitive Systematisation of the Positive Worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. General View of the Intellectual Existence of Man, or Definitive Systematisation of the Positive Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. General View of the Active Existence of Man, or Definitive Systematisation of the Positive Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. General View of the Last Phase of the Transition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GENERAL CONCLUSION OF THE FOURTH VOLUME | 455

CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY | 460

Final Invocation | 472

Appendix to the Fourth Volume.—The Positivist Library in the Nineteenth Century | 483

¹ I. Letter to Dr. J. McClinton.
II. Letter to M. Vieillard, Senator.
III. "The Occidental Review."
GENERAL APPENDIX
TO THE
SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY
CONTAINING
ALL THE EARLY ESSAYS BY THE AUTHOR
ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

PARIS
1854
GENERAL APPENDIX.

SPECIAL PREFACE.

This Appendix fulfils the promise which I made, in 1851, when I commenced the treatise now completed, of reproducing all my early Essays on Social Philosophy. Collected from periodicals long since forgotten, they may assist students disposed to follow my own course of philosophical development in their efforts to master Positivism. But their publication is more especially intended to demonstrate the perfect harmony which exists between my youthful efforts and my matured conceptions.

This complete continuity of thought is disguised by the exceptional magnitude of my task, and obscured by the analytical habits of our day, so unfavourable to any comprehensive judgment. All but those who grasp the necessary connexion between the philosophic basis and the religious superstructure must regard the two portions of my career as divergent. The fact, therefore, that my second life simply realised the aim which I proposed to myself in early life requires to be made clear. This the present Appendix is calculated to do, since it proves, that from the outset, I endeavoured to found that new Spiritual Power, of which I now lay the basis. As the final result of my early Essays, I was led to perceive that the Social operation presupposed an Intellectual elaboration, since without this the doctrine required to terminate the occidental anarchy could not be solidly built up. For this reason I devoted the first half of my career to constructing, out of the materials supplied by the sciences, a truly Positive Philosophy, this being the only possible basis of a universal religion. The theoretic foundation being thus laid, the residue of my life
was with good reason devoted to that Social Aim, which at first I had imagined was accessible without any intellectual preparation.

Besides the natural difficulty of comprehending so vast a scheme, antipathies also often interfere with a just perception of the intimate relation between my 'System of Positive Polity' and 'System of Positive Philosophy.' Notwithstanding the desire generally felt for the termination of the Occidental Revolution, active sympathies exist, especially among littérateurs, with that absence of discipline which is characteristic of our anarchic condition. Individual pretensions are wounded by the institution of a Priesthood, bound by its office to insist on the observance of rules affecting public and even private life; rules too which are inflexible since they always admit of verification. Hence a disposition to regard my religious construction as being at variance with its philosophic basis, the intellectual attractions of which were unallowed by any such drawback. This Appendix however will demonstrate the inconsistency of all who adopting the Positive Philosophy reject those Social Applications which I announced from the outset. Whether their attitude spring from incapacity to grasp my conceptions in their entirety, or from regret for the cessation of the religious interregnum, their speculative adhesion to the new synthesis renders it incumbent on them to admit its legitimate development. The Political System far from being opposed to my Philosophy is so completely its outcome, that the latter was created as the basis of the former, and of this the proof is supplied by the present Appendix.

Keeping this object in view, those Essays alone are preserved which reveal my characteristic aspirations, all such being set aside as betray the unfortunate personal influence that overshadowed my earliest efforts. From these artificial productions I only extract two unmistakable indications of my constant tendency towards the Positive Religion. In 1817 a publication of mine, otherwise without value, contained the characteristic maxim: *Everything is relative: this is the only absolute principle.* A second indication of the same nature, as decisive but more fully expanded, is furnished in an Essay of the year 1818 where I treated the liberty of the press as a means of securing to all citizens a consultative influence. Beyond these references I find nothing worthy of mention in my Essays composed before the six now collected for publication. I therefore disavow any other edition, and I have destroyed the unpublished materials.

The first Essay was written, in July 1819, for the 'Censor'—the only French periodical that posterity will deem noteworthy—but was never inserted. I publish it here, partly as proving that, even at one and twenty, I was tending towards the Separation of the Two Powers; partly because the views presented are still useful.

I now, as is just, reclaim possession of the second Essay, written in April 1820, the authorship of which, then known only to a few readers, was with my tacit consent abandoned to the editor of the journal (the 'Organiser') which inserted it. By giving its true title I mark it as the first outline of my general conception of Modern History, distinguishing that double movement, constructive and destructive, the union of which
characterises the revolution of Western Europe. The historical contrast
between France and England, according as central or local government
prevailed, was there established with sufficient clearness and guided
several writers, who profited by the conception, without indicating its
source.

The third Essay, published in May 1822, and containing the fundamental
discovery of Sociological Laws, decisively indicated my philosophic and
social tendencies. Its appropriate title, as here given, sufficiently discloses
the intimate combination of the scientific and political points of view
which had hitherto occupied my mind to an equal degree though separately.
This decisive effort was first only published in one hundred copies gra-
tuitously distributed as proofs. When reproducing it in 1824, with some
additions of secondary importance in an impression of one thousand copies,
I thought it right to add to its special title that of ‘System of Positive
Polity’—a title premature indeed but rightly indicating the scope of
my labours. The promise in my earliest years of that systematisation
which the present treatise could alone realise being thus evident, no one
can ignore the unity of my career.

Even the title of the fourth Essay, published in November 1826,
manifests more clearly my tendency to establish a new Spiritual Author-
ity in harmony with a Scientific Philosophy. The demonstration of my
 Fundamental Laws precedes the appreciation of the continuous advance
of Humanity towards the reorganisation of the Theoretic Power.

Finally the publication of the fifth Essay, March 1826, in the same
journal (the ‘Produce’), decisively established the divisions, both philo-
sophic and social, between the two elementary Social Powers.

My persevering aspiration to found a new Priesthood was thenceforward
so manifest as to draw upon me opposing criticisms; the revolutionary
school accusing me of theocratic tendencies while the retrograde party
hailed me as a defender of social order. The widely different appreciation
of the last mentioned Essay by two writers of repute (Benjamin Constant and
Lamennais) already revealed the normal attitude of the new party founded
by me towards the old parties they represented. When the eloquent
defender of Catholicism, degenerating into a revolutionary declamer,
became blindly hostile to Positivism, this contrast could be verified in a
single mind.

Anyone comparing these five Essays, but especially the three last, will
perceive a constant progression, the last term of which reveals the general
scope of the entire—to reorganise the Spiritual Power by renovating Philo-
sophy. I thus prepared the way for my Fundamental Treatise, the oral
elaboration of which began in 1826, although the first volume was not
published until July 1830. In the course of this philosophical evolution,
terminated in 1842, I steadily intimated that religious construction which
its social destination, as originally designed, demanded.

The sixth and concluding Essay, published by the ‘Journal of Paris’ in
August 1828, manifests the transition from my social début to my intellectual
career, which began, the following year, with the completion of the course
of lectures commenced in 1826,¹ but soon after suspended by my cerebral attack. The insight gained through my personal experience was utilized in this review of the memorable work in which Broussais worthily combated the metaphysical influence. This concluding Essay will ever possess a historical interest since it roused the great biologist to the noble effort which produced, at the close of his admirable career, his just appreciation of the masterly conception of Gall, till then disregarded by him.

¹ I deem it right to preserve the memory of this first effort, by reproducing the short programme circulated in a manuscript form at the beginning of 1826.

### Course of Positive Philosophy in 72 Lectures.

*From the 1st of April, 1826, to the 1st of April, 1827.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Preliminaries, 2 lectures</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Exposition of the scope of the course</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Exposition of the plan of the course</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mathematics</th>
<th>16 lectures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometrical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astronomy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inorganic bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physiology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Physics</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geometry.

Mechanics.

Calculus.
FIRST PART.

(July 1819.)

SEPARATION OF OPINIONS FROM ASPIRATIONS.

Rulers would gladly have it taken for granted that they alone can see right in politics, and consequently are entitled to a monopoly of opinion on such matters. They have doubtless their own reasons for speaking in this way, while subjects have theirs for refusing assent to a principle which, under every point of view, is wholly absurd. For, on the contrary, rulers, even when honest, are by their position more disqualified from gaining a just and elevated view of general politics; since a continual preoccupation with details incapacitates for correct theory. Should a publicist wish to form large political conceptions, let him rigorously refrain from political office. How can he be both actor and spectator?

But on this question men have run from one excess into another. Opponents of the absurd pretension of rulers to exclusive political wisdom have fostered among subjects the prejudice, less dangerous but equally absurd, that everyone is competent to form, by mere instinct, just views in politics; thus encouraging each citizen to set himself up as a legislator. It is remarkable, as observed by Condorcet, that men deem it ridiculous to affect a knowledge of physics or astronomy, &c., without having studied these sciences; yet believe that anyone can understand political science and possess a firm and decided opinion on its most abstract principles without any necessity for reflection or special study.

This arises, as Condorcet might have added, from politics not having yet become a positive science; for, evidently, when it has become such everyone will understand that the study of the observations and deductions which form its basis is indispensable for its comprehension.

However, in order to reconcile all, and exclude this prejudice without sanctioning the principle of political indifferentialism so dear to rulers, it might be well to distinguish, more than is usually done, between opinions and aspirations. It is reasonable, natural, and necessary that every citizen should have political aspirations, since all have an interest in the conduct of social affairs. It is evident, for example, that all citizens who do not belong to the privileged class, and live by the fruit of their labour, must desire liberty, peace, industrial prosperity, economy in public expenditure, and a just employment of the revenue. But a political opinion expresses more than desires. It includes a judgment, for the most part decided and absolute, that these can only be satisfied by particular measures and by no others. Now on this head it is ridiculous and unreasonable to pronounce without special study. The question arises; is such a measure or in-
stitution fitted to effect a given end? Evidently the reply involves a series of reflections that call for a particular examination, failing which the end proposed may be deemed attainable by means capable of producing an exactly opposite effect. Thus, many people, who sincerely desire liberty and peace, have, nevertheless, notions as to the means of securing these blessings so erroneous that, if put in practice, they must lead to disorder and arbitrary power.

Two important consequences in politics follow, as I believe, from this separation of opinions and aspirations.

Firstly, taking the view above suggested, and regarding unenlightened men as confounding in their political estimates the end and the means it will be seen that a greater uniformity exists than is commonly imagined in the political aspirations of a nation. In France for example, across those who profess retrograde opinions, there are a few only, belonging to the privileged classes, who from conviction truly desire the reestablishment of ancient institutions. The majority at bottom, with the rest of the world, wish for liberty, peace, and economy. The association of this desire with the idea of the feudal régime, arises simply from their regarding it as the only means adapted to secure the above ends.

In the second place, the above separation determines, as it appears to me, the share in the government which rightly belongs to the mass of the people. The public alone should indicate the end; because though it may not always know what is really wanted, it perfectly understands its own wishes, and no one else is entitled to dictate these.

When, however, public opinion has once clearly indicated the end, the consideration of the measures for effecting it exclusively belongs to scientific politicians. It would be absurd for the masses to reason about them. The business of the public is to form aspirations; that of publicists to propose measures; that of rulers to realise them. The failure to distinguish these three functions must in a greater or less degree cause confusion.

In a word, when politics shall have taken the rank of a positive science, the public should and must accord to publicists the same confidence in their department, which it now concedes to astronomers in astronomy, to physicians in medicine, &c.; with this difference however that the public will be exclusively entitled to point out the end and aim of the work.

Such confidence, attended as it has been, with most serious disadvantage, while politics have remained vague, mysterious, devoid of principle, in a word, theological, will so soon as they have been transformed into positive science, be accompanied by no greater evil than the confidence which we daily and fearlessly accord to the physician, even in matters of life and death.

When this transformation has been effected the submission due to reason will be perfectly reconciled with the precautions needful against arbitrary power.
SECOND PART.

(April 1820.)

A BRIEF ESTIMATE OF MODERN HISTORY.

The advance of civilisation calls on us to replace a system which was based upon the combination of the spiritual and temporal powers; the first being papal and theological, the second feudal and military.

As regards the spiritual element the birth of this system may be traced from the growing preponderance of Christianity in Europe, towards the third or fourth century. The origin of the temporal power is referable to nearly the same epoch, being that of the first great efforts of the Northern populations to establish themselves in the South of Europe, and the consequent dismemberment of the Roman Empire.

These two powers were definitely constituted during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. At this period Feudalism on the one hand was universally established as a settled basis as a National power; on the other Catholicism was completely organised as a European power.

Let us pause for a moment to make two important observations on this remarkable epoch.

In the first place this twofold organisation established itself in a short time and without much difficulty, because it had been gradually prepared during the seven or eight centuries that followed the birth of the two powers.

The establishment of the temporal power resulted from the overthrow of the Roman Empire by the Northern populations. Its consolidation however was unavoidably deferred until the termination of the irruptions by the victories of the earliest invading settlers over the later invaders. Such was the object of the wars of Charlemagne against the Saxons and Saracens, and afterwards of the Crusades.

The elevation of the spiritual power had been prepared by the overthrow of Polytheism and the establishment of the Christian religion whose numerous clergy had spread themselves over Europe.

When the Pope, Hildebrand, in the eleventh century openly proclaimed the supremacy of the Papacy as a European power over the National powers, he merely asserted a principle the foundations of which were already settled in all heads, or, in other terms, embodied a faith of which the elements had long been accepted.

In the second place it is worthy of remark that the two powers coincided, both in the period of their rise and in that of their consolidation. Their decline also manifests the same analogy. This constant corres-
pondence of the two powers tends to prove—and that apart from the arguments which demonstrate their mutual dependence—that they must disappear simultaneously; that the temporal power cannot be replaced by a power of a different nature without an analogous transformation in the spiritual power, and vice versa.

This social system had taken its rise during the preceding one, and even at the period when the earlier system had attained its complete development. In like manner when the Catholico-Feudal system culminated, the germ of its destruction commenced, as well as the elements of the system destined in our day to replace it.

In truth as regards the temporal power the Emancipation of the Commons dates from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. As regards the spiritual power, the Positive Sciences were introduced into Europe by the Arabs about the same time.

Let us fix our attention on this fundamental fact, since it forms the real starting point for the series of observations by which we now endeavor to throw light upon the existing political system.

The Feudal or military power must be replaced by the Industrial capacity.

So long as War was, in fact, and rightly, considered as the chief source of the prosperity of nations, it was natural that the direction of its temporal affairs of society should be in the hands of a military power as that Industry, occupying a subordinate position, should be only used as an instrument. On the contrary when experience has at last convinced society that the only road to riches lies through peaceful activity, or work of industry, the direction of affairs properly passes to the industrial capacity. Henceforward military force, in its turn, can only occupy a subordinate position, as a merely passive force, and one in all probability destined to become finally useless.

Now the Emancipation of the Commons laid the foundation for this new state of things; facilitating and even necessitating a change which as will presently be shown, ever after developed itself with increasing force. This emancipation established the Industrial Capacity as a social organisation distinct from the Military Power; thus conferring on it an independent existence.

Before this epoch not only were the artisans as a body absolutely dependent on the military class; but each of them was entirely at the mercy of the individual caprices of his territorial lord.

The Emancipation of the Commons while leaving in force the first or collective kind of subjection, abolished the second or individual, and in so doing prepared the way for the destruction of the former. Up to that time the artisans possessed nothing as their own. All they possessed, and even their persons, belonged to their lords, and they enjoyed only what these thought proper to relinquish. Their emancipation created an industrial property, springing from labour, a kind of property distinct from independent of, and soon rivalling territorial property which in its origin and constitution was purely military.

Thanks to this memorable innovation the Industrial Capacity was enabled to develop, perfect, and extend itself, and nations could then organise themselves completely on a basis of industry. The ruling powers alone, together with the general government of which these continued in possession maintained a military character.
Let us next make observations in reference to the Spiritual Power, analogous to those which we have just made on the temporal power.

The Spiritual Power must, in like manner, be replaced by the Scientific or Positive Capacity.

At the period when all branches of knowledge were essentially conjectural and metaphysical the direction of society in spiritual matters naturally fell into the hands of a theological power, since theologians were then the only general thinkers. On the contrary as soon as the entire range of knowledge became based upon observation, the direction of spiritual affairs would rightly be confided to the scientific or positive capacity, since this is evidently superior to theology or metaphysics.

Now the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe by the Arabs created the germ of this important revolution which in our day has embraced all special branches of thought and even reached our general conceptions so far as regards their critical or negative aspect.

No sooner had the Arabs founded, in the portions of Europe conquered by them, schools for teaching the sciences of observation, than a general enthusiasm for this new enlightenment animated all distinguished minds. Schools of a like nature soon arose throughout Western Europe; observatories, schools of dissection, museums of natural history were established in Italy, France, England, and Germany. From the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon cultivated the physical sciences with distinguished success. The superiority of the positive over the conjectural, of physics over metaphysics was so strongly felt from the outset, even by the spiritual power, that several eminent members of the clergy, and among others two popes, went, about the same time, to complete their education at Cordova by studying at that school sciences of observation under Arabian professors.

Resuming then the preceding observations, we may take it as certain that at the moment when the Catholicico-Feudal system assumed its definite organisation, the elements of a new social system took their rise. A positive temporal capacity, that is to say the Industrial Capacity, sprang up beside the existing Military Power, then come to full maturity; and a positive spiritual capacity, that is to say the Scientific Capacity, arose behind the Spiritual Power, at the moment when this began to develop its full activity.¹

Before commencing our examination of the special facts, let us observe a remarkable difference between the old and new systems which shows itself from the very birth of the latter. This difference I have endeavoured to render by contrasting the words power and capacity. I do not say: a new power arises beside each of the two ancient powers, but: a capacity arises beside a power. In other words the action of principles then took its rise, and in our day substitutes itself for the action of men; Reason taking the place of Will.

The military character of the ancient system naturally demanded in the highest degree passive obedience from the nation. On the contrary the

¹ The social distinction between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers must subsist in the new as in the old system. This division which had no existence among the Romans is the most fundamental improvement which the Moderns have introduced into the organisation of society. By this alone, as permitting the separation of theory and practice, it became possible to make politics a science. There is however this difference that in the new system the separation is no longer between two Powers but between two Capacities.
industrial capacity, regarded as the rightful guide of the temporal affairs of society, is not and should not be associated with arbitrary power, since the plans which it may propose for advancing the public good on the one hand can be judged, and, on the other hand, can be executed without resorting to coercion.

The spiritual power, in like manner, being in its very essence conjectural, necessarily exacted the highest degree of confidence and mental submission. Such submission was an indispensable condition of its existence and action. On the contrary the positive scientific capacity, in directing the spiritual affairs of society requires no blind faith, nor even confidence; at least on the part of all who can comprehend demonstrations; while as regards those who cannot, experience has sufficiently proved that reliance placed in the unanimous conclusions of men of science, not being liable to abuse, cannot be prejudicial.

The positive scientific capacity may therefore, in so far as it is a creative force, be considered as the source of power; but of a power which replaces Revelation by Demonstration.

Such then is our starting point. In the eleventh century the temporal and spiritual powers attained their definite constitution, and at the same epoch two positive capacities took their rise, preparing the overthrow of the powers which they were finally destined to replace. In a word; one system culminated; another was born. Since that period the two systems have always co-existed in a state of mutual antagonism, at one time secret, at another open; the first however always losing ground while the second continually advanced.

An investigation of the past is, therefore, divisible into two parallel series, which respectively embrace the decline of the old and the growth of the new system. This division will form the basis of this Essay.

FIRST SERIES.

At the period above selected for the commencement of this investigation, the two systems—one at its apogee the other just springing into life—were so unequal in force that for a long time no direct and apparent struggle could arise between them. Accordingly history shows that the open conflict only dates from the sixteenth century. The four or five centuries, immediately preceding formed the period of greatest splendour of the Catholicico-Feudal systems; but this splendour rested on a foundation already undermined.

Had historians more deeply analysed and examined the Middle Ages, they would not have confined their expositions to the obvious features of that period. They would have pointed out the gradual preparation of the great events afterwards developed, and would not have represented the sixteenth century as a series of sudden and unforeseen explosions. However this may be, unquestionably, the open struggle between the two systems only dates from that century.

The Spiritual Power was essentially characterised by its exercising a European function, and was consequently in reality subverted by the
attack of Luther and his co-reformers on the Papal authority. This also completely sapped the surviving influence of theological authority by destroying the principle of blind faith, and substituting for it that of the right of free inquiry, which, at first confined within narrow limits, was inevitably destined to expand continually and embrace, at last, an indefinite field.

This twofold change was accomplished as completely in countries that remained Catholic, especially in France, as in those which embraced Protestantism.

The two cases however presented one essential difference. In Catholic countries, the spiritual power feeling its downfall as a distinct and independent body, generally speaking, subordinated itself to the royal authority, devoting to its service and support the same doctrines by which the church had formerly predominated over the monarchy.

This change in the rôle of the clergy had the effect of prolonging its political influence somewhat beyond its natural duration; but it damaged the cause of royalty by associating its fortunes more closely with those of doctrines which had lost all credit among the educated classes.

The religious Reformation, by reason of the wars it occasioned, occupied the entire of the sixteenth and the first part of the seventeenth centuries. Immediately after this movement began the assaults upon the Temporal Power in France and England.

In each of these countries the Commons, guided by one of the two branches of the temporal power, led the attack. Between the two nations but one difference existed on this head. With the English Feudalism became the ally of the Commons against the royal authority, while in France they were headed by Royalty against feudalism.

This combination of the Commons with one element of the temporal power against the other element had originated in both countries after their emancipation, and had even contributed not a little to produce it. Long before the seventeenth century the alliance had produced unmistakable results which prepared the important events of that century.

In France Cardinal Richelieu laboured for the overthrow of Feudalism; an enterprise terminated by Louis XIV., who reduced the nobility to entire insignificance and political nullity, leaving them no other office than that of guard of honour to royalty. It is essential to observe that both Richelieu and Louis XIV. powerfully encouraged the fine arts, the sciences and the industrial arts; they endeavoured to enhance the political importance of savants, artists and artisans, while lowering that of the nobles. This policy was most clearly manifested by the minister Colbert, himself an artisan. But this fact belongs to our second series of observations and it suffices to note it here.

In England the issue of the struggle was the revolution of 1688, which limited the royal power as far as could be done without subverting the ancient system. Thus in each of these two countries the attack on the Temporal Power, in distinct ways, weakened, as far as was possible, a different element of this power; so that the two nations had effected the overthrow of the temporal power up to the point where further change became impracticable without abandoning the ancient social system. To effectuate this final result, it was sufficient that each nation should adopt the modification made by the other. This has occurred in France, since the French adopted the English Constitution.

The coalition between the Commons and one element of the temporal
power against the other element, and the active assistance which in several
countries was accorded by the temporal against the spiritual power, makes
it impossible, without a thorough investigation, to seize the true nature of
these attacks.

Hence has sprung a widespread error which it is important to point out
and refute. In place of seeing in these events the struggle of the Commons
headed by certain elements of the Catholicico-Feudal system against in
other elements, historians have only seen a quarrel of kings and popes and
of the royal and feudal authorities between themselves. The Commons
have been merely regarded as instruments employed by the different powers
and seldom in any other light.

Before proceeding to rectify the error just mentioned, it may be well to
observe that, whatever view be taken, our present series will remain
unaffected, since its main object is to prove the continuous decline of the
ancient system. Nevertheless it is very far from being a matter of
indifference whether we form a just or an erroneous conception of the
extent to which this decline was wrought by the influence of the artists,
artists, and savants who collectively constituted the Commons.

It may be laid down as a principle that any discordance of elements
constituting a system is an evident sign of its decay. Thus from the first
great act of antagonism between the temporal and spiritual powers, the fall
of both, sooner or later, might have been predicted.

Antagonism of this sort showed itself at a very early period in the
ancient system, even anterior to its complete organisation; but became
continuous almost immediately after its definitive establishment. Reflec-
tion shows that it was inherent in this system.

Powers are of necessity rivals and jealous of each other, even when
their common interest manifestly dictates an intimate alliance. These
powers being, in fact, incapable of a clear definition, it is natural that each
should aspire to exclusive dominion. A true and enduring combination
can only exist between positive Capacities. Combination then becomes
possible, and, so to speak, inevitable, since each of these capacities naturally
confines itself to its proper office, which is defined as sharply as possible.
 Pretensions to universal influence, which alone could disturb this natural
arrangement, strike all men as absurd, and, consequently, could never
muster a sufficient number of followers to make them dangerous.

The Commons being at their birth manifestly too feeble to struggle
alone against the ancient system, were forced to attach themselves to the
heads of the enemy's camp. They endeavoured to profit by the divisions
that arose within it, and such was their prudence, they did in fact always
profit by them. Their plan was very simple, and consisted in always
supporting that power which at each period and in each country was most
liberal, that is in harmony with their interests. This plan they
followed persistently, with an admirable instinct, in all the partial crises
which preceded the two great struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Thus their conduct in these later periods was by no means
accidental, but resulted from long established habits.

Now this explains why in England the Commons sided with the Lords
against the King, while in France they took part with Royalty against
Feudalism. At more remote periods the Commons both in France and
England, had embraced the cause of the Spiritual Power because this was
then the most liberal. In reality therefore, the Commons were not the mere
instruments of the ancient powers; on the contrary the latter, although moved by impulses peculiar to themselves, should rather be regarded as having been instruments of the former. In fact the attack upon the ancient system took place both through and for the Commons. They were not dupes, if any such there were, in the transaction.

Moreover, the Commons, in the struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, exercised a direct action peculiar to themselves. Each of the two elements of the new system, the Industrial capacity and the Scientific capacity, contributed to the result. Although these always acted concurrently, nevertheless, as was natural, the latter principally concerned itself with the Spiritual power as the former did with the Temporal power. Each capacity fought hand to hand with the corresponding power and, as is worthy of remark, the scientific capacity, while endeavouring to overthrow the theological doctrines, felt itself obliged to take its stand upon theology, or at least, to accommodate its arguments to the theological method. This is mainly observable in the writings of Lord Bacon. This fact in the spiritual struggle corresponds to the alliance of the Commons with one of the elements of the military power in the temporal conflict.

It is not necessary to demonstrate the marked influence exercised by the Sciences of Observation upon the Reformation of Luther; since no one in the present day questions it. The best historians of this period have indicated the influence, which though less direct and decided, was exercised upon this reform by the progress of the Useful Arts; pointing out the great impulse given to commerce and manufactures by the discovery of America and the passage to the Indies round the Cape of Good Hope, which indeed itself resulted from the progress of the useful arts combined with the sciences of observation.

Two other discoveries of the first rank, made, one in the arts towards the end of the fifteenth century, the other in the sciences about a century later, confirmed and hastened the decline of the ancient system, and secured for the new an advance more direct and certain, more calm and more rapid.

Of these discoveries the first was that of Printing, which if it did not cause the Reformation, at least rendered its spread much more rapid and complete than it otherwise would have been. But this did not form its main influence in the overthrow of the ancient system.

The considerations are well known that prove the immense revolution which this discovery effected in social order, by rendering public opinion supreme. Passing these over, we shall present the subject in another aspect.

We say therefore: first, that the discovery of printing secured to the new system the means of taking a direct and complete initiative in replacing the ancient system independently of any protection from its declining elements; secondly, that it assuaged, in a large measure, the antecedent violence of the struggle, by substituting criticism for attack.

The second of these discoveries is that of the true Astronomical Theory devised by Copernicus, proved and established by Galileo.

Even the best minds rarely estimate at its true value, the vast influence which the change of ideas then wrought exerted in the radical destruction of the theological system. So great was this influence that it alone would have sufficed to demolish that system. The following consideration, which my readers can develop, will suffice to show this.
The entire theological system is based upon the supposition that the earth is made for man and the whole universe made for the earth; remove this supposition and the basis of all supernatural doctrines gives way. Now Galileo, having demonstrated that our planet is one of the smallest, is in no respect distinguished from the others, and revolves with them about the sun, the hypothesis that nature is made for mankind alone so manifestly shocks good sense and contradicts fact, that it must appear absurd and collapse, and with it must fall the edifice of faith. In a word the theological doctrines are entirely incompatible with the truths of modern astronomy; and are so felt even by those whose astronomical belief does not rest on demonstration.

This consideration, when sufficiently weighed, must satisfy us that the Inquisition, in endeavouring to suppress at the outset the theory of Galileo, was faithful to its office as the police of the Spiritual Power.

To resume our previous remarks, it appears that by the end of the seventeenth century two attacks had been made on the ancient system; one in the sixteenth century on the spiritual power, the other in the seventeenth century on the temporal power.

At first sight this twofold attack might seem sufficient, but such was far from being the case. The system had been attacked in its elements but not as a whole; beaten in detail it still needed to be beaten as a system. Besides, each special struggle had been directed by a single branch of the ancient powers and thus was not sufficiently decisive. The victory of the new over the old system had not been made sufficiently clear; and this was an additional reason which necessitated a further struggle.

Anyone therefore living at the end of the seventeenth century, and well acquainted with the real state of affairs might have predicted with perfect confidence that the two antecedent but partial attacks were merely preparatory, and would in the succeeding century be followed by an attack directed against the entire old system and destined to effect its final destruction. Such events were the inevitable consequence of historical events since the eleventh century, but more immediately of the last two centuries.

It would be superfluous to consider in detail facts so near to our own time and known to all. In truth, the eighteenth century was, as might be expected, the result, the complement, and the résumé of the two preceding centuries.

In reference to the Spiritual Power the principle of the Right of Private Judgment in religion (laid down by Luther though at first very timidly) was then pushed to its furthest limits. The boldest applications of this right advanced side by side with the efforts made to vindicate its supremacy. The theological creeds thus submitted to discussion were entirely overthrown, no doubt somewhat recklessly, precipitately, and superficially, with an exaggerated disregard of the past and an inadequate insight into the future; but they were irremediably overthrown, since criticism covered them with ridicule even among the least instructed classes. This is an undeniable fact; and we make the observation without discussing its grounds.

If we examine what were the destinies of the Temporal Power in France, where the eighteenth century should be principally studied, we shall find that Feudalism having in the preceding century lost all political power, forfeited in this all social consideration.
Royalty, after having, under Louis XIV., obtained complete dominion over the temporal power by the support which the Commons lent to it, ceased to ally itself with them; a serious mistake on its part.

Louis XIV. committed a great error in allying himself with the nobility, which—oblivious of its having once held an equal rank with the monarch—at last resigned itself to accept, in exchange for money and honors, a subordinate and insignificant political rôle.

Had not Louis XIV. committed this great error; had he abandoned to its fate a declining power irrevocably doomed, and whose destruction was hastened by himself; had he in fine simply continued to follow the direction taken by the Commons, he would, without doubt, have saved all the misfortunes which afterwards fell on Louis XVI.

This false step it was which originally discredited Royalty in the eyes of the Commons and alienated them from it. The discredit thrown on the royal power by the private life of the Regent and the libertinism of Louis XV., put the finishing stroke to this declension. At the same time the philosophers, having subjected the temporal, as they had the spiritual power, to discussion, it also succumbed the more easily because it was, since the Reformation, in great part founded on the same doctrines.

Thus the eighteenth century carried the criticism of the two powers to its last limits, and completed the ruin of the Ancient System, both in its elements and as a whole. A more detailed examination of the process by which its overthrow was effected would here be out of place.

I shall merely indicate the influence which the immense and ever increasing progress of the sciences of observation from the time of Galileo inevitably exercised for the destruction of theological doctrines. Newton's discovery of a general physical law, Franklin's analysis of the principal meteorological phenomenon, besides his invention for subordinating it to human power; in a word, all the numerous and remarkable discoveries made during this century in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and physiology contributed to the radical and irrevocable destruction of the theological system, more efficaciously than all the writings of Voltaire and his coadjutors, although these really exercised a prodigious influence. Neither the partisans nor the adversaries of the ancient system have adequately appreciated this fact.

Thus prepared or, to speak more truly, necessitated, the French Revolution burst forth. From the outset it took a wrong direction and the Royal Power was overthrown.

The royal power speedily raised itself once again. Forming as this did both head and heart of the ancient system, the one could only disappear with the other; and no system can disappear until a fresh one has come into being and is ready to replace its predecessor.

From this great movement resulted the abolition of privileges, the proclamation of the principle of unlimited liberty of conscience, and finally the establishment of the English constitution, granted by the crown.

The abolition of privileges completed the ruin of Feudalism, reducing the temporal power to the single element of royalty.

Unlimited liberty of conscience once proclaimed as a principle,¹ the Spiritual Power was wholly and irrevocably abolished.

¹ Its proclamation rendered impossible the establishment of any theological authority, either political, or simply moral. Doctrines having been abandoned
The establishment of the English constitution should be viewed under two aspects, differing from each other and in some degree opposed.

On the one hand it continued the work of demolition, by limiting the Royal Power, now the only surviving part of the ancient system, as far as could be done without abandoning this.

On the other hand, by establishing a Chamber intended to represent Public Opinion, this innovation provided the means of transition, through which it became possible, peaceably, easily, and promptly, to initiate the normal system so soon as this was prepared and ready to take its place.

Having thus terminated the first series of observations, I shall briefly resume the results of my examination.

I set out from this position:

In the eleventh century the Catholico-Feudal system had acquired its definite constitution both as to the spiritual and the temporal power.

From the same epoch dates the rise of the elements of the new social system. These were firstly the Industrial Capacity sprung from the enfranchisement of the Commons and represented by the artisans; secondly, the Scientific Capacity which took its rise with the introduction of the science of observation into Europe by the Arabs.

For four or five hundred years these two systems coexisted without any open conflict, their forces being so unequal; but during this period the struggle was silently prepared.

From the commencement of the sixteenth century, three grand conflicts arose between the new and old system. Two of them were partial, one was general; and each occupied about one century.

The sixteenth century witnessed the attack on the spiritual, the seventeenth on the temporal power; while the general and decisive attack on the ancient system took place during the eighteenth, determining the fall of the theologico-military system.

The true condition of the Ancient System may without exaggeration be thus described.

On the one hand, dogmatic faith no longer exists, all the beliefs which lay at its root being extinct or nearly so. Thus the spiritual power can now only exert an influence upon the lowest orders of society.

On the other hand, the temporal power stands reduced to one only of its two branches—royalty. This is itself reduced to the smallest dimensions consistent with the bare subsistence in an inert state of the ancient system.

In fine the ancient system in our day no longer possesses any force but such as is rigorously required for the maintenance of order until the establishment of the new one; and its continued efficacy for this purpose would be very doubtful were the advent of the latter too long postponed.

to the good pleasure of each individual, perhaps no two professions of faith would have been identical, and that of each person might vary from morning to evening, altering with the ever varying state of his physical and moral sensibilities, and the changes in his social circumstances.

In a word it is evident that, as regards their political consequences unlimited liberty of conscience and entire theological indifference come to exactly the same thing. In neither case can supernatural beliefs serve as the basis of morals. Far from concealing this fact we cannot repeat it too often, since it proves the necessity for reconstructing and building on positive principles (that is to say principles deduced from observation) that morality which is the basis or rather the general bond of the social organisation.
GENERAL APPENDIX—SECOND PART.

In conformity with this exposition I leave others to judge whether the organisation of the new system is urgent; and whether artists, scientific men and artisans do not gravely err when they are indifferent on this head.

Such is the true state of society at this moment with reference to the ancient system. The second series of observations will soon show us how far our social state is more satisfactory in relation to the new system.

SECOND SERIES.

If in the preceding series the march of civilisation has appeared stormy, in that on which we now enter we shall find it calm. Hitherto we have only considered the successive steps in the disorganisation of the ancient system of society. But contemporaneously with this decline, a New Social Order was completely, though gradually, created. This in our day has become sufficiently developed to replace the ancient and already decrepit order. It remains to study and explain the gradual development of the new system.

Let us once more retrace our steps.

We have seen that in the eleventh century at the very moment when the ancient system culminated, the elements of a new social organisation had sprung up. These elements were, as regarded the temporal power, the Industrial Capacity born from the enfranchisement of the Commons, as regarded the spiritual, the Scientific Capacity resulting from the introduction of the positive sciences into Europe by the Arabs.

If at this epoch some man of genius could have looked with sufficient insight into the then condition of affairs he must infallibly have foreseen, from its very beginning, the entire of the great revolution since accomplished; he must have become aware that the two elements just created would inevitably tend to overthrow the two powers whose combination constituted the system then in vigour.

He must likewise have foreseen that these new elements would expand, more and more, at the expense of the two powers; so as, little by little, to found a system finally destined to replace the ancient one.

Applying ourselves to verify this fundamental view, we shall find that the second series is implicitly contained in its earliest germs. We shall next examine the manner in which the new system was effectively organised.

The twofold and inherent tendency of the new system—to destroy the ancient system and to replace it—was the immediate result of the two following causes.

In the first place, from the very nature of things the industrial capacity and the scientific capacity are antagonistic one to the military the other to the theological power.

In the second place the source of these two capacities placed them outside the ancient system, since they were represented by classes distinct from and independent of the temporal and spiritual power.

This latter feature, while it assured the future of both capacities and
their complete development, impressed upon them an indelible character of opposition to and incompatibility with the ancient system.

Up to the present time so little attention has been paid to this essential view that it becomes necessary to develop it at some length.

In the social state which still subsists in Russia, where all industrial undertakings are directed, in the last resort, by the feudal class, the industrial capacity does not present itself in natural opposition to the military power, or as properly belonging to a distinct state of society. It has not yet assumed its characteristic attitude. The artisans are only passive instruments in the hands of the military rulers. So also with the scientific capacity, so long as the sciences are cultivated by the theological powers alone, as was the case in the early periods of civilisation in the ancient theocracies of the East, and still is so in China. The scientific capacity is then merely an instrument of government in the hands of the priesthood.

Such in fact was the state of affairs in Europe down to the memorable period which we have selected as our starting-point.

Before the Enfranchisement of the Commons the small amount of agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial enterprise which then existed, if not directed by the temporal chiefs, was, at least, dependent upon them.

So likewise, before the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe by the Arabs, the small subsisting aggregate of knowledge was entirely in the hands of the spiritual power.

It is worthy of remark that this state of things, while it lasted, secured the perpetuation of the ancient system; not merely because the main-springs of the new one were completely at the mercy of the two ancient powers, but also because, for this very reason, the development of the two capacities was completely arrested.

When the sciences and arts are regarded simply as instruments, they can never rise above a certain, and that a very low point, as may be seen in China and India.

On the contrary as soon as the Commons were enfranchised, and the positive sciences exclusively cultivated by laymen, which happened shortly after their introduction into Europe, the face of things was entirely changed.

These two great events first permitted the arts and sciences freely to expand; no other limit being thenceforward imposed on the progress of the two positive capacities but that of the duration of the human race.

In the second place from this date the industrial capacity and the scientific capacity, disengaged for ever from the ancient system, established themselves in a solid manner outside of it, thus acquiring a separate and characteristic existence. But it was impossible they should cease to be instruments of the ancient system without becoming its enemies: as the proverb says, *Qui non est mecum, contra me est.*

This fundamental revolution, therefore, created two new social forces, the industrial force and the scientific force. These from their birth, and owing to their origin, were externally impressed with a twofold character: being at once antagonists of the ancient political order and elements of a new order.

The contempt and hatred which from that time forward Feudalism and Theology persistently manifested, the one towards the Industrial Arts, the other towards the Sciences of Observation, only strengthened this antagonism and rendered it more decided.
Thus the change wrought during the eleventh century contained in principle at once the destruction of the ancient system and the creation of a new order of things.

Since this epoch history has been nothing but the consequence and the development of the primitive social dualism above described. Having in the preceding series considered this social development in its first aspect, we now proceed to examine its progress under the second point of view.

It would assuredly be absurd to suppose that the new system has been organised by Savans, Artists, and Artisans, in accordance with a predetermined unvarying plan pursued from the eleventh century to our own time. At no period has the progress of society been regulated by a system conceived by a man of genius and adopted by the masses. This would, from the nature of things, be impossible, for the law of human progress guides and dominates all; men are only its instruments. Although this force springs from ourselves, it is no more possible for us to withdraw from its influence or control its action than to change at our pleasure the original impulse which causes our planet to revolve around the sun.

Secondary results, alone, are subject to our control. All that we can do is consciously to obey this law, which constitutes our true providence, ascertaining the course it marks out for us, instead of being blindly compelled by it. Here, in truth, lies the goal of the grand philosophical revolution reserved for our own times. Nevertheless when the political order presents a series of events connected together exactly as if their human agents had framed such a plan, is not such an hypothesis admissible as a means of elucidating this connection of events? In doing so we should merely employ, with still less departure from the reality, the method adopted in the physical sciences, where intentions and design are attributed even to inorganic matter in order to afford a clearer view of the phenomena. Besides as regards their consequences, a great resemblance subsists between a connected series of events and a premeditated plan; and we shall presently see that the evolution of the new system was determined by the original constitution of its elements.

The following may be regarded as the plan adopted by the Commons,

1 The capital error of the legislators and philosophers of antiquity, in truth, lay in their endeavouring to regulate the progress of civilisation by their systematic views; whereas the latter should have been subordinated to the former. This error was, nevertheless, very excusable and natural, on their part; for at that epoch the origin of civilisation was too recent to allow of anyone observing its law of progress, or even perceiving the existence of such a law, much less recognising that its course lies beyond our control.

Evidently this truth could only be reached à posteriori, and not à priori. In other words politics could not become a science, without a basis of observation, and observations could only be made after a prolonged period of civilised existence. It was necessary to await the establishment of a social system, which should embrace numerous populations consisting of several great nations, and last a long while, before a theory could be founded upon this great experiment.

2 I may be allowed also to remark that, admitting it to be true that science becomes positive only when founded on observed and acknowledged facts, it is equally certain (as the history of inexact in all directions proves) that no branch of knowledge acquires a scientific character until an hypothesis has combined all its fundamental facts.

Thus whenever politics shall have become a science, it is certain that it will employ hypotheses, as the other sciences do, and that they will be employed in the sense pointed out above.
from the period of their emancipation, for gradually preparing the re-
organisation of society on a new and suitable basis: to employ themselves
solely with operations upon nature in order to utilise her powers for
the benefit of the human race; and to exercise an action upon men
only so far as was necessary in order to enlist their co-operation in this
aim.

Such in brief was the simple plan invariably pursued from the outset by
men of science and artisans, who started with a single object, the former of
studying nature in order to understand her, the latter of applying this
knowledge to satisfy the wants and desires of mankind.

This course was so wise that a better could not have been selected, had
scientific men and artisans framed one advisedly.

In fine this plan is so perfect that nothing remains for us now but to
apply it to the general direction of society, in like manner as our forefathers,
step by step, brought it to bear on each part of the social organisation.

It is easy to explain why this plan was followed without premeditation or
even conscious action. After giving this explanation we shall briefly
indicate the ground of its success.

The Commons by the very fact of their enfranchisement were freed
from the state of individual dependence which previously weighed upon
them; but the artisans and men of science remained collectively dependent
upon the military and theological classes.

At the outset this dependence was so great and the Commons were so
weak that they were manifestly unable to withdraw from it. But this
obstacle which at first sight seemed insurmountable to their interests, really assured
the success of their efforts. They were thus preserved from being led astray,
and constrained, by an invincible necessity, to pursue the course which was
really the wisest. Debarred from the idea of sharing in government, or
even of withdrawing themselves from the collective despotism, the Commons
only sought to profit by the degree of individual liberty they had gained
in such a way as to develop to the utmost the scientific and industrial
capacities.

Men of science and artists only endeavoured to act upon nature, the one
to obtain, by observation and experiment, a knowledge of her laws, the other
to apply this knowledge to the production of necessary, useful, or agreeable,
objects. In adopting this course they simply followed a natural tendency
to ameliorate our lot; for in consequence of their political inferiority this
action upon nature was the only course which the Commons could adopt for
improving their social condition. Hence we may clearly perceive the force
which obliged the Commons to pursue, unconsciously, the plan above
indicated.

As a means of showing how conformable to their real interests was this
plan, let us put a case. Assuming then that the condition of affairs was not
originally such as I have described it, let us imagine that the Commons had,
immediately after their enfranchisement, obtained a full share of political
power, what use would they have made of this power? What would have
occurred? In all probability the result would have been as follows.

Their participation in political power would have caused them to lose
sight of their true aim,—the development of the industrial and scientific
capacities. At all events this development would have been far slower than
it was, and consequently the Commons would have continued, for a much
longer period, in subjection to the military and theological powers. For it
needed a powerful awakening of the sense of common interests combined
with the force of demonstration to enable them to struggle with marked
success against physical force combined with that of superstition. Ac-
dordingly both in France and in England, the Commons did not, until a
comparatively recent period, evince any great anxiety to assume those
legislative functions which were accorded to them in each country during
the struggles of Royalty and Feudalism by one or other of these branches of
the temporal power.¹

Let us now, directly, examine the advantages of the course followed by
the Commons.

Without troubling themselves as to the way in which the military and
theological authorities directed society, and putting, as it were, out of view
the ancient system, the Commons set to work to organise all the special
departments left to their control, with the single object of operating upon
nature. By adopting this wise course, they were assured not only of giving
no displeasure to the existing powers but of being agreeable to them and
receiving from them every encouragement compatible with their exercise of
authority. More than that; they were certain, little by little, through their
extensive action on nature and the riches and consideration thus acquired,
to redeem themselves gradually from the oppression that weighed upon
them.

Finally they could reckon on being able, by the advance of industrial
and scientific capacity, to acquire a progressive increase of force, which
would gradually allow of their treating with their rulers as equals, and
eventually of obtaining an ascendency over them; and this has in our day
really become possible.

Those who place their happiness in exercising an arbitrary authority
merely for the pleasure of exerting it are, fortunately, very rare anomalies
in human nature. The majority of men desire power, when placed within
their reach, not as an end but as a means. They value it, less from love of
authority,² than because their idleness and incapacity disposes them to

¹ The alliance of the Commons with one portion of the temporal power against
the other, in France and England, was really very serviceable to the artisans and
men of science; but this coalition should be considered in reference to the
destructive of the old, and not to the organisation of the new system. In the
first series of remarks, I have thus considered it.

The little anxiety evinced by the Commons to profit by the share in the
legislative powersecured for them by their allies in the ancient system, was
clearly manifested in England, where, nevertheless, the Commons have pursued
with greater vigour than elsewhere this kind of political progress. We know that
previous to the epoch when they began to have a voice in the imposition of taxes,
they regarded the sending of deputies to Parliament as a heavy burden, because
the feudal nobility only summoned them in order to ascertain how much the
Commons could pay, and to plunder them accordingly.

² This love of authority, though certainly indestructible in man, has neverthe-
less been, to a great degree, nullifi-d by the progress of civilisation, or, at least,
its inconveniences have almost disappeared in the new system. In fact, the
development of our action upon nature has changed the direction of this senti-
ment, by guiding it towards things. The desire to command men has gradually
transformed itself into that of modifying nature at our pleasure.

From this moment the love of power, born in all men, ceased to be hurtful or,
at least, we may anticipate the time when instead of doing harm it will do good.
Thus it is that civilisation has perfected man's moral nature; not merely as
regards the intellect but also as to the passions. Though, by virtue of the laws
of the human organisation, the latter order of vital functions is not directly unsuc-
siptible of improvement, it becomes so through the influence exercised by the former
employ others in procuring enjoyments instead of themselves joining in this labour.

The dominant aim of almost all persons is not to act upon man, but upon nature. There is hardly anyone who does not eagerly renounce even absolute authority, when its exercise excludes the enjoyment of those advantages of civilization which result from our action upon things. The English Nabob who has made his fortune in Bengal, and exercises unlimited power over thousands of Hindus, sighs for the moment when he can return to Europe and there possess the enjoyments of life; though he well knows that in England he cannot commit the smallest arbitrary against the meanest sailor without risk to himself. We are therefore certain to succeed with most men, when it is proposed to sacrifice a certain degree of authority by way of exchange for a certain measured dominion over things.

Thus the success of the plan followed by the Commons from the pride of their enfranchisement was founded on a law of human nature.

We are in this way able to explain the cause of all the chief advances effected by the elements of the New Social System during their gradual organisation. These advances were essentially due to the perseverance of the Commons in following the simple and complete plan above expounded. Events, independent of this plan, accelerated its success; but the plan itself mainly determined the result. It, therefore, only remains for us recapitulate the various kinds of progress realised.

In order to avoid confusion in expounding the new system, in reference to its Temporal and Spiritual development, it is requisite to distinguish between the advances effected by the mass of the Commons and those made by their temporal and spiritual Leaders. Moreover, the Social and the Political progress of the new system should be separately considered. By its social progress we understand its internal development, apart from all relations with the ancient system; by its political progress the influence which the latter allowed the new system to exercise in the formation of the political order, as well as the share of legislative authority which it obtained.

Let us now consider the social and political progress of the new system under their temporal aspects; and among these, first, the social progress.

This is not the place for retracing, even in a summary way, the truly vast improvements effected by art and industry since the emancipation of the Commons. Let us simply review them in reference to the organisation of the new system.

Since this epoch the industrial capacity has attained to a development, which even the most vivid imagination cannot accurately represent. All the arts previously known have been prodigiously improved, and a far larger number of new arts discovered. Agriculture has multiplied its products enormously. Commercial relations have been incalculably improved and have been, at the same time, largely extended, especially since the discovery of the New World. In a word the action of the human race upon the external world has been, to an inappreciable degree, increased, and, so to speak, created.

As the result of this increased action a much larger portion of the human race in civilised countries, is now abundantly and securely provided with the necessaries of life, although population has greatly increased.
GENERAL APPENDIX—SECOND PART.

Objects of convenience and luxury have also come into use to a proportionate extent.

Such have been the chief results of this progress in reference to the temporal organisation of the new system.

The Commons have gradually acquired a preponderating influence and consideration. All social arrangements have fallen under their control, all the real forces of society have come into their hands, and, since the invention of gunpowder, even the military power has become subordinated to them.

On the one hand the discovery of powder destroyed the physical superiority over the artisans which the possession of arms conferred upon the military classes; and supplied the former with the means of self-protection without receiving a soldier’s education. On the other hand it placed the entire system of war in dependence upon the industrial arts and sciences of observation.

At the same time war having thus become more and more costly, it could no longer be carried on without loans, for which the military power was dependent upon the Commons. In a word, matters gradually reached the stage when war became impossible if the industrial and scientific capacities refused their cooperation.

Under the temporal point of view the political advances of the new system were the direct and necessary result of its social progress. In proportion as the Commons acquired greater riches, with more consideration and civic importance, they augmented their influence over the general direction of society, and their direct political authority.

It is in England chiefly that the advance of the Commons in this respect should be observed, because it has there been most clearly revealed.1

The Commons having, in the English Parliament, begun by slowly obtaining a kind of consultative voice in the vote on taxation, gradually obtained a deliberative voice, and in the end, the supply was specially conceded to them. Their exclusive right on this head was irrevocably made a fundamental principle of the constitution in the settlement of 1688.

At the same time, the influence of the Commons in the formation of the general political plan became increasingly large. At the same epoch, in England it reached such a height that the ancient rulers in principle admitted that social prosperity is based upon industry, and consequently that the political plan should be conceived in the interest of the Commons. Under both these aspects the ancient system has been modified in favour of the new one, as far as was possible, so long as society, as a whole, remained under the control of the ancient system.

1 Almost immediately after their enfranchisement the Commons were invited, in France no less than in England, to cooperate in the formation of the States General; but in France this step produced hardly any results.

I take this opportunity of stating that I have not felt it desirable to consider the attempts made soon after their emancipation, at almost all points of civilised Europe, but especially in Germany and Italy, to organise industrial societies. These attempts, indicating the birth of the new system, have left no durable trace. They had not, nor could they have had an organic character. In so rapid a review, considerations of this kind, far from enlightening, would have confused the mind.
This progress effected by the Commons was assuredly very important, but it is also very important not to exaggerate its significance or to confound a mere modification with a total change of system.

The exclusive right of voting the taxes granted to the Commons, should, theoretically, have invested them with supreme political power. But in fact, up to the present time this right has benefited them very little, because they have not really exercised it. The House of Commons has been at bottom merely a sort of appendage to royalty and feudalism; an instrument in the hands of the ancient system. Moreover the maxim admitted in England by the temporal power that the political plan should be concealed in the interests of industry, has, to the present time, but slightly benefited the Commons. The reason for this is, that the ancient system, commanding the situation and of necessity preserving its position until the new system was definitely organised, could only place at the service of the Commons its peculiar modes of action—namely, force and cunning. In this way, since the famous Navigation Laws, the temporal power has systematically sought and plotted, in order to serve the interests of the Commons.

The establishment of the Parliamentary Régime in England must, therefore, be regarded as having, as far as was possible, modified the ancient system, and supplied a transition to the new system. In this respect only was it useful to the Commons, for, considered in itself and absolutely, its results were at least as mischievous as they were useful to them.

France, by her recent adoption of the English constitution, has placed herself on a level with England in both of the above respects; with the advantage however, that the change having been effected at a much more advanced period of civilisation, it was far more complete. Feudalism having been overthrown before the parliamentary régime was adopted the ancient system was modified far more deeply in France than in England. The principle which proposes the interests of the Commons, as the end and rule of political combinations, has there acquired a broader, more general, and preponderating character.

In fine, the parliamentary system having been first established in France at a period when the necessity for a total change in the political system was profoundly felt, its transitional character has become much more marked.

Let us next study the social and political progress of the new system, in reference to the spiritual power.

Before the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe all special as well as general knowledge was either theological or metaphysical. The few speculations about nature then suggested were exclusively founded upon religious beliefs. But from this memorable epoch the natural sciences, more and more, sought for a basis in observation and experiment. Nevertheless down to a recent period they suffered from an admixture of superstition and metaphysics. It was only towards the end of the sixteenth and the early years of the seventeenth centuries that they succeeded in entirely disengaging themselves from theological beliefs and metaphysical hypotheses. The epoch at which they began to be truly positive must be referred to Bacon who gave the first signal of this great revolution; to Galileo his cotemporary who furnished its earliest exemplification; and lastly to Descartes who irreversibly emancipated the intellect from the yoke of authority in matters of science. Then it was that natural philosophy arose and the scientific capacity acquired its true character, that of contributing the spiritual element of a new social system.
From this epoch, the sciences successively became positive in the natural order of sequence, that is to say according as they were more or less closely related to man. Thus, astronomy first, then physics, later chemistry and finally, in our own day, physiology, have been constituted as positive sciences. This revolution, then, has been completely accomplished for all special branches of knowledge, and evidently approaches its consummation for philosophy, morals, and politics. The influence of theology and metaphysics on these subjects has already been destroyed in the eyes of all educated men, though they are not yet based upon observation. The realisation of this condition is alone wanting for the spiritual development of the new social system.

In proportion as the sciences became positive and consequently advanced with increasing rapidity, a multitude of scientific ideas entered into general education, while the religious doctrines gradually lost their influence. Special schools for the sciences arose, in which the influence of theology and metaphysics was almost nothing. Finally the mental state has undergone such a change in this respect that in our day, the ideas of everyone, from the least instructed to the most enlightened, spring, almost entirely, from the positive sciences; the ancient beliefs occupying, comparatively speaking, but a small place, even in the classes over which these beliefs have maintained their strongest hold.

It may be said without exaggeration that the doctrines of religion influence men's minds only so far as morality is still associated with them. This influence will, of necessity, continue until the epoch when moral philosophy has undergone the revolution already effected in all special branches of knowledge, and become positive. From that moment the domination of theological beliefs will cease for ever; since it is manifest that a state of things in which the different branches of knowledge have become positive, while the ideas destined to combine all remain superstitious, can only be transitional, since the contrary conclusion implies a contradiction in the order of nature.

The political advances of the new system in its spiritual aspects, have likewise been the inevitable consequence of its social progress.

Since the establishment of the first schools for teaching the sciences of observation in the thirteenth century, the royal power in France and the feudal power in England constantly and increasingly encouraged the sciences and elevated the status of scientific men.

In France royalty, more and more, adopted the practice of consulting men of science, seeking their approbation in reference to matters they were competent to decide, thus implicitly recognising the superiority of positive and scientific, over theological and metaphysical ideas.

Little by little our kings came to regard as a matter of duty acts which they originally regarded as praiseworthy, and recognised the obligation of encouraging the sciences and deferring to the decisions of scientific men. The creation of the Academy of Sciences, instituted under Louis XIV. by his minister Colbert, is a solemn declaration of this principle. At the same time that institution was a first step towards the political organisation of the spiritual element of the new system.

Since this epoch the mental action of the scientific capacity has greatly multiplied the number of Academies in all parts of Europe. This influence has been inaugurated in a regular and legal manner. Its political authority has proportionably increased; and has exerted a direct and ever increasing
influence upon national education. Regarded from this point of view, the legal attributes with which the first class of the Institute is actually endowed are nearly as extensive as they could be, so long as the body which exercises them is not charged with the teaching of morals. But this cannot take place until morals have become a positive science. In this respect then, as in all others previously considered, the ancient system has yielded its place to a new one, preparing the way for this as far as possible. Further progress can only be effected by organising the new system.

It is essential to observe that while scientific activity has increasingly consolidated and extended itself in each European nation, considered apart from the rest, the scientific forces of the different countries have also become more and more closely connected. The sentiment of nationality has been, in this respect, usually set aside, and men of science in all parts of Europe have formed an indissoluble league which has always tended to make the scientific advances effected at each period European property. The Holy Alliance, against which the ancient system had no resource, is now powerful for realising the organisation of the new system than the coalition of all the bayonets of Europe can be for arresting or even for checking its progress.

Up to a certain point the same combination has taken place between the industrial capacities of the various European nations; but it has been far less complete. The sentiment of national rivalry, the inspirations of a savage and absurd patriotism, created by the ancient system and by it studiously kept alive, have still maintained a great influence over the temporal element. For this reason the alliance of the various European nations for the organisation of the new system can only begin in reference to the spiritual element. The coalition of the temporal capacities must arise after, and as a result of, the former movement.

Lastly: it is important to remark that while the two elements of the new system were separately effecting national and European progress towards their final political organisation, the combination of the two elements and consequently the formation of the system has also been accomplished with increasing success. A class, which occupies an intermediate position between men of science, artists, and artisans, that of engineers, sprang up; and thenceforward the combination of the two capacities may be considered as having begun. This alliance has increased to such an extent that, now, the concurring judgment of scientific men and of artisans (though less decidedly as regards the latter) regards the sciences and arts as destined to modify nature for the benefit of man, the former by mastering her secrets, the latter by applying the knowledge so acquired.

1 As a general proposition it is clear that the supreme direction of national education, and the teaching of morals ought to be in the same hands; it would be absurd to separate them. Accordingly so long as morals remain solely based upon religious beliefs it is inevitable that the general direction of education should appertain to a theological body or at least to the theological spirit.

The men who, in our day, speak so strongly against the Jesuits, the missionaries, and other religious corporations should therefore consider that the only way to deprive these societies of their remaining influence is to base morals upon the observation of facts. Until this has been accomplished, all such complaints must prove almost useless, because they are in great part unfounded.
Numerous establishments, both public and private, chiefly in France and England, have given life to this principle by organizing the above combination. Such are, in France, the Conservatory of arts and trades, and the various schools connected with it; the Society for the encouragement of manufactures; the School for bridges and roads.

Thus not only has each of the two elements of the new system in its turn advanced towards complete organisation, and finally outstripped the corresponding element of the ancient system, but their combination has continually perfected itself, thus preparing the way for their joint direction of society.

In the preceding remarks we have only considered the social and political progress effected by the spiritual and temporal leaders of the new system. It remains to consider the steps accomplished by the mass of the people towards the new social organisation.

These steps have been of two sorts; one the capacity acquired by the Masse for living under the new temporal and spiritual order, the other their progressive coordination under the new temporal and spiritual Leaders.

A population must have reached a certain degree of temporal and spiritual capacity before it can live under a system of social order which is not based temporarily on force and spiritually on blind faith. That man cannot be emancipated who, as to the former, has not contracted certain habits of order, economy and love of work, and who, as to the latter, does not possess, in a sufficient degree, knowledge and foresight. Such a man must continue in leading strings. So also as regards a nation: until it has fulfilled these conditions it can only be governed in an arbitrary manner. Thus, for example, the Russian serfs who in a time of pressing need, eat the seed-corn, are still incapable of enjoying even individual liberty. To attempt their emancipation before they had contracted better habits would be a real absurdity which could not lead to success. While in France, where the entire mass of the nation can endure hunger without touching the seed-corn, the people do not require to be governed (that is to say commanded). It is sufficient for the maintenance of order that the affairs of common interest should be regulated.

In like manner, as regards the spiritual function a people who, for example, has sufficient confidence in sorcerers to allow themselves to be guided by them in affairs of importance, requires to be arbitrarily governed by more enlightened men. Such a people could not be abandoned to their own guidance without injury to their interests. But it is evident that so soon as the mass of a nation is competent to conduct their ordinary affairs by their own knowledge, and thus satisfies the two conditions above mentioned, they do not need to be despotically ruled, but may be left to follow their own guidance without danger to public tranquillity. We may even say that every exertion of arbitrary power, exercised at a period when it has become useless tends to disturb tranquillity rather than to maintain it.

Since the enfranchisement of the Commons the mass of the French population has gradually contracted the habits and acquired the degree of enlightenment requisite for living under the new system. The abolition of slavery has of itself rendered all men proprietors, and since that time proletaries, in the rigorous acceptance of that word, have not existed. It is even fitting to observe that the industrial property, sprung from enfranchisement,
naturally requires a much greater capacity than territorial property as this has existed. For the latter, apart from its cultivation, requires no other talent than that of enjoying the income with sufficient moderation not to encroach on capital. It is the cultivator and not the proprietor who has need of capacity.

The people having acquired property, have gradually contracted a love for order and work, with habits of forethought and respect for property, and have, at the same time, in France, England, and the North of Germany acquired the elements of knowledge.

Much, doubtless, remains to be done under both these aspects, and especially the second. But the progress made has been sufficient to render it unnecessary that the people should be governed by force and superstition. The masses have acquired sufficient capacity for living together under the new system, in which the action of government should be reduced to what is indispensable for establishing a subordination of work in that general action of man upon nature which is the final aim of the system.

In truth, the maintenance of public tranquillity is, in our times, essentially due to these new habits alone; the military apparatus of the temporal and the infernal apparatus of the spiritual power contributing to this end only in an accessory manner.\(^1\)

Let us now examine in what way the population gradually organised itself under its new temporal and spiritual Leaders.

Before the enfranchisement of the Commons the only and permanent leaders of the masses were the military classes. On the contrary, since their enfranchisement the people have gradually detached themselves from these leaders and at the same time organised themselves under the guidance of the industrial leaders. Towards these the people, having contracted habits of subordination and discipline which, though not strict, are quite sufficient for maintaining industrial order and the harmony of society.

To the origin of permanent and paid armies, as instituted by Charles VII., we may refer the epoch of the complete separation of the people from their military leaders. During the interval, which separated their enfranchisement from the birth of this institution the masses were placed, pretty equally, under the authority of the two kinds of leaders. As to all usual works of peace they were under the direction of the industrial leaders; but as to military works and exercises they were generally speaking under the command of the military leaders.

Standing and paid armies once established, the business of a soldier having thus become the pursuit of a particular class severed from the general population, the mass of the people had no longer any relation with the military leaders, and no other organisation than an industrial

---

1 When in the terrible famine of 1794, at the very moment that the lowest class of the people was all-powerful, this same class was seen dying by thousands, without any disturbance to public tranquillity, we may well say that the French people know how to respect property.

2 The influence of the ancient system is still indispensable for the maintenance of order, but in a different point of view from that we have just considered. It is only required as a check on the disturbance of public tranquillity by ambitious and intriguing men disposed to trouble it by engrossing powers which must excite their avidity until the new system has been definitively organised. But the people do not thus aim at power; those who do so are the idle and parasitic class of society, that is to say the ancient feudalism and the feudalism of Bonaparte.
one. The soldier no longer regarded himself, or was regarded as belonging to the people. He passed from the ranks of the new system into those of the old, from the commonalty into the feudal class, and that was all: he altered his own character and not that of the system to which he previously belonged.

Thus this institution of standing armies, which in our day has, by the progress of civilisation, become so burthensome and useless, was indispensable as a transitional step towards the organisation of the new system.

Considering the present condition of the people we shall perceive that, as regards temporal matters, they have no direct and constant relations except with their industrial leaders. Follow out in thought the daily relations of the workman, whether in agriculture manufactures or commerce, and you will find that he is brought into habitual contact with agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial leaders, and not at all, for example, with the great lord and landed proprietor, or the sleeping partner to whom the manufactary or commercial establishment wholly or in part belongs. Any connexion he has with the military leaders of society arises from the general relations of the new with the old system: he has none of a different kind.

This is the proper place for observing the fundamental and advantageous difference which exists between the present organisation of the people under their industrial leaders and their former subjection to their military leaders. This difference will bring out one of the most important and happiest contrasts between the old and the new system.

In the ancient system the people were enrolled under their leaders, in the new they are combined with them. The military leaders commanded; the industrial leaders only direct. In the first case the people were subjects, in the second they are partners. Such is the admirable character of industrial combinations that all the participants are in fact co-workers and partners, from the humblest workman to the richest manufacturer and the ablest engineer.

In a society embracing men who neither bring capacity nor capital, there must, of necessity, be masters and slaves; otherwise the workmen would not be so foolish as to consent to such an arrangement if they could avoid it: it is impossible to conceive such a society originating in any other way than by force. But in a system of cooperation where all bring capacity and capital, there is a real partnership, and no inequality exists but that of capacity and capital, both necessary (that is to say unavoidable). The disappearance of such inequality it would be absurd and mischievous to expect.

Each person obtains a degree of importance and advantages proportionate to his capacity and contribution, and this constitutes the highest degree of equality which is either possible or desirable. Such is the fundamental character of industrial society, and this the people have gained by organising themselves in subordination to the leaders of art and industry. Their new leaders exercise no authority over them save what is strictly necessary for maintaining good order in their work, and this amounts to very little. The industrial capacity is by its nature as averse to exercising as to suffering arbitrary power. Besides let us not forget that in a society of workers everything naturally tends to order: disorder always comes from the idle.

Finally let us remark that the progress of industry, the sciences, and
the fine arts, by multiplying the means of subsistence, diminishing the number of the unoccupied, enlightening men's minds, and softening manners, tend, more and more, to banish the three great causes of disorder—poverty, idleness, and ignorance.

We have now, in reference to the spiritual element to make observations analogous to those which have just been offered as regards the temporal aspects of society.

Before the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe, or to speak more correctly, before the sciences had passed from the hands of the clergy into those of the laymen—an event which followed the first very closely—the mass of the people was spiritually organised under their theological leaders. The people believed on their bidding, consulted them on every matter and blindly followed their decisions; such doctrines as it suited them to establish became the faith of the masses. In a word, the people contracted in relation to them a habit of absolute confidence and of unlimited mental submission. But from the moment that the positive sciences acquired a certain development this confidence and respect were gradually withdrawn from the clergy and transferred to the men of science.

This change was powerfully seconded by the analogous change effected in temporal relations. The people, industrially organised, soon perceived that their ordinary mechanical labours were in no wise connected with theological ideas, that they could not derive from theologians any real information about the objects of their daily occupations. Wherever they could establish a connexion, direct or indirect, with men of science, they lost the habit of consulting the clergy and adopted that of putting themselves into relation with those who possessed positive knowledge. Doubtless this relation is still very far from being as intimate as it might and ought to be, but this chiefly springs, not from a deficient love of knowledge among the people, but from the want of opportunities and of efforts to supply them with useful information. On the contrary the people are far more desirous of instruction than the idle frequenters of our drawing-rooms, because their labours at every moment impress on them their need of it. Whenever the people could study they have studied. But although the action of scientific capacity on them is still very small, compared with what it may become, it is much greater than we usually imagine. Striking and incontestable facts prove that the people in our day accord to the unanimous opinion of men of science the same degree of confidence which in the Middle Ages they accorded to the decisions of the spiritual power.

Thus, for example, for about one century the people have unanimously ceased to believe in the immovableability of the earth, and accepted the theory of modern astronomy, with as much confidence as they ever accorded to the ancient religious beliefs. What is the cause of this revolution in popular opinion? Is it that the people have acquired a knowledge of the demonstrations which establish the theory of the movement of the earth? Certainly not, since these demonstrations are probably not understood by more than three thousand persons in the entire French population. The confidence of the people evidently flows from their having perceived the unanimity of men of science on this head.

Let us examine in like manner all the discoveries in the sciences of observation which have been popularised, and we shall find that they have become so in the same way. Thus the people have successively accepted
the circulation of the blood, the identity of thunder and electricity, &c. &c. Besides, as regards the sciences all who cannot comprehend demonstrations belong to the people. The same confidence which induced men of the world to accept the analysis of air and water, the law of universal gravitation, the decomposition of light, and so many other astronomical, physical, chemical, and physiological discoveries will induce their acceptance by the people somewhat later.

It is then proved by the plainest facts that the people have now, spiritually, confidence in and subordinate themselves to their spiritual leaders, just as they do, temporarily, to their industrial leaders. Consequently I am entitled to infer that in the new system confidence has become organised as well as subordination.

We should likewise here observe that the confidence of the people in their new spiritual leaders is, by its nature, quite distinct from that which they felt under the old system for their theological leaders. The latter consisted in a state of mental submission altogether blind and which required from each individual an absolute negation of his own reason. Confidence in the opinions of men of science has an entirely different character. It is the assent given to propositions about matters susceptible of verification, and unanimously admitted by men who have acquired and established a capacity for judging them.

In truth the facts are admitted without proof; but they are thus admitted only because the public consider themselves incapable of following the demonstrations which establish these truths. This confidence always, by implication, reserves the right of contradiction in case new demonstrations should be produced which show it to be unfounded, or the believer should acquire sufficient knowledge to contest the received opinions. The people are thus far from renouncing the free exercise of their reason.

This confidence of the people in the opinions of men of science is absolutely of the same kind as, though much larger than, that of scientific men towards each other.

Every day mathematicians accept the results of physiologists upon the faith of their word, and reciprocally each class of savants in their respective spheres do the same.

In the same science do we not constantly see scientific men provisionally put faith in the assurance of the others before knowing and judging the demonstrations? What mathematician for example would refuse to admit without examination a proposition certified by Lagrange?

This faith produces no inconvenience in the sciences because it is only provisional. The confidence of the people in men of science has exactly the same character; only the provisional nature of their assent, though always regarded as such, is indefinitely prolonged. Thus this confidence is in no wise humiliating for the people, and could never affect their interests injuriously in the least degree, as did their mental subjection to the theologians.

The fear that a despotism founded on science may one day establish itself would be a ridiculous and absurd chimera, and could only arise in minds entirely foreign to positive ideas.

The people then being now, spiritually and temporally, organised for the new system the most difficult step towards its establishment has been accomplished. This great change has simplified, as far as possible, the
work of its definitive establishment, by reducing all that remains for its accomplishment to the relations between the leaders of the new and the leaders of the old systems.

The people no longer present any difficulty in solving the question. The question will be resolved in the interest of the people, but they will remain outside and passive in relation to it.

The only danger to be feared, the only needful precaution, is that of not allowing ourselves to be turned aside from the end by the intrigues of ambitious men, who dispute among themselves the falling remnants of the ancient system.

Such, in a general view, are the principal parts of the picture which, since the eleventh century, is presented to us by the progress of civilisation, considered in reference to the gradual development of the new social system. Let us now resume, as briefly as possible, the results of this great organic series.

RÉSUMÉ OF THE SECOND SERIES.

We set out from this fundamental fact: the Enfranchisement of the Commons and the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe in the eleventh century created the two elements of a new social system, industrial capacity and scientific capacity.

We next observed;

1st. That the two elementary capacities of the new social system were established on bases of a character different from that of the powers on which the ancient system rested.

2nd. That these two capacities established themselves outside of the ancient system and so as to render themselves as independent of it as possible.

3rd. That the Commons, representing the union of the two capacities, from the beginning adopted the wise course of not pretending to share authority with the old system, but simply sought to profit by the independence they enjoyed with a view to exercising the greatest possible action upon nature.

4th. That this plan, persistently followed, had its twofold and natural effects. On the one hand the elements of the new system have acquired their full and complete development, whence has flowed the preponderance of their civil force; on the other hand they have gradually obtained a larger measure of liberty of which they have always made use in the same manner; and finally they have naturally acquired a portion of legislative authority to which they did not directly aspire.

5th. That the entire spiritual and temporal forces of society have passed into the hands of the Commons; the military force itself being subordinated to their influence.

6th. That the Commons have obtained as great an influence over the political plan laid down by the ancient system as was attainable, until they could themselves form the plan; the temporal power having admitted in principle that the social organisation ought to be framed in the interest of the Commons.
GENERAL APPENDIX—SECOND PART.

7th. That the temporal power has established the parliamentary régime which, by conceding—at least in principle—to the Commons the exclusive right of voting taxes, invested them with so large a share of legislative authority as they could without destroying their own.

8th. That this measure of authority more than suffices for enabling the Commons in our day to proceed, directly and in a legal manner, to the final organisation of the new system.

9th. That contemporaneously with the progress thus effected by the temporal and spiritual leaders of the new system, the mass of the people have entirely withdrawn from their military and theological chiefs and organised themselves, both under temporal and spiritual aspects, under the leaders of the two positive capacities.

Finally that the ancient has thus yielded to the new system all that could be yielded without self-destruction and has smoothed the way for the latter to arrive at its definitive constitution.

Such then is the actual condition of the new system as resulting from the past since the eleventh century. All the forces of society belong to it. All the doctrines necessary for its organisation exist in their germs; namely the sciences of observation. In a word society, in all its parts, is organised for acting upon nature. It only remains to organise it as a whole in the same way. The means which the Commons required to effect that object now exist.

GENERAL RÉSUMÉ OF BOTH SERIES.

When the ancient system had attained its definitive constitution (in the eleventh century) the elements of the system destined to succeed it took their rise.

From this epoch two influences of a different nature have been simultaneously and uninterruptedly exerted by the new system, the one tending to destroy the ancient one, the other to replace it.

As regards the former influence the Commons allied themselves at first with one of the powers of the ancient system against the other, while profiting by the divisions which arose between them; and after having conquered the power against which they had fought the Commons formed a new league with one of the fractions of the power whose allies they had been against another fraction of the same power.

As regards the latter influence the Commons held themselves aloof from the ancient system, limiting themselves to action upon nature.

 Destruction and construction have always been combined so that the new system possessed itself, one by one, of all the positions occupied by the ancient, according as they were abandoned by it.

During the period of its unabated vigour, the ancient system guided both the general action of society and all special social movements, both spiritual and temporal. Little by-little all the private relations and special branches of knowledge disengaged themselves from the bonds of the ancient system and co-ordinated themselves in reference to the new. Finally the new system organised itself as to all the details of social life.
work of its definitive establishment, by reducing all that remains for its accomplishment to the relations between the leaders of the new and the leaders of the old systems.

The people no longer present any difficulty in solving the question.

The question will be resolved in the interest of the people, but they will remain outside and passive in relation to it.

The only danger to be feared, the only needful precaution, is that of not allowing ourselves to be turned aside from the end by the intrigues of ambitious men, who dispute among themselves the falling remnants of the ancient system.

Such, in a general view, are the principal parts of the picture which, since the eleventh century, is presented to us by the progress of civilisation, considered in reference to the gradual development of the new social system. Let us now resume, as briefly as possible, the results of this great organic series.

RÉSUMÉ OF THE SECOND SERIES.

We set out from this fundamental fact: the Enfranchisement of the Commons and the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe in the eleventh century created the two elements of a new social system, industrial capacity and scientific capacity.

We next observed;

1st. That the two elementary capacities of the new social system were established on bases of a character different from that of the powers on which the ancient system rested.

2nd. That these two capacities established themselves outside of the ancient system and so as to render themselves as independent of it as possible.

3rd. That the Commons, representing the union of the two capacities, from the beginning adopted the wise course of not pretending to share authority with the old system, but simply sought to profit by the independence they enjoyed with a view to exercising the greatest possible action upon nature.

4th. That this plan, persistently followed, had its twofold and natural effects. On the one hand the elements of the new system have acquired their full and complete development, whence has flowed the preponderance of their civil force; on the other hand they have gradually obtained a larger measure of liberty of which they have always made use in the same manner; and finally they have naturally acquired a portion of legislative authority to which they did not directly aspire.

5th. That the entire spiritual and temporal forces of society have passed into the hands of the Commons; the military force itself being subordinated to their influence.

6th. That the Commons have obtained as great an influence over the political plan laid down by the ancient system as was attainable, until they could themselves form the plan; the temporal power having admitted in principle that the social organisation ought to be framed in the interest of the Commons.
THIRD PART.

(May 1832.)

PLAN OF THE SCIENTIFIC OPERATIONS NECESSARY FOR REORGANISING SOCIETY.

INTRODUCTION.

A social system in its decline, a new system arrived at maturity and approaching its completion—such is the fundamental character which the general progress of civilisation has assigned to the present epoch. In conformity with this state of things, two movements, differing in their nature, agitate society; one a movement of disorganisation, the other of reorganisation. By the former, considered apart, society is hurried towards a profound moral and political anarchy which appears to menace it with a near and inevitable dissolution. By the latter it is guided to the definitive social condition of the human race, that best suited to its nature, and in which all progressive movements should receive their completest development and most direct application. In the co-existence of these two opposed tendencies consists the grand crisis now experienced by the most civilised nations; and this can only be understood when viewed under both aspects.

From the moment when this crisis began to show itself to the present time the tendency of the ancient system to disorganisation has predominated, or rather it alone is still plainly manifested. It was in the nature of things that the crisis should begin thus, so that the old system might be sufficiently modified to permit the direct formation of the new social system.

But now that this condition has been fully satisfied and the Catholicico-Feudal system has lost its power, as far as is possible, until the new system has been inaugurated, the preponderance still maintained by the negative tendency constitutes the greatest obstacle to the progress of civilisation and even to the abolition of the ancient system. Its persistence forms the first cause of those terrible and continually renewed shocks by which the crisis is accompanied.

The only way of ending this stormy situation, of staying the anarchy which day by day invades society, in a word of reducing the crisis to a simple moral movement, consists in inducing the civilised nations to abandon the negative and to adopt an organic attitude; turning all their efforts towards the formation of the New Social System as the definitive object of the crisis and that for the attainment of which everything hitherto accomplished is only a preparation.
The ancient system after having completely lost all its influence on
details, has, step by step, lost, in temporal and spiritual matters, the
greater part of its command over the general action of society.

It still holds possession of the general political plan, which cannot
be otherwise until the total organisation of the new system. But it is
admitted as a fundamental principle that this plan ought to be framed in the
interest of the Commons.

The temporal power has been reduced to the smallest dimensions com-
patible with its existence until the entire extinction of the ancient system
and its replacement by the new one. The spiritual power, as a political
element, has been completely overthrown. It retains no other influence
than that derived from the fact that the teaching of morals remains in its
hands, as being still based upon its doctrines.

The new system after having obtained the exclusive direction of all the
details of society, has, step by step, gained in the ordering of the ensemble
all that the ancient system has lost.

Under temporal aspects the right of the Commons to modify at their
pleasure the general political plan has been recognised; and the legal exercise
of this right has been regularly constituted, the means of effecting the trans-
ition being thus also provided. Under spiritual aspects the Scientific
Capacity has obtained all the influence it can possess over national educa-
tion until the teaching of morals has passed into its hands.

The force of the two systems in relation to the action they exercise upon
the direction of society, regarded as a whole, is in our day almost identical;
any difference being rather in favour of the new than the old system.

Thus the actual condition of society presents the co-existence of a
declining and of an adult system, the former of which has lost all its
influence over details and half of what it possessed over the ensemble, while
the latter dominates every part and enjoys a larger share of influence over
the ensemble.

The new system then needs to mount but one step more in order to reach
a complete organisation and entirely to replace the ancient system. It only
remains for it to complete its temporal and spiritual achievements; in
temporal matters by gaining possession of the House of Commons, in
spiritual by establishing: 'Morals on principles solely deduced from obser-
vation. In truth all is ready for this step; the means exist, we only require
to use them.
THIRD PART.

(May 1823.)

PLAN OF THE SCIENTIFIC OPERATIONS NECESSARY FOR REORGANISING SOCIETY.

INTRODUCTION.

A social system in its decline, a new system arrived at maturity and approaching its completion—such is the fundamental character which the general progress of civilisation has assigned to the present epoch. In conformity with this state of things, two movements, differing in their nature, agitate society; one a movement of disorganisation, the other of reorganisation. By the former, considered apart, society is hurried towards a profound moral and political anarchy which appears to menace it with a near and inevitable dissolution. By the latter it is guided to the definitive social condition of the human race, that best suited to its nature, and in which all progressive movements should receive their completest development and most direct application. In the co-existence of these two opposed tendencies consists the grand crisis now experienced by the most civilised nations; and this can only be understood when viewed under both aspects.

From the moment when this crisis began to show itself to the present time the tendency of the ancient system to disorganisation has predominated, or rather it alone is still plainly manifested. It was in the nature of things that the crisis should begin thus, so that the old system might be sufficiently modified to permit the direct formation of the new social system.

But now that this condition has been fully satisfied and the Catholic-Feudal system has lost its power, as far as is possible, until the new system has been inaugurated, the preponderance still maintained by the negative tendency constitutes the greatest obstacle to the progress of civilisation and even to the abolition of the ancient system. Its persistence forms the first cause of those terrible and continually renewed shocks by which the crisis is accompanied.

The only way of ending this stormy situation, of staying the anarchy which day by day invades society, in a word of reducing the crisis to a simple moral movement, consists in inducing the civilised nations to abandon the negative and to adopt an organic attitude; turning all their efforts towards the formation of the New Social System as the definitive object of the crisis and that for the attainment of which everything hitherto accomplished is only a preparation.
Such is the prime necessity of the present epoch. Such also is the general scope of my labours and the special aim of this essay, the object of which is to set in motion the forces capable of bringing society into the track of the new system.

A brief examination of the causes which have hitherto hindered and still do hinder society from frankly assuming an organic attitude, should naturally precede an exposition of the measures necessary for effecting this object.

The numerous and repeated attempts made by the People and Kings to reorganise society prove that the need of such a reorganisation is generally felt. But on both sides it is only felt in a vague and imperfect manner. These two kinds of attempts are, though for different reasons, equally vicious. To the present time they have not, nor could they have produced any real organic result. Far from tending to terminate the crisis these efforts only contribute to prolong it. Such is the true cause which, in spite of so many efforts, by keeping society in the negative track, leaves it a prey to revolutions.

To establish this fundamental proposition, it is sufficient to take a general view of the attempts at reorganisation undertaken by Kings and the People.

The error committed by Kings is easier to understand. For them the reorganisation of society means the re-establishment pure and simple of the feudal and theological system in all its integrity. In their eyes no other means exist of terminating the anarchy which results from the decline of this system.

It would be unphilosophical to regard this view as if it were mainly dictated by the special interests of the governing classes. Chimerical though it be, this idea naturally presented itself to minds seeking, in good faith, a remedy for the existing crisis. They feel in its entire extent the need for a reorganisation; but they have not considered the general progress of civilisation, and, viewing the present state of affairs under one aspect only, they do not perceive the tendency of society to establish a new system more perfect, and not less harmonious, than the ancient one. In a word it is natural that this view should be taken by rulers, since from their position they must of necessity perceive more clearly the anarchical state of society and consequently experience more forcibly the necessity for applying a remedy.

This is not the place to insist on the manifest absurdity of such an opinion; which is now universally recognised by the majority of enlightened men. Doubtless Kings, while seeking to reconstruct the ancient system, do not comprehend the nature of the present crisis and are far from having measured the magnitude of their enterprise.

The downfall of the feudal and theological system does not spring, as they believe, from recent, solitary, and in some sort accidental causes. Their downfall in place of being the effect of the crisis is, on the contrary, its source. The decline of this system has come to pass continuously during the preceding centuries, by reason of a series of modifications, independent of the human will, to which all classes of society contributed, and of which Kings themselves have often been the first agents and most eager promoters. In a word it was the necessary consequence of the progress of civilisation.

In order then to re-establish the ancient system it would not be sufficient to push society back to the epoch when the existing crisis began to reveal
itself. For, even supposing this could be done, which it could not, we should have merely replaced the body politic in the situation which necessitated the crisis. Retracing past ages, it would be requisite to repair, one by one, all the losses suffered by the ancient system during six centuries in comparison with which all that it has lost for the last thirty years is of no importance.

No other mode of effecting this would be possible but to annihilate all the results of civilisation which have caused this decline.

Thus for example it would be absurd to assume that the eighteenth century philosophy—itself the direct cause of the downfall of the ancient system considered in its spiritual aspectscan be destroyed unless we also assumed the annihilation of the sixteenth century; of which the philosophy of the last century is only the consequence and development. But, as the Reformation of Luther is, in its turn, simply a necessary result of the progress of the sciences of observation introduced into Europe by the Arabs, the re-establishment of the ancient system would not have been secured unless the positive sciences had been also suppressed.

In like manner, under temporal aspects, we should be led, step by step, to the necessity for replacing the industrial classes in a state of servitude, since in the last resort the disfranchisement of the Commons is the first and general cause of the decline of the feudal system. Finally such an enterprise is set in its true light by this reflection, that after overcoming so many difficulties, the least of which taken by itself surpasses the power of man, we should have gained nothing but the postponement of the definitive fall of the ancient system, by thus obliging society to recommence its destruction, since the principle of progressive civilisation inherent in human nature would not have been extinguished.

It is manifest that no person could entertain a project which is monstrous, whether we consider its magnitude or its absurdity. Man, in spite of himself, belongs to his epoch. Those who oppose, as they believe, the greatest resistance to the progress of civilisation unconsciously obey its irresistible influence, nay themselves second it.

Accordingly kings in projecting the reconstruction of the feudal and theological system, fall into perpetual contradiction; contributing, by their own acts, both to complete the disorganisation of this system and to accelerate the formation of that which must replace it. Facts of this kind offer themselves abundantly to the observer.

To point out, in this place, only a few of the most remarkable, we see kings esteem it an honour to encourage the cultivation and diffusion of the sciences and fine arts, and to stimulate the development of industry. We see them creating for this purpose numerous and useful establishments, although the decline of the ancient system is ultimately referable to the progress of the sciences, fine arts, and industry.

Thus again kings, by entering into the treaty of the Holy Alliance, degraded as much as in them lay the principal basis of the ancient system, the theological power, since they established a supreme European council in which that power had not even a consultative voice.

Finally the way in which opinions are now divided as to the struggle undertaken by the Greeks offers a still clearer example of this self-contradictory spirit. On this occasion, we see the men who aim at restoring

1 In order to appreciate the entire significance of this fact we must remember that the Pope himself adopted the above view by expressly refusing the young Roman nobles permission to go to the assistance of the Greeks.
their former influence to theological ideas involuntarily manifesting the decline of these ideas, since they do not fear to utter wishes in favour of Mahometanism which would have drawn down upon them the accusation of sacrilege during the ascendency of the ancient system.

By pursuing the line of observation just indicated everyone can without difficulty add fresh instances, that occur continually. Kings, so to speak, do no act and take no step tending to re-establish the ancient system which is not immediately followed by an act directed in the contrary way; the same decree often containing both one and the other.

Such inconsistency in fundamentals is well fitted to place in the clearest light the absurdity of a plan which is not understood, even by those who endeavour to realise it with the greatest earnestness. It shows clearly how complete and irrevocable is the ruin of the ancient system. It is useless to enter here into greater details.

The manner in which the People have hitherto understood the reorganisation of society, is no less erroneous than that adopted by kings, though in a different way. Their error however is more excusable since it lies in a misconception of the new system towards which the progress of civilisation transports them, though its nature has not, as yet, been clearly determined; while kings pursue an enterprise the entire absurdity of which is plainly demonstrable, even by a superficial study of the past. In a word Kings are at variance with facts, the People with principles, the last being always more difficult to grasp. But it is much more important to eradicate the misconception of the people than that of kings, because the former constitutes an essential obstacle to the progress of civilisation, and alone gives some show of reason to the latter.

The characteristic view which predominates in the popular mind as to the mode of reorganising society indicates a profound ignorance of the fundamental conditions necessary to give consistency to any social system.

It essentially consists in attributing an organic character to the negative principles which served to destroy the feudal and theological system; in other words, it mistakes more modifications of the old system for the system which has to be established.

If we attentively examine the doctrines now accredited among the people as exhibited in the speeches of their ablest adherents and as expounded in the most systematic writings; considered in themselves and in their successive growth, we shall find that they are conceived in a purely critical spirit, incapable of affording any basis for reorganisation.

The government which in a regular state of affairs stands at the head of society as the guide and agent of general activity is, by these doctrines, systematically despoiled of every active influence. Deprived of any important participation in the organic life of the body politic, it is reduced to an office of mere negation. It is even thought that the entire action of the body politic upon its members ought to be strictly limited to the maintenance of public tranquillity. But in no active society has this ever been other than a subordinate object, the importance of which has even been singularly diminished by the development of civilisation since this has made it easy to maintain order.

Government is, thus, no longer regarded as the head of society destined to bind together the component units and to direct their activity to a common end. It is represented as a natural enemy encamped in the midst of our social system against which society needs to fortify itself by the
guarantees already obtained while maintaining a permanent attitude of mistrust and defensive hostility ready to break forth at the first symptom of attack.

Passing from the *ensemble* to details, the same spirit is still more apparent. It suffices here to prove this in reference to the principal points affecting spiritual and temporal relations.

Under spiritual aspects the principle pervading the popular aim is the dogma of unlimited Liberty of Conscience. Considered in the sense which it originally had, that is to say, in reference to a negative destination, this dogma is nothing but the extension of a great general fact, the decline of theological beliefs.

Itself the result of such decline, this doctrine has, by a necessary reaction, powerfully contributed to accelerate and propagate it; but by the nature of things its influence stopped there. Regarded simply as a means of combating the theological system the dogma in question favours the progress of the human mind. But it ceases to do so and loses all its value when conceived as a basis for the great social reorganisation reserved for our epoch. It then becomes just as injurious as before it was useful, since it constitutes an obstacle to reorganisation.

Proclaiming the sovereignty of each individual reason, this doctrine in fact essentially tends to hinder the uniform establishment of any system of general ideas, without which nevertheless society cannot exist. For let the mass of men become as highly instructed as is possible, it is evident that the greater part of the general conceptions currently received can only be accepted by them on trust and not as the result of demonstration. Thus such a dogma is, by its very nature, only applicable to ideas destined to vanish and therefore regarded with indifference; and in point of fact it has only been applied to such at the moment of their decline and in order to hasten their fall.

To apply this doctrine to the new as well as to the old system, still more to see in it an organic principle, is to fall into the strangest contradiction. If such an error could last, the reorganisation of society would be for ever impossible.

In astronomy, physics, chemistry and physiology there is no such thing as liberty of conscience; that is to say everyone would deem it absurd not to place confidence in the principles established for these sciences by competent thinkers. If the case is different in politics, this arises from the circumstance that, the old principles having been abandoned while the new are yet unformed, established principles during this interregnum do not in a just sense exist. But to convert this transitory fact into an absolute and eternal dogma and treat it as a fundamental principle, evidently amounts to a proclamation that society should always continue deprived of any general doctrinal basis. It must be admitted that such a notion justly deserves the charge of anarchy brought against it by the ablest defenders of the theological system.

Under the temporal aspect the dogma of the Sovereignty of the People corresponds to the dogma just considered of which it is only the political application. It was created as a means of combating the principle of Divine Right, itself the general political basis of the ancient system, shortly after the dogma of liberty of conscience had been formed to destroy the theological ideas on which this principle was founded.

*What has been said for one applies therefore to the other. The anti-

Liberty of Conscience and Sovereignty of the People.
feudal, like the anti-theological dogma, having effected its negative aim, has reached the natural term of its career. The former can no more furnish the political basis of the social reorganisation than the latter its moral basis. Both, being devised for purposes of destruction, are equally unfitted for construction.

One of these doctrines, far from furnishing an organic principle, merely substitutes individual for papal infallibility; the other only replaces the arbitrary power of kings by that of the people, or rather of individuals. The 'sovereignty of the people' tends to dismember the body politic by placing power in the least capable hands; while the 'right of private judgment' tends to the complete isolation of thinkers by investing the least enlightened men with an absolute right of control over the system of ideas conceived by superior intellects for the guidance of society.

The criticism just developed as to the two fundamental doctrines can be easily applied to all the more special notions which constitute the popular philosophy. The result will always be the same. It will be seen that all of these, like the two principal ones, are merely the formal expression of corresponding historical facts relative to the decline of the feudal and theological system. It will also be seen that all alike have a simply negative destination, which constitutes their only value, and renders them wholly unfitted for reorganising society.

Thus a careful examination of the popular doctrine confirms the anticipations of a philosophic coup d'oeil, showing that weapons of war cannot be metamorphosed into instruments of construction. This doctrine, purely negative, both as a whole and in detail, was most serviceable in seconding the natural course of civilisation as long as the main operation was the struggle with the ancient system. But when regarded as capable of presiding over social reorganisation, it is completely inadequate. It forces society into a condition of chronic anarchy both in temporal and spiritual relations.

Doubtless it was natural to human weakness that the people should begin by attributing an organic character to negative principles, rendered familiar to them by continual applications. But it is not the less true that the prolongation of such an error constitutes the principal obstacle to the reorganisation of society.

Next, comparing the two distinct modes,—bitherto considered separately,—in which the People and Kings conceive this reorganisation, it will be seen that each of them, owing to its peculiar vices, is equally powerless to launch society on an organic course, and so to secure the future against the return of the convulsions that have continually accompanied the great crisis which characterises the present epoch. Both are alike anarchical, the one by its own nature, the other by its necessary consequences.

In this respect the only difference between them is that, in the opinion of kings the government purposely places itself in direct and continuous opposition to society; while according to the popular view society takes up a permanent attitude of hostility to government.

These two opposed and equally vicious conceptions, by their very nature tend reciprocally to strengthen each other and in consequence to maintain indefinitely the source of revolutions.

On one hand the attempts of kings to reconstruct the feudal and theological system necessarily provoke on the part of the people an explosion of the negative doctrines in all their dangerous energy. It is even apparent
that in the absence of such attempts these doctrines would have already lost their main vigour, as no longer possessing any object. Now that kings have solemnly adhered to their fundamental principle (the dogma of liberty of conscience) with its consequences, the irrevocable decline of the ancient system is clearly established. But the efforts to resuscitate the divine right of kings revive the sovereignty of the people and give it new life.

On the other hand, owing to the fact that the modifications introduced into the ancient system already permit efforts directed towards forming the new system, the preponderance which the people still accord to negative principles naturally impels kings to re-establish the ancient system as the only means of averting a crisis which, under its present aspect, appears to lead to nothing but the dissolution of society. And, in truth, such a prolongation of negative philosophy when a social reconstruction is needed alone imparts plausibility to the views of kings. For admitting that their view, owing to the utter impossibility of realising it, is not really more organic than that of the people, in theory at least it is so; and since some system must exist, this circumstance places the kingly conception in some, though a very imperfect, relation with the wants of society.

Let us add to this faithful picture of our social situation the influence of the various factions whose projects are so eminently facilitated by such a state of things. If we study their efforts to prevent light being thrown upon the social problem and to hinder a better understanding and recognition of their mutual errors on the part of kings and people we shall form a just estimate of the melancholy situation in which society is now placed.

The preceding considerations demonstrate that the way of final escape from this deplorably vicious circle, this inexhaustible source of revolutions, lies neither in the doctrine of kings nor in that of the people. The formation and general adoption by both people and kings of Organic Conceptions can alone suffice to withdraw the latter from their retrograde, the former from their negative direction.

Such a doctrine can alone terminate the crisis by forcing society into the track of the new system, which the growth of civilisation has prepared and now offers as a substitute for the feudo-theological system.

By the unanimous adoption of this doctrine satisfaction will be afforded to all that is reasonable in the existing opinions both of the people and of kings, their discordant and vicious elements being discarded. The just apprehensions of kings as to the subversion of society being dissipated, no legitimate motive can any longer urge them to oppose the growth of the human intellect. While the people, turning all their aspirations to the formation of the new system, will no longer feel irritated against the feudo-theological system, but will await its peaceable extinction in the natural course of events.

Having thus established the necessity for adopting a new and truly organic doctrine, we shall next examine its opportunity. It will sufficiently appear from the following considerations that the moment for commencing this great operation has at last arrived.

A careful study of the actual state of the most advanced notions forces upon the mind a singular and almost self-contradictory observation. Although no other political ideas subsist but such as are founded either on the retrograde or the negative doctrine, neither of these possesses a real
preponderance, and neither exerts an action sufficiently powerful to direct society. These two doctrines which, as above shown, theoretically lend force to each other, are notwithstanding employed only to impose reciprocal limits or rather to annul one another in the general conduct of affairs.

The great political movement produced during the last thirty years by the spread of negative ideas has destroyed their chief influence. On one hand by giving the finishing blow to the ancient system it has terminated their natural existence, and has almost completely taken away the ground which enlisted popular sympathies on their side. On the other hand the application of the modern ideas to the reorganisation of society has completely manifested their anarchical character. Since this decisive experiment negative aspirations have inspired no real passion among the people. Consequently, notwithstanding any appearances to the contrary, retrograde passions can no longer exist among kings, since they have distinctly recognised the decline of the feudal-theological system and the necessity for abandoning it.

In neither direction is any real action exerted within the sphere of government or of society. Kings and people in practice employ the retrograde or negative doctrine in an essentially passive way, that is to say as a weapon of defence. Nay more, each side uses the two doctrines by turns almost to the same extent, with however one natural difference. Regarded as an instrument of reasoning, the negative doctrine attracts the people because they feel more completely the necessity for abandoning the ancient system, while kings adhere to the retrograde doctrine, since they experience more deeply the need of social order.

It is easy to verify and elucidate this remark by observing the existence of and the credit enjoyed by a Mongrel Doctrine which is nothing but a mixture of retrograde and negative ideas. This phase of opinion, though possessing no influence at the outset of the crisis, has now become predominant both among rulers and the ruled. Both of the active parties unequivocally recognise its ascendency since they equally adopt its language.

The prevalence of such an opinion clearly establishes two facts most essential for the correct understanding of the present epoch. In the first place it proves that the insufficiency of the negative doctrine for the great actual wants of society is felt as profoundly and universally as the incompatibility of the feudal-theological system with the present state of civilisation. In the second place it furnishes a guarantee against the ascendency either of the negative or of the retrograde view. For whenever one of them seems about to acquire a preponderance, the disposition of men's minds immediately inclines to the other, and so remains until this, encouraged by seeming approval, has become sufficiently active to cause similar alarms and in consequence experiences a similar revulsion of feeling.1 These succeeding oscillations produce themselves sometimes in

---

1. The merits of this intermediate, or rather self-contradictory doctrine precisely consists in its supplying an organ for the above attitude. Besides it is evidently devoid of constructive power, since it has no special character and is compounded of opposing views which mutually destroy each other. As experience has already clearly shown, its ascendency can have no other result than that of causing society to oscillate between negative and retrograde tendencies. In the existing political situation, and while awaiting the establishment of a truly organic doctrine, this undecided course is certainly indispensable, as a means of preventing
one direction, sometimes in another according as the natural course of events specially reveals either the absurdity of the ancient system or the danger of anarchy. Such at this moment is the working system of practical politics, and such it will remain until men's attention is directed towards the mode of reorganising society; and a public opinion has been created capable of fulfilling the two grand conditions demanded by our epoch, but hitherto regarded as contradictory, namely the abandonment of the ancient system, and the establishment of a regular and stable order of society.

This reciprocal annulling of the two opposed doctrines, observable even in opinions, is especially evident in active life. In truth when the important events of the last ten years are examined with reference both to the negative and retrograde tendencies, we shall discover that they have never contributed to the effective progress of the corresponding system and that their result has only been to hinder the preponderance of the opposing system.

To resume then; not only are the popular and monarchical doctrines equally incapable of satisfying that fundamental need of reorganisation which characterises the present epoch—whence results the necessity for a new general doctrine—but the triumph of either in our day is alike impossible. Neither in truth can exercise any decided influence; and hence we may infer that men's minds are sufficiently prepared to receive the organic doctrine.

The destination of society now come to maturity is neither to inhabit for ever the old and miserable but which its infancy erected, as kings suppose; nor to live eternally without shelter after having left it, as the people imagined. Its destiny is rather this, that, aided by acquired experience, it should with all the accumulated materials construct an edifice fitted for its needs and enjoyments. Such is the great and noble enterprise reserved for the present generation.

----------

GENERAL VIEW.

The defects in the modes of conceiving the Organisation of Society by the People and by Kings having been shown, we are forced to conclude that both have pursued wrong methods in framing the plan of reorganisation. Such a state of things admits of but one explanation; but it is important to establish this assertion directly and accurately.

the violent disorders to which the preponderance of either the retrograde or negative party would expose society. In this sense all rational men should be eager to forward it. But while such a policy renders the revolutionary epoch less stormy, it incontestably tends to prolong its duration. For a view which elevates a self-contradiction to the rank of a system, and induces men carefully to avoid the total extinction of the two extreme doctrines in order that one may always be opposed to the other, of necessity prevents the social body from ever attaining a stable condition. In a word in our day this policy is reasonable and useful if maintained as simply provisional, but becomes absurd and dangerous when regarded as definitive.

Such are the reasons why, in my examination of the existing opinions on social reorganisation, I have not mentioned the above point of view.
The inadequacy of the monarchical view and of that of the people proves the necessity for a new and truly organic doctrine, alone capable of ending the terrible crisis which agitates society. So likewise by examining the methods which, on either hand, have led to these imperfect results we shall discover the proper mode of shaping and establishing the new doctrine, and the social forces destined to direct this great work.

The general defect of the method pursued, alike by the people and by kings, in framing the Plan of Reorganisation lies in the very erroneous conceptions formed respecting the nature of such a work. Hence it followed that they confided this important mission to men who were necessarily unqualified for it. This is the primary cause of the fundamental aberrations pointed out in the preceding chapter.

Although this cause has operated as much with kings as with the people; it is useless to consider it specially in reference to the former. For kings not having invented anything and having confined their efforts to reproducing the ancient doctrine to meet the wants of the new social order, their incompetence to conceive a true reorganisation has, by this fact alone, been sufficiently established. On the other hand for the same reason their course, though in principle as absurd as that of the people, has naturally been more methodical, since it was furnished to their hand in detail. The people alone having produced a sort of new doctrine our examination should be mainly directed to their mode of proceeding in order to discover the source of its defects. It will be easy, afterwards, to apply to kings, with suitable modifications, the general remarks made in reference to the people.

The multitude of the so-called Constitutions produced by the people since the beginning of the crisis, and the excessive minuteness of their dispositions, manifested more or less in all, would alone suffice to convince every capable intellect how entirely the nature and difficulty of forming a plan for social reorganisation have been hitherto misunderstood. When society shall have been reorganised our descendants will be amazed, by the production, within a period of thirty years, of the constitutions, each in succession proclaimed eternal and irrevocable, several of which contain more than two hundred very circumstantial articles without reckoning the organic laws thereto annexed. Such verbiage would disgrace the human mind in politics, were it anything but a mere phase and an unavoidable transition towards the true and final doctrine.

But society does not and cannot progress in this way. The pretension of constructing offhand in a few months or even years a social system, in its complete and definitive shape, is an extravagant chimera absolutely incompatible with the weakness of the human intellect.

Let us observe the mode which our intellect adopts in analogous but far simpler cases. When a science is reconstituted on a new theoretical basis, sufficiently prepared, in the first instance the general principle is announced, discussed, and verified: subsequently by a long series of efforts all the parts of the science are worked out and their coordination established, which, at the outset, no one, not even its founder, could have conceived. Thus, for example, after Newton had discovered the law of universal gravitation a century of arduous labours and the cooperation of all European geometers was needed to confer on physical astronomy a constitution in harmony with the law. So likewise in the arts. To cite but a single example, when the elastic force of steam was conceived as a new moving power applicable to machinery, nearly a century was needed for developing
the series of manufacturing improvements which directly resulted from
this discovery. If such evidently be the necessary and invariable course
of the human mind in revolutions which, despite of their importance and
difficulty, are only special, how absurd must appear the presumptuous
course hitherto followed in reference to the most general, momentous and
difficult of all revolutions—that which aims at completely recasting the
social system.

If we pass from these comparisons, which, though indirect, are decisive,
to direct comparisons, we shall always arrive at the same result. Let us
examine the rise of the Catholico-Feudal system, a revolution of precisely
the same nature as that of our own time. Far from this system having
been constituted offhand, it did not assume its true and definitive shape
until the eleventh century, that is to say more than five centuries posterior
to the general triumph of Christian doctrines throughout Western Europe,
and the definitive settlement of the Northern populations in the empire of
the West. No man, whatever might be his genius could, in the fifth
century have foreshadowed, with any degree of precision, the plan of this
constitution, although the fundamental principle, whence it necessarily
flowed, was then solidly established, both under temporal and spiritual
aspects. Doubtless, owing to the progress of knowledge and the character
of the social system—in itself more simple and natural—which has to be
established in our day, its complete organisation should be much more
rapidly effected. But the progress of society, depending as this does on
the permanent nature of mankind, must be at all times essentially the
same; the differences consisting simply in greater or less rapidity. Hence
the above great experiment proves the absurdity of attempting to improvise
a complete plan for reorganising society down to its smallest details.

Confirmation of this conclusion, if needed, would be furnished by
observing the growth of the Negative Doctrine among the people. It is,
manifestly, nothing but the general development and complete application
of the individual Right of Private Judgment asserted, in principle, by
Protestantism. Now two centuries almost were needed before all the
main consequences of this doctrine were deduced, and its theory formed.
No doubt the resistance of the feudo-theological system has greatly
influenced the slowness of its advance. Evidently, this could not have
been the only cause; the slow progress was due to the very nature of the
work. Now what is true of a negative doctrine should à fortiori be true
of one truly organic.

We must therefore conclude from this first class of considerations that,
down to the present time, the People have not comprehended the great
work of Social Reorganisation.

Endeavouring then to ascertain in what precise way the nature of this
work has been misconceived, we find that the error consists in regarding
an enterprise which is essentially theoretical, as purely practical.
The formation of any plan for social organisation necessarily embraces
two series of works as distinct in their objects as in the intellectual efforts
they demand. One, Theoretical or spiritual, aims at developing the leading
conception of the plan—that is to say the new principle destined to co-
ordinate social relations—and at forming the system of general ideas, fitted
to guide society. The other, Practical or temporal, decides upon the
distribution of authority and the combination of administrative institutions
best adapted to the spirit of the system already determined by the theo-
retical labours. Since the second series repose on the first, of which it is only the result and realisation, the general enterprise must of necessity begin by the former. It constitutes its soul and, although merely preliminary, forms its most important and difficult portion.

In consequence of their having overlooked this fundamental distinction or, in other words, of having exclusively fixed their attention on the practical side, the People have naturally been led to conceive Social Reorganisation in accordance with the defective doctrine which we have examined in the previous chapter. All their errors flow from this profound original aberration; and their derivation from it is easily shown.

In the first place owing to this infraction of the natural law of the human mind the people, while imagining that they were constructing a new social system, really continued in the track of the ancient one. This was unavoidable, since the aim and spirit of the new one were left undetermined. So it must ever be until this indispensable condition has become fulfilled.

Every social system, whether constructed for a handful of men or for several millions, aims definitely at directing all special forces towards a general result; for the exercise of a general and combined activity is the essence of society. On every other hypothesis there is merely an agglomeration of a certain number of persons upon the same soil. This it is which distinguishes human society from that of other gregarious animals.

Hence it follows that the clear and precise ascertainmet of the active aim constitutes the first and most important condition of a true social order, since this fixes the true meaning of the system.

On the other hand a society, however numerous it may be, can, just as an individual, propose to itself only one of two possible active aims. These are a violent action upon the rest of the human race, that is to say conquest; and an action upon nature modifying it for the advantage of man, or production. Every society which is not definitely organised for one or other of these aims, must be mongrel and devoid of character. The military aim characterised the ancient, while the industrial aim characterises the modern system.

The first step needed for social reorganisation was therefore to proclaim this new aim. Since this was not done, we have not abandoned the ancient system even when seeming to diverge from it most widely. Now, this strange deficiency in our so-called constitutions has, clearly, sprung from the desire to organise a system in detail, before the ensemble had been conceived. In other words it was the consequence of having directed attention exclusively to the practical side of the reorganisation without having first decided on the theoretical part or even thought of constituting it.

As a necessary consequence of this primitive error, mere modifications of the ancient system have been mistaken for a complete transformation. Its substance has remained essentially unchanged; all the alterations made bearing on the form alone. The only aim has been a redistribution of the ancient powers and an opposition between different branches. Discussions bearing upon this object have been and still are regarded as the sublime in politics, though in truth they constitute only a very subordinate detail. The direction of society and the nature of social powers have been conceived as being always the same.

Moreover it is essential to point out that these mere discussions on the
distribution of powers, have, by a further consequence of the original error, been as superficial as possible. For no account has been taken of that capital division into Spiritual and Temporal powers, which was the chief improvement introduced by the ancient system into general politics. Attention having been wholly directed to the practical side of social reorganisation, men have naturally adopted the absurd notion of a constitution devoid of a spiritual power, which, if it could last, would in truth be a retrograde step leading to barbarism. The temporal aspect has been alone considered. Nothing has been regarded but its distribution into legislative and executive powers, and this evidently forms a subdivision only.

In order to guide their intelligence through the modified phases of the feudo-theological system the people were necessarily obliged to assume as organic those negative principles which helped them to struggle against the ancient system from the time when its decline became evident and which therefore were destined to modify it. We must not omit to observe that, while overlooking the separation of theory from practice as a part of the general scheme of reorganisation, the people have involuntarily verified the necessity for this law, as resulting from the very nature of things, by themselves conforming to it in their efforts to modify the ancient system.

Such is the strict concatenation of consequences, resulting from the fundamental error of treating as simply a matter of practice that labour of social reorganisation which is in its essence theoretical. In this way the people have gradually come to regard as a truly regenerated social system, as the final outcome of a perfected civilisation, that which is only the ancient system deprived of all that gave it vigour and reduced to the miserable state of an emaciated skeleton. Such is the true origin of the fundamental errors pointed out in the preceding chapter.

Since the want of a true reorganisation always makes itself apparent and must do so until it has been satisfied, the spirit of the people is agitated and exhausts itself in seeking new combinations. But, being inflexibly confined within the narrow circle where their erroneous course originally placed them, and from which civilisation vainly urges their departure, the people imagine they can reach the goal of their efforts through fresh modifications of the ancient system, and more complete applications of the negative doctrine. Thus from change to change, that is to say by destroying more and more entirely the feudo-theological system, but without replacing it, the people rapidly advance towards complete anarchy which is the only natural issue of such a course.

This conclusion evidently proves the urgent and unavoidable necessity for adopting in the great work of Social Reorganisation the plan so clearly pointed out by the nature of the human intellect. It constitutes the only means of escaping from the disastrous consequences with which the people are threatened in consequence of having pursued a different course.

This proposition being of fundamental importance for determining the true direction of the great political operations needed in our time, it cannot be rendered too clear. It is therefore useful briefly to repeat the direct philosophical considerations on which it is based, although it may be regarded as sufficiently established by the foregoing investigation of the erroneous course hitherto pursued by the people.

It does little honour to the human intellect to be obliged to prove that a separation universally recognised as indispensable in the cases of least complexity is indispensable as regards the most general and difficult of
undertakings. We admit as an elementary truth that the direction of any manufacture, the making of a road or bridge, the navigation of a vessel, &c., must be guided by antecedent theoretical knowledge. Yet it is supposed that the reorganisation of society can be confided to merely practical men.

Each entire human operation, from the simplest to the most complicated, whether executed by an individual or by a multitude, is unavoidably composed of two portions; in other words gives rise to two kinds of considerations; one theoretical another practical, one concerning the conception another the execution. The former of necessity precedes the latter which it is destined to guide. In other words all action presupposes antecedent speculation. Even in operations seemingly of the most routine character this analytic process is observable; the difference being only in the correct or erroneous conception of the theory. The man who pretends, whatever the subject may be, to emancipate himself from theories, as is well known, merely refuses to admit the theoretical advances effected by his contemporaries, and upholds antiquated theories long since superseded. Thus for example those who affect to disbelieve in medicine generally abandon themselves with stupid eagerness to the greatest charlatanism.

In the earliest infancy of the human mind theoretical and practical labours are executed by the same person for all operations; yet this circumstance while rendering the distinction less evident does not affect its reality. Soon however these two classes of operations begin to disengage themselves, as demanding different, and in some respects contrasted, capacities and culture. As the collective and individual intelligence of the human race develops itself, this separation becomes more and more pronounced and general, and constitutes the source of new advances. The degree of a nation's civilisation, philosophically considered, may be really measured by the extent to which theory and practice have been separated and harmonised. For the grand instrument of civilisation consists in the Division of Labour and the Combination of Efforts.

By the definitive establishment of Christianity the separation of theory and practice was systematically and completely effected in relation to the general action of society, as it had already been in relation to all special operations. It was vivified and consolidated by the creation of a spiritual power, distinct and independent of the temporal power, and which maintained towards the latter the natural attitude of a theoretical towards a practical authority, modified of course by the special character of the ancient system. This great and beautiful conception was the principal cause of the admirable vigour and consistency which distinguished the Feudo-Catholic system during its flourishing period. The inevitable decline of this system has for the moment obscured this important distinction. The superficial and negative philosophy of the last century misconceived its importance. But it is evident that the distinction should be carefully preserved, as well as all the other acquisitions which the human intellect effected under the influence of the ancient system and which cannot perish with it. It should occupy the first rank, and govern the spiritual and temporal powers of another sort in the system which must be established in our day. Doubtless society ought not to be organised with less completeness in the nineteenth century than it was in the eleventh.\(^1\)

Now if the necessity for the separation of theory and practice demands

---

\(^1\) This great question of the Separation of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers will form hereafter the subject of a special essay.
recognition as regards political operations of daily and ordinary occurrence, how much more must this division, based as it chiefly is on the weakness of the human intellect, be called for in so vast an operation as that of the total reorganisation of society. It constitutes, in fact, the first condition for treating this great question in a way adequate to its importance.

The indications of philosophical observation are confirmed by direct experience. No important innovation has ever been effected in the order of society, until the practical efforts which were its immediate object, had been prepared by adequate conceptions, fitted to guide and support the former. History furnishes two decisive confirmations of this truth.

The first of these relates to the formation of the theologic-feudal system, an event which should be to us a source of inexhaustible information. The ensemble of the institutions which in the eleventh century constituted this system had manifestly been prepared by theoretical labours which date from the elaboration of Christianity by the School of Alexandria. The establishment of the Papacy, as the supreme European authority, was the necessary consequence of this antecedent development of Christian doctrine. The general institution of Feudalism, based on reciprocal duties of obedience and protection between the weak and the strong was, in like manner, only the application of this doctrine to the regulation of social relations incident to the then state of civilisation. Who can fail to see that neither of these institutions could have been founded without the preceding development of the Christian theory.

The second confirmation, still more obvious, since it almost falls under our own eyes, is furnished by the progress of the modifications which the people have introduced into the ancient system since the commencement of the existing crisis. It is manifest that they have been entirely based upon the development and systematic arrangements which the philosophy of the eighteenth century imparted to negative principles. These labours, although being negative they were of subordinate importance, had so decidedly a theoretical character and were so distinct from the subsequent practical labours, that not one of the men who contributed thereto, formed any clear or enlarged idea of the modifications which they might produce in the following generation. This reflection ought to have struck any person who has attentively compared their works with the succeeding changes. Yet, if in the writings and discourses of even the ablest men who laboured in framing our pretended constitutions, the ideas directly borrowed from the philosophies of the eighteenth century were suppressed, the residue would amount to very little.

The question now before us, if considered from the historical point of view, may be easily decided by the following considerations which we merely indicate, intending to develop them hereafter.

In our day society is disorganised under both spiritual and temporal aspects. Spiritual anarchy has preceded and engendered temporal anarchy. In the present epoch the social malady depends much more on the first than on the second cause. On the other hand an attentive study of the progress of civilisation proves that the spiritual is now more completely prepared than the temporal reorganisation of society. Thus our first efforts to terminate the revolutionary epoch should aim at reorganising the spiritual power; yet hitherto attention has only been fixed upon the renovation of the temporal power.

The preceding considerations manifestly enforce the necessity of separa-
ting the theoretical and practical operations required for our social reorganisa-
tion in the present day; in other words of conceiving and executing the
operations which concern the spirit of the new social order and the corre-
sponding system of general ideas in contradistinction to those which affect
social relations and administrative results. Nothing essential and durable
can be effected in practice until the theory is elaborated, or at least far
advanced. To proceed differently would be like building without a founda-
tion; putting form before the substance; in a word perpetuating the
fundamental error committed by the people. This, as we have just seen, is
the prime source of their aberrations, the obstacle above all to be overcome
with a view to the reorganisation of society on a plan fitted to the existing
state of knowledge.

Having established the nature of the preliminary labours which must
be executed in order to place the organisation of the new social system upon
a solid foundation, it is easy to determine what are the Social Forces destined
to fulfil this important mission. This remains to be settled before we
explain the scheme which has to be worked out.

Having now demonstrated that the mode of proceeding adopted by the
people is radically wrong, it would, doubtless, be superfustious to insist much
on the truth that the men to whom this great work was confided were
absolutely incompetent. The people having misconceived the nature of
the work, they could not but deceive themselves in the choice of the men
destined to execute it. The very fitness of the men chosen for the work,
as conceived by the people, rendered them unfit to direct it in the way that
it ought to be conceived. The incapacity of these representatives, or rather
their incompetence, has then been what might be expected, since no one is
competent to fulfil two offices essentially opposite in their nature.

The class of Lawyers has chiefly furnished the men selected to direct
the elaboration of the so-called constitutions established by the people
during the last thirty years. Naturally and necessarily they have been
invested with this function, as hitherto conceived.

In fact, since the people merely sought to modify the ancient system,
and the negative principles destined to guide such modifications were
fully established, the power of eloquence was the force especially needed
for the work, and lawyers have habitually cultivated it. This sort of
ability, though of subordinate importance, since it is merely adapted to
secure the triumph of any given view without reference to its formation
and grounds, is for that very reason eminently fit for propagandism. The
principles of the negative philosophy were not elaborated by lawyers but by
Metaphysicians, who, besides, constitute spiritually the class which corre-
sponds to that of lawyers under temporal aspects. These principles however
have been propagated by lawyers. They occupied, for the most part, the poli-
tical arena during the struggle with the feudo-theological system. On them
therefore naturally devolved the task of instituting the modifications
needed to bring this system into harmony with the negative philosophy,
which they alone were accustomed to apply.

Manifestly the case is no longer the same as regards those organic
operations the urgency of which has been demonstrat-ed. The active
employment of eloquence or the power of persuasion is no longer specially
called for, but reasoning or the faculty which investigates and coordinates.
Lawyers are generally endowed with the largest share of ability under the
first head; but, for that very reason, they are the least capable as regards
the second. Professing to discover the method of recommending any opinion whatever, the more practised they are in this sort of work the more unfit they become to coordinate a theory according to its true principles.

Here then is no mere question of self-love; the entire question resolves itself into the necessary and exclusive relation which subsists between each sort of capacity and each kind of work. Lawyers directed the formation of the plan of reorganisation when this was conceived in a manner wholly erroneous. They have done their appropriate work. Invited to modify and criticise they did modify and criticise. It would be unjust to reproach them with the faults of a direction which they did not choose and the rectification of which does not belong to them. As long as the direction was useful and even indispensable, so also was their ascendancy. But at the same time we should recognise the necessity for the disappearance of this influence when an opposite direction ought to prevail. No pretension can be more absurd than that of aiming at the reorganisation of society on a purely practical basis and without first executing the indispensable theoretical works. But a still greater absurdity would be the singular hope of effectuating a true reorganisation by an assembly of orators strangers to every positive theoretical conception and selected without regard to any definite condition of capacity by men who are, for the most part, still more incompetent.

The nature of the works to be executed, of itself sufficiently indicates the class on which their execution must devolve. Since these works are theoretical, it is clear that those whose professed aim it is to form theoretical combinations, in other words Savants occupied with the study of the sciences of observation, are the only men whose capacity and intellectual culture fulfil the necessary conditions. It would be evidently abnormal when the most urgent social needs call for a general work of the highest order of importance and difficulty, to entrust this work to any but the greatest intellectual forces we can command and to men who pursue a method of which the superiority is universally recognised. Doubtless in other branches of society men may be found equal and even superior in theoretical capacity to that of the majority of savants, for the effective classification of individuals is far from conforming universally to the natural or physiological classification. But in a work so essential we must consider classes and not individuals. Besides even as regards such exceptional instances, education, that is to say, the system of intellectual habits which results from the study of the sciences of observation, can alone

1 I am far from drawing the inference that the class of Lawyers ought no longer to follow any political career. I only wish to prove that their action should take a different course.

According to the views just put forward the present condition of society requires that the supreme direction of intelligence should cease to appertain to Lawyers; but they are not the less called by their vocation to second, in some very important ways, that new general direction which others must originate. In the first place, possessing as they do, more than any other class, the means of persuasion and the habit of placing themselves at the political point of view, they should powerfully concur in the propagation of the organic doctrine. In the second place the Lawyers, and especially such among them as have profoundly studied positive law, exclusively possess the capacity for making regulations; one of the great capacities necessary to the formation of the new social system, and one that will be useful as soon as the purely spiritual portion of the general work of reorganisation has been terminated or even sufficiently advanced.
develop their natural theoretical capacity. In a word whenever society requires theoretical work of any given sort, it is conceded that this must be confided to the corresponding class of savants. Hence it devolves on the **ensemble** of the scientific corps to guide the general theoretical work the necessity for which has been demonstrated.\(^1\)

Besides, the nature of the case forbids any mistake on this head; since liberty of choice is absolutely interdicted for several reasons which point to the class of savants as the only one qualified to execute the theoretical labour of social reorganisation.

In the system to be constituted the spiritual power will be confided to the hands of savants, while the temporal power will belong to the heads of industrial works. These two powers then should naturally proceed to the formation of this system; just as they will when it is established undertake its daily application; due allowance being made for the superior importance of the work now to be executed. This work embraces a spiritual portion which ought to be treated first and a temporal portion which will follow. Accordingly on the savants devolves the task of undertaking the first series of works and on the leaders of industry that of organising, on the bases thus established, the administrative system. Such is the simple course indicated by the nature of things, which teaches us that the very classes which form the elements of the powers of a new system and must one day be placed at its head, can alone create it because they alone are capable of truly apprehending its spirit, and impelled in this direction by the combined force of their habits and their interests.

Another consideration places in a still clearer light the necessity for confiding to the cultivators of Positive Science the theoretical labour of reorganising society.

In the preceding chapter it has been remarked that the negative doctrine encourages in most minds, and increasingly strengthens, the habit of setting themselves up as the supreme judges of general political conceptions. This anarchical state of intellect, when erected into a fundamental principle, is a manifest obstacle to the reorganisation of society. The intellects really competent to construct the true organic doctrine destined

---

1 In accordance with ordinary practice, we include under the term Savants, men who though not devoting their lives to the special cultivation of any of the sciences of observation, possess a scientific capacity and have studied the positive sciences sufficiently to become penetrated with their spirit and familiar with the principal laws that regulate natural phenomena.

Without doubt the active formation of the new social doctrine, hitherto too rare, is essentially reserved for this class of savants. The other savants are too much preoccupied with their special pursuits, and even still too much affected by certain erroneous intellectual habits, resulting from this speciality, to allow of their being really active in establishing political science. But they will nevertheless fulfil, though passively, a most important office in this great elaboration; as judges of the work. The results obtained by the men who follow out the new philosophical direction, will have neither value nor influence until adapted by the special savants, as possessing the same character as their own works.

I have thought it necessary to offer this explanation, in order to meet an objection which naturally presents itself to the majority of readers. It is however evident that this distinction between two sections of the scientific world, one actively and the other passively engaged in elaborating the organic doctrine, is wholly secondary and in no wise affects the essential proposition laid down in the text.
to end the existing crisis would therefore labour in vain unless from their antecedent position their authority was in fact recognised. Deprived of this condition and subjected to the capricious control of a policy of inspiration their work could never be uniformly adopted. Now casting our eye over society we shall soon perceive that this spiritual influence in our day lies exclusively in the hands of the savants. They alone as regards theory exercise an uncontested authority. Thus, apart from their being alone competent to form the new organic doctrine, they are exclusively invested with the moral force essential to secure its recognition. The obstacles to such recognition presented by the negative prejudice which attributes a moral sovereignty to each individual as his inborn right would be insurmountable by any other than that class. They possess the only leverage capable of overthrowing this prejudice, in the habit gradually contracted by society since the foundation of the positive sciences of submitting to the decisions of the savants as regards all special theoretical ideas. This habit the savants will easily extend to general theoretical conceptions as soon as they undertake their coordination.

Thus the savants in our day possess, to the exclusion of all other classes, the two fundamental elements of spiritual government, Capacity and Authority in matters of theory.

Lastly, one other essential characteristic, which like the above exclusively belongs to scientific power, calls for notice.

The existing crisis is manifestly common to the several nations of Western Europe although all do not participate in it to the same degree. Nevertheless it is treated by each of them as if it were purely national. Yet it is evident that a European crisis demands a European treatment.

This isolation of the nations forms a necessary consequence of the fall of the feudal-theological system, followed by the dissolution of the spiritual bonds which this system had established among the people of Europe and which it has been vainly sought to replace by a state of reciprocal hostility, disguised under the name of a European Balance of Power. The negative doctrine is inadequate to restore the harmony it destroyed with the ancient fundamental principle; on the contrary postpones its realisation. In the first place the negative philosophy, by its very nature, tends to isolation; in the second place the nations cannot come to a complete understanding on the principles of that philosophy, because each of them endeavours to modify the ancient system by its instrumentality in a different degree.

The true Organic Doctrine can alone produce the harmony so imperatively demanded by the condition of European civilisation. This doctrine should, perforce, realise it by offering to the nations of Western Europe the system of social organisation adapted for all, and which they will enjoy in its completeness, sooner or later, according to the special state of their intelligence. Besides, it should be observed that this harmony will be more perfect than that produced by the ancient system where it only subsisted under the spiritual aspect; while in our day it should equally subsist under the temporal aspect, so that the nations are invited to constitute, in a complete and permanent manner, a true and general social organisation. And, in truth, if such an investigation were in its right place here, it would be easy to show that each of the nations of Western Europe is, by the special character of its civilisation, placed in the most favourable position for forwarding such or such a part of the general system, whence the immediate advantage of their cooperation becomes evident. But this

VOL. IV. N N
consideration proves that all European nations alike should work in common to found the new system.

Considering the new organic doctrine under this point of view, it is manifest that the force destined to shape and establish it, having to produce the combination of the different civilized nations, should be a European power. Now this office forms, no less than the others already enumerated, the special attribute of the scientific power. It is clear that scientific men alone constitute a really compact and active body, all of whose members throughout Europe have a mutual understanding and communicate easily and continuously among themselves. This springs from the fact that they alone, in our day, possess common ideas, a uniform language, a general and permanent aim. No other class possesses these powerful advantages, because no other fulfills the above conditions in their integrity. The industrial classes even, so eminently disposed to union by the character of their labours and habits, are still too much influenced by the hostile inspirations of a savage patriotism to allow of their establishing as yet a real European alliance among themselves. Such a result is reserved for the active labours of scientific men.

It is doubtless superfluous to demonstrate that the existing relations of scientific men must acquire a far greater intensity when they direct their general efforts towards the formation of the new social doctrine. This result must follow since the force of the social tie is necessarily proportionate to the importance of the aim sought by association.

In order to appreciate aright and in its entire extent the value of this European force which appertains to the savants, it is requisite to compare the conduct of rulers with that of nations in relation to this matter.

It has been above observed that rulers while adopting a plan absurd in principle pursue its execution much more methodically than the people, because the course they follow is prescribed by the past in the greatest detail. Thus under the aspect which we are considering, the rulers throughout Europe combine their efforts while the nations remain isolated. By this circumstance alone the rulers obtain a relative advantage over the people who have no corresponding way of combating such combination, which thus becomes of extreme importance.

The leaders of opinion among the people have no other resource than to exclaim against such a superiority of position which not the less subsists. They proclaim, as a general proposition, that the different States have no right to interfere in the social reforms of each other. Now this principle, which is nothing but the application of the negative philosophy to external relations, is, like the other dogmas that compose it, absolutely false; like them it is only the vicious generalization of a transitory fact—namely the dissolution of the relations which, under the ancient system grew up between the European nations. It is clear that the nations of Western Europe, by the common character and connectivity of their civilisation, both as regards its gradual development and its actual condition, constitute one great community, the members of which possess reciprocal rights, less extended no doubt but of the same nature with those belonging to the different portions of a single State.

Moreover we see that this negative conception, even if true, does not promote, but rather hinders its end, since it tends to prevent the nations from uniting. As one force can only be restrained by another, the people, regarded from a European point of view, will manifestly continue subordinate to their rulers, until the scientific force, which alone possesses a
European character, presides over the great work of social reorganisation. This force alone can furnish to the people the true counterpoise to the Holy Alliance, making due allowance for the necessary superiority of a spiritual over a purely temporal coalition.

To resume then;—the necessity for confiding to Scientific Men the preliminary theoretical labours recognised as indispensable for reorganising society is solidly based upon four distinct considerations, each of which would have sufficed to establish it: 1stly, scientific men are by the character of their intellectual capacity and cultivation alone competent to execute these works; 2ndly, from the nature of the case this office is reserved for them as constituting the spiritual power of the system to be organised; 3rdly, they exclusively possess the moral authority requisite in our day to determine the adoption of the new organic doctrine when formed; 4thly, and lastly, of all the social forces in existence that of scientific men is alone European. Such a combination of proofs should, without doubt, place the great theoretic mission of scientific men beyond question and controversy.

From all that precedes it follows that the fundamental errors committed by the People in their mode of conceiving the Reorganisation of Society are in the first instance referable to the mistaken course which they have adopted for attaining this end; that the error of this course consists in treating social reorganisation as a purely practical operation, though it is essentially theoretical; that the nature of things and the experience of history demonstrate the absolute necessity of dividing the entire work of reorganisation into two series, one theoretic the other practical of which the former should be first executed and serve as basis to the latter; that the preliminary execution of the theoretical works demands the exertion of a new social force distinct from those which have hitherto occupied the scene but have become entirely inadequate; finally that for various decisive reasons this new force should appertain to scientific men devoted to the sciences of observation.

The ensemble of these views may be regarded as intended to lead reflecting minds to that elevated point of view whence both the vices of the course hitherto followed for the reorganisation of society and the character of that which should, in our day, be adopted may be embraced at a single glance. In the last resort all resolves itself into establishing, through the combined efforts of European savants, a positive theory in politics distinct from practice, and one which shall bring our social system into harmony with the present state of knowledge. Pursuing this course of reflection we shall perceive that the above conclusions may be resumed in a single conception: scientific men ought in our day to elevate politics to the rank of a science of observation.

Such is the culminating and definitive point of view at which we should place ourselves. From this point of view it is easy to condense into a series of very simple considerations the substance of all that has been said in the present essay. It remains to effect this important generalisation, which can alone supply the means of advancing further by rendering the march of thought more rapid.

From the nature of the human intellect each branch of knowledge in its development is necessarily obliged to pass through three different theoretical states: the Theological or fictitious state; the Metaphysical or abstract state; lastly the Scientific or positive state.
In the first state supernatural ideas serve to bind the small number of isolated observations which then constitute science. In other words, the facts observed are explained, that is to say, conceived a priori, by means of invented facts. Such is the necessary state of all knowledge in its infancy. With all its imperfections this forms the only mode of connecting facts possible at that epoch. It furnishes therefore, the only instrument by means of which we can reason on facts, thus sustaining our intellectual activity which above all requires a rallying point. In a word this state is indispensable as a condition of further progress.

The second state is simply destined to serve as a means of transition from the first to the third. It has a mongrel nature, connecting facts by ideas which are no longer entirely supernatural and have not yet become completely natural. In a word these ideas are personified abstractions, which the mind can at will regard as the mystic name for a supernatural cause, or the abstract statement of a mere series of phenomena, according as it approximates more nearly to the theological or the scientific state. This metaphysical state presupposes that facts, multiplied in number, have at the same time become more closely connected by more extended comparisons.

The third is the definitive state of all knowledge whatsoever; the two first having been destined to prepare it gradually. Then facts become connected by general ideas or laws of a completely positive kind, suggested or confirmed by the very facts, which are themselves frequently only simple facts sufficiently general to be elevated to the rank of principles. We constantly endeavour to reduce these to the smallest possible number, yet without proposing any hypothesis incapable of being sooner or later verified, and always regarding these principles simply as a general mode of stating the phenomena.

Men familiar with the progress of the sciences can easily verify the truth of this general historical résumé in reference to the four fundamental sciences already rendered positive, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry and Physiology, as well as their dependent sciences. Those even who have only considered the sciences in their present state can make this verification as to physiology which, although it has at last become as positive as the other sciences, still subsists under the three states in different classes of intelligence. This fact is particularly evident in reference to the phenomena specially called moral: for these are conceived by some as the result of a continuous supernatural action; by others as incomprehensible results of the action of an abstract entity; and lastly by others as connected with organic conditions susceptible of demonstration and beyond which it is impossible to go.

Considering Politics as a science and applying to it the preceding remarks, we find that it has already passed through the two first states and is now on the point of reaching the third.

The doctrine of Kings represents the theological state of politics. In the last result, this is in truth based on theological ideas. It exhibits social relations as resting on the supernatural idea of Divine Right. It explains the successive political changes of the human race by an immediate supernatural guidance, exercised continuously from the first man to the present day. In this way alone was political science conceived, until the ancient system began to decline.

The doctrine of the People expresses the metaphysical condition of politics. It is wholly founded on the abstract and metaphysical hypothesis
of a primitive Social Contract antecedent to all development of the human faculties by civilisation. The instruments of reasoning which it habitually employs are 'rights,' regarded as natural and common to all men in the same degree and guaranteed by this contract. Such is the primitive negative doctrine, originally drawn from theology as a means of warfare against the ancient system and which has been subsequently erected into an organic idea. Rousseau was its chief systematiser, in a work which served and still serves as the basis of the ordinary redactions upon social organisation.

Lastly the Scientific Doctrine of politics considers the social state in which the human race has always been found by observers as the necessary effect of its organisation. It conceives the scope of this social state as determined by the rank which man holds in the natural scale, the result of facts which are not themselves susceptible of explanation. It perceives in truth that from this fundamental relation results the constant tendency of man to act upon nature in order to modify it for his own advantage. It then considers the social order as aiming at a collective development of this natural tendency, so as to give the highest possible efficiency to this useful action. This being settled, it endeavours, by direct observations on the collective development of the race, to deduce from the fundamental laws of the human organisation the evolution it has undergone and the intermediate states to which it has been subjected before reaching its definitive state. Guided by this series of observations this doctrine regards the improvements reserved for each epoch as necessitated, without resorting to any hypothesis, by the stage of development which the human race has reached. Thus, in reference to each degree of civilisation, it views political combinations as merely intended to facilitate natural tendencies when these have been sufficiently ascertained.

Such is the spirit of the positive doctrine which it is important to establish in our day, applying it to the present state of civilised man and considering antecedent states only so far as may be necessary in order to establish the fundamental laws of the science.

It is easy to explain at once why politics could not sooner become a positive science and why at the present time they are destined to become one.

Two fundamental conditions, distinct yet inseparable, were indispensable for that object.

In the first place, it was essential that all the Special Sciences should have successively become positive, for the ensemble could not acquire that character so long as the elements were devoid of it. This condition is now fulfilled.

The sciences have become positive, one after the other, in the natural order of effecting this revolution. This order is that of the greater or less degree of complication in their phenomena, or, in other words, of their more or less intimate connection with man. Thus at first astronomical phenomena, as the simplest, and then in succession, physics, chemistry, and physiology have been reduced to positive theories; the last of these only quite recently. The same reform could not be accomplished for politics until it had been effected for the other phenomena, since political phenomena depend upon these and are the most complicated of all. But if this renovation could not be effected sooner, its realisation now has become an evident necessity.

In the second place, it was essential that the Preparatory Social System
during which action upon nature was only the indirect object of society should have reached its last stage.

On one hand, the just theory could not arise until then, because it would have been too far in advance of practice. The former being destined to guide the latter, could not precede it too long. On the other hand it could not earlier have obtained a sufficient experimental basis. It was requisite that a social order should have been founded and accepted by a very large population, embracing several considerable nations, and lasting as long as possible, before a theory could be founded upon this vast experiment.

The second of these conditions is now satisfied no less than the first. The theological system, destined to prepare the human intellect for the scientific system, has closed its career. This is undeniable since the metaphysical system, the only object of which is to subvert the theological system, has, generally speaking, obtained a preponderance among the nations. A Scientific Polity must therefore arise, for some theory being indispensable, we should otherwise be driven to assume the reconstitution of a theological polity; the metaphysical polity being, to speak correctly, not a true theory but a negative doctrine suitable only for a transition.

To resume,—no moral revolution ever existed at once more inevitable, more ripe, and more urgent than that required to elevate politics to the rank of the natural sciences, through the combined efforts of European savants. This revolution can alone introduce into the great crisis of our day a really preponderating force, capable of preserving society from the terrible explosions of anarchy which threaten it, by putting it on the track of that improved social system which the state of our knowledge demands.

In order to set in motion with the utmost possible promptitude the scientific forces destined to fulfill this salutary mission, it was essential to lay down the general prospectus of the theoretical works required for the re-organization of society, by raising politics to the rank of the natural sciences. I have ventured to conceive this plan which I now solemnly submit to the savants of Europe.

Profoundly convinced that, whenever this discussion commences, my plan, be it adopted or rejected, will necessarily lead to the formation of the definitive plan; I do not hesitate in the interests of society now threatened with long and terrible convulsions which their intervention can alone avert, to adjure all the European savants to express, freely and publicly, their well-considered judgment upon the general scheme of constructive operations which I submit to them.

This prospectus embraces three series of works.

The first series aims at forming a System of Historical Observations upon the general progress of the human intellect destined to become the basis of a positive polity, thus wholly freeing it from a theological and metaphysical character and impressing on them a scientific character.

The second series seeks to establish a complete system of Positive Education adapted to a regenerated society constituted with a view to action upon nature; in other words it aims at perfecting such action so far as this depends upon the faculties of the agent.

Lastly, the third series embraces a general exposition of the Collectiv Action which civilized men, in the present state of their knowledge, can exercise over Nature so as to modify it for their own advantage, directing their entire forces to this end and regarding social combinations only as means of attaining it.
GENERAL APPENDIX—THIRD PART.

FIRST SERIES OF WORKS.

The fundamental condition which must be fulfilled in order to treat politics in a positive spirit, consists in determining with precision the limits within which, by the nature of things, the combinations of social order are contained. In other words, it is necessary in politics, as in the other sciences that the offices of observation and of imagination should be rendered perfectly distinct and the latter subordinated to the former.

In order to place this leading conception in a clear light, it is necessary to compare the general spirit of positive politics with that of theological and metaphysical politics. In order to simplify their comparison the two last must be considered under one head; but this cannot alter the results since, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, the second is merely a modification of the first, differing from it only by having a less pronounced character.

The theological and metaphysical states of any science possess one characteristic in common—the predominance of imagination over observation. The only difference which exists between them under this point of view, is that in the first the imagination occupies itself with supernatural beings and in the second with personified abstractions.

The necessary and constant consequence of such a state of the human mind is to persuade man that he is, in all respects, the centre of the natural system, and consequently endowed with an indefinite control over phenomena. This opinion, it is evident, results directly from the supremacy exercised by the imagination, combined with the natural tendency which dispose men in general to form exaggerated ideas of their importance and power. Such an illusion constitutes the most prominent characteristic of the infancy of human reason.

Regarded from the philosophic point of view, the revolutions which have led the different sciences up to the positive state have produced the general result of inverting this primitive order of our ideas.

The fundamental characteristic of these revolutions consisted in transferring to observation the preponderance hitherto exercised by the imagination. Consequently the results have been in like manner reversed. Man has been dethroned from his central position and reduced to the rank he really occupies. In the same way his activity has been confined within its just limits, having been reduced to the office of modifying, more or less, by their interaction a certain number of the phenomena which he is destined to observe.

The mere statement of this historical view entitles all who have clear notions about the sciences which have become positive to verify it.

Thus in Astronomy man commenced by considering the celestial phenomena, if not as subject to his influence, at least as having direct and intimate relations with all the details of his existence. Indisputable and multiplied demonstrations were needed to induce man to accept with submission a subordinate and imperceptible position in the general system of the universe. So also in Chemistry he imagined himself competent to modify at will the intimate constitution of bodies, before he limited his efforts to observing the reciprocal action of the different terrestrial substances as shown in their effects. In Medicine too, it was only after having long hoped to remedy at will the disorders of his organization, and even to resist
indeed infinitely the causes of destruction, that man finally recognised that his action was of no avail until it coincided with the natural working of the organisation, and much more when opposed to this.

Politics have not, any more than the other sciences, escaped this law based upon the nature of things. The condition in which it has hitherto existed and still remains, presents a perfect analogy with the relation of astrology to astronomy, of alchemy to chemistry, and of the search after a universal remedy to medical science.

In the first place it is evident, from the preceding chapter, that theological and metaphysical politics considered in reference to their method, agree in giving a preponderance to imagination over observation. It cannot indeed be denied that observation has been employed in theoretical politics, but it was so only in a subordinate manner, subject to the caprices of imagination, as for example in chemistry during its alchemistic phase.

This predominance of the imagination in politics necessarily led to consequences analogous to those above described for the other sciences. We can easily verify this by direct observations upon the common spirit of theological and metaphysical politics, regarded from a theoretical point of view.

Down to the present time man has had faith in the unlimited power of his political combinations to perfect social order. In other words the human race has hitherto been regarded politically as unmoved by any inherent forces, and always disposed passively to receive whatever impulse the legislator, armed with a competent authority, wished to give.

By a necessary consequence the absolute has always reigned and still reigns in Theoretic Politics, whether theological or metaphysical. The common end which they propose is to establish, each in its own way, the eternal and most perfect type of social order, without taking into account a given state of civilisation. Both pretended to the exclusive discovery of a system of institutions capable of attaining that end. The only thing which in this respect distinguishes them, is that the former formally prohibits any important modification of the plan traced by it; while the latter permits criticism provided this moves in the given direction. With that difference they are both alike by nature absolute.

This absolute character is still more apparent in their applications to Practical Politics. Each of them perceives in its peculiar system of institutions a sort of universal panacea applicable to all political evils, of whatever nature these may be, and whatever may be the stage of civilisation actually reached by the people for whom the remedy is destined. In like manner both judge the régimes belonging to different nations at distinct epochs of civilisation, in reference only to their greater or less concordance with, or opposition to their own unvarying types of perfection. Thus, to quote a recent striking example, the adherents of theological and metaphysical polity have, each in their turn and at brief intervals of time, proclaimed the social organisation of Spain to be superior to that of the most advanced European nations, without paying any regard to the actual inferiority of Spanish civilisation in comparison with that of the French and English above whom the Spaniards have been elevated as to the political régime. Such judgments, other examples of which it would be easy to cite, show clearly how entirely the spirit of theological and metaphysical polity disregards the actual state of civilisation.
To complete their characterisation it is important to remark that they both, generally speaking, though for different reasons, agree in setting up a very imperfect state of civilisation as the perfection of social re-organisation. We may even see that the most consistent adherents of metaphysical polity (such as its coordinator Rousseau) have been led to regard the social state as a degeneration from a State of Nature; the creation of their own imagination and simply the metaphysical counterpart of the theological conception of the fall of human nature through Original Sin.

This accurate résumé confirms the belief that the preponderance of imagination over observation, has produced in political science results exactly similar to those it engendered in the other sciences before they were rendered positive. The absolute search for the best possible government, taking no account of the state of civilisation, is evidently of the same nature as that for a panacea applicable to all maladies and all temperaments.

The general spirit of theological and metaphysical polity being thus reduced to its simplest expression, we gather from the preceding remarks that it essentially resolves itself into two considerations. As regards method it consists in the preponderance of imagination over observation. As regards general ideas destined to guide the operations, it consists, on one hand, in a purely abstract consideration of social organisation, regarded as independent of the state of civilisation, and, on the other hand, in viewing the progress of civilisation as not being subject to any law.

By reversing this process we should necessarily discover the point of view adapted to Positive Politics, since, as above pointed out, the same opposition may be observed between the conjectural and positive state of the other sciences. By this mental operation, we shall only extend to the future the analogy observed in the past; and we are thus led to the following results.

In the first place, in order to impress a positive character on political science we must introduce into this, as into all other sciences the preponderance of observation over imagination. In the second place, that this fundamental condition may be fulfilled, we must on one hand, conceive Social Organisation as intimately connected with the state of civilisation and determined by it, on the other, consider the Progress of Civilisation as being subject to an invariable law based upon the nature of things. Politics cannot become positive, or, what comes to the same thing, observation cannot obtain a preponderance over imagination until these two last conditions shall have been fulfilled. But it is clear, inversely, that if they are fulfilled, if the theory of politics is consistently established on this basis, the imagination will spontaneously become subordinated to observation and politics be rendered positive. Thus the final analysis reduces everything to these two conditions.

Such then are the two fundamental ideas that should preside over positive efforts in theoretic politics. Having regard to their extreme importance it is indispensable to consider them in greater detail. It is not our business here to demonstrate them, for this is precisely the scope of the operations we have to accomplish. We only seek to state them with sufficient completeness, in order that competent minds may, in some degree, verify them by comparing them with facts generally known. Such a verification is sufficient to convince the mind of the practicability of
treating politics in the same way as the sciences of observation, and our chief object will be attained if we create such a conviction.

Civilisation properly so called, consists on one hand in the development of the human mind, on the other in the result of this, namely the increasing power of man over nature. In other words the component elements of civilisation are Science, the Fine Arts, and Industry; this last expression being understood in that enlarged sense which I have always assigned to it.

Regarding civilisation from this precise and elementary point of view it is easy to perceive that the state of the social organisation essentially depends on that of civilisation and should be regarded as its result; whereas imaginative polity considers the former as isolated from and even quite independent of the latter.

The state of Civilisation necessarily determines that of the Social Organisation, whether spiritual or temporal, under the two most important aspects. In the first place it determines its nature by fixing the aim of social action; in the next place it prescribes its essential form by creating and developing the social forces, temporal and spiritual, destined to guide this general action. In truth it is clear that the collective action of the social body, being nothing else than the resultant of the individual action of all its constituent members directed to a common end, cannot be constituted otherwise than its elements, which are manifestly determined by the more or less advanced state of the sciences, the fine arts, and industry. It is still more evident that the prolonged existence of any political system is inconceivable, unless it confers supreme power on the predominant social forces, the nature of which is invariably prescribed by the state of civilisation. Reason points to this conclusion and experience confirms it.

All the varieties of social organisation which have hitherto existed, have only been modifications more or less extensive of a single system, the Military and Theological system. The original formation of this system was the evident and necessary result of the imperfect condition of civilisation at the epoch when it arose. When industry was in its infancy, society adopted War as its active aim. It did so naturally and reasonably, since such a condition of affairs both supplied the resources of war and enforced its practice by the most energetic stimulants that can act upon man,—the necessity for exercising his faculties and that of living. In like manner it is clear that the theological state, which then affected all special theories, necessarily impressed the like character on the general ideas destined to form the social bond. The third element of civilisation,—the Fine Arts—then predominated; and was in truth the chief instrument of founding the primitive organisation. Had it not developed itself we cannot conceive how society could have been organised.

If we next observe the successive modifications which this original system has undergone, and which metaphysicians have mistaken for so many different systems, we shall find the same result. In all of them we shall see the unavoidable effects of the ever growing expansion of the Scientific and Industrial elements, at the outset so insignificant. Thus it came to pass that the passage from polytheism to theism, and later the Protestant reformation were chiefly produced by the continual, though slow, progress of positive knowledge; in other words, by the action exerted upon older general conceptions, by special ideas which gradually
acquired a positive character. In like manner under temporal aspects the transition from the Roman to the Feudal State, and, still more manifestly, the decline of the latter through the enfranchisement of the Commons and its results, are essentially referable to the increasing importance of the industrial element. In a word all the general facts prove the close dependence of the social organisation upon the state of civilisation.

The best thinkers, those who approximate most closely to the positive condition in politics, now begin to perceive this fundamental principle. They feel that it is absurd to conceive the political system as an isolated fact, and to attribute to it those social forces which on the contrary produce it. In a word they already admit that the political order is and can only be the expression of civil order; in other words, that the preponderating social forces, of necessity, at last, become the directing ones. Only one step more is needed to recognise the subordination of the political system to the state of civilisation. For if it is clear that the political order is the exponent of the civil order, it is, at least, equally apparent that the civil order itself is merely the exponent of the state of civilisation.

Doubtless social organisation in its turn inevitably reacts on civilisation in ways more or less marked. But this influence which, notwithstanding its great importance, is only secondary, cannot overturn the natural order of dependence. This reaction itself, rightly considered, proves that the order is that above described. For experience always shows that if the social organisation be constituted in a sense at variance with the coexisting civilisation, the latter in the end invariably gets the upper hand.

It must then be admitted, as one of the two fundamental ideas constituting the essence of Positive Polity that the social organisation, whether past or present, should not be considered apart from the state of civilisation whence in truth it necessarily flows. If to facilitate investigation, we sometimes find it useful to consider them separately, this abstraction should always be regarded as simply provisional, without allowing ourselves to lose sight of the subordination established by the nature of things.

The second fundamental idea is this; that Civilisation progresses according to a necessary Law.

The experience of the past proves, in the most decisive manner, that the progressive march of civilisation follows a natural and unavoidable course, which flows from the law of human organisation and, in its turn, becomes the supreme law of all practical phenomena.

In this place it is manifestly impossible to expound the law in question with precision, or to verify it historically, even in the briefest manner. We only propose to offer some reflections on this fundamental conception.

The first reflection points to the necessity for assuming that such a law does exist in order to explain the political phenomena.

All men who possess a certain knowledge of the leading facts of history, be their historical views what they may, will agree in this, that the cultivated portion of the human race, considered as a whole, has made uninterrupted progress in civilisation from the most remote periods of history to our own day. In this proposition, the term civilisation is understood in the sense explained above, including therefore the social organisation.

No reasonable doubt can be raised about this fundamental fact as regards the epoch which extends from the eleventh century to the present.
time, in other words commencing with the introduction of the Sciences of Observation into Europe by the Arabs, and the Enfranchisement of the Commons. But the truth is equally incontestable as regards the antecedent period. Savants are now well convinced that the pretensions to advanced scientific knowledge put forward on behalf of the ancients by littérateurs are devoid of all real basis. The Arabians are proved to have surpassed them. Such also has been the case, even more decidedly, as regards industry, at all events in reference to all that calls for real ability, and does not result from mere accident. Even if the fine arts were deemed to constitute an exception, their exclusion is susceptible of a natural explanation which would leave the main proposition essentially untouched. Lastly as regards the social organisation, it is perfectly manifest that this, during the same period, made the greatest progress, owing to the establishment of Christianity, and the formation of the Feudal System, so superior to the organisation of Greece and Rome.

It is therefore certain that civilisation has, under every aspect, made constant progress.

On the other hand, while discarding the disparaging spirit, alike blind and unjust, introduced by the metaphysical philosophy, we cannot but perceive that in consequence of the state of infancy which has hitherto characterised political speculations, the practical combinations that have until now guided civilisation were not always those best adapted to promote its progress, and, frequently, tended rather to impede than to assist this. There have been epochs in the main political activity of which was of a purely stationary character. Such, generally speaking, were those of social systems in their decline; for example, of the Emperor Julian, of Philip II. and the Jesuits, and lastly of Bonaparte. Let us also bear in mind that, as already pointed out, the social organisation does not regulate the course of civilisation, but, on the contrary, results from this.

Frequent cures, effected in spite of a treatment manifestly erroneous, have revealed to physicians the powerful action by which every living body spontaneously tends to rectify accidental derangements of its organisation. In like manner the advance of civilisation, notwithstanding unfavourable political combinations, clearly proves that civilisation is governed by a natural law of progress, independent of all combinations, and dominating them. If this principle were denied, in order to explain such a fact, and comprehend how it has come to pass that civilisation in place of being retarded by errors committed, has almost invariably benefited by them, we could only have recourse to direct continuous supernatural guidance, after the fashion of theological politics.

Lastly, it is well to remark that too frequently events have been regarded as unfavorable to civilisation which were only apparently so. The chief cause of this misapprehension has been, the insufficient attention paid, even by the best intellects, to an essential law of organised bodies, which applies with equal force to the human race acting collectively, as to a single individual. It consists in the necessity for a certain degree of resistance in order that all forces may be fully developed. But this remark in no way affects the preceding consideration. For though obstacles are needed to develop forces, they do not produce them.

The conclusion deduced from this fundamental consideration would be much strengthened, if we took into account the remarkable identity observable in the development of the civilisation of different nations,
between whom no political intercommunication can with probability be assumed. Such an identity could only have been produced under the influence of a natural progress of civilization uniformly applicable to all nations as resulting from the fundamental laws of the human organisation, common to all. Thus, for example, the customs of the early times of Greece, as they are described by Homer, are found to be almost identical with those which subsist among the savage nations of North America. So likewise the feudalism of the Malays closely resembles that of Europe in the eleventh century. These points of resemblance, it is clear, can only be explained in the way above mentioned.

A second consideration will render evident the existence of a natural law regulating the progress of civilization.

If, in conformity with the view above submitted, we admit that each phase of the social order is necessarily derived from that of the corresponding civilization, we may in our observations lay out of consideration this complex element; and the results arrived at for the residuary facts will equally apply to the organisation of society.

Reducing thus the question to its simplest terms, it becomes easy to perceive that civilization follows a determined and invariable course.

A superficial philosophy, which would make this world a scene of miracles, has immensely exaggerated the influence of chance, that is to say of isolated causes, in human affairs. This exaggeration is peculiarly apparent in reference to the Sciences and the Arts. Among other remarkable examples, everyone knows the great admiration excited even in intelligent minds by the idea that the law of universal gravitation was revealed to Newton by the fall of an apple.

All sensible men in our time admit that chance plays only a very small part in scientific and industrial discoveries; that in none but insignificant discoveries does it rank as chief agent. But to this error has succeeded another which, though in itself much less unreasonable, has nevertheless almost the same disadvantages. The office of chance has been in like manner transferred to genius. This explanation hardly accounts more felicitously for the action of the human mind.

The history of human knowledge clearly proves that all our labours in the sciences and arts are so connected, whether in the same or in succeeding generations, that the discoveries of one age prepare those of the following, as the former had been themselves prepared by those of the preceding. It has been demonstrated that the isolated power of genius is greatly less than that with which it has been credited. The man most justly distinguished by great discoveries almost always owes the largest share of his success to his predecessors in the same career. In a word the human mind follows, in the development of the sciences and arts, a definite course, one that transcends the greatest intellectual forces, which arise, so to speak, only as instruments destined to produce in due course successive discoveries.

Confining our observations to the sciences whose progress we can follow most easily from remote periods, we see, in truth, that their main historic epochs,—that is to say their passage through the theological and metaphysical into the positive stage,—are rigorously determined. These three states succeed each other necessarily in an order prescribed by the nature of the human mind. The transition from one to the other takes place according to a course the steps of which resemble each other in all the sciences,
nor can the greatest amount of genius dispense with passing through them. Turning from this general review to the subdivisions of the scientific or definitive state, we observe the same law. Thus for example, the great discovery of universal gravitation was prepared by the labours of the astronomers and geometers of the 16th and 17th centuries, chiefly by those of Kepler and Huygens. They were indispensable to its birth, and certain, sooner or later, to produce it.

It appears, therefore, from the preceding remarks that the elementary march of civilisation is unquestionably subject to a natural and invariable law which overrules all special human divergencies. But as the state of the social organisation of necessity follows that of civilisation the same conclusion applies to civilisation, considered as a whole or in its elements.

The two considerations above announced, though insufficient to furnish a complete exposition of the progress of civilisation, nevertheless, prove its reality. They show the possibility of determining with precision all its attributes by a careful observation of the past, and of thus creating positive polity.

Our business is next to fix exactly the practical aim of this science; and its general points of contact with the wants of society; especially its connexion with the real work of reorganisation which is so imperiously required by the actual state of the body politic.

To effect this, it is necessary at the outset to ascertain the limits of all true political action.

The fundamental law which governs the natural progress of civilisation rigorously determines the successive states through which the general development of the human race must pass. On the other hand, this law necessarily results from the instinctive tendency of the human race to perfect itself. Consequently it is as completely independent of our control as are the individual instincts the combination of which produces this permanent tendency.

Since no known fact authorises us to believe that the human organisation is liable to any fundamental alteration, the progress of that civilisation which flows from it is in essentials unalterable. To speak more precisely, none of the intermediate steps which it prescribes can be evaded, and no step in a backward direction can really be made.

Nevertheless, the progress of civilisation is more or less modifiable, and may vary in point of rapidity within certain limits, from various causes, physical and moral, which can be estimated. Among these causes, are political combinations. In this sense only is it possible for man to influence the course of his own civilisation.

This action upon the race is quite analogous to that which is attainable in relation to the individual; the analogy resulting from the identity of source. By employing suitable means we can, up to a certain point, accelerate or retard the expansion of an individual instinct; but we can neither destroy it nor alter its nature. So likewise with the instincts of the race; paying due attention to the varying extent of this modifying power when the duration of the race is compared with that of the individual.

The natural progress of civilisation, therefore, determines with entire certainty for each epoch the improvements of which the social state is susceptible, whether in its parts or as a whole. Such improvements alone can be carried out, as in fact they are carried out, by the combinations of philosophers and statesmen, at times even in spite of these combinations.
All men who have exercised a real and durable action on the human race, whether in temporal or spiritual matters, have been guided and sustained by this fundamental truth, which the usual instinct of genius partially revealed to them, although never yet systematically demonstrated. They have, at every epoch, perceived what were the changes which the state of civilisation tended to bring about. These they enunciated, and proposed to their cotemporaries doctrines and institutions in harmony with them. Whenever their conceptions were in accord with the real state of affairs, the changes so foreseen were speedily realised or consolidated. The social forces which had long been silently growing, suddenly appeared at their voice on the political scene with all the vigour of youth.

History having been, up to the present time, written and studied in a superficial spirit, such coincidences and striking results, in place of instructing men, as might be naturally supposed, have only astonished them. These facts, when misapprehended, even help to keep alive the theologico-metaphysical belief in the indefinite power of legislators over civilisation. They maintain this superstitious idea in minds otherwise disposed to reject it, were it not apparently supported by observation. This untoward result arises from the circumstance that in these great events we are only men, never the forces which irresistibly impel them. Instead of recognising the preponderating influence of civilisation the efforts of these far-seeing men are regarded as the true causes of the improvements effected, but which would equally have taken place, though somewhat more slowly, without their intervention. No one troubles himself with considering the enormous disproportion between the alleged cause and the results; a disproportion which would make the explanation much more incomprehensible than the fact itself. People look at the appearance and neglect the reality which is behind. In a word, according to the ingenious expression of Madame de Staél, we mistake the actors for the drama.

Such an error is exactly of the same nature as that of the Indians who attributed to Christopher Columbus the eclipse which he had foreseen.

Generally speaking when the individual appears to exert a great influence, it is not due to his own forces, since these are extremely small. Forces external to him act in his favour according to laws over which he has no control. His entire power lies in the intelligent apprehension of these laws through observation, his forecast of their effects, and the power of subordinating them to the desired end which he thus obtains, provided he employs them in accordance with their nature. The effect once produced, ignorance of natural laws leads the spectator, and sometimes the actor himself, to attribute to the power of man what is really due only to his foresight.

These general remarks apply to political action in the same way, and for the same reasons, as to physical, chemical, and physiological action. All political action is followed by a real and durable result, when it is exerted in the same direction as the force of civilisation, and aims at producing changes which the latter necessitates. On every other hypothesis it exerts no influence or a merely ephemeral one.

The most fatal case, without doubt, is that in which the legislator, temporal or spiritual, acts, designedly or otherwise, in a retrograde sense, for he then places himself in opposition to that which alone gives him force. But the course of civilisation so entirely regulates political
action, that this is resolutless, even if advancing with society, when it
endeavours to progress more rapidly than circumstances permit. Experience,
indeed, proves that the legislator, however great may be his power, neces-
sarily fails if he undertakes to realise improvements which, though in
harmony with the tendencies of civilisation, are too far in advance of its
actual condition. Thus, for example, the great attempts of Joseph II.
to civilise Austria beyond what its condition permitted, were as com-
pletely nullified as the vast efforts of Bonaparte to carry France back to
the feudal system; though both personages possessed the largest measure
of arbitrary power.

It follows from the above considerations that the true polity, the
positive polity should no more seek to govern phenomena than the other
sciences do. This ambitious chimera, which characterised their infancy,
they have abandoned for the simple task of observing and correlating their
phenomena. Political science should do the same. It should exclusively
employ itself in coordinating all the special facts relative to the progress
of civilisation and in reducing these to the smallest possible number of
general facts, the connexion of which ought to manifest the natural law
of this progress, leaving for a subsequent appreciation the various causes
which can modify its rapidity.

The practical utility of such a political science of observation may now
be easily estimated.

A sound political system can never aim at impelling the human race,
since this is moved by its proper impulse, in accordance with a law as
necessary as, though more easily modified than, that of gravitation. But
it does seek to facilitate human progress by enlightening it.

There is a great difference between obeying the progress of civilisation
blindly and obeying it intelligently. The changes it demands take place
as much in the first as in the second case; but they are longer delayed
and, above all, are only accomplished after having produced social pertur-
bations more or less serious, according to the nature and importance of
these changes. Now the disturbances, of every sort, which thus arise in
the body politic, may be, in great part, avoided, by adopting measures
based on an exact knowledge of the changes which tend to produce
themselves.

Such measures consist in so ordering affairs that the anticipated ameliora-
tions may be effected directly, instead of being produced by the sheer force
of necessity athwart all the obstacles which ignorance engenders. In other
words the essential aim of practical politics is, properly speaking, to avoid the
violent revolutions which spring from obstacles opposed to the progress of civil-
sation; and to reduce these to a simple moral movement, as regular as,
though more intense than, that which gently urges society in ordinary periods.
Now, in order to attain this end, it is manifestly indispensable that we
should know, as precisely as possible, the actual tendency of civilisation
so as to bring our political conduct into harmony with it.

It would, doubtless, be chimerical to hope that the movements which,
more or less, compromise the ambitious and interested aspirations of entire
classes, can be effected with complete calmness. But it is, nevertheless,
certain that hitherto far too much importance has been given to this cause in
explaining revolutionary convulsions, the violence of which has been, in great
part, due to ignorance of the natural laws which regulate the progress of civilisation.
It is only too common to attribute to egotism what essentially springs from ignorance, and this mischievous error contributes to maintain irritation between men, in their private and public relations. But, in the present case, is it not evident that those who have placed themselves in opposition to the course of civilisation, would not have adopted this attitude if its antagonistic character had been clearly demonstrated? No one is so foolish as knowingly to place himself in opposition to the nature of things. No one has any satisfaction in exerting an influence of which he clearly discerns the ephemeral nature. In this way the demonstrations of a polity based on observation are capable of acting upon the classes whom prejudice and interest would otherwise engage in a struggle against the course of civilisation.

Doubtless, we should not exaggerate the influence exerted by the intellect over the conduct of men. But, assuredly the force of demonstration is far more important than has hitherto been supposed. The history of the human mind proves that this force alone has often decided changes in effecting which it had to struggle with a combination of the greatest human forces. To cite only the most remarkable example, the power of positive demonstration has alone caused the adoption of the theory of the movement of the earth. Yet this had to overcome, not only the resistance of the theological power, at that period still so powerful, but, above all, the pride of the human race, supported by the most plausible arguments ever advanced in favour of an erroneous idea. Experience of so decisive a kind should enlighten us as to the great power of real demonstrations. The absence of such demonstrations has been the chief reason why statesmen have allowed themselves to be carried away by serious political aberrations. Let demonstrations appear, and the aberrations will soon cease.

Besides, even if we consider the question of interests alone, it is easy to see that a positive polity ought to supply the means of avoiding violent revolutions.

In truth, if the improvements called for by the progress of civilisation have to struggle with some ambitious and interested aims, others of the same kind are favourable to them. Besides, from the very fact that these improvements have reached their maturity, the real forces which favour them are stronger than the opposing forces, though appearances do not always bear out this conclusion. Knowledge of the law of progress enforces resignation, and, still more, guides action. The governing classes, clearly perceiving the end which they are called on to realise, can reach it directly, in place of wasting their forces on tentative and mistaken efforts. They will by anticipation combine measures for overcoming opposition with others calculated to facilitate the acceptance of the new order of things by their opponents. In a word the triumph of civilisation will operate in a manner at once as prompt and as calm as the nature of things will permit.

To resume, the course of civilisation does not, properly speaking, advance in a right line. It is composed of a series of progressive oscillations, more or less ample or slow, on either side of a mean line, which may be compared with that presented by the mechanism of locomotion. But these oscillations may be made shorter and more rapid, by political combinations based on a knowledge of the mean movement which always tends to prevail. Such is the permanent practical utility of this kind of knowledge. It evidently becomes more important in proportion as the changes necessi-
tated by the course of civilisation are themselves more momentous. Its usefulness has accordingly reached its maximum in our day; since the social reorganisation which alone can terminate the existing crisis, is of all the revolutions which the human race ever experienced the most comprehensive.

The fundamental datum and positive starting point of general practical politics consists therefore in a determination of the real tendency of civilisation. By ascertaining this we can harmonise political action with it and render as mild, and as short as possible, the crisis which the human race inevitably undergoes during its successive passages through the different stages of civilisation.

Persons who, though intelligent, are unfamiliar with the method which suits the human mind, and even those who see that a knowledge of the laws which regulate the progress of civilisation can alone furnish a solid and positive basis for political combinations, may suppose that this historic investigation need not be pushed back to the origin of civilised society, but that it will suffice to consider its present condition. Such a view is natural, having regard to the narrow way in which politics are now regarded. But its delusive character is easily shown.

Experience has proved that, so long as the human mind advances in a positive direction, there are many advantages and no inconveniences is rising to the highest degree of generality, because it is far easier to descend than to ascend the scale. In the infancy of positive Physiology it was supposed that the human organisation could be understood by studying man alone; an error completely analogous to that now under discussion. It has been since recognised that the formation of clear and large exceptions of the human organisation requires us to consider man as forming the limit of the animal series; and even, in a still more general point of view, as forming part of the system of organised bodies. Physiology has only received its definitive constitution since the comparison of the different classes of living beings has been carried out on a large scale, and systematically employed in the study of man.

In Politics the various states of civilisation correspond to the different organisations in Physiology. But, the reasons which compel us to consider all the epochs of civilisation are still more imperative than those which have induced physiologists to institute a comparison of all organisations.

Doubtless a study of the present condition of civilisation, considered apart, and independently of the states which have preceded it, may furnish very useful materials for the formation of positive polity, provided the facts are observed in a philosophical spirit. Nay it is certain that, by studies of this kind, true Statesmen have hitherto been enabled to modify the conjectural doctrines which guided their efforts, so as to render these less discordant with the real wants of society. But it is not the less evident that such a study is totally inadequate to form a true positive polity. It can furnish nothing but materials. In a word, the observation of the present state of civilisation, considered by itself, can no more determine the actual tendencies of society, than the study of any other isolated epoch can do.

The reason for this is, that the existence of a law cannot be established by a single term. Three terms, at least, are needed, in order that the connexion ascertained by comparing the two first, and verified by the
third, may serve to reveal the following ones. Such provision is the practical object of every law.

When, in tracing an institution and a social idea, or a system of institutions and a complete doctrine, from their birth to their present stage, we find that, from a given epoch, their influence has always been either diminishing or increasing, we can foretell with complete certainty the destiny which awaits them. In the first case, it is proved that their tendency is at variance with that of civilisation, and hence their final disappearance may be predicted. In the second case, on the contrary, we may conclude that they will ultimately predominate. The period of their fall or triumph may even be calculated, within narrow limits, from the extent and rapidity of the variations observed. Manifestly therefore such a study is a fruitful source of positive knowledge.

But what can we learn from the observation of a single State where we must embrace, at one view, doctrines, institutions, and classes, both growing and declining, without reckoning the ephemeral action which only depends on the routine of the moment? What human sagacity could avoid confounding these opposed and heterogeneous elements? How could we discover the realities which make so little noise amid the phantoms which hurry over the stage. It is clear that, amid such confusion the observer could only advance if guided by a knowledge of the past, for this alone can teach him to direct his view so as to see things as they really exist.

The chronological order of historic epochs is not their philosophical order. In place of saying: the past, the present, and the future, we should say the past, the future, and the present. In truth it is only when we have conceived the future by the aid of the past that we can with advantage revert to the present so as to seize its true character.

These considerations, though applicable to every epoch, are so, in a still higher degree, to the present. In our day three different Systems coexist in the heart of society: the theoligico-feudal system, the scientific-industrial system, and lastly the mongrel and transitional system of metaphysicians and lawyers. In the midst of such confusion it is entirely beyond the grasp of the human mind to make a clear and exact analysis, or to frame real and precise statistics of the body politic, unless it be enlightened by the past. It is demonstrable that sound intellects, which if better guided would have risen to a truly positive polity, have continued in a metaphysical state because they considered the present condition of affairs apart from their antecedents, and even because they did not go back far enough in the series of observations.

We therefore are bound to study, as profoundly and completely as possible, all the states through which civilisation has passed, from its origin to the present time. We must consider their coordination and connexion and how they can be combined under general heads capable of furnishing principles; making manifest the natural laws of the development of civilisation, and exhibiting the philosophic picture of the social future as deduced from the past, in other words determining the general plan of reorganisation destined for the present epoch. Lastly we need the application of these results to the present state of things so as to determine the direction which ought to be impressed on political action with a view to facilitate the definitive transition to the new social state. Such are the operations essential
for giving to political theory a positive basis adequate to the best and urgent needs of society.

The above constitutes the first series of theoretic problems, for the solution of which I venture to invoke the combined forces of European savants.

The considerations above set forth having sufficiently indicated the spirit of Positive polity, its comparison with Theological and Metaphysical polity may be rendered more precise.

Comparing them in the first place, under the most important point of view, in reference to the actual wants of society, the superiority of positive polity is easily explained. Its superiority consists in the fact that the positive system discovers, whereas other systems invent. Theological and metaphysical polity devise plans for regulating the present state of civilisation which accord with the absolute conditions assumed to be the highest good. Positive polity proposes measures based on observation; simply as being those which the course of civilisation tends to produce. This difference in method renders it equally impossible for the polity of imagination to discover, or for the polity of observation to miss the true social reorganisation. The one makes the greatest efforts to invent a remedy without considering the malady. The other, persuaded that the principal source of recovery is the vital force of the patient, confines itself to ascertaining, from observation, the natural issue of the crisis, in order to facilitate it by eliminating the obstacles that spring from empiricism.

In the second place, a scientific polity can alone furnish men with a theory about which it is possible to agree, and this is a matter of the first importance.

Theological and metaphysical polity, aiming at the best possible government, lead to interminable discussions, since such a problem cannot be reduced to certainty. The political régime should be, and of necessity is, in harmony with the state of civilisation. The best for each epoch is that which suits it best. Therefore there is not and cannot be any political régime absolutely preferable to all others; there are merely some states of civilisation more perfect than others. Institutions good at one period may be and most frequently are bad at another and vice versa. Thus, for example, Slavery which is now a monstrosity, was certainly at its origin an admirable institution, designed to prevent the strong from destroying the weak, constituting an unavoidable transition in the general development of civilisation. In like manner, conversely, Liberty which, to a reasonable extent, becomes so useful to individuals and nations that have reached a certain stage of knowledge, and contracted some habits of foresight, by permitting the development of their faculties, is very mischievous to those who have not yet fulfilled these two conditions; and who require for the sake of themselves, as well as of others, to be kept in tutelage. It is therefore evident that there can be no common understanding as to what forms the absolutely best possible government. To reestablish harmony no other expedient is admissible but that of entirely proscribing any discussion of the plan laid down. This is the course which the theological polity has adopted; more consistent in this respect than metaphysical polity, since its actual persistence proves that it fulfilled the conditions of existence. We know that metaphysics by giving unrestrained scope to the imagination has induced a doubt and even a formal denial of the utility of the social state for the happiness of man, a conclusion which strikingly illustrates the impossibility of agreement upon such questions.
The practical aim of scientific politics being, on the contrary, to ascertain the system which the march of civilisation, indicated by the past, now tends to bring about, the problem is altogether positive and can be decided by observation. The freest investigation can and should be accorded, without any fear of its leading to disorder. After the lapse of a certain time competent minds, and finally all men, must agree as to the natural laws which govern the progress of civilisation, and the resultant system, whatever may originally have been their speculative opinions; just as men have ended in a common understanding about the laws of the solar system, those of the human organisation, &c.

Finally positive politics furnish the only road by which the human race can find an issue from arbitrary courses, under the dominion of which it must remain so long as the theological and metaphysical polity predominates.

The absolute, in theory, of necessity leads to the arbitrary, in practice. So long as the human race is considered to contain no spontaneous principle of movement, but to owe its impulse to the legislator, so long, in spite of the most eloquent declamations, must the arbitrary subsist in the highest degree and affect the most essential aspects of life. The nature of things imposes this necessity. The human race being thus abandoned to the discretion of the legislator, who decides on the best possible form of government, arbitrary power may be limited as to details, but manifestly can never be excluded from the ensemble. Whether the supreme legislative office be in the hands of one or of many, whether it be hereditary or elective, makes no difference in this respect. Even if the entire body politic became the legislator, supposing this were possible, the result would be the same; with this difference only, that arbitrary power being then exerted by society on itself, the inconveniences would become greater than ever.

On the contrary scientific polity wholly excludes the arbitrary, because it banishes those absolute and vague conceptions which gave birth to and maintain this. Under such a régime the human race is regarded as subject to a natural law of development which can be ascertained by observation, and which prescribes for each epoch, in the most unequivocal manner, the political course it is possible to pursue. The arbitrary then, of necessity, ceases. Government by measures replaces government by men. Then arises in politics a true law, understood in the real and philosophic sense which the illustrious Montesquieu attached to that phrase. Whatever may be the form of government as to its details, in substance, at least, the arbitrary cannot then appear. In politics all is settled by a truly supreme Law, recognised as superior to human forces; since it ultimately flows from the nature of our organisation, over which it can exert no influence. In a word, this law excludes with equal efficacy, the arbitrary of theology, or the Divine Right of Kings, and the arbitrary of metaphysics, or the Sovereignty of the People.

If some should regard the supreme dominion of such a law, merely as another form of the arbitrary, as it now exists, they should in consistency also complain of the inflexible despotism exercised over the whole of nature by the law of gravitation, as well as of the despotism,—no less real, and more analogous as being more susceptible of modification,—exercised by the laws of the human organisation, of which the course of civilisation is merely the result.

The preceding remarks naturally lead us to mark out with precision the
respective domains of observation and imagination in politics. This investigation will complete our sketch of the general spirit of the new politics.

In truth it is necessary to distinguish between two sorts of operations. The first, constituting properly speaking political science, aims at forming a system suitable to the present period, the second concerns its propagation.

In the first class of operations, it is clear that the imagination ought only to play a subordinate part, remaining at all times under the guidance of the observing powers, as in the other sciences. The study of the past can and should be employed to assist the discovery of means for provisionally coordinating facts, until their definitive relations can be deduced from the facts themselves, the point always to be kept in view. Even this use of the imagination should only embrace secondary facts, any other being manifestly erroneous. In the second place the determination of the system according to which society is, in our day, destined to effect its own reorganisation should be almost wholly inferred from observation of the past. Its study will determine not only the ensemble of the system but its most important portions, with a precision which will probably astonish the savants when they commence the work. It is, nevertheless, certain, that the degree of precision obtainable by this method, cannot reach the point at which the system could be confided to the leaders of industry for actual use by them in practical combinations as indicated in the preceding chapter. Accordingly under this latter aspect also, imagination should play a secondary part in scientific politics. This will consist in conferring the necessary degree of precision on the outlines of the new system, the general plan and the characteristic features of which have been determined by observation.

There is however another sort of operations, equally indispensable for the definitive success of the grand enterprise of social reorganisation, though subordinate to the preceding, where the imagination finds full scope for its exercise.

In ascertaining what is to be the new system, it is necessary to put aside its advantages or inconveniences. The principal, indeed the only question should be: what is that Social System indicated by observation of the past, which the progress of civilisation must establish. To occupy our thoughts about the excellence of that system, would be to confuse everything and even to miss our goal. We should confine ourselves to the simple conception that, inasmuch as the positive idea of goodness and that of harmony with the state of civilisation are identical, we are certain to obtain the best system now attainable, if we discover that which is most in harmony with the present state of civilisation. The idea of goodness having as a positive conception no separate existence, and becoming positive only when connected with the state of civilisation, we should apply ourselves to the latter as constituting the direct object of our researches, and alone capable of rendering politics positive. To point out the advantages of the new system and its superiority over the antecedent states should be regarded as merely secondary and not allowed to exercise any influence in guiding our labours.

It is incontrovertible that by proceeding in this way, we shall found a polity truly positive, and in harmony with the grand wants of society. The new system should be thus ascertained; but it is clear that to ensure its definitive adoption by society, it ought not to be presented under a shape which is very far from being the fittest to determine a social adhesion.
GENERAL APPENDIX—THIRD PART.

In order to establish a new Social System, just conceptions will not suffice. It is necessary that the mass of society should feel attracted by it. This condition is not merely indispensable to overcome the obstacles, more or less serious, which this system must encounter among the classes who are losing their ascendancy. It is needed above all for the satisfaction of the moral craving for enthusiasm inherent in man when he enters upon a new career. Without such enthusiasm he could neither overcome his natural inertness nor shake off the powerful yoke of ancient habits; without which it is impossible to secure the free and full development of all his faculties in their new occupation. Since this necessity always manifests itself even in the least complicated cases, its absence would involve a contradiction in the most complete and important changes, in those which must most deeply modify human existence. Accordingly all history testifies in favor of this truth.

It is therefore clear that the right mode of conceiving and presenting the new system under a scientific polity is not at all fitted to fulfill this indispensable condition.

The mass of mankind will never be inspired with a passion for any system, by proving to them that it is one which the progress of civilization has prepared and now demands for the guidance of society. A truth of this nature is accessible to a very limited circle and for them even demands too long a series of mental operations, to allow of its inspiring an attachment. It can only produce among savants that profound and tenacious conviction, the necessary result of positive demonstrations, which offers a stronger resistance, but, for that very reason, is less active than the lively and captivating persuasion of ideas that excite the passions.

The only way of obtaining this result consists in presenting a vivid picture of the ameliorations which the new system should bring about in the condition of mankind, regarded under all points of view, and apart from its necessity and opportunity. Such a perspective alone, can induce men to effect the moral revolution within themselves, essential for establishing the new system. This alone can repress that egotism, now rendered predominant by the dissolution of the ancient system, and which, after our ideas have been enlightened by scientific labors, will remain as the only serious obstacle to the triumph of the new social organization. This alone can draw society from its apathy, and impress on it that active devotedness which is demanded by a social state destined to maintain all the human faculties in constant action.

Here then we find a sort of work in which the imagination should perform the principal part. Its activity can produce no bad effect, since this will be exerted in the direction pointed out by scientific labors; and it will aim, not at inventing a new system, but at spreading one which has been determined by positive polity. Thus set in motion the imagination ought to be entirely left to itself. The more open and free its attitude, the more complete and salutary will be its indispensable activity.

Such is the part specially reserved for the Fine Arts in the general work of social reorganization. Thus this vast enterprise will obtain the cooperation of all the positive forces; that of the savants to determine the plan of the new system; that of the artists to cause its universal adoption, that of the industrial chiefs to put it into immediate execution by establishing the needful practical institutions. These three great forces will lend
each other a mutual support in founding the new system, as they will do to ensure its daily application, when established.

In determining, then, the social system suitable to the present epoch the positive polity invests observation with the supremacy now accorded to imagination. At the same time it confides to the imagination anew and more perfect office than that which the theologico-metaphysical polity assigned to it; for since the human race has advanced near the positive state the imaginative faculty, though supreme, has revolved in a circle of obsolete ideas and monotonous pictures.

Having sketched the general nature of positive polity it is useful to cast a rapid glance over the chief attempts heretofore made to raise politics to the rank of the sciences of observation. We shall thus gain a twofold advantage; that of demonstrating the opportunity of such an undertaking, and of throwing light upon the spirit of the new polity by exhibiting it under several points of view differing from those already indicated.

Montesquieu must have the credit of the earliest direct attempt to treat politics as a science of facts and not of dogmas. Such evidently is the true aim of the Spirit of Laws (l’Esprit des Lois), as all who understand this work will concede. The admirable Introduction where the general conception of law is presented would alone suffice to establish this aim. It is clear that Montesquieu mainly aimed at ranging, as far as possible, under a certain number of heads all the political facts known to him and at exhibiting the laws of their connexion.

Were it our task to appreciate such a work, its merits should be judged relatively to the period of its execution. We would then perceive that the Spirit of Laws decisively establishes the philosophic superiority of Montesquieu over his cotemporaries. To have emancipated himself from the negative spirit at the time when it exerted the most despotic power even over the greatest intellects; to have profoundly felt the worthlessness of a metaphysical and absolute polity; to have appreciated the necessity for departing from it at the very time when, in the hands of Rousseau, it was assuming its definitive form; these are decisive proofs of Montesquieu’s mental superiority.

But in spite of the supreme ability erinced by Montesquieu, as will be, more and more, acknowledged, his labors are far from having raised politics to the rank of a positive science. They have not in the least satisfied the fundamental and indispensable requisites for attaining this object as above stated.

Montesquieu did not perceive that great fact which regulates all political phenomena, the natural development of civilisation. Hence it follows that his researches can only be employed as materials, as a collection of observations and hints towards the creation of the positive system of politics. For the general views which he employed to connect the facts are not positive.

Notwithstanding the manifest efforts of Montesquieu to disentangle himself from metaphysics he did not succeed in doing so. From metaphysical considerations he undoubtedly deduced his principal conceptions. This conception has a double fault. Instead of being historical it is dogmatic; in other words it does not sufficiently regard the necessary succession of the different political states. In the second place it attributes an exaggerated importance to a fact, which is altogether secondary—the form of government. Accordingly the preponderating influence which
Montesquieu has given to this idea is purely imaginary, and contradicts the best established facts. In a word the political facts have not really been coordinated as they should be in every positive science. They have merely been grouped under hypothetical ideas, contrary, for the most part, to their true relations.

The only important portion of the theoretical works of Montesquieu possessing a truly positive character, is that which concerns the political influence of outward and local circumstances, acting continuously, designated by the term Climate. But it is easy to see that, even in this respect, in consequence of the general error of his method, the ideas put forward by Montesquieu can only be employed when they shall have been entirely recast.

In truth it is now clearly recognised by all observers that Montesquieu has in several respects greatly exaggerated the influence of climate. Such exaggeration was unavoidable.

No doubt climate exerts over political phenomena a real action which it is very important to understand. But such action is only indirect and secondary. It is confined to accelerating or retarding in a certain measure the natural progress of civilisation; but this cannot in itself be affected by these modifications. In truth this progress is identical, in all climates, except as regards its rapidity; because it springs from more general laws, those of the human organisation, essentially the same for all localities. Since then the influence of climate over political phenomena merely modifies the natural course of civilisation, which maintains its predominance, this influence cannot be studied with advantage and properly estimated until the fundamental law has been ascertained. If the indirect and subordinate cause were studied before the direct and principal cause, such a violation of the laws of the human mind would unavoidably give an entirely false idea of the influence of the former and lead to its being confounded with that of the latter. This is what happened in the case of Montesquieu.

The foregoing reflexions on the influence of climate manifestly apply to all other causes which, without essentially altering the course of civilisation, can modify its rate of advance. This influence can only be determined with precision when the natural laws of civilisation shall have been established, by eliminating all such modifications. Astronomers in commencing their study of the laws of the planetary movements omitted all consideration of the perturbations. After these laws had been discovered, the modifications could be determined and finally even reduced to the general law which had only been established with reference to the principal movement. If the attempt had been made, in the beginning, to account for the irregularities, it is plain that no precise theory could ever have been constructed. The case is exactly the same as regards the subject in hand.

The inadequacy of the political system of Montesquieu can be clearly verified in its applications to the wants of society.

The necessity for a social reorganisation in the most advanced countries existed as truly in the time of Montesquieu as it does now. For the bases of the feudo-theological system had already been destroyed. Subsequent events, by completing the destruction of the ancient system, have only rendered this necessity more evident and more urgent. Montesquieu, however, did not propose the creation of a new social system as the
practical aim of his labors. Since he had not coordinated the political facts by a theory fitted to render evident the necessity for a revolution at the stage which society had then reached, and at the same time to exhibit the general character of the new system, he could, as in fact he did, only confine himself to indicating improvements in detail suggested by experience, which simply constituted modifications, more or less important, of the feudal-theological system.

Montesquieu no doubt showed a wise moderation, in confining his practical suggestions within the limits which the facts as imperfectly studied by him imposed, when, on the other hand, he could so easily have invented utopias. At the same time, he clearly evinced the inadequacy of a theory which was unfitted to meet the most essential demands of practical life.

To resume, then, Montesquieu felt the necessity of treating politics by the same method as the sciences of observation; but he did not form any conception of the general operation needed to effect this purpose. His researches, nevertheless, were of the utmost importance. They facilitated the intellectual combination of political ideas, since they presented a mass of facts coordinated by a theory which, though far removed from the positive state, approached it much more nearly than all anterior efforts.

Condorcet it was who grasped the general conception of the operation fitted to raise politics to the rank of the sciences of observation. He first saw clearly that civilization is subject to a progressive course, every step of which is strictly connected with the rest by virtue of natural law; discoverable through philosophic observation of the past, and which determine, in a positive manner for each epoch, the improvements adapted to the social state as a whole, and to each portion of it. Not only did Condorcet thus conceive the method of impressing on politics a truly positive character, but he endeavoured to demonstrate the theory in the work entitled 'Sketch of an historical view of the progress of the human mind;' of which the title and introduction alone should suffice to secure for its author the eternal honour of having created this great philosophic conception.

If this capital discovery has hitherto remained wholly barren, has yet, made hardly any sensation; if no one has pursued the track pointed out by Condorcet; if, in a word, politics have not become positive, we must attribute this, in great part, to the fact that the sketch which Condorcet traced was executed in a way quite at variance with the scope of his undertaking. He completely misconceived its most essential conditions, so much so that the work needs to be entirely recast. It is necessary to prove this.

In the first place the Distribution of Epochs constitutes the most important portion of the plan in a work of this nature, or, to speak more correctly, it alone constitutes the plan considered in its greatest generality: since it determines the principal mode of coordinating the facts observed. Now the method of distributing the facts which Condorcet adopted is absolutely erroneous since it does not fulfil even the most obvious condition, that of presenting a homogeneous series. We see that Condorcet by no means felt the importance of a philosophic distribution of the epochs of civilization. He did not perceive that this distribution should itself be the object of a preliminary operation, the most difficult of those which the formation of positive politics demands. He imagined that he could ade-
QUATELY coordinate facts by assuming, almost arbitrarily, for the commencement of each epoch some remarkable event, not industrial, nor scientific, nor political. By adopting this plan, he remained within the circle of literary historians. It was impossible for him to form a true theory, that is to say, to establish a real connection between the facts, since those intended to connect all the rest were disconnected from each other.

To the Naturalists, as being of all savants those who are obliged to form the most extended and difficult classifications, are due the chief advances in the general method of classifying. The fundamental principle of this method has been established from the time that botany and zoology produced philosophical classifications, that is to say, classifications based on real relations, and not on hypothetical groupings. The true principle consists in making the order of generality of the different degrees of division conform, as far as possible, to that of the relations observed between the phenomena to be classed. In this view the hierarchy of families, of genera, &c. is nothing but the statement of a coordinated series of general facts, divided into different ranks more and more specialised. In a word Classification then becomes merely the philosophic expression of Science, the progress of which it follows. To know the classification is to know the science, at least in its more important portion.

This principle is applicable to every science. Accordingly Political Science, seeking to attain a solid basis, should profit by this philosophic conception as disclosed, employed, and verified by the other sciences, and take it as a guide in distributing the different ages of civilisation. The grounds for arranging the various epochs of civilisation in reference to the general history of the human race according to their natural relations, exactly resemble those which naturalists employ in arranging the vegetable and animal organisations under one law. In political science, however, they are still more urgent.

For, if an appropriate coordination of facts is of the first importance in every science, it is all in all for political science, which if this condition were unfulfilled would entirely fail in its practical aim. This aim is, as we know, that of determining by the observation of the past the Social System which the progress of civilisation tends to realise in our day. Now this determination can only result from a correct coordination of the anterior states, which govern the law of this progress. It is clear from this view, that political facts, however important they may be, possess no practical value unless coordinated, while in the other sciences the knowledge of facts independently of their mutual relations has, for the most part, a certain utility.

The different epochs of civilisation, then, in place of being distributed, as Condorcet did, without regard to their natural order and merely in reference to events of greater or less importance, ought to be disposed in accordance with the philosophic principle already recognised by savants as that which should govern all classifications. The principal division of epochs should offer the most general view of the history of civilisation. The secondary divisions, to whatever degree it may be deemed advisable to carry them, should offer in succession views more and more special of this same history. In a word the tabular Arrangement of Epochs should be of such a nature as to present, in itself, an abridged expression of the ensemble of the work. The work if it fell short of this would only be provisional, and however well executed would have no value except as a collection of materials.
It is evident that such a division of epochs cannot be invented, and that, even in its most general aspect, it can only spring from a first sketch of the synoptic view, a first coup d'œil over the general history of civilisation. Doubtless, however important, and even indispensable, this method may be, in the formation of positive polity, its application would be impracticable and a provisional work only could be accomplished, if this operation were not already sufficiently prepared. But the histories heretofore written, and particularly those produced within the last half century, although very far from having been conceived in a right spirit, furnish a tolerable equivalent for the preliminary collection of materials. We can therefore immediately undertake the task of a definitive coordination.

In the preceding chapter I have submitted, though under the spiritual aspect only, a general view which, as it seems to me, fulfils the conditions above stated for effecting the primary coordination of the past. It constitutes the first result of a philosophic study of the ensemble of the history of civilisation.

I believe that this history may be divided into three grand epochs, or states of civilisation, each possessing a distinct character, spiritual and temporal. They embrace civilisation at once in its elements and its ensemble, which, as above pointed out, evidently constitutes an indispensable condition of success.

Of these the first is the Theological and Military epoch. In this state of society, all theoretical conceptions, whether general or special, bear a supernatural impress. The imagination completely predominates over the observing faculty to which all right of inquiry is denied.

In like manner, all the social relations, whether special or general, are avowedly and exclusively military. Society makes conquest its one permanent aim. Industrial pursuits are carried on only so far as is necessary for the support of the human race. Slavery, pure and simple, of the producer is the principal institution.

Such is the first great social system produced by the material progress of civilisation. It existed in an elementary shape from the very commencement of regular and permanent societies. In its entirety it becomes completely established only after a long series of generations.

The second epoch is Metaphysical and Juridical. Its general character is that of possessing no well-defined characteristics. It forms a link and is mongrel and transitional.

Under spiritual aspects it has been already characterised in the preceding chapter. Observation is still kept subordinate to imagination, but the former is, within certain limits, allowed to modify the latter. These limits are gradually enlarged, until, in the end, observation conquers the right of examining in every direction. At first it obtains this right in reference to all special theoretical conceptions, and gradually, by force of exercise, to general theoretic ideas, which constitutes the natural termination of the transition. This period is one of criticism and argument.

Under temporal aspects industry in this second epoch becomes more extended, without as yet acquiring the upper hand. Consequently society is no longer frankly military and yet has not become frankly industrial, either in its elements or in its ensemble. The special social relations are modified. Industrial slavery is no longer direct; the producer, still a slave, begins to obtain some rights in his relations with the military. Industry makes fresh advances which finally issue in the total abolition of individual
slavery. After this enfranchisement, the producers still remain subject to a collective arbitrary authority. Nevertheless, the general social relations soon undergo a modification. The two aims of activity, conquest and production, advance pari passu. Industry is at first favoured and protected as a military resource. Later its importance augments; and finally war is regarded and systematically pursued as a means of favouring industry: which is the last term of the intermediate régime.

Lastly, the third epoch is that of Science and Industry. All special theoretic conceptions have become positive and the general conceptions tend to become so. As regard the former observation predominates over imagination; while in reference to the latter observation has dethroned the imagination, without having as yet taken its place.

Under temporal aspects industry has become predominant. All the special relations have gradually established themselves upon industrial bases. Society, taken collectively, tends to organise itself in the same manner, by making production its only and constant aim.

To resume, the last epoch has ended as regards the elements and is commencing as regards the ensemble. Its direct point of departure dates from the introduction of the Positive Sciences into Europe by the Arabs, and the enfranchisement of the Commons, that is to say, from about the eleventh century.

In order to prevent all confusion in applying this general view, we should never lose sight of the fact that civilisation necessarily progressed in reference to the spiritual and temporal elements of the social state, before advancing in regard to their ensemble. Consequently the three great and successive phases were inevitably inaugurated as to their elements before they commenced as to the ensemble, a circumstance which might occasion some confusion if we did not make a large allowance for this unavoidable difference.

Such then are the principal characteristics of the three epochs into which we can divide the entire history of civilisation, from the period when the social state began to acquire real solidity until the present time. I venture to submit to savants this primary division of the past; which appears to me to fulfill the essential conditions of a good classification of the ensemble of political facts.

If this be adopted we must discover at least one sub-division, in order to execute a first sketch of the great historic view. The principal division will facilitate the discovery of those which succeed it, by supplying the means of considering the phenomena from a point of view at once general and positive. It is clear also that, in conformity with the fundamental principle of classification, these different subdivisions should be conceived in the same spirit as the principal division, and constitute simply a development of it.

Having thus appreciated the work of Condorcet as regards the distribution of epochs, we must consider the spirit which presided over its execution.

Condorcet did not perceive that the first direct effort of a work which aimed at the formation of a positive polity should be to destroy for ever the critical philosophy of the eighteenth century, by turning the efforts of thinkers towards the reorganisation of society, as the practical aim of their labours. Consequently, he did not feel that the preliminary condition, the fulfilment of which was indispensable for executing the important enter-
prise, consisted in divesting himself, as much as possible, of the prejudices
introduced into all minds by this negative philosophy. Far from doing so
he allowed himself to be blindly governed by these prejudices. In place
of observing, he condemned the past. Hence his work simply became
a long fatiguing declamation, from which no positive instruction can be
derived.

Admiration and reprobation of phenomena ought to be banished with
equal severity from every positive science, because all pre-occupations of this
sort directly and unavoidably tend to hinder or mislead examination.
Astronomers, physicists, chemists, and physiologists neither admire nor
blame their respective phenomena. They observe them, although these
phenomena may afford ample subject for reflections of each sort; of which
numerous examples may be cited. Savants, with reason, leave such con-
siderations to artists within whose sphere they really fall.

It should be the same in this respect in political science as in the other
sciences. Such exclusion of admiration or reprobation is, however, much
more needed for the former, because there it becomes more difficult, and
affects the investigation more deeply, inasmuch as, in this science, the phe-
nomena are much more closely connected with the passions than in any
other. Thus, the Critical Spirit to which Condorcet yielded is directly con-
trary to that which ought to reign in scientific politics, even though all the
criticisms it makes on the past were well founded. But the mischief does
not stop here.

Doubtless, as has been already remarked in this chapter, the practical
combinations of statesmen have not always been conceived in a suitable
way; and frequently they have even been guided in a sense adverse to
civilisation. This observation, however, merely amounts to this, that
statesmen have endeavoured to continue, beyond their natural existence,
doctrines and institutions no longer in harmony with the state of civilisa-
tion. Assuredly such a mistake will appear very excusable; if we consider
that hitherto no positive mode has existed of discovering that it was an
error. But to apply to systems of ideas and institutions a view applicable
only to facts of secondary importance; to represent, for example, as simply
an obstacle to civilisation, that feudito-theological system which constituted,
the contrary, the most marked provisional progress of society, and
enabled it to affect so many definitive conquests; to hold up the classes
who during a long succession of ages, led the general movement of society
as engaged in a permanent conspiracy against mankind; such a spirit
equally absurd in its principles and revolting in its consequences, is, I say,
the irrational result of the philosophy of the last century, and it is deplor-
able that a man like Condorcet should have been unable to withdraw him-
self from its influence.

This absurdity, springing from the inability to comprehend the natural
connection between the advancing steps of civilisation, manifestly makes it
impossible to explain them. Accordingly the work of Condorcet, generally
speaking, is in constant contradiction with itself.

On one hand it proclaims the state of civilisation reached in the
Eighteenth Century as being in very many respects far superior to its
original condition. But the total progress could only be the sum of the
partial advances effected by civilisation during all the preceding states.
Condorcet, however, almost always, represents these as having been, from
the most essential points of view, periods of retrogradation. We are the
landed in a perpetual miracle, and the progressive march of civilisation becomes an effect without a cause.

In a truly Positive Polity an entirely opposite spirit should prevail.

We should regard institutions and doctrines as having reached, at every period, the greatest perfection compatible with the corresponding civilisation, and this must have been the case, at least after a certain time, since they were necessarily determined by it. Moreover during their greatest vigour, they always manifested a progressive and never a retrograde character. Otherwise they never could have held their ground against the march of civilisation whence their power was derived. Only in the period of their decline they usually exhibited a stationary character, a fact easily explicable, partly by the repugnance to extinction, as natural to political systems as it is to individuals, partly by the state of infancy in which politics have hitherto continued.

We must consider in the same spirit the passions developed at the various epochs by the governing classes. During their greatest vigour the social forces are necessarily generous, for they have nothing more to gain and they have not yet learnt to fear. It is only when their decline commences that they become egotistic, because all their efforts are then directed to preserving a power the foundation of which is sapped.

These views are in evident conformity with the laws of human nature, and alone furnish a satisfactory explanation of political phenomena. In a final analysis, then, instead of regarding the past as a tissue of monstrosities, we should, generally speaking, consider society as having been, on the whole, guided with all the wisdom which the situation allowed.

If, at first sight, some special facts appear to contradict this general fact, it is always more philosophical to endeavour to discover the cause of the seeming deviation than at once to allege the existence of a contradiction. For it would be a departure from established scientific method to subordinate the most important and best established fact to one of secondary nature and less frequent occurrence.

It is evident indeed that this, like every other general idea, should not be used without proper limitations.

Doubtless some resemblance is discoverable between the spirit of positive polity thus regarded, and the famous theologico-metaphysical dogma of Optimism. The analogy is, in truth, real. But there exists an immeasurable difference between a general observed fact and an hypothetical creation of the imagination. The difference becomes still greater when we take the consequences into account.

The theologico-metaphysical dogma by proclaiming as an absolute truth, that everything is as well ordered as possible, tends to make the human race stationary, since it takes away all prospect of real improvement. The positive conception that the social organisation for a certain period during each epoch is as perfect as the state of civilisation permits, by no means checks the spirit of improvement. On the contrary this view imparts in practice a more efficacious impulse, since it directs to their true end,—the perfecting of civilisation,—efforts which would have remained abortive had they been directly applied to social organisation. Besides, such a conception, being neither absolute nor mystical, incites man to reestablish harmony between the political régime and the state of civilisation, in cases where that relation has been temporarily deranged. But it throws light on the operation, by warning us not to mistake the effect for the cause.
In reference to this analogy it is useful to observe that, in other matters also, the positive philosophy can by a suitable transformation, appropriate a general idea originated by the theologico-metaphysical philosophy. True general ideas, however erroneous may be the form they assume, never lose their value as methods of reasoning. The ordinary progress of the human mind consists in adapting them to its different states by transforming their character. We can verify this in all the revolutions which have conducted the different branches of knowledge to the positive state.

Thus, for example, the mystic doctrine of the Influence of Numbers originated by the School of Pythagoreans, has been reduced by geometers to this simpler and positive idea: phenomena which do not offer much complication can be reduced to mathematical laws. In like manner the doctrine of Final Causes has been transformed by physiologists into the principle of conditions of existence. The two positive ideas, doubtless, differ widely from the two theologico-metaphysical ideas. But the latter, no less manifestly, contain the germ of the former. A well conceived philosophical operation sufficed to impart a positive character to these two hypotheses the products of genius in the infancy of the human race. Moreover this transformation, far from impairing, has augmented their value as means of reasoning.

The same reflections are exactly applicable to the two general political ideas, one positive the other fictitious, above compared.

Before terminating our examination of the work of Condorcet, it is well to deduce from it a third point of view under which we may consider the spirit of positive polity.

Condorcet has frequently been reproached with having ventured to terminate his work with a picture of the Future. This bold conception is, on the contrary, the only philosophical view of great importance introduced by Condorcet into his work, and one that ought to be carefully preserved in the new history of civilisation, of which such a picture evidently constitutes the natural conclusion.

The reproach which may with reason be addressed to Condorcet is that of having endeavoured to determine the future, but of having determined it erroneously. This arose from his mode of conceiving the past, which, for the reasons already stated, was completely erroneous. Condorcet, having coordinated the past in a mistaken way, the future could not be deduced from it. This inadequacy of observation obliged him to frame the future in accordance with his imagination, and as a necessary consequence of this he conceived it wrongly. But this want of success, the cause of which is obvious, does not prove that, supposing the past to be rightly coordinated, we cannot determine, with certainty, the general characteristics of the social future.

Such an idea only seems strange because we are not yet accustomed to regard politics as a true science. For, thus regarded, the determination of the future through the philosophic observation of the past, would, on the contrary, strike us as perfectly natural, being familiarised to us by other kinds of phenomena.

All sciences aim at prediction. For the laws established by the observation of phenomena are generally employed to foretell their succession. In truth all men, however little advanced, make predictions, based on the same principle, the forecast of the future from the past. All men, for example, predict the general effects of terrestrial gravity, and a multitude of other phenomena sufficiently simple and usual to reveal their order of succession
to the least capable and attentive spectator. The power of prevision is measured in each person by the extent of his knowledge. The prevision of the astronomer who predicts, with complete accuracy, the condition of the solar system many years in advance, is absolutely the same in kind as that of the savage who predicts the next sunrise. The only difference lies in the extent of their knowledge.

Manifestly then, it is quite in accordance with the nature of the human mind that observation of the past should reveal the future in politics as it has done in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and physiology.

Such a determination of the future should even be regarded as the direct object of political science, as of the other positive sciences. It is clear, in truth, that the ascertainiment of the Social System in which the élite of the human race are in our day called on to take part, constitutes the true practical object of positive politics, and is nothing but a general determination of the future of society regarded as the result of the past.

To resume, Condorcet was the first to conceive the true nature of the general operation required for raising politics to the rank of the sciences of observation; but his execution of this conception was, under the most essential aspects, completely erroneous. The end was entirely missed; first in theory and consequently in practice. Thus this operation must be once more undertaken as a whole, in accordance with a truly philosophical method; Condorcet's attempt being considered merely as an indication of the real end of scientific politics.

In order to complete this brief examination of the efforts hitherto made to raise politics to the rank of the positive sciences, it remains for us to consider two other attempts. These, unlike the two former, do not fall within the true course of intellectual progress in political science; nevertheless, it is useful to mention them.

The necessity for rendering Social Science positive is so evident in our day; this great enterprise has so completely arrived at maturity: that several superior minds have endeavoured to achieve it by treating politics as an application of other sciences, already rendered positive, by bringing it within their sphere. As these attempts, from their nature, could not be realized, they were much oftener projected than followed out. It will therefore be sufficient to consider them from the most general point of view.

The first consisted in the attempt to treat social science by Mathematical Analysis, and in especial by the Calculus of Probabilities. This road was opened by Condorcet, and mainly followed by him. Other geometers pursued his path and shared his hopes, but added nothing essential to his labours, at least under the philosophical aspect. All agreed in regarding this method as the only one adapted to impress a positive character on politics.

The considerations developed in this chapter seem to me to establish sufficiently that the application of mathematical analysis is in no degree necessary to render politics a positive science. We cannot, however, stop here, for it is easy to see that such a mode of regarding social science is purely chimerical and consequently altogether erroneous.

Were it our business to examine here in detail the works of this sort

---

1 Such a project on the part of Condorcet proves, as we have seen in our previous inquiry, that he was far from having clearly conceived the fundamental importance of the History of Civilization. For, had he discerned in the philosophic observation of the past the method of rendering social science positive, he would not have sought this elsewhere.
hitherto executed, we could easily prove that they have added no idea of any value to the mass of acquired knowledge. For example, we should find that the efforts of geometers to press the Calculus of Probabilities beyond its legitimate scope, have only resulted in offering, after long and troublesome calculations, some almost trivial propositions as to the theory of certainty, the truth of which is perceived at once by every man of good sense. But we must confine our examination to the enterprise itself regarded in its greatest generality.

In the first place the considerations by which several physiologists, especially Richat, have shown the entire impossibility, generally speaking, of any real and important application of Mathematical Analysis to the phenomena of organised bodies, are, in a direct and special manner applicable to moral and political phenomena, which are only a particular development of the former.

These considerations are based on the fact that the most indispensable preliminary condition of bringing phenomena within mathematical laws is that their degrees of quantity be fixed. Now in all physiological phenomena every result, whether partial or total, is subject to vast changes in quantity, which succeed each other with the greatest rapidity and in the most irregular manner, under the influence of a multitude of different causes not susceptible of any precise estimate. This extreme variability is one of the leading characteristics of the phenomena peculiar to organised bodies, and constitutes one of the broadest differences between them and unorganised bodies. It manifestly excludes all hope of ever submitting them to real calculations, such, for example, as those relating to astronomical phenomena; the best fitted to serve as a type in comparisons of this sort.

Having laid down this proposition one can easily understand that the perpetual variation of effects,—resulting from the extreme complication of the causes that concur in producing them,—should reach its maximum in reference to the moral and political phenomena of the human race, since these are of all physiological phenomena the most complicated. They are in truth the phenomena of which the quantitative variations are the greatest, the most frequent, and the most irregular.

Weighing these considerations with due care, we may, without forming too low an opinion of human capacity, unhesitatingly affirm that, not merely in the present state of our knowledge, but when this has reached its highest conceivable range, every great application of Mathematics to Social Science is, and will remain necessarily impracticable.

In the second place, even supposing such a hope could be realised, it is incontestably true that in order to realise it, Political Science must first be studied directly, that is to say by endeavouring simply to coordinate the series of political phenomena.

In truth, admitting the high importance of mathematical analysis when rightly employed, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is nothing but a means to an end or a Science of Method. In itself it teaches nothing real; but only becomes a fruitful source of positive discovery when applied to observed phenomena.

Within the sphere of those phenomena which admit of its being applied the application can never take place immediately. It always assumes, in the corresponding science, a preliminary degree of cultivation and improvement, consisting in the knowledge of precise laws discovered by observation relating to the quantity of phenomena. So soon as such
laws have been discovered, however imperfect they may be, mathematical analysis becomes applicable. From that time analysis, affording a powerful instrument of deduction, facilitates the reduction of phenomena to a small number of laws, often to a single law; enables us to bring within its range, with the utmost precision, a multitude of phenomena which at first sight seem not to fall under it. In a word it establishes in the science a complete coordination, unattainable to the same extent by any other means. But it is manifest that any application of mathematical analysis, if attempted before this preliminary condition of the discovery of certain laws of quantity has been fulfilled, would be entirely illusory. Far from rendering any branch of knowledge positive, such a proceeding would only plunge the study of nature into the metaphysical domain by transferring to abstractions what exclusively belongs to observation.

Thus for example we can understand why mathematical analysis has been applied, with great success, to astronomy, geometrical or mechanical, to optics, to acoustics, and quite recently to the theory of heat, as soon as the progress of observation within these various branches of physics established exact and quantitative laws between their phenomena; though before these discoveries, such applications could have had no real basis. In like manner, again, even those chemists who are most deeply convinced of the possibility of applying, at some future day largely, yet in a positive spirit, mathematical analysis to chemical phenomena do not on that account abstain from this direct study. For they are well convinced that a long series of investigations, based on observation and experiment, are essential for arriving at those numerical laws without which such an application of analysis would want a real foundation.

The indispensable condition just indicated is the more difficult of fulfilment, and demands, in each science, a degree of progress and perfection all the greater in proportion as the phenomena are more complicated. In this way, astronomy became, at least in its geometrical portion, a branch of applied mathematics before optics, optics before acoustics, and lastly the theory of heat. So also chemistry in our day is very far from this state, if indeed it can ever reach it.

Estimating therefore, by these indisputable principles, the application of mathematics to physiological phenomena in general, and particularly to the social phenomena of the human race, we see that, even admitting such an application to be possible, it could in no way dispense with a direct study of social phenomena, which, on the contrary, it prescribes as a condition precedent to any mathematical analysis. Moreover, considering with attention the nature of this condition, we shall see it presupposes, as regards the physics of organised bodies in general, and social physics in particular, a degree of perfection which, even if attainable, could manifestly only be attained after ages of cultivation. The discovery of precise and calculable laws in physiology would indicate a degree of progress far beyond what is anticipated even by those physiologists who entertained the highest hopes of the future destiny of this science. In truth, for the reasons above pointed out, such a state of perfection should be regarded as being entirely chimerical, incompatible with the nature of the phenomena, and quite dis proporcioned to the real grasp of the human intellect.

The same reasons evidently apply, with still greater force, to Political Science, having regard to the greater complication of its phenomena. To imagine the possibility of one day discovering quantitative relations between
the phenomena of this science assumes that it can be perfected to such a degree that, even before it had reached that point of perfection, everything really interesting would have been discovered to an extent far exceeding all reasonable expectations. Thus, mathematical analysis would only become applicable at a time when its application could no longer have any real importance.

It results from the preceding remarks that on one hand the nature of political phenomena absolutely forbids all hope of applying to them mathematical analysis, on the other that its application, assuming it to be possible, could not raise politics to the rank of a positive science, since this presupposes the existence of political science.

Up to the present time, Geometers have not sufficiently attended to the great and fundamental division of our positive investigations, into the study of inorganic and of organised bodies. This division, which we owe to physiologists, is now settled on a basis that cannot be shaken, and is established more and more firmly in proportion as it is carefully examined. It limits, in a precise and unalterable way, the true applications of mathematics, even when extended as far as possible. We can establish as a principle the impossibility of extending mathematical analysis beyond the physics of inorganic bodies, the phenomena of which are the only ones which offer the degree of simplicity and consequently of fixity requisite for their reduction to numerical laws.

If we take into account how, even in the simplest applications of mathematical analysis, its progress is embarrassed when we endeavour to bring its abstract results sufficiently into harmony with concrete facts, it will be seen that its real sphere is rather exaggerated than underestimated by the principle above stated.

The idea of treating Social Science as an application of Mathematics in order to give it a political character, had its source in the metaphysical prejudice that outside of mathematics there can be no real certainty. This prejudice was natural at the period when all positive knowledge lay within the sphere of applied mathematics, and when in consequence everything not embraced by them was vague and conjectural. But since the rise of two great positive sciences, chemistry and especially physiology, where mathematical analysis plays no part, and which are not the less felt to be as certain as the rest, such a prejudice is entirely inexcusable.

Astronomy, optics, &c., are not positive and certain sciences because they are applications of mathematical analysis. This character belongs to them in their own nature. It results from their being founded on observed facts, and can only result from that, for mathematical analysis when isolated from the observation of nature has merely a metaphysical character. Undoubtedly, in the sciences to which mathematics are inapplicable, we should keep much closer to the line of simple and direct observation. Deductions cannot be prolonged so far with safety, because the means of reasoning are much less perfect. With this single difference and within proper limits, their certainty is as great. We obtain, no doubt, a less complete coordination, but one sufficient for the real wants of scientific application.

The chimerical search after an unattainable perfection could have no other result but the unavoidable retardation of the progress of the human mind; wasting great intellectual forces and turning the efforts of savants from their efficacious positive direction. Such is the definitive judgment
which, I believe, should be passed on attempts, past or future, to apply mathematical analysis to social physics.

A second attempt, and one in its nature infinitely less misleading than the preceding, but equally unattainable, is that which seeks to give a positive character to Social Science by treating it simply as a direct consequence of Physiology. Cabanis is the author of this conception, and by him chiefly it was elaborated. It forms the true philosophic aim of his celebrated work entitled, 'Relations between the Physical and the Moral in Man'; and will be so regarded by every person who has considered the general doctrine expounded in his work as organic and not purely critical.

The considerations submitted in this chapter on the spirit of Positive Polity prove that this attempt, like the one last noticed, was, of necessity, misconceived. But we must accurately point out its error.

This consists in a disregard of that direct observation of the social past which should supply the fundamental basis of positive politics.

The superiority of man as compared with the other animals has, and in truth can have, no other cause than the relative perfection of his organisation. Therefore everything that the human race has effected, and can effect, must manifestly be regarded as being in the last resort a necessary consequence of organisation modified in its results by external circumstances. In one sense Social Physics, that is to say the study of the collective development of the human race, is really a branch of physiology, or the study of man conceived in its entire extension. In other words the History of Civilisation is nothing but the indispensable result and complement of the Natural History of man.

But if it be important to understand thoroughly and never to lose sight of this incontestable filiation, on the other hand it is a complete mistake to draw the conclusion that it is unnecessary to institute any clear demarcation between Social Physiology and Physiology properly so called.

When physiologists study the natural history of an animal species endowed with sociability,—that of the beavers for example,—they rightly include the history of the collective action exerted by the community. They do not consider it necessary to establish a line of demarcation between the study of the social phenomena affecting the race and that of the phenomena which concern the individual. Such an absence of precise thought does no real harm in this case, although the two orders of phenomena are distinct. For, inasmuch as the civilisation even of the most intelligent among the sociable races is arrested almost at its commencement, mainly by the imperfections of their organization, and secondarily by the preponderance of the human race, so short a series of connected facts offers no difficulty to the coordination of the collective phenomena with the individual phenomena. Thus the general ground for creating divisions calculated to facilitate study,—namely our intellectual inability to follow too long a chain of deductions,—does not here exist.

On the other hand, let us suppose the species of beavers to have become more intelligent, its civilisation developing itself freely, so that a continual chain of progress from one generation to another existed, we shall at once feel the necessity for treating apart the history of the Social Phenomena of the species. As to the earliest generations this study might be connected with that of individual phenomena. But in proportion as we recede from the commencement, the deduction would become more difficult of verifica-
tion, and at last impracticable. This is exactly what takes place in the highest degree with reference to man.

No doubt the collective phenomena of the human race, as well as its individual phenomena, must, ultimately, be traced to the special nature of its organisation. But the condition of human civilisation in each generation directly depends only on that of the preceding, and directly produces only that of the following generation. It is possible to follow this connection, as precisely as is requisite, from the beginning, if we only attempt to establish the immediate relations of the succeeding terms of the series. On the contrary it would entirely exceed our mental force to connect the later and earliest steps of progress if we suppressed all intermediate links.

The rashness of such an enterprise in the study of the race, may be illustrated by a reference to individual phenomena. Assume the case of a physiologist who, convinced that the different phenomena of the successive periods of life are simply the consequence and necessary development of the primitive organisation, should attempt to deduce with precision the history of any given vital epoch from the condition of the individual at his birth, and discard all direct examination of the different periods as not required for the comprehension of the developed state. The error is even more serious as regards the race than it would be in reference to the individual, seeing that the successive terms of the series are both much more complicated and much more numerous in the first than in the second case.

An obstinate perseverance in this impracticable course would not only render it impossible to study the History of Civilisation in a satisfactory manner, but unavoidably lead us into fundamental errors. For, owing to the total impossibility of directly connecting the different states of civilisation with the original and general starting-point as determined by the special nature of man, we should soon be led to attribute to the immediate action of secondary organic circumstances facts that really are remote consequences of the fundamental laws of our organisation.

Thus for example several distinguished physiologists have given an exaggerated importance to characteristics of Race as explaining political phenomena. They have attributed to them national differences, almost invariably due to the inequality of advance in civilisation. Hence the unfortunate error of treating what in truth is but momentary, as if it were unalterable. Such aberrations, of which it would be easy to multiply examples, and which are all derived from the same primitive error in the mode of proceeding, clearly confirm the necessity for separating the study of social from that of ordinary physiological phenomena.

Mathematicians who have attained to philosophical conceptions consider the phenomena of the universe, both organic and inorganic, as embraced by a small number of immutable laws common to them all. On this physiologists with reason observe that, even supposing all these were one day perfectly known, the impossibility of making an uninterrupted series of deductions would necessitate the maintenance of the division between the study of living and that of inert bodies, which is now founded on the diversity of laws. The same reason is directly applicable to the division between social physics and physiology properly so called, in other words between the physiology of the race and that of the individual. The separation is, no doubt, much less marked, since the one is a secondary the other a primary division. But, allowing for this difference of degree, there is a similar impossibility of deduction.
The total insufficiency of this deductive mode of proceeding can be easily verified, if, in place of regarding it merely in relation to the theory of positive politics, we consider its bearing on the Practical Aim of this science, that is to say the determination of the system in accordance with which society should now be reorganised.

No doubt we can demonstrate from physiological laws what is the general state of civilisation most conformable to the nature of the human race. But it is evident from the preceding remarks that we cannot advance farther on this road. Such an idea taken by itself is merely speculative, and cannot practically lead to any real and positive result. For it does not enable us to know positively, how far the human race at present falls short of this point, the course that should be followed to reach it, or the general plan of social organisation corresponding thereto; all matters requiring a direct study of the history of civilisation.

If, notwithstanding, we seek to give a practical basis to this speculative and incomplete conception it becomes impossible to avoid the absolute. For the application of Social Science would thus consist in forming an unvarying type of vague perfection, without any distinction of epochs, after the model of conjectural polity. The conditions by which the excellence of this type is determined are certainly much more positive than those which serve to guide theological and metaphysical polity. But this does not change the absolute character inherent in such a problem, treat it as we may. Politics therefore can never become truly positive in this way.

Thus, whether from the theoretical or practical point of view, it is equally erroneous to conceive Social Science as simply a result of Physiology.

The true and direct relation between the knowledge of the Human Organisation and Political Science, as characterised in this chapter, consists in the fact that the former supplies the latter with its point of departure.

To physiology exclusively belongs the positive demonstration of those causes which render the human race competent to develop a constantly progressive civilisation, so long as the condition of our planet opposes no insurmountable obstacle. Physiology alone can mark out the true character and the general course of this civilisation. Lastly it alone can throw light upon the formation of the primitive aggregations of men, and deduce the history of the childhood of our race down to the period when this gave the first impulse to civilisation by creating Language.

Here naturally stops the office of directly physiological considerations in relation to social physics, which should then be based simply on the immediate observation of the progress of the human race. Beyond the point thus indicated the difficulty of deduction would surpass our forces, because thenceforward the advance of civilisation becomes much more rapid, so that the number of phenomena requiring coordination suddenly augments. On the other hand the office which physiology should perform in the study of the past of society would no longer be necessary, or required to supply the want of direct observation. For reckoning from the creation of language immediate data for tracing the development of civilisation exist, so that no gap occurs to mar the completeness of positive conceptions.

To obtain a complete view of the true office of Physiology in social physics we must add to the preceding remarks another consideration. As Condorcet truly felt, the development of the race,—being only the resultant
of individual development passing from one generation to another,—should, of necessity, present a general likeness to the natural history of the individual. Owing to this analogy the study of man, considered by himself, supplies certain means of verification and reasoning, as regards that of the race, of a kind distinct from those above mentioned, and which, though less important, have the advantage of embracing all epochs.

To resume, although the physiology of the race, and that of the individual constitute two sciences exactly similar in kind, or rather two distinct portions of a single science, it is nevertheless indispensable to conceive and treat them separately. It is necessary that the former should seek its basis and starting-point in the latter, if it would become truly positive. But it should then be studied apart, and repose upon the direct observation of social phenomena.

The attempt to place Social Physics exclusively in the domain of Physiology was natural, when no other way could be found of impressing the former with a positive character. But this error would be without excuse now that we can easily satisfy ourselves of the possibility of rendering Political Science positive by basing it on the immediate observation of the history of society.

In the second place, at the epoch when the study of the intellectual and moral functions was transferred from the sphere of metaphysics to that of physiology, it was difficult to avoid all exaggeration in ascertaining the true domain of physiology and not to include in this the investigation of social phenomena. The period of conquests cannot be that for assigning precise limits. Accordingly Cabaniés, who was one of the chief co-operators in this great revolution, is specially excusable for his illusion on this head. But now when a severe analysis can and ought to succeed to the enthusiasm of the original impulse, nothing should any longer prevent our recognising the necessity for a division indispensably demanded by the weakness of the human intellect.

No real ground now exists for isolating, in the study of the individual, the phenomena specially called moral from the rest. The revolution which has bound them all together must be regarded as the most essential step that physiology has made as yet under the philosophical aspect.

On the contrary, considerations of primary importance demonstrate the absolute necessity of separating the study of the collective phenomena of the human race from that of individual phenomena; while establishing, nevertheless, the natural relations that exist between these two great sections of physiology. The endeavour to dispense with this necessary division would be an error, less serious indeed, but of the same sort as that, so justly combated by true physiologists, which presents the study of living bodies as a mere consequence of and appendix to that of inorganic bodies.

Such are the four chief attempts, made to the present time, to raise politics to the rank of the sciences of observation, and which, taken together, decisively prove the necessity and maturity of this great enterprise. Each, when specially examined from a distinct point of view, confirms the principles already set forth in this chapter as to the true mode of giving a positive character to politics, and consequently of forming with certainty the general conception of the New Social System which can alone terminate the existing crisis of civilised Europe.

We may then take it as demonstrated, both à priori and à posteriori,
that this great result can only be attained by considering Political Science as a special kind of physics based upon direct observation of the phenomena relative to the collective development of the human race. Its aim must be the coordination of the social past, and its result the determination of the system which the march of civilisation tends to produce in our time.

This Science of Social Physics is, evidently, as positive as any other science of observation, and its certainty quite as real. The laws which it discovers, being based on the ensemble of observed phenomena, their application deserves our entire confidence.

This science, like all others, possesses general resources for verification, even independently of its necessary relation with physiology. These resources are based on the fact that in the present condition of the human race, considered as a whole, all degrees of civilisation coexist on different points of the globe, from that of the New Zealand savages to that of the French and English. Thus the connection established by the succession of epochs can be verified by a comparison of places.

At first sight the new science seems to be reduced to simple observation, and wholly deprived of the help of experiment; yet this, as astronomy proves, would not prevent it from becoming positive. But in physiology, setting aside experiments on animals, pathological cases are really equivalent to direct experiment on man, because they change the habitual order of phenomena. In like manner and for similar reasons, the various epochs when political combinations tended more or less to arrest the development of civilisation should be regarded as real experiments in Social Physics, even better fitted than pure observation to manifest or confirm the natural laws which preside over the collective progress of mankind.

If, as I venture to hope, the considerations submitted in this chapter convince savants of the importance and possibility of founding positive political science in the sense above indicated, I shall offer in greater detail my opinion on the mode of executing this first series of operations. But I deem it advisable to repeat the necessity for dividing it into two kinds, the first embracing general conceptions, the second special investigations.

The first kind of investigations should aim at establishing the general progress of mankind, putting aside the various causes that may modify the rate at which civilisation advances and consequently all the differences between nations, however great these may be. The second kind of investigations should aim at estimating the influence of their modifying elements, thus drawing the final picture in which each nation shall fill the special position appropriate to its own development.

Both classes of investigations, but especially the latter, admit of various degrees of generality, the necessity for which will probably make itself apparent to savants.

The propriety of treating the first order of investigations before the second is based on this evident principle,—as applicable to the physiology

1 Doubtless it is superfluous to refute the exaggerated objections presented by different authors, especially by Volney, against the certainty of historic facts. Even supposing these objections could be adopted to the extent urged by those writers, they would not in the least affect the most important and general facts, which alone need be considered in the study of civilisation.
of the race as to that of the individual,—that peculiarities should only be studied after establishing general laws. If this rule were disregarded, we should be obliged to forego the acquisition of any clear conception.

The possibility of proceeding in this way results from the fact that an adequate number of special points have in our day been sufficiently investigated to allow of our attempting their general coordination. Physiologists did not postpone the task of framing a conception of the ensemble of our organisation until all the special functions were known. It ought to be the same in Social Physics.

Stating the foregoing considerations with more precision, we see that they tend to establish the necessity for proceeding from the general to the particular in forming Political Science. Examining this precept in a direct manner, we easily recognise its truth.

The method pursued by the human mind in the investigation of the laws which govern natural phenomena under the point of view we are now considering presents an important difference, according as it occupies itself with the physics of inorganic or of organic bodies.

As regards the former branch, man forms an imperceptible portion of an immense series of phenomena, the entirety of which we can never, without great presumption, hope to grasp. As soon therefore as he begins to study these in a positive spirit, he must consider the most special fact in order gradually to raise himself to the knowledge of some general law, which in turn become the starting-point for fresh investigations. On the other hand in the physics of organised bodies man is himself the most complete type of the ensemble of phenomena. Hence his positive discoveries of necessity begin with the most general facts, which afford him an indispensable assistance in studying a class of details the precise knowledge of which he is, by their nature, for ever precluded from ascertaining. In a word, in both cases, the human intellect proceeds from the known to the unknown; but in the first he rises from the particular to the general, because the knowledge of details is more accessible to him that that of the ensemble; while in the second, he begins by descending from the general to the particular, because he is more intimately acquainted with the whole than with the parts. The perfecting of these two sciences, viewed philosophically, consists in allowing each to adopt the method of the other, although the characteristic method must always have the preference.

Having considered this law from the highest point of view which positive philosophy affords, it admits of an easy verification by observing the development of the Natural Sciences down to the present day, beginning with the moment when each of them definitively ceased to possess the theological or metaphysical character.

In the study of inorganic bodies, considering only its main divisions, we find astronomy, physics, and chemistry at first quite isolated from each other, and afterwards becoming mutually related to such an extent that they now tend to become a single science. In like manner, considering each branch apart, we trace it springing from the study of facts at first incoherent, and gradually reaching the generalisations now known. It is only in astronomy and some sections of terrestrial physics that the human mind has as yet succeeded, to any great extent, in following a different course. It may even be said that in astronomy the original course has only been altered by the law of universal gravitation in a secondary degree, as regards the ensemble of phenomena, though in the most im-
portant way as regards ourselves. For it has not yet embraced, and, in all likelihood, never will bring within the sphere of its applications, the most general astronomical facts, namely the relations of the different solar systems of which we possess no knowledge. This remark, concerning the most perfect branch of inorganic physics, offers a striking verification of the principle above stated.

If we next examine the application of this principle to the study of living bodies its confirmation is equally evident. In the first place the general relations that connect the component functions of an organism are now assuredly better understood than the partial activity of each organ. In like manner, considered from a still more general point of view, the study of the general relations that exist between the various organisms, whether animal or vegetable, is, doubtless, more advanced than that of each special organism. In the second place the main branches of organic physics were at first confounded under one head. Only in consequence of the progress of positive physiology have we succeeded in analysing with precision the different general points of view under which a living body can be considered so as to found a rational division of the science upon these distinctions. So certain is this, that, having regard to the recent date when the physics of organised bodies really acquired a positive character, the distribution of its chief parts has not even yet been clearly settled. The above view is still more apparent in reference to savants than to the sciences, since physiologists are evidently less special in their investigations than the savants devoted to the study of inorganic bodies.

We may therefore consider it established, by observation and reasoning, that the human intellect ordinarily advances from the particular to the general in inorganic physics, but on the contrary from the general to the particular in organic physics; that, at all events, the latter science undoubtedly advances for a long while in this direction from the moment it assumes a positive character.

If, hitherto, the second part of this law has been ignored, if it has been assumed that, in every kind of research, the human mind, of necessity, proceeds from the particular to the general, this error admits of an easy explanation. The physics of inorganic bodies having been, as was natural, first established, the precepts of positive philosophy were naturally based on the observation of its progress. But the continuance of this error would be inexcusable, now that philosophical observation can embrace both orders of natural sciences.

Applying, then, to Social Physics, which is only a branch of physiology, the principle just demonstrated, it proves that in studying the development of the human race we must commence by coordinating the most general facts, descending from these to deductions of increasing speciality. But, in order that there may be no uncertainty as to this essential point, we shall do well to verify the principle directly for the particular case.

All historical works hitherto written, even the best of them, have merely had and could only have the character of annals; that is to say they described, in chronological order, a certain series of special facts, more or less important and correct, but always isolated from each other. No doubt considerations relating to the coordination and the filiation of political phenomena have not been wholly neglected, especially during the last half-century. But it is clear that this introduction of new ideas has not, as yet, remoulded the character of this sort of composition which still
wears the literary stamp. As yet there exists no true history, conceived in
a scientific spirit, that is to say aiming at the discovery of those laws which
regulate the social development of the human race; the object of the series
of investigations considered in this chapter.

The distinction thus pointed out suffices to explain why it was, almost
universally, believed up to the present time, that in history we should pro-
ceed from the particular to the general, and why, on the contrary, we ought
now to proceed from the general to the particular, under the penalty of ob-
taining no result.

For when we only endeavour to frame with accuracy general Annals of
the human race, we should manifestly begin by constructing those of the
different nations, which in turn can only be founded on provincial and civic
chronicles or even on simple biographies. In like manner, in order to form
complete annals of each portion of the population, it is indispensable to
group a series of separate documents relative to each point of view under
which they ought to be considered. In this way we ought, unquestionably,
to proceed in order to collect the general facts that form the materials of
Political Science, or rather the objects with which its combinations are
concerned. But a wholly opposite course becomes indispensable, as soon as
we aim at the direct formation of the science, that is to say, the study of
the connection of the phenomena.

In truth, from their very nature, all kinds of social phenomena develop
themselves simultaneously, and under the influence of each other, so that it
is absolutely impossible to explain the course pursued by any of them with-
out having first formed a general conception of the progress of the whole.

For example, everyone knows, in our day, that the reciprocal action of
the different European states is too important to allow of their histories
being really separated. But the same impossibility is not less apparent in
reference to the different kinds of political facts subsisting in a separate
society. Is there not a manifest connection between the advance of one
science or art and that of the other sciences or arts? Is not the progress
of the study of nature related to that of our command over nature? Are
not both intimately bound up with the condition of the social organisation,
and reciprocally? Therefore in order to ascertain with precision the real
laws affecting the development of the simplest branch of society, we ought
to reach the same degree of precision for the rest; which is evidently absurd.

On the contrary we should make it our primary aim to conceive, in its
greatest generality, the development of the human race, that is to say to
observe and connect with each other the most important advances it has
successively made in different directions. Next we should endeavour gradu-
ally to impart to this picture an increasing degree of precision; subdividing,
with greater distinctness, the lines of separate observation and the phe-
nomena to be observed. In like manner in a practical point of view, the
picture of our social future, at first determined in a general manner, by a
primary study of the past, will become more and more detailed, in proportion
as our knowledge of the antecedent progress of the human race increases.
The final perfection of the science,—one which in all likelihood will never

1 I am here only seeking to establish a fact, not to judge it. Besides, I am
well convinced of the utility, and even of the absolute necessity, of this class of
writings considered as preliminary operations. But it is equally certain that
annals are no more history than collections of meteorological observations are
physics.
be completely attained,—would consist, as regards theory, in conceiving with precision the Filiation which, from the commencement, connects the advances made by each generation with those of the preceding and succeeding generations, embracing the entire body politic, every science, art, and portion of the political organisation. As regards practice, such perfection would consist in a rigorous determination, embracing every essential detail, of that system which by the natural progress of civilisation ought to prevail as the Final Social System.

Such is the method strictly prescribed by the nature of Social Physics.
FOURTH PART.

(October 1825.)

PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SCIENCES AND SAVANTS.

In whatever way we study the general development of the human intellect, whether according to the rational method or empirically, we discover, despite of all seeming irregularities, a fundamental Law to which its progress is necessarily and invariably subjected. This law consists in the fact that, the mental constitution of man, and every portion of it, of necessity, passes through three successive phases, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive or physical. Thus man began by considering phenomena of every kind as due to the direct and continuous influence of supernatural agents; he next regarded them as products of different abstract forces, residing in the bodies but distinct and heterogeneous; while he ends by viewing them as subjected to a certain number of natural and invariable laws, which are merely the general expression of the relations observed in their development.

All who have adequately studied the state of the human mind at the various epochs of civilisation will easily verify the correctness of this general statement. A very simple observation suffices to guide us to this verification now that the revolution has been effected in reference to the larger portion of our ideas. The education of the individual, so far as this is spontaneous, necessarily presents the same essential phases as that of the race and vice versa. Now at the present day everyone who is on a level with his time can easily see by his own experience, that he was during his infancy a theologian, in his youth a metaphysician, and has become a physical thinker in his mature age. The history of the sciences proves that the same has taken place in reference to the human race. But in addition to this fact, it is possible to explain why the formation of human ideas necessarily followed this course.

In order to comprehend this inevitable concatenation, we must consider the above law, like all other social facts, from a twofold point of view: under the physical aspect, as being inevitable and flowing from the natural laws of human organisation, and under the moral aspect, as being indispensable, and constituting the only mode adapted to the development of the human mind.

Under the first of these aspects the law is easily intelligible.

A natural and irresistible instinct disposes the human race to adopt theological before reaching physical philosophy. The personal action exerted by man on other beings is the only kind of which he comprehends the modus operandi; through his consciousness of it. He is thus led to conceive in an analogous way the reaction which external bodies exert upon
himself, and likewise the action they exert upon each other, of which he can only see the results. At all events he must conceive them in this way until the progress of observation has revealed the striking differences that separate these phenomena from his own. If, subsequently, he alters his conceptions on this subject, it is only because having been discredited by experience and reflection of original illusions, he entirely renounces the attempt to penetrate the mystery which envelope the mode of producing phenomena—all knowledge of their nature being for ever inaccessible to him.—for the mere observation of their effective laws. Even, at the present time, after all our advance in positive notions, if we endeavoured, in reference to the simplest phenomena to understand how the fact we name a cause engenders the other fact we name an effect, we should be unavoidably compelled to resort to images analogous to those which served as the basis of the primitive human theories: as Barther, generalising an idea of Hume, has judiciously remarked.

Man, then, necessarily begins by regarding all the bodies which attract his attention as so many living beings, animated with a life resembling his own; but, generally speaking, more intense, by reason of their greater activity. Afterwards, continued observation leads man to convert this primitive hypothesis into another, less enduring one, that namely of a dead nature guided by a larger or smaller number of invisible superhuman agents, distinct and independent of one another, corresponding in attributes and authority to the kind and extent of the phenomena attributed to their agency. This theory, originally applied only to the phenomena of external bodies, is at a subsequent period extended even to those of social and individual man, as soon as our range of thought has embraced these. Then it is that Theological Philosophy begins to acquire real consistency and to influence powerfully the progress of the human mind.

But the inevitable and continued improvement of our knowledge of nature before long modifies and in the end destroys this system.

In truth, man has never been entirely in the theological condition. Some phenomena have always existed, so simple and regular, that, from the first, he could only consider them as subjected to natural laws, in the way which Adam Smith has well explained.1 But such phenomena were at the outset neither the most numerous nor the most important. As to other phenomena, it may be said that man had recourse to theological explanations only so long as physical conceptions were impossible. Whenever they became attainable, he adopted them exclusively.

The first effect of the progress of observation was to dispose the human mind gradually to reduce the number of supernatural agents; attributing to one the operations which originally demanded several, according as the relations of phenomena acquired greater generality. This result, pushed as far as possible, finally simplified the theological system so far as to reduce it to unity.

From this period, the continuous action of the identical principle which at first guided the human mind from Fetishism to Polytheism, and finally from Polytheism to Theism, led him to enjoin the intervention of the great

---

1 See in his Posthumous Works the 'Philosophical Essay on the History of Astronomy.' This work, too little known on the Continent, and generally insufficiently appreciated, is more positive in its character than the other productions of Scottish philosophy, those of Hume excepted. Remarkable in its day it may even yet be studied with great advantage.
supernatural cause within limits more and more narrow, always reserving its application for those phenomena whose laws remained unknown. As to all other phenomena, when the discovery of their laws permitted their accurate prediction, and consequently allowed men to regulate them more completely than theological theories could do, he discontinued, more and more, the employment of those in his habitual speculations and resorted increasingly to the conceptions which ministered more completely to his two grand necessities,—prevision and action. Finally, from the time that natural conceptions acquired sufficient extension and generality (that is to say in our own day), and embraced in their essentials all the objects of investigation really accessible to us, the human intellect, extending analogically to all, even unknown, phenomena, what had only been verified for a certain number, considered all of them as subject to physical laws, the discovery of which, with increasing accuracy, became thenceforward the only reasonable object of our speculative labours. From that time the Theological Method, which had not entirely ceased to be employed, was considered inapplicable to our investigations, and the Positive Method began exclusively to direct the action of our intelligence.

Having thus considered this great revolution as inevitable, it is necessary to explain why it was indispensable to the development of the human reason. The Positive Method has in our day obtained so complete an ascendancy over the intellect that we find a difficulty in understanding why the Theological and Metaphysical Philosophy were at any period useful, if less necessary, as an instrument of research. They, but especially the former, are almost universally regarded as aberrations of the intellect, even by the small number of thinkers who perceive that they were unavoidable. It is, then, necessary to rectify our conceptions on this important point, since, if it be not explained, we could understand the law of the succession of the three philosophies very imperfectly and in a way greatly to limit the extent and value of its applications. It is, without doubt, important to prove that the human mind has not continued down to our time in a state of madness; and that at each epoch it has constantly employed that method which was most favourable to its progress, at least as regards the general scope of its efforts.

Assuredly it cannot now be denied that observation of facts is the only solid basis for human knowledge. Taking this principle in its most rigorous sense, we may say with strict truth that no proposition which does not admit of being reduced to a mere enunciation of fact, particular or general, can have any real or intelligible sense. But it is no less certain that the development of the Imagination must precede that of Observation. The causes which necessitate this order in the education of the individual, render it still more indispensable in that of the race.

The positive method is the safest and even the only safe one; but it is, at the same time, the slowest, and for this reason quite unsuitable to the infancy of the human mind. If this be appreciably felt even when our intelligence has long been in full activity, we can easily see that it must have been so much more decidedly at the period of our earliest efforts. The mere possibility of such a method presupposed a series of observations, prolonged in proportion as the most elementary natural laws demand more time for their discovery. On the other hand, whatever may be asserted to the contrary, pure empiricism is impossible. Unless man connects facts with some explanation, he is naturally incapable not merely of combining and making
deductions from them, but even of observing and recollecting them. In a word it is as impossible to make continuous observations without a theory of some kind, as to construct a positive theory without continuous observations. It is therefore plain that the human mind would have unavoidably remained in a perpetual torpor, had it been compelled to defer all reasoning about phenomena until their relations, and the mode of investigating them, could be derived from observation. Accordingly the earliest advances of the human intellect could not be effected in any other way than the theological method, the only one susceptible of spontaneous development. It alone possessed the important property of presenting from the outset a provisional theory, vague and arbitrary, it is true, but direct and easy, which immediately grouped the primary facts and, by cultivating our faculties of observation, prepared the advent of a positive philosophy.

Were it possible here to enter into some details on this great subject, we should see clearly that the Theological Philosophy, as a whole, not only was indispensable for preparing the development of the positive method; but that its various improvements, the result of accumulating observations, by a necessary reaction contributed much to accelerate these. To mention only the most remarkable example, it is evident that unless Polytheism had risen to Theism, natural theories could never have developed themselves. This admirable simplification of theological philosophy reduced the action of the chief supernatural power, in each special case, to a certain general direction, the character of which was unavoidably vague. Thus the human mind was authorised, and even strongly impelled, to study the physical laws of each class of phenomena regarded as a mode of action of this power. On the contrary, before this epoch, since the positive investigation of even the simplest phenomena encountered so many special and minute theological explanations, every physical enquirer was unavoidably an irreligious person.

The necessity for pursuing this course becomes still more evident if we consider that the theological philosophy was, not merely the only one possible, but the only one adapted to the nature of those researches which of necessity first engaged the human mind.

Except by experience, based on the very exercise of his faculties, man could not learn their true limits. Originally he is always disposed to overestimate their extent. This disposition is, at that time, singularly strengthened by his ignorance of natural laws, which gives rise to the hope of exercising over nature a power, so to speak, unbounded. In this mental state the only investigations which seem worthy of seriously occupying the human intellect are those relating to the origin and end of the universe, and all its phenomena. In truth they alone are fitted to do so. At first we are amazed to find such temerity united to such profound ignorance. Further reflection, however, shows us the impossibility of supplying a motive sufficiently energetic to engage and sustain the human intellect at its earliest stage in theoretical researches without the powerful attraction inspired by these vast problems, that seem to comprehend all others, and even without the chimerical hopes of indefinite power connected with their solution. Kepler had a lively sense of this necessity as regards Astrology in connexion with Astronomy, and Berthollet has made the same remark as to Alchemy in reference to Chemistry. But let the explanation have what value it may, the fact, itself incontestable, suffices to prove how completely the theological philosophy is alone adapted to the primitive condition of the human intellect. For the essential feature of positive philosophy is precisely that
of regarding all these great questions as insoluble by the human mind.
Interdicting our intelligence from all enquiries into the first and final causes
of phenomena, it confines its operations to the discovery of their actual
relations. It is therefore evident that, had it even been possible, at the
outset, to choose between these two methods, the human mind would not
have hesitated to reject with disdain that which, promising little and in its
nature slow, harmonises badly with the extent and eagerness of our intellec-
tual requirements in their earliest stage.

The preceding reflections therefore prove that, having regard only to
the Philosophic Conditions of the development of the human mind, it was
long necessary to employ the theological method before taking for its
guidance the positive method. But this necessity becomes still more
evident, if we also take into account Political Conditions, no less indispens-
able than the former for the intellectual growth of mankind.

The spiritual development of man apart from his temporal development,
as likewise the progress of the intellect apart from that of society, can
only be separately studied by a mental abstraction; for these two move-
ments, though distinct, are not independent, but, on the contrary, exercise
reciprocal influence indispensable to each of them.

It is not sufficient to state the general proposition that the cultivation of
the intelligence is only possible in society, and by society. We should also
recognise that the nature and extent of social relations at each epoch deter-
dine the character and rate of our spiritual progress, and reciprocally. For
everyone now knows that no real and durable progress of the human
mind is conceivable in a condition of society where each person is constantly
obliged to provide his own subsistence. For in that state there can be no
separation of theory and practice; the primary condition of mental develop-
ment. But among pastoral, and even among agricultural populations
whose mode of living has overcome the original obstacle, this fundamental
condition is often far from being realised. It is further necessary that the
social organisation should be sufficiently advanced to allow of the regular
establishment of a class of men who, being freed from the cares of material
production and of war, can dedicate themselves uninterruptedly to the con-
templation of nature. In a word, on this head, as on many others of no less
importance, the formation of human science presupposes a complicated state
of society. But, on the other hand, no real and coherent society can form
and maintain itself except under the influence of some system of ideas,
fitted to surmount the opposition of individualising tendencies. Always so
strong at the outset, and to make these concur in maintaining a settled
order. This essential function could therefore only be fulfilled by a philos-
ophic theory which should dispense with that slow preliminary elabora-
tion necessary for the development of real knowledge, but demanding
the prolonged duration of a regular and complete political order. Such is
the admirable character of the theological philosophy, as distinguished from
all others. To it we must naturally ascribe the original establishment of
all social organisation. Deprived of the powerful and happy influence which
it alone can exert on men in the infancy of nations, we can imagine no per-
manent social classification fitted to sustain and stimulate, up to a certain
point, the advance of the human faculties. From the point of view which
we are now considering, what other influence but that of theological
doctrines could, in the midst of a population of warriors and slaves, admit
of and maintain the existence of a corporation simply occupied with intel-
lectual labours, far less secure to it a preponderance alike indispensable to its earliest operations, and to the stability of society?

Thus, having regard to the conditions, whether moral or political, of the development of the human intellect, we find that its activity, of necessity, began with theological philosophy, before reaching positive philosophy. It is easy to demonstrate, with equal certainty, that the human mind could only pass from one to the other by employing the Metaphysical Philosophy.

Theological and positive conceptions are too heterogeneous, nay too antagonistic, to allow of our intelligence,—which only advances by almost imperceptible degrees,—passing from one to the other without intermediate steps. Such intermediate steps have been, and could only be, metaphysical conceptions. These, belonging at once to theology and physics, or rather being nothing but the former modified by the latter, are by their very nature eminently fitted to second this operation, in which all their utility consists.

Theological philosophy, placing itself at the prime source of all phenomena, is essentially occupied in unfolding their efficient causes, while positive philosophy,—laying aside all search after causes, as being inaccessible to the human mind,—is exclusively occupied in discovering laws, that is to say, the constant relations of similitude and succession which subsist between facts. Between these two points of view is naturally interposed the metaphysical, which regards each phenomenon as the product of an abstract force peculiar to itself. This method is valuable from the facility it gives for reasoning on phenomena, without directly considering supernatural causes, which the human mind was thus enabled gradually to eliminate from its combinations.

In point of fact, it is by such a process that this change has been effected in all intellectual departments. As soon as the progress of observation enabled man to generalise and simplify his theological conceptions, in each class of phenomena the primitive Supernatural Agent was replaced by a corresponding Entity, to which thenceforward attention was exclusively directed. These entities were, at first, a kind of emanations from the supreme power. But, thanks to their indeterminate character, they were finally spiritualised so as to be no longer regarded as anything but abstract names for phenomena. This transformation took place in proportion as the increase of natural knowledge manifested the emptiness of such a mode of explaining facts, and at the same time permitted the substitution of another for it. Thus metaphysics became a mode of transition, at once natural and indispensable, from theology to physics. Its triumph is on one hand the unmistakable sign, on the other the direct cause, of the decline of the former and the rise of the latter.

The above considerations clearly prove that theological and metaphysical theories constituted an indispensable preparation for the human mind; but they also show that these doctrines could have had no other destination since their development has only been a continuous and progressive advance towards positive theories. Their very fitness as guides for the infancy of human reason renders them powerless as guides for its mature state. Once the intellect abandons a theory, it is never again taken up. The vigour and influence of a method should be measured by the number and importance of its applications. Methods which produce no results are soon entirely abandoned. Now, seeing that during at least two centuries those
Theologico-metaphysical methods, which presided over our earliest intellectual efforts, have become entirely sterile; seeing that the most exclusive and important discoveries, those which do most honour to the human mind, have, since this epoch, entirely resulted from the employment of the Positive Method, this fact alone clearly proves that to the latter must henceforward belong the exclusive direction of human thought.

While rendering full justice to the important and innumerable services of every kind heretofore rendered by theology and metaphysics, it cannot be concealed that our intellect is not destined to compose theogonies indefinitely, or for ever to content itself with logomachies. To acquire the most exact and complete knowledge attainable of the laws of nature, and thus to discover the influence which the human race is destined to exercise over the external world, such are the true and constant objects of the efforts of human genius when its preparatory education has terminated. Positive philosophy is, then, the definitive state of man, and should only cease with the activity of our intelligence. The interest with which it inspires us, is perfect harmony with our spiritual wants, are such, that, from the time of its earliest formation by the discovery of some great laws, the most distinguished intellects renounce, with singular facility, the seductive hopes of an absolute and transcendental knowledge offered by theology and metaphysics, and seek with ardour the pure-intellectual satisfaction attached to real and precise science. In our day it is doubtless unnecessary to insist much on proofs of a tendency which manifests itself at every moment and is a thousand ways, even in the least advanced mind. Wherever positive conceptions have been placed in competition with mystical and vague conceptions, disgust with the latter has speedily manifested itself.

From the considerations, then, above indicated, results the demonstration, theoretical and experimental, of the grand fact above enunciated: the human intellect naturally passes successively, in every department of its activity, through three different theoretic phases—the theological state, the metaphysical state, and the positive state. Of these the first is provisional, the second transitory, and the third definitive.

This fundamental Law should henceforth be, in my opinion, the starting-point of all philosophical researches about man and society.

Inasmuch as the theological and metaphysical doctrines still maintain some activity, or at least considerable influence, it is evident that this important revolution is not terminated. To what extent is it so? What remains to complete its accomplishment? This has now to be investigated.

The present is not the place for examining by what series of operations so great a change has been produced. It is sufficient to fix our ideas by

1 Already at the end of the sixteenth century Bacon compared theological conceptions to virgins consecrated to the Lord, who had become sterile. In our time, he would assuredly have extended the comparison to metaphysical conceptions, the sterility of which is equally evident.

2 Language which, historically considered, presents a faithful picture of the human intellect, furnishes us with clear proof of this. The word 'science,' which, at first, was applied only to theologico-metaphysical speculations, and subsequently to the researches of pure erudition which they engendered in our day, when employed without qualification, imports, even in common acceptation, only the positive branches of knowledge. Whenever another signification is sought to be imposed upon this word, it becomes necessary to have recourse to periphrases, the use of which clearly proves that, in the view of the existing public, true knowledge above consists in positive conceptions.
noting a fact. It is to the movement of the human intellect, determined by the precepts of Bacon, the conceptions of Descartes, and the discoveries of Galileo,—a movement which was itself only the final and inevitable result of all the anterior labours,—that we must refer the direct origin of a truly positive philosophy, that is to say, of a philosophy disengaged from that theologico-metaphysical alloy which had theretofore more or less debased natural theories.

During the two centuries elapsed since this memorable epoch the various branches of knowledge have at last reached the positive state. But if, for our present object, it is of little consequence how this transformation has been effected, it is on the other hand very important to remark carefully in what order our different kinds of ideas have been transformed; since this notion is indispensably necessary for completing our knowledge of the law above stated.

On this head a very simple and natural course is observable.

Our different conceptions have successively become positive in the same order in which they became, first theological, then metaphysical. This order corresponds to the degree of facility which the study of the correlative phenomena presents. It is determined by their greater or less complication, their greater or less dependence, their degree of speciality, and their more or less direct connection with man—four grounds, which, though each exerting its distinct influence, are at bottom inseparable. Here, then, we have the classification which is dictated by the nature of the phenomena, such as we now know them to be.

Astronomical phenomena are at once the most simple, the most general, and the most remote from man: they influence all the rest without being influenced by them, at least in any degree appreciable by us; they obey one law only, the most universal in nature, that of gravitation. After them come the phenomena of terrestrial physics properly so called, which are mixed up with the preceding class and besides obey special laws more limited in their results. Next come chemical phenomena, dependent on both of the preceding, and in which we discover a fresh series of laws, concerning affinities, less extensive in their range. Lastly come physiological phenomena in which we observe all the laws of physics, celestial and terrestrial, and of chemistry, but modified by other laws peculiar to themselves, the sphere of which is still more limited.

From this simple exposition it follows that our conceptions, assuming one or other of the three general forms above designated, may have acquired a considerable extension in reference to the inferior portions of the encyclopaedic scale without having developed themselves in reference to the higher. The former conceptions are independent of the latter; while, on the other hand, they cannot have been formed as to the higher phenomena, without having first acquired a certain degree of consistency with respect to the lower, the influence of which must unavoidably be taken into account in every theory. This classification, therefore, inevitably determines the order of development of each of the three philosophies. The facts are in accordance with this theory, as it is easy to verify. The verification is more particularly easy as regards the positive philosophy, the recent formation of which, being naturally slower, presents more distinct intervals.

Observing, from this point of view, the progress of the human mind during the last two centuries, we perceive that Astronomy was the first to become a positive science; then Physics; next Chemistry; and, lastly, in our
own time, Physiology. Such is the present condition of intellectual development.

In order to ascertain with the necessary precision the exact stage which this great revolution has reached, we must, as regards the last science, distinguish between the portion which concerns the intellectual and affective functions and that which embraces the organic functions.

The Moral Phenomena were the latest of all to pass out of the domain of theology and metaphysics and enter into that of physics. This was, doubtless, conformable to the encyclopedic scale above laid down. But if this circumstance makes the transformation less apparent in reference to these phenomena, the fact is no less real, though as yet unobserved by the majority of thinking people. All who are truly on a level with their age, are aware that physiologists, in our day, study moral phenomena exactly in the same spirit as the other phenomena of animal life. Extensive labours have been undertaken in this direction, and pursued with ardour for the last twenty years; positive conceptions, more or less fruitful, have sprung up; schools have spontaneously arisen to develop and propagate such ideas; in a word, all the signs of human activity have unequivocally revealed themselves in reference to moral physiology. It would serve no purpose here to take a side for or against any of the views which divide opinion, as to the kind, number, extent, and reciprocal influence of the organs assignable to the various functions, whether intellectual or affective. No doubt, on these points the science has not yet definitively constructed its basis: only some generalities, inadequate though valuable, have been solidly established. But the very existence of this diversity of theory, evincing an uncertainty unavoidable in every young science, clearly proves that the great philosophic revolution has been accomplished for this branch of our knowledge, as for all others, at least in the intellectual vanguard of the human race, whose example is, sooner or later, followed by the masses. For, amidst their divergencies, the positive method is admitted on all hands to be that alone admissible. Everyone recognizes that the only legitimate aim is the combination of the anatomical with the physiological point of view. Theology and metaphysics are, by common consent, eliminated from the question; at least they never play any important part, and, whatever may be the final result of the discussion, it can only diminish their influence. In a word, these discussions being confined within the domain of science, philosophy has no further concern with them.

I have particularly insisted on this last philosophical fact for two reasons. First, because it has hitherto been rarely observed and, not unfrequently, even disputed. Secondly because it furnishes to everyone who has rightly comprehended my classification of the sciences, at once a new proof, indirect indeed but unanswerable, and a clear résumé of the entire intellectual transformation.

Having thus shown by facts the point which the formation of positive philosophy has now reached, we must consider what remains to be done for its completion.

The natural series of phenomena furnishes, so to speak, of itself the reply to this question.

The four great classes of observation already established do not embrace, at least in express terms, all the points of view under which existing beings can be considered. We evidently miss the social point of view as regards beings which can be so regarded, and especially man. It is, however, equally clear
that this omission is the only one. Thus we already possess celestial physics; terrestrial physics, mechanical and chemical; vegetable physics; animal physics. We still need one physical science,—social physics,—in order to complete the natural sciences. This condition once fulfilled, we can, resuming all our various conceptions, at last construct a true Positive Philosophy, capable of satisfying every real requirement of our intelligence. Thenceforward the human intellect will be no longer obliged to recur on any subject to the theological or the metaphysical method, which, having lost all their utility, will cease to exist, except historically. In a word, the human mind will then have entirely completed its intellectual education, and can directly pursue its definitive destination.

Such are the important considerations which it is now my duty to develop.

My present limits do not permit me to characterise, completely, the spirit and method which specially appertain to this last branch of natural philosophy. To prevent all confusion I simply remark that I understand Social Physics to mean that science which occupies itself with the study of social phenomena,1 considered in the same light as astronomical, physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena, that is to say as being subject to natural and invariable Laws the discovery of which is the special object of its researches. Thus it directly seeks to explain, as precisely as possible, the great phenomena of the development of the human race, under all its essential aspects, that is to discover by what necessary chain of successive transformations the human race, starting from a condition barely superior to that of a society of great apes, has been gradually led up to the present stage of European civilisation. The essence of this science consists in regarding the thorough study of the past as furnishing the true explanation of the present and a general indication of the future. Always considering social facts, not as subjects for admiration or criticism, but as subjects for observation, this science alone concerns itself with establishing their mutual relations, and appreciating the influence which each exerts on human development as a whole. In reference to practice, social science, setting aside all absolute ideas of good or evil institutions, considers them as being always relative to a definite condition of society and varying with it. At the same time, it considers them as always capable of springing up spontaneously by the mere force of their antecedents, independently of any direct political intervention. Its applications therefore simply aim at a demonstration of the various tendencies peculiar to each epoch in accordance with the natural laws of civilisation and observation. These general results become in their turn the positive starting-point for the labours of the statesman. He seeks simply to discover and institute the practical forms which correspond to the fundamental conditions in order to avoid, or at least to soften as much as possible, the more or less serious crises, that spring out of the natural course of events, when this has not been anticipated. In a word, in

1 Social phenomena, as belonging to man, are no doubt included under physiological phenomena. For this reason social physics must necessarily start from individual physiology and maintain continual relations with this science. Nevertheless, the former must be considered and cultivated as an entirely distinct science, by reason of the progressive influence of human generations upon each other. This influence, which in social physics is the preponderating consideration, cannot be rightly studied from the physiological point of view.
this as in every other order of phenomena, science leads to forethought, and forethought allows us to regulate action.

In order to make this general view really useful, I must add to the above description, unavoidably imperfect, of the nature of Social Science, a succinct intimation of the fundamental principle which pervades the Positive Method characteristic of this science. It is this—the intellect, in investigating social laws, must proceed from the general to the particular, that is to say, must begin by apprehending in its ensemble the entire development of the human race, distinguishing at the commencement only a very small number of successive states. Afterwards it must gradually descend, increasing the numbers of intermediate steps, with ever increasing precision, the natural limit of which would be the interval of a single generation in the coordination of the terms of this great series. Such a mode of proceeding is essentially common to all parts of the physics of organised bodies, but it is peculiarly necessary in Social Physics.¹

Such then, so far as I can here point out, is the nature of the new physical science, destined to complete the system of our positive knowledge. After giving this definition, which I consider indispensable in order to fix our ideas, it is easy to explain why this last branch of natural philosophy could not be sooner constituted, and why also it must inevitably begin in our time.

Social theories, even regarded under a purely philosophical aspect, necessarily preserved longer than the rest the theologico-metaphysical character, in accordance with the law of formation above established. For their phenomena manifestly occupy the last rank in our encyclopedic scale, as being at once the most complicated, the most special, the most immediately connected with man, and the most dependent on all the rest. It is undoubtedly inconceivable that the human mind should attain to positive ideas about social phenomena, without having first acquired a sufficiently extended knowledge of the fundamental laws of the human organisation. But this knowledge presupposes the previous discovery of the chief laws of the inorganic world. And these, moreover, directly influence the character and conditions of human societies.

Readers accustomed to the consideration of natural laws, will easily feel the extent and force of this universal and profound relation. To indicate only one very marked case, where, however, the relation is least obvious, it is easy to convince oneself that astronomical phenomena by their great generality exert a preponderating influence over social phenomena. Their laws could not be changed, in the slightest degree, without introducing a profound alteration in the nature and development of human societies. For example, who does not see that the movement of the earth, at first ignored and afterwards discovered, must have deeply influenced our entire intellectual system? It may even be said that the simplest circumstances affecting form or position, insignificant as part of astronomical order, possess a supreme importance in the political order. Let us suppose a variation of some degrees in the obliquity of the ecliptic, which would redistribute climate; a

¹ Besides, the nature of social physics may be easily apprehended if we consider it as established by the fundamental Law above expounded. For on this supposition the science has already come into existence. The discovery of this law, its truth being admitted, constitutes the first direct step in social physics, since it presents a primary link of the most general description, between the phenomena of society.
slight increase or diminution in the distance of the earth from the sun, changing
the length of the year and the temperature of the globe, and as a probable
consequence the duration of human life; or let us suppose many other
similar modifications, astronomically speaking of very small moment; it is
manifest that the course of human development must then have differed
widely from its actual one. We can easily multiply similar hypotheses, of
every sort, adapted to exhibit the real interdependence of the various order
of phenomena. They will readily show that the conditions of existence of
human societies are in a necessary and continuous relation, not only, as is
evident, with all the laws of our organisation, but with all the physical or
chemical laws of our planet, and those of the solar system of which it forms
a part. So intimate is this relation that, if any important change arose in
even one of those numberless influences of every kind under the absolute
dominion of which our societies exist, the development of the human race
would be profoundly changed; assuming even the absence of any variations
which might affect its existence.

It is therefore evident that social phenomena by their very nature could not
be reduced to positive theories before a similar revolution had been effected
for astronomical, physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena. Seeing
that such a transformation has only been effected in reference to these last
in our time, and is hardly yet commenced for moral phenomena, the
theory of which is indispensable to social physics, it is easy to understand
why this science has been hitherto unattainable.

This explanation becomes still more clear if we consider another circum-
stance altogether peculiar to social phenomena. In truth their positive study
became possible only when the growth of the human race had reached a stage
sufficiently advanced to disclose some natural laws of succession. If we
endeavour to measure the influence of this condition it seems to me that
the experimental basis of social physics could not have been sufficiently
extensive had it not embraced the entire development of the human race
down to our time. This conjecture is demonstrable to all who admit the
law above stated; for this law could not manifest itself until the revolution
it involved had been entirely undergone by the human mind, in reference to
the greater part of our ideas. Now this brings us exactly to the epoch
indicated by other grounds.

The same considerations which explain the causes that have hitherto
hindered the positive method from extending itself to social theories prove,
with equal evidence, that this latter part of the great intellectual renovation
should necessarily be effected in our day.

The human intellect constantly tends towards unity of method and
doctrine; this is its regular and permanent condition, every other being only
transitory. We cannot employ habitually a certain method in the greater
part of our combinations, without finally either renouncing it entirely or
extending it to all the rest. The Latter supposition is alone possible relatively
to methods the superiority of which has been established by experience.
It would therefore be self-contradictory to suppose that the
human mind, after having raised itself to the power of reasoning in a positive
way upon all astronomical, physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena
should always continue to reason theologically and metaphysically, as regards
social phenomena. Whoever has studied the intellectual nature of man,
will feel that it cannot be so. Inevitably, therefore, it must happen either
that astronomy, physics, chemistry, and physiology will again become
metaphysical, and even theological, an absurd supposition; or that politics will become positive, a proposition assuredly certain.

A philosopher of the nineteenth century who more than any other fathomed the nature of the former condition of the human race, M. de Maistre, deeply felt the necessity for this alternative. He clearly saw that the development of the natural sciences tended radically to destroy the rule of theology and metaphysics. He realised that, in order to be truly consistent in his regret for the decline of the ancient system, intellectual and social, he must boldly ascend to those ancient times when mental unity was achieved by subordinating all our conceptions to supernatural philosophy.¹

Doubtless, seeing that all the positive sciences could not be simultaneously constituted, periods, more or less prolonged, must have existed, during which the human mind employed at one and the same time each of the three methods for a certain order of ideas.² Metaphysical philosophy, according to its practice, converting a transitory state into an immutable principle, has established as a maxim, a fundamental and absolute apportionment between theological and positive method, under the abstract names of Faith and Reason. But experience clearly proves that this doctrine has served no other purpose than that of extending the domain of reason at the expense of that of faith; and this in truth constituted the natural office of this principle of transition, itself long useful. In despite of this eternal truce between theology and physics the latter has always tended, more and more, to invade the entire system of our ideas, and its power—in that direction has increased—in proportion to the conquests already effected. As nothing now remains to be mastered by the positive method but social ideas, it is evident that it must end by embracing these also within its dominion; and that at no distant period, if we consider the immense power it gains by its exclusive dominion over all other classes of ideas.

The inference drawn from this consideration respecting unity becomes still more apparent when we examine the formation of the theological or metaphysical theory of social phenomena.

The superficial philosophy of the eighteenth century generally represented the theological doctrine of society as the work of unbelieving legislators, who saw in it an instrument of domination. Without here insisting on the revolting absurdity of such an hypothesis, which it is no longer necessary to refute, experience shows us that theological philosophy, in conformity with the general law of development established at the beginning of this essay, extended itself to social phenomena, and consequently became an instrument of organisation simply through the empire which it had at first acquired by affording an explanation of external nature, and of man himself. This explanation furnished the origin and fundamental condition of the general supremacy obtained by the theological system. The same

¹ Among other passages, see in the 'Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg,' a very remarkable comparison between the character of ancient and that of modern science.

² This passing and unavoidable confusion is the chief difficulty in verifying the law above expounded. But the difficulty will disappear if we consider the encyclopedic classification already established, and observe that the three methods have never been simultaneously employed in reference to the same order of ideas.

Within my experience the fact of this coexistence of the three methods is in truth the only serious objection hitherto made to this fundamental law. Moreover, this objection has never been presented by any but persons who, though intellectually superior, were unacquainted with the positive sciences.
relation is always observable in the various forms which it successively assumes. For example, is it not apparent that, the human intellect having once risen to the idea of one great supernatural cause producing all the phenomena of the external world and the phenomena of individual man, could not but apply the same doctrine to the direction of societies? The same thing occurred when human conceptions became metaphysical. So soon as this transformation had taken place as to astronomical, physical, chemical, and physiological ideas, its prompt extension to political ideas might be foreseen. There is a connection, profound, though indirect, between the conceptions of Aristotle about terrestrial and celestial physics, the scholastic doctrines of the Middle Ages, and the social contract of Rousseau. The spirit is the same, extending itself to a new order of ideas. Therefore, since social theories have in fact always stood in close and necessary relation with those which concern other phenomena; since, again, the transformations that have hitherto affected the former have always corresponded to those experienced by the latter; the same course must repeat itself—and that still more decidedly by reason of the greater discordance of methods—as regards the advent of the positive spirit, which having embraced the phenomena of nature must inevitably extend itself to political phenomena.

In truth all the symptoms, general or special, which could mark such a revolution, have manifested themselves with an energy which leaves no doubt of its speedy accomplishment.

The absolute preponderance obtained, during the last century, by Metaphysical Philosophy in the region of social ideas is an incontrovertible sign of the complete decline of theology. On the other hand, the profound disgust generally displayed towards a Metaphysical Polity since the experience of the French Revolution, without however reviving the ascendency of theological doctrines, is no less certainly an indication of the approaching formation of a Positive Polity, alone capable of determining a universal assent by minds who will no more submit to the dominion of abstractions than to the authority of oracles, and refuse to yield any longer to aught but the force of facts.

We may even say that direct attempts, more or less complete, have already been made by the most distinguished thinkers to satisfy this new need of the human mind. Such, essentially, is the character of the works of the great Montesquieu. First in his work on the Romans, but above all in the Spirit of Laws, he endeavoured to connect political phenomena with each other and to seize the laws of their interdependence. This attempt was, doubtless, too premature to succeed, but the fact of its having been made clearly proves the tendency of the human mind. At a later period Condorcet, moving in the same direction, rose to a direct and final conception, proposing to himself the study of the successive developments of the human race: and although his work was an entire failure, it shows, no less, how deeply the want was felt. From the same point of view we may consider the efforts made in England during the last century to perfect history by imparting to it the character of scientific explanation, instead of the descriptive or literary character which had theretofore marked it. In Germany the works of Kant and Herder on the philosophy of history, and subse-

1 Kant, in a small work written in 1784, of which even the title is remarkable ('Introduction to a General History of the Human Race'), expressly laid down that social phenomena, like all others, should be regarded as reducible to natural laws.
quently the formation among Jurists of a school which regards legislation as always necessarily determined by the state of civilization, manifest, with equal clearness, the general tendency of our age towards positive doctrines in politics. Every day a taste for the works which display this character is increasingly manifested; dominating even the spirit of party. The men who most earnestly endeavour to re-establish the empire of theology, unconsciously yielding to the genius of the age, make it a point of honour to employ chiefly positive considerations in establishing their views.

The period has then at last arrived when the human mind, as the final result of all its previous labours, can complete the ensemble of natural philosophy, by reducing social phenomena, as all others have been reduced, to positive theories. The various preliminary efforts above pointed out indicate the necessity for this operation, and render it immediately practicable; but they leave it still to be effected. Such is the great philosophic effort reserved for the nineteenth century by the natural progress of our intellectual development.

When this work shall have been completed, or rather, sufficiently advanced to show that the human mind has irrevocably entered upon this new path, we can and should proceed to the construction of a general system of human knowledge, all the elements of which will then exist.

Both before and since the Encyclopedia of the Eighteenth Century, a number of attempts were made in this direction: but none of them have succeeded. Every day we see new ones arise which attain to no greater success, and serve no end but that of proving how strongly our intelligence needs to reduce its requirements to order and unity. The worthlessness of all these efforts arises from the circumstance, that, the various branches of human knowledge being heterogeneous, it was necessarily impossible to combine them in a single system. At former periods it was possible to construct a theological or metaphysical encyclopedia. Thus, for example, all the systems of the Greek philosophers were, in their age, so many encyclopedias. When social physics have acquired some consistency, it will become possible to construct a Positive Encyclopedia. But to attempt, as has hitherto been attempted, the formation of an encyclopedia at once theological, metaphysical, and positive, is to aim at constructing an ensemble out of elements which mutually exclude each other. It is not surprising that enterprises so ill-conceived should have ended in throwing discredit upon such a project for all sound intellects. But such ought no longer to be the case when social science having become positive, and theology, with metaphysics, having been expelled from their last asylum, the system of our ideas will be exclusively composed of homogeneous elements. Then it will be sufficient to resume the various kinds of knowledge corresponding to the different classes of phenomena, in order to discover their natural connection, and thus to form a true positive philosophy, much more complete and more closely united in its parts than was possible for the metaphysical and even the theological philosophy, which, being by their nature provisional, were never strictly universal.

This vast undertaking, which, without doubt, the present century will

1 For example, the philosophical excellence, unquestionably great, of the work 'The Pope,' is essentially owing to the circumstance, that, by a grave self-condignation, the author sought, as far as possible, to employ only positive reasons, and has made a very secondary use of considerations drawn from theological and metaphysical philosophy.
see carried out, should be regarded as the last act and final aim of the great revolution begun by Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo. It is indispensable, as being the only possible spiritual basis of the new social state towards which the human race so strongly tends in our day; for as an ensemble alone can any doctrine obtain the leadership of society. So long as positive conceptions remain isolated; until they offer themselves to the mind as various portions of a single and complete system, they may possess a great importance in special cases, they may even obtain great advantages in a struggle against the political authority of theology and metaphysics; but they can never replace these in the supreme direction of social order. Doubtless the perfecting of our knowledge indispensably demands the establishment within the domain of science of a permanent division of labour, and even that the specialisation of each kind of researches should be pushed as far as possible. But it is equally incontestable that the social masses, which perpetually need all these different results at once, and which neither can nor ought to be preoccupied with this internal mechanism, can only be brought to adopt scientific doctrines as their habitual guides by seeing them presented as branches of one and the same tree. This condition is no less indispensable in reference to the scientific body itself, in order to impart unity and homogeneity to its political action, which will always be very weak unless concentrated. So long as this state of things shall subsist, theology and metaphysics, in spite of their manifest decrepitude, will still maintain, simply by virtue of their generality, a legitimate title to moral sovereignty.

This last consideration brings me in another way to the necessity for social physics. In the reasonsings hitherto employed I intentionally put aside the point of view of Social Organisation, in order to fix the attention solely upon the philosophic movement which alone could determine this change. But the conclusion deduced from this peculiar order of considerations is singularly fortified if we reflect, as we ought to do, on the great political wants of our existing society. I shall now confine myself to one general aspect of this important portion of the question, which I shall hereafter treat in detail.

Manifestly, society, regarded from a moral point of view, is in a condition of real and profound Anarchy, acknowledged by all observers, whatever may be their speculative opinions. This anarchy results in the last resort, from the absence of any preponderating system, capable of uniting all minds in a communion of ideas. Positive conceptions have acquired an extension sufficiently great to annul, in fact, the political influence of theology, and even of metaphysics, without having as yet become sufficiently general to replace these in the spiritual guidance of society. As a result of this fundamental opposition, minds, no longer united by any real bond, diverge on all essential points, with that licence which unregulated individualism must produce. Hence the entire absence of public morality; the universal spread of egotism; the preponderance of considerations purely material; and, as a last inevitable consequence, corruption erected into a system of government, as being the only kind of order applicable to a population become deaf to all appeals made in the name of a general ideal and alive only to the voice of private interest. In order completely to terminate this disorder which, if it could last, must result in the entire dissolution of social relations, it is necessary to destroy its source, by bringing society back, in one way or another, to a state of unity. Now, this can only be
accomplished in one of two modes; either by restoring to theological philosophy—for it is useless to speak of metaphysics, which is merely transicional—all the influence it has lost; or by completing positive philosophy so as to make it capable of definitely replacing theology. To these simple terms we can now reduce the great social problem. If then we consider that the impossibility of re-establishing theology in the entire extent of its ancient dominion is demonstrated—and assuredly no one doubts this—no other solution is possible than the definitive formation of the positive philosophy. Our business is not to enquire whether that is advantageous or regrettable; whether the operation is difficult or easy; whether it requires a long or a short time. All such idle questions are put aside by one unanswerable observation: society has no other issue, we must then forthwith put our hand to the work. Besides, the other considerations here pointed out show that the last revolution needed to re-establish society on a sure basis of order, far from being beyond the existing forces of the human mind, as is supposed, has been so completely prepared by its antecedents, that it has now become inevitable.

Thus the formation of Social Physics, which, viewed intellectually, has been proved indispensable for a complete philosophical system, is no less necessary from a political point of view, as the condition of a homogeneous social education, itself the basis of a fixed and well-ordered hierarchy. These two essential conditions are, as is evident, complementary. For education and philosophy stand in close and necessary relation; since it is impossible to develop a society otherwise than under the influence of some preponderating system of ideas. Social education was first theological, then metaphysical, because philosophy passed through each phase in succession. In our day it is at once theological, metaphysical, and positive, because philosophy offers these three aspects in reference to different classes of ideas; or rather, neither education nor philosophy now really exist precisely because three systems prevail which naturally exclude each other. Last in the new social era on which the human race is about to enter, philosophy, and consequently general education, ought to become entirely positive. These two great operations, the first of which should form the basis of the second, correspond to the same fundamental wants of our actual civilisation considered under two different aspects, the need of a doctrine and that of guidance.

In my judgment this work has already commenced, for I consider social physics as having, even now, come into existence; and this point of view will always predominate in my philosophical labours. But I do not ask my readers to share immediately my conviction on this head. I merely desire to direct their attention to this natural and continuous progress of the human race, always more decidedly attracted towards positive philosophy. I hope to show them that the period has arrived when this revolution must unavoidably extend itself to social theories, and, finally, to satisfy them that its accomplishment is the only real way of re-establishing moral order in society, without attempting to raise any useless discussions as to the opportuneness or exact mode of this change.

The considerations here presented naturally lead us to study the Sciences under a new point of view.

In my estimation they are not simply the rational basis of the action of man upon nature. Their importance in this respect, although assuredly very great, is only indirect and secondary. It does not adequately account for
the profound interest which the human mind, guided by an admirable instinct, has always taken in the most abstract scientific theories, without any idea of material advantage; an interest which still subsists in full force, despite of the vicious preponderance accorded during the last three centuries to the merely practical point of view.

I consider that the Sciences, even in their actual condition, are directly and mainly destined to satisfy this fundamental need of our intelligence,—a system of positive conceptions as to the different classes of phenomena which can become the subject of our observations.

Viewed historically, the Sciences have emancipated the human mind from the tutelage of theology and metaphysics, which, though indispensable for its infancy, tended afterwards to prolong this indefinitely. Viewed in their present state, the sciences ought, by their methods and general results, to determine the reorganisation of social theories. Viewed with reference to the future, the sciences, once systematised, must constitute the permanent spiritual basis of social order, so long as our race shall continue to exist.

This general résumé presents the social existence of men of science under a point of view which departs from ordinary ideas. It remains then to develop it in order to take a complete grasp of the great moral revolution that now tends to realise itself in the human race.

The political history of Savants, regarded as a whole, presents three great epochs which correspond exactly to the triple condition—theological, metaphysical and positive—of human philosophy that forms the subject of our first article. I must here confine myself to a summary exposition of this new series of general facts.

The first social system under which the human mind was enabled to achieve real and lasting progress, was fundamentally characterised by the confusion of the temporal with the spiritual power; or, more accurately, by the complete subordination of the one to the other. To speak with still greater precision, it essentially consisted in the general and absolute preponderance of a Philosphic Caste, organised under the influence of theological philosophy.

Every primitive society, so far as its development is indigenous and spontaneous, manifests a natural tendency towards such an organisation. But this régime could not establish itself completely and acquire a great consistency in any countries but those where, by a favourable conjunction of climate and position,—which this is not the place to explain,—the theological philosophy was enabled soon to attain its complete development, and in consequence to gain an irresistible ascendancy over the other parts of the social system. These conditions were fulfilled in Egypt, in Chaldea, in Hindostan, in Tibet, in China, and in Japan, to which we may add Peru and probably Mexico, some generations before the discovery of America.

Considering this state of society merely from an abstract point of view, one is especially struck by this profound character of unity and interdependence, which then so entirely predominated in the intellectual system. Never, since this period, did the esprit d'ensemble manifest itself to the same extent; and it can never again be realised except by the direct construction of the positive philosophy.

The primary cause of this absolute systematisation doubtless lay in the homogeneity of human conceptions, then uniformly theological. But this cause, though operating universally, did not everywhere produce the same
effect, at least not in so eminent a degree. An organisation of the scientific body peculiar to this social state was also requisite.

By the mere existence of a Philosophic Caste it may be said that a regular and permanent division had been established between theory and practice. But in the first place, this division was incomplete in one very important respect, since it did not extend to social combinations; in the second place there existed no precise distribution of labour within the theoretical domain. Such is the special nature of this primitive scientific organisation.

That universality of knowledge, which is now so justly regarded as an ambitious chimera, then, on the contrary, constituted the dominant character of the members of the spiritual corporation. In the upper ranks of the hierarchy each minister of worship was at once astronomer (or rather astrologer), physician, doctor, even engineer, and also a legislator and statesman. In a word the names of Priest, Philosopher, and Savant, which have since acquired such different significations, were then exact synonyms. The combination of these three characters is well marked in the person of Moses, whom we may consider as the best known type of this primitive condition of the human intellect.

It is easy to explain this pretension to universal knowledge, since it directly depends upon the same causes which produced the preponderance of the learned caste, and it is at least as inevitable. Granting that a given combination of physical causes has permitted human conceptions to attain, in certain countries, a development sufficiently rapid to allow of their being quickly systematised under theological inspiration, it manifestly resulted from this very rapidity that at the period of coordination the different branches of knowledge were not sufficiently extensive to demand or to admit of a real and stable division.

But this universality of work is not only coincident and necessarily connected with the social supremacy of the learned caste, it also forms its strongest support. The credit obtained by the Priests as astronomers, doctors, and engineers was the basis of their political authority; and race was the power they enjoyed was an indispensable condition for the development of their scientific speculations.

We must seek in the nature itself of this spiritual organisation the true and fundamental explanation of the admirable vigour and consistency always so characteristic of this primitive social system, as compared with all societies that have since existed. In a society whose elements are so closely connected that no portion can be impaired without shaking the ensemble ought we to be astonished at the energy of resistance which has hitherto triumphed over all known forces? Accordingly this social state should be considered as the glorious epoch of the theological system. However real may have been its subsequent influence we may say, without exaggeration, that after this period it continually declined. To this point therefore must the human race recede, if retrogradation were possible.

While recognising that the theocratic régime was at once the necessary consequence and the indispensable condition of the earliest advances of the human intellect, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that this system, by its nature, tended to become a permanent and almost invincible obstacle to more extended progress. Whether there be a necessary incompatibility between the complete consolidation of the social system and its perfectibility, or whether, rather, the combination of these two qualities was merely...
task which exceeded the means then accessible to man; it is certain that the most strongly organised nations became at last almost stationary. This happened in all countries when the theocracy was able to establish itself completely. The explanation is easy.

Without division of labour, the perfecting of the human intellect is not possible. Intellectually the theocratic system had no value, except as furnishing the means of organising, on a regular and stable basis, the germ of the separation between theory and practice. But this primary division which, once fixed, became, by the very nature of the system, unalterable, required to be pushed much farther in order to allow of an indefinite development of the human faculties. Such was the radical vice of this primitive system.

The different classes of our conceptions cannot develop themselves with equal rapidity. I have already pointed out the necessary succession which their development invariably manifests. From this we may perceive that the scientific organisation in question, by virtue of which all the various theories are cultivated at once by the same intellects, cannot long exist without becoming strongly opposed to the perfecting of our knowledge, since it admits only of such advances as can be simultaneously made in all parts of the intellectual system.

This view is much strengthened, when we combine with the purely philosophical point of view, the political stand-point, characteristic of this first social epoch, the fusion of the temporal with the spiritual power. For this condition, by itself, renders impossible every great improvement of human theories, as tending to the total and immediate overthrow of the political order. How could any important progress be expected under a régime which converted every great discovery, not only into an act of impiety, but into a revolt. The theological philosophy was, in those primitive times, and has since continued to be the only sort fitted to guide society. Accordingly so long as the temporal power was merely a derivation from the spiritual power; may further so long as physical theories and social doctrines were not entirely separated, the former could not advance beyond the theological state without destroying the bases of society.

If then the progress of the human intellect was, at first, only rendered possible by means of an elementary stage in the division of labour regulated by the theocratic régime, it is evident that its subsequent advance demanded, no less imperatively, a much greater subdivision, but one that could only be effected under a totally different régime. Above all, it was essential that the culture of the human mind should become independent of the immediate guidance of society, in order that the division and perfecting of our knowledge might take place without compromising the existence of the political order.

The natural development of the various theories would doubtless, in the end, have spontaneously determined this separation, even in the theocracies, although from the causes above indicated such a change would in them have been much retarded. In fact it would seem impossible but that, however slow might be the progress, at the end of a certain time, the ever increasing difficulty of comprehending the totality of human ideas, must lead to a continual increase in specialization. We may even observe in the learned castes of the different theocracies some beginnings of a perfected division. But the course of events did not allow any theocracy to enjoy an existence sufficiently prolonged to allow of our observing the development.
of such a revolution. Happily for human civilisation, the new scientific organisation established itself in a much more rapid manner.

It was in Greece that this change, so indispensable for the future destiny of the human intellect, was effected. Owing to the way in which the branches of knowledge were introduced from Egypt and the East into that country, intellectual activity from the outset was wholly external to social order. The military activity towards which the Grecian societies necessarily inclined, rendered the lasting establishment of a pure theocracy impossible in them. At the same time, other causes presented obstacles to the free and entire development of this sort of activity, too powerful to allow of its exclusively absorbing, as at Rome, all the intellectual forces. By this happy combination of conditions the division between theory and practice presently became much more complete than it was in the theocracies, and theory could freely subdivide itself. A class of men were formed, purified from all political ambition and freed from all material preoccupation, devoted to a merely philosophical existence. Starting from the primitive mental acquisitions of every sort accumulated by the sacerdotal castes, their only and constant aim was to cultivate, as completely as possible, the domain of human intelligence. This memorable revolution in the organisation of the scientific body is resumed by the marked distinction which was thenceforth established between the terms Philosopher and Priest. Abstractedly considered, to this new condition of things corresponds the metaphysical character which then clearly began to manifest itself in the intellectual system.

At the beginning of this second organisation, the only real progress effected consisted in the character imparted to the Spiritual Corporation, which became purely speculative and completely disengaged from all participation in the conduct of public affairs. Moreover, the first Grecian Sages no more specialised their theoretical researches than did the sacerdotal castes: except only that from the beginning they assigned to the fine arts, which were more developed than other branches, a completely separate domain. But despite of this confusion, then inevitable, the capital condition was fulfilled, and the division of human sciences was gradually established according as their development increased.

At first the Philosophers hoped to be able to perfect moral and social conceptions pari passu with the theories which concern physical phenomena. The result of their labours, at last, made evident the necessity for a complete separation of these two classes of researches. The earliest attempts to perfect Social Theories, where we can already observe a certain vague tendency to divest them of the theological character, showed that such a transformation was still far beyond the forces of the human mind. Those philosophic schools, whose speculations had, more especially, taken this direction recognised, that, for this reason, and above all with reference to the conditions of social reorganisation, it was impossible to go beyond the highest generalisation of the theological doctrine, long since reached by the superior class of the sacerdotal hierarchies. Thenceforward researches relating to the external world and the physical nature of man, as being naturally susceptible of a more rapid improvement, and at the same time, less immediately bound up with political order, were entirely separated from social doctrines. The latter continued theological, while the former became metaphysical, and in consequence approached more nearly to the positive condition.
Thus, by degrees, a spiritual organisation was established entirely different from that of the sacerdotal castes. The names of Savant and of Philosopher which, at first, when detaching themselves from that of Priest, were regarded as equivalent, became, in their turn, entirely distinct. Thenceforward the former was applied only to thinkers devoted to the cultivation of the physical sciences, whose existence, detached, even in theory, from the movement of society, was still more purely speculative than that of the early Wise Men of Greece. The latter only denoted those who, exclusively occupied with moral and social studies, sought more and more to take part in the spiritual government. In a word from that period the distinction became essentially the same as now. The two classes were so completely separated that, in the latest periods of the Grecian philosophy, they soon became rivals. About the age of Alexander the separation began to show itself clearly. It was profoundly characterised by two great series of works, those of Aristotle in the direction of the special sciences, those of Plato in the direction properly called philosophic. The formation of the Museum of Alexandria, so different from the ancient Grecian schools, is an unanswerable testimony to the existence of this separation, which it powerfully contributed to develop.

To this division we owe the ultimate progress of the human mind. The Sciences, entirely isolated, were, thenceforward, able to expand, subdivide, and perfect themselves, and gradually to become positive, abandoning the metaphysical character which they possessed at the beginning of this period, without disturbing the social economy. Philosophy concentrating its forces on a single point, was enabled to prevail on the majority of civilised nations to abandon Polytheism for Theism, and thus to develop in all its energy the civilising power of theological doctrines.

This spiritual organisation, born in Greece, was the first foundation of the social system established twelve centuries afterwards, and which was essentially characterised by this admirable division between the spiritual and the temporal power, by which it acquired such a superiority over the theocratic system. The germ of this system doubtless existed in the purely speculative activity of the philosophic sects within the Grecian populations. In order to allow of its development, it was necessary that the separation of the sciences and philosophy should permit the latter to tend freely towards the union of the different schools under a theism common to all. This end attained, one essential temporal condition was alone needed to begin the direct foundation of a new social organisation. It consisted in the decline of the system of conquest produced by the union of the whole civilised world under a single dominion, which resulted from the preponderance of Rome. So soon as these two fundamental bases had been laid, the course of events might hasten or retard the development of the social system of the Middle Ages; but in the end, of necessity, it could not but establish itself.

If the first commencement of this system is referable to the mental organisation of Greece, we may also discover therein the primary cause of its decline during the last four centuries. Owing to the absolute separation

1 At this period we see in Archimedes, the perfect type of the scientific class properly so called. Assuredly the purely speculative activity of this class is well characterised by the historic picture of the sublime death of this great man; but, still more by the admirable naïvité shown in the apology he addressed to posterity for having sacrificed, even for a moment, his genius to discoveries of practical utility.
established between the sciences and philosophy the theological system could only harmonise with the special branches of knowledge so long as these retained the character they had when this system acquired its definitive state. It could not by any possibility adapt itself to their further progress. When they began to be positive, the intellectual incompatibility between theology and physics rapidly acquired a political character, and manifested itself, more and more openly, as a fundamental antagonism between the spiritual power and the scientific class, which had originally constituted itself externally to the social system. Such is the great original schism which, somewhat later, became the general source of the disorganisation of this regime.

Plato shut his school against those who were ignorant of geometry, the only science which then possessed a definite character. During nearly a century his disciples had a large share in the perfecting of this branch of our knowledge. But, soon, the impossibility was clearly manifested of reconciling this kind of researches with the philosophic labor which that sect justly regarded as its most important work and special office by virtue of its original constitution. Gradually and for ever the Platonists became entire strangers to the scientific movement. Archimedes, Apollonius, Hipparchus, the three great mathematicians of ancient times, were certainly not Platonists.

During a long period, the fundamental opposition between the sciences and philosophy was not sufficiently marked to allow of their antagonism compromising the theological system. So soon as this made itself felt, it became a danger to science, before proving itself such to theology. St. Augustine, it is true, endeavours to refute the reasonings of the astronomers of Alexandria as to the sphericity of the earth; and such an attempt by so great a mind clearly shows how far the severance of philosophy and science had gone. But it is easy to perceive that this discussion is purely philosophical and that he, as a member of the spiritual power, by no means attaches to it the immense importance which afterwards sprang out of the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo.

The reorganisation of the Social State under the auspices of Theism was so important an operation that it almost exclusively attracted the aggregate of intellectual forces, and before everything else commanded the attention and respect of society. Thus, during its long continuance the sciences were, comparatively speaking, much neglected, at least in the West. Moreover, the very slowness of their progress easily allowed the members of

1 Some distinguished thinkers who feel the true cause of the decline of the theological system, desire, in our day, to attempt its restoration by fusing it with the sciences. But this involves an oversight of the fundamental remark just made. Even if the radical disparity between theology and physics did not make their combination altogether impossible, its accomplishment would require us to follow successively, in an inverse sense, all the modifications which since Plato have taken place in the spiritual organisation of society. Without doubt, existing Europe cannot become once more Egyptian.

2 This abandonment of the sciences is generally regarded as a consequence of the invasions of the barbarians; but it was manifestly long anterior to these. It showed itself from the earliest period of Christianity, by the decay into which the Museum of Alexandria fell. Some clear marks of this tendency may even be seen from the date when Platonism began to overshadow the other philosophic sects. The alienation and even mutual antagonism of Savants and Philosophers properly so called developed themselves more and more from that time.
the spiritual power to keep pace with the sciences, without in any way injuring the theological office.

But as soon as the new social system had been definitively developed by the labours of the great Pope Hildebrand and his first successors, the germs of dissolution, which this system contained from its birth, soon began to make themselves apparent. The principal forces of the human mind and the public attention, concentrating themselves once more, little by little, upon the sciences, produced great and rapid advances in this direction. From that time the Spiritual Power rapidly declined, especially when the positive nature of the new mental acquisitions began to show itself.

In vain did the Clergy manifest a commendable eagerness to take possession of this new domain. Individual, or even collective, aspirations, however powerful, could prevail neither against the inflexible nature of things, which created an absolute incompatibility between theology and physics; nor against that severance from the sciences which was so deeply impressed upon the theological philosophy of the Middle Ages from its birth, and continually developed itself. In the end it was generally felt that the culture of the positive branches of knowledge could not properly belong to any but minds entirely devoted to these and free from all obligation to maintain heterogeneous doctrines.1

The great efforts of the clergy, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, to take possession of positive theories at their birth, were singularly favourable to their progress, since this corporation was then the only one whose members could give themselves up uninterruptedly to speculative activity. But they did not, nor could they, change the ascendantal character. If some ecclesiastics devoted themselves entirely to this new class of labours, they ceased to be Priests in order to become Savants, and in no degree lessened the antagonism naturally subsisting between these two mental systems. We now think of Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon as men of science, never remembering that one was an archbishop and the other a monk.

The incompatibility of the natural theories with theological philosophy was not long in clearly manifesting itself at an early period after the epoch of these two illustrious men, by the indifference which the clergy, generally speaking, manifested towards this new study, and even by the kind of instinctive aversion with which it soon inspired them. An evident proof of these dispositions may be found in the necessity, soon and increasingly felt by monarchs, of instituting a special system of teaching for the Sciences, placed under their immediate protection and made entirely independent of ecclesiastical authority. From this period dates the first extension of metaphysics to moral and social ideas, as well as the earliest direct efforts in opposition to the doctrines of the clergy. Through the influence of these various circumstances, the separation and opposition of Science and Theology were, thenceforward and everywhere, fully and irrevocably established. The more decided struggles which occurred later only developed this antagonism more and more.

The present is not the place for entering into the details of this view. It is enough to have proved, that, from the period when the theological philosophy of the Middle Ages had completed the corresponding social framework, the new series of efforts by which the Jesuits attempted, with so much perseverance and skill, to gain possession of the sciences, but which succeeded no better than the earlier attempts, rendered still more evident the radical impracticability of this undertaking.

1 At a later period, the

Modern History of Science and Savants.
organisation, its action became entirely defensive; that a new spiritual order sprang up from the growth of natural theories, the culture of which more and more attracted the main forces of the intellect; that positive branches of knowledge increasingly became a part of general education; in a word that Savants, kept outside of the spiritual power, gradually acquired all the influence which the Clergy had by degrees lost.

What remains to be done by men of science in order to raise them, is their turn, into a New Spiritual Power, no less powerful in its way than the old power? It is necessary to complete the system of positive knowledge, by creating Social Physics, and so, at last, to construct Positive Philosophy. Thus and only in this way can the sciences, investing themselves with complete generality, replace theology become powerless for the moral government of society.

This conception of the future of the sciences leads us to consider the third organisation of the scientific body which corresponds to the positive state of philosophy, as did the Greek organisation to its metaphysical, and the Egyptian or Asiatic to its theological state. Savants, having at last constructed their appropriate philosophy, will incorporate themselves anew with society in order to assume, once more, its spiritual guidance, but in a way completely different from the theocratic method. It remains for me to indicate the internal elaboration which for this purpose must be effected within the scientific class. The limits of this essay only permit me to present this conception very succinctly. I shall, afterwards, treat each of its essential portions in more detail.

The positive mental system, more especially, demands and stimulates the division of labour. From its birth, the study of natural theories constantly and increasingly subdivided itself. From the simple fact of its indefinite expansion, it will necessarily undergo an increasing subdivision. Therefore there can be no idea of imposing on savants that character of generality which they still want by a universality of efforts analogous to that of the sacerdotal cases. The design, even if attempted, would be impracticable, having regard to the actual extent of each kind of knowledge. On the contrary, the indispensable improvement can only be effected by a more perfect application of the principle of division of labour. What is needed is simply to relegate social investigations and philosophy, rendered positive, to a new branch of the scientific body. This class will be distinct from all other classes of savants, but only in the same sense that these are distinguished from each other. This new class will be compelled by the nature of its doctrines to maintain direct and uninterrupted relations with the others, as these reciprocally will be in regard to it through a general education preliminary to special education.

Observation of the internal formation of the scientific body, proves that in reference to organisation, as well as to doctrine, we need only complete a revolution which has developed itself with ever augmenting force. This is easily conceivable if we consider the encyclopedic order above established. In truth, the different classes of savants, although all special, are not so to the same extent. Geometers are naturally the most special, because their science rests on no other, being, on the contrary, the basis of the entire of natural philosophy. Passing to astronomers, we already find greater generality in their science; because, in addition to the direct study of the phenomena it embraces, these are necessarily subordinated to the perpetual use of the mathematical sciences. Physicists properly so called,
are still less special, because the nature of their studies requires a permanent resort to mathematical methods, and a direct knowledge of the general laws of the system of the world. For a similar reason chemists, who fulfil the conditions imposed by the nature of the phenomena which they study, necessarily possess a still greater degree of generality. Lastly physiologists, engaged in studying phenomena the laws of which are bound up with those of all the rest, are naturally the least special of all savants; being compelled to possess at least a general knowledge of mathematical, astronomical, physical, and chemical science. Social physicists will simply elevate themselves, in the same direction, one degree above the physiologists. Studying a class of phenomena, which by their nature depend on the laws of all the preceding, they indispensably require a preliminary education familiarising them with the methods and main results of all other positive sciences, as furnishing the only rational basis of their own labours. Thus having continually under their eyes the ensemble of physical knowledge, they will inevitably be led to the direct construction of positive philosophy, as soon as their special science has advanced sufficiently far not to absorb all their activity.  

Simultaneously with the formation of this new class of savants, an important subdivision should also be effected in the scientific body, indispensable to the exactness of its philosophic character and consequently to the efficiency of its political action. It consists in a new and final improvement in the general division between Theory and Practice. This division is still incomplete inasmuch as the office of Engineer has always been, more or less, mixed up with that of the Savant, on which, even in our day, it exerts a very prejudicial influence. In the early history of natural theories this confusion was, doubtless, inevitable; as it was also indispensable, in order to make their value appreciated by minds too gross to understand the utility of theories which do not allow of immediate applications. But, now, this direct and permanent relation is no longer needed. Henceforward the sciences should be judged above all by their philosophic value. Accordingly men of science, far from being bound to place limits on their sentiments of theoretic dignity, should firmly resist every attempt, inspired by the exaggerated practical tendencies of our age, to reduce them to mere engineers. But an appropriate system of doctrines constitutes the best way of definitively extinguishing pretensions which will necessarily continue and be, to a certain extent, legitimate, until the relations between theory and practice have been organised by the aid of conceptions specially adapted to this end. Scientific men can alone construct this system, since it must flow from their positive knowledge of the relations that subsist between the external world and man. This great operation is indispensable in order to constitute the class of Engineers into a distinct corporation, serving as a

1 Moreover, to complete the solution of this problem of universality about which so much has been said, it is necessary, as it seems to me, to make a distinction between active and passive universality. The former implies the wish to perfect all the branches of human knowledge simultaneously; and this is evidently absurd and chimerical. The latter consists in cultivating a single science by the help of a knowledge of all the rest, sufficiently extensive and accurate to allow of comprehending their spirit and appreciating their relations with that which is specially cultivated. This is not only practicable, but indispensable. What I have just said shows that it is realised, more or less, in the different classes of savants. It ought to develop itself completely in the investigators of Social Physics.
permanent and regular communication between the Savants and Industrialists in reference to all special works.1

Such then, speaking generally, are the different doctrines essential for completing the modern organisation of the scientific body, and previously shown to be indispensable for completing the intellectual system adapted to the new condition of the human mind. Doubtless these works will not be executed by living savants, whose faculties are irrevocably engaged in important researches, the interruption of which would be absurd and injurious. They could, however, be usefully undertaken only by minds educated under the influence of the various positive methods, familiar with the chief results of all the physical sciences, and subject to the direct and continued sanction of the existing scientific body. On the formation, more or less rapid, of this new class of savants must depend the development of these complementary labours, destined at last to invest the positive system with that spiritual supremacy assigned to it by the invariable law of progress of the human race.

As soon as these various works shall have attained sufficient maturity to acquire an unmistakable character, we shall see the education of society fall, spontaneously and for ever, into the hands of the savants. Already every preparation is made for this great revolution. The natural sciences have at last, in the eyes of all men, and must more and more, become the principal object of instruction. Where the regular system of public education does not sufficiently supply this pressing need of existing minds, they seek its independent satisfaction and succeed in finding it. Governments, assisting, as they have done from the commencement, this special movement, create a multitude of special establishments. From the highest branches of theoretical instruction to the simplest rudiments destined for the least cultivated intellects, they endeavour by every means in their power, to impress a positive character on all minds.2

1 It is easy to recognise in the scientific body as it now exists, a certain number of engineers distinct from savants properly so called. This important class of necessity arose late, when Theory and Practice, which set out from such distant points, had approached sufficiently to give each other the hand. It is this that makes its distinctive character still so undefined. As to characteristic doctrines fitted to constitute the special existence of the class of Engineers, their true nature cannot be easily indicated because their rudiments only exist. I know but one conception capable of giving a precise idea, that of the illustrious Monge on Descriptive Geometry, as constituting the general theory of the arts of construction. The doctrines appropriate to Engineers should consist of a series of analogous conceptions, relating to all the other great operations of practice rationally analysed. Their formation assumes that the construction of positive philosophy has already reached a certain point, for all important applications to the arts usually demand a combination of various kinds of scientific knowledge.

2 The establishment of the class of Engineers, in its proper character, is the more important because this class will, without doubt, constitute the direct and necessary instrument of the coalition between Savants and Industrialists, by which alone the new social system can commence.
can really hasten this regeneration, are already essentially developed. Nothing is wanting except the great philosophical condition, without which all these partial efforts, however efficiently pursued, could produce no very important result—the formation, as above pointed out, of generalised positive conceptions.

The views submitted in this essay may be regarded as a first sketch of the problem of the Spiritual Power, treated merely from the philosophical point of view. Having thus laid down the principles of our discussion, we can now directly and thoroughly examine this great question, the most momentous of our time. This shall form the subject of a new investigation.

maintained itself uninterruptedly and with an ever-increasing intensity. At this moment the working classes are immediately called to participate in it by institutions, among the most zealous promoters of which we may name M. Charles Dupin in France, and Dr. Birkbeck in England, which have been powerfully seconded by the governments. Even in Russia similar institutions are contemplated. They already exist in Austria and Prussia, and within a few years all Europe will be covered by them. Their influence cannot fail to produce the foundation of institutions of the same kind, but of a higher order, for the upper classes of industry, as may be actually seen in England.

Perhaps it is by this direct method that social education can be entirely regenerated, when the necessary doctrines shall have been formed. For a recast of the existing universities would probably be too difficult.
FIFTH PART.

March 1826.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SPIRITUAL POWER.

All the social systems of antiquity were characterised by the Confusion of the Spiritual and the Temporal Powers; whether one of these two powers was entirely subordinated to the other, or, as more frequently happened, they were joined in the same hands. Thus regarded, these systems ought to be divided into two great classes, according as one or the other of the two powers predominated. Among those nations where, from the nature of the climate and locality, theological philosophy could rapidly arise, while the development of military activity was repressed,—as in Egypt and almost the entire of the East,—the temporal power was only a derivative from and appendix to the spiritual power, which was the supreme and constant regulator of the entire social organisation in its minutest details. On the contrary, in those countries where, from a concurrence of physical causes, human activity was, at an early period, turned to warlike pursuits, the temporal power dominated the spiritual power and systematically employed it as an instrument and auxiliary. Under the last head fall, in a nearly equal degree, notwithstanding important differences, the social systems of Greece and Rome.

This is not the place to explain why these two kinds of organisation were necessary in the countries and at the epochs of their formation, nor how they worked concurrently, each in its own way, towards the general amelioration of the human race. They are now referred to merely in order to mark with precision the most important political difference which has characterised the entire history of the theologico-military system, separating its constitution in Antiquity from its constitution in the Middle Ages.

In this last period not only did the theological and military system undergo an immense amelioration through the establishment of Catholism and Feudalism; but the grand political result of that foundation, namely the Separation of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers, must be considered as having, in a high degree, perfected the theory of the social organisation for the entire duration of the human race, under any conceivable régime. By this admirable division, human societies were enabled to establish themselves on a much larger scale, since it rendered possible the union under one spiritual government of populations so numerous and so varied as to require distinct and independent temporal governments. In a word it has become possible to reconcile, to a degree theretofore impracticable, the opposite advantages of political centralisation and dispersion. It has even become possible, without falling into any absurdity, to conceive, that at some future day, distant indeed but inevitable, the entire human race, at all
events the entire of the white race, shall be united in one universal community,—a supposition involving self-contradiction so long as the spiritual and temporal powers were confounded. In the second place, within each separate society, the great political problem of reconciling the subordination to authority, essential for the maintenance of public order, with the possibility of reforming its course whenever this needs rectifying, was solved as far as possible by the separation legally established between moral government and material government. Submission, in clothing itself with the character of voluntary assent, ceased to be servile; while remonstrance was no longer hostile, at least within certain limits, since it rested on a moral power legitimately constituted. Before this period there was no alternative between abject submission and direct revolt. Such is still the condition of societies,—for example those organised on the basis of Mahommedanism,—where the two powers were from their origin confounded by the law.

To resume, by the fundamental division between the spiritual power and the temporal power, organised during the Middle Ages, human society was enabled to become at once more extended and better ordered; a combination which all the legislators and even the philosophers of antiquity had proclaimed impossible.

Although the Catholic and Feudal system, effected, as far as the duration of its supremacy permitted, all the general advantages just pointed out as inherent in the separation of the two powers, and in this way contributed more powerfully than all previous systems to the perfecting of Humanity, it is no less necessary to recognize that its subsequent decline was at once absolutely unavoidable and rigorously indispensable.

I have already demonstrated that theological philosophy and the moral power based upon it, by their nature, could only obtain a provisional supremacy, even in the most perfect condition attainable by them, that is to say, under Catholicism. I have established that after having guided the preliminary educatio of the human race, they must in its maturity be necessarily replaced by a positive philosophy, and a corresponding spiritual power. It is much easier to prove the corresponding truth as regards the temporal power, which, originally founded on military preeminence, must finally belong to industrial superiority in that mode of life towards which modern society, more and more, tends. Accordingly, great as was the value of the Catholic and Feudal system, in relation to the period of its ascendancy, the development of the human race, in its twofold direction, scientific and industrial, necessarily ended by destroying this system, all the more rapidly because it was exceptionally favourable to science and industry. I have even proved, that under the spiritual aspect, we may at the very commencement of this system discern the germ of its destruction, which developed itself immediately after the epoch of its greatest splendour. This remark, the extension of which to the temporal order is easy, (since the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of the Commons almost coincided with the complete establishment of feudalism), furnishes a striking proof of the provisional nature of the social system of the Middle Ages.

It is not my intention to give here the history either of the formation of this régime, or that of its dissolution. But, in order to place in a clear light the moral condition of existing society,—the special subject of this essay,—I

1 See the Philosophical reflexions on the Sciences and Savants.
must offer a general view of the way in which the spiritual disorganisation of this system has been effected, with the main results thus produced.

The destruction of one social system and the establishment of another are operations too complicated in their nature, and requiring too much time to allow of their ever being carried on contemporaneously. In the first place, the institution of a new political order presupposes the previous overthrow of the preceding social state, both as a condition of reorganisation by putting aside the obstacles which hindered it, and a means of proving its urgency by manifesting the evil effects of anarchy. But, even under purely mental aspects, the human intellect, from the weakness of its resources, cannot clearly understand a new social system, until the previous one has been almost entirely dissolved. It would be easy to verify this deplorable necessity by numerous examples.

Naturally, therefore, and inevitably, whenever the human race is obliged to pass from one political régime to another, there arises a period of anarchy, at least of moral anarchy, the duration and intensity of which are determined by the extent and importance of the change. This anarchical character, of necessity, developed itself, in the highest degree, during the period of the disorganisation of the Catholic and Feudal system, since the revolution then demanded was the greatest in the whole course of human history;—the direct transition from the Theological and Military to the Positive and Industrial state, compared with which all previous revolutions were simple modifications. Accordingly, it prevailed in the 16th 17th and 18th centuries, during which this social disorganisation was effected.

During the entire course of this period, which may be justly described as revolutionary, all sorts of anti-social ideas were put forward and reduced to dogmas as agencies for the demolition of the Catholic and Feudal system, in order to rally against it all those anarchical passions of the human heart, which, in ordinary times, would be repressed by the preponderance of an organised social régime. For example, the dogma of the unlimited Liberty of Conscience was first constructed to destroy the theological power; then that of the Sovereignty of the People to overthrow the temporal power, and lastly that of Equality to dissolve the ancient social classification; not to mention those conceptions of less importance that compose the critical doctrine, each of which has tended to demolish a corresponding piece of the ancient political edifice.

Everything that develops itself spontaneously is necessarily legitimate during a certain period, since it thus satisfies some real social want. Accordingly I am far from overlooking the utility or even the necessity for the critical doctrine, during the last three centuries. I believe, moreover, that this doctrine will inevitably continue, despite of all contrary appearances, until the direct establishment of a new social system; and that, during this period, it will exert an indispensable influence, since then only can the ancient system be regarded as having terminated its existence. But if, in this sense, the action of the Critical Doctrine should be considered, to a certain extent, indispensable for the development of civilisation, it no less constitutes, in a far more important way, the chief obstacle to the establishment of that new political order whose advent it prepared.

By an irresistible fatality, the various dogmas which compose the critical doctrine, were only enabled to acquire the degree of energy essential for the complete fulfilment of their natural destination, by assuming an absolute character; but this renders them necessarily hostile not only to the system
they attacked, but to any social system. Accordingly from the time that the
demolition of the ancient political order was sufficiently effected, the
influence of the critical principles produced in society a disposition, some-
times involuntary, at other times conscious, to repel all real organisation.
The habit contracted during three centuries, of applying this doctrine to all
social questions naturally induced men to adopt it as the basis for reorgani-
sation, when the catastrophes which resulted from the destruction of the
ancient system proved the necessity for a return to order. Then was
exhibited the strange phenomenon, inexplicable to anyone who has not fol-
lowed its historical development,—political and moral disorder elevated into
a system and presented as the ideal of social perfection. For each of the
dogmas of the critical doctrine, when understood organically, comes back
exactly to the principle, that society under its corresponding aspect ought
not to be organised.

It would be easy to demonstrate, as to each of the modern political
doctrines, that this judgment is nowadays exaggerated. But I do not now
propose to undertake the direct and complete examination of the Critical
Doctrine. I have only sketched it here in order to show clearly the point
of view under which I regard this theory. For my present purpose I must
confine myself to the consideration of its most important principle, namely
its attitude towards the fundamental law of the division between the
spiritual power and the temporal power.

Of all Revolutionary Prejudices, which have sprung up during the
last three centuries, owing to the decline of the ancient social system, the
most ancient, the most deeply rooted, the most generally accepted, the one
that lies at the root of all the rest, is the principle which proclaims that no
spiritual power should exist in society or, what comes to the same thing,
that this power should be entirely subordinated to the temporal power.
Monarchs and nations who are more or less openly at variance upon every
other portion of the critical doctrine, are entirely agreed about its starting
point. In the countries where Protestantism triumphed, this annihila-
tion or absorption of the spiritual power was regularly and openly pro-
claimed. But the same principle, has been, at bottom, as really, though
indirectly, established in those states which are still nominally Catholic,
where we have seen the temporal power completely subjugating the
spiritual hierarchy, and the clergy aiding this transformation, eager to relax
the bonds of union with its central government in order to nationalise itself.
Finally, as an evident and recent proof of the power and universality of this
opinion, it will be sufficient to mention that we have seen some justly
esteemed philosophers who, while struggling against this prejudice, found
only obstinate opponents in their own party.

After the general explanation above given, I am not afraid of being
accused, in reference to this central idea as well as other parts of the
Critical Doctrine, of overlooking their utility and even their temporary
necessity as means of effecting the transition from the ancient to the modern
social system. But, considering that the demolition of the former system
inevitably began with the spiritual order, the same course should of necessity
be followed in the establishment of the latter. I am thus led to a direct
examination of the fundamental principle of the critical doctrine, in order that,
to the best of my ability, men may be brought back to the true elementary
notions of general politics, forgotten for three centuries, so far as these are
applicable to the present state of society. Such is the aim of this essay, in
which I shall endeavour to prove the necessity for the institution of a Spiritual Power distinct from and independent of the temporal power, and to determine the main characteristics of the new moral organisation, appropriate to modern societies.

I must first prepare reflecting minds for placing themselves at a point of view so foreign to existing habits. For this purpose I think it necessary to make a series of observations, which, though not directly affecting the question, strike me as adapted to draw attention to it, by showing, empirically, that the universal tendency of modern Publicists and Legislators to adopt a political organisation without a spiritual power, leaves a vast and deplorable void in social order.

The experience of the past may be used in two different ways to establish the necessity for the division between the spiritual power and the temporal power, first by comparing the condition of the human race under the dominion of Catholicism and Feudalism with its condition under the essentially temporal organisations of Greece and Rome,—secondly by showing the mischief produced, since the beginning of the 10th century by the suppression of the spiritual power, or, what is politically equivalent, its usurpation by the temporal power. Although it might be possible to draw from the former class of observations important instruction directly applicable to the present question, the great diversity of the epochs would render such a demonstration too complicated to allow of its producing that intimate conviction which I especially desire to produce. Besides, I have sufficiently indicated the basis of such a comparison at the beginning of this essay. Thus, in what follows, I shall address myself exclusively to the latter order of facts, the consideration of which, as being more direct and evident, ought to be more decisive. It therefore remains for me to consider briefly, in reference to modern society, the principal political evils which may with certainty be attributed to the dissolution of the spiritual power. So important an investigation would naturally require extensive development. But the reader, once placed at the right point of view, can himself easily supply details which I cannot here introduce.

In order to confine this series of remarks to such facts only as are capable of determining a clear and irresistible conviction, I purposely put aside all consideration of the great revolutionary catastrophes, although these are, ultimately, traceable to the spiritual disorganisation of society. I do so because, notwithstanding their origin, their return may be reasonably regarded as impossible. I confine my investigation to the habitual state of civilised nations during the last three centuries, as now subsisting.

Considering, first, the most general political relations, we see that, as long as the Catholic system preserved its vigour, the relations between state and state were subordinated throughout Christian Europe to a regular and permanent organisation, which was capable of habitually maintaining among them a certain voluntary order, and of inciting them, when circumstances demanded it, to a collective activity, as in the vast and important operation of the Crusades. In a word, there existed then what M. de Maistre, with profound truth, calls the miracle of the European monarchy. Doubless, in consequence of the state of civilisation at that period, the government was very imperfect. But in this respect, as in reference to the nation, is not the most imperfect government after all very preferable to anarchy? What has happened on this head since the absorption of the papal power? The various European powers have returned to a state of barbarism in their
mutual relations. Kings inscribed on their cannons the words—thenceforward quite accurate—ultima ratio regum. What expedient has been devised for filling up the immense void which the annulling of the spiritual power left? Doubtless justice should be rendered to the efforts of diplomatists to produce and maintain, in the absence of a real bond, what has been called the Balance of Power in Europe: but we cannot forbear from smiling at the idea of constituting in this way a real international government. It is manifest that this system of political equilibrium, considered in its whole duration, has caused more wars that it has hindered. The shock caused by the French Revolution ground it to powder, and every state has remained in continual fear of a general encroachment by some great power. At this moment is not all Europe in dread, though no doubt without cause, of seeing the entire system of international relations put into jeopardy by the death of one man?

To the foregoing it must be added, in accordance with a judicious remark of M. de Maistre, that the action of the Spiritual Power should be estimated not only by the obvious benefits it produces, but especially by the mischief it prevents, though these are not so easily ascertained. A memorable example pointed out by this philosopher suffices to show clearly the importance of his remark.

In the formation of the colonial system which followed the discovery of America, two rival nations, each of whom might envy the other the most important colonial possessions of the globe, and who were at many points constantly in contact, never engaged in a single war on this ground, while all the other European powers, obstinately and bitterly contended among themselves for some almost insignificant stations. How was this great result produced? By a single act of the spiritual power, even then shaken to its foundation. A simple bull of Alexander VI., which from the outset equitably traced a general line of demarcation between the colonial establishments of Spain and those of Portugal, sufficed.

I repeat the assertion, all that has happened has necessarily happened, and I can feel no barren regret as to the past. But, let me point out, with the great Leibnitz, the fact of the important void left in the European organisation by the inevitable dissolution of the spiritual power, and thence conclude that, the establishment of a new Moral Government is imperiously demanded by the present state of civilised nations.

Hence also how disorders in the internal organisation of each people.

The decline of the theological philosophy and the corresponding spiritual power has left society without any moral discipline. Hence a series of effects which I shall mark in the order of their natural connection.

1st. A complete mental dispersion. Since everyone endeavours to form by his unaided forces a system of general notions without fulfilling any of the indispensable conditions, it has become quite impossible to obtain in the mass of men, even between two minds, a real and durable agreement upon any social question, however simple. If this anarchy had no other effects than its ridiculous side, the mischief would be unimportant, and satire would suffice to reduce it within reasonable limits. But the facility it affords for regarding the majority of the subjects that so eminently concern good order, as being open, with almost equal reason, to opposite conclusions produces effects of the most serious nature.
In order to estimate rightly the depth and universality of this Intellectu- 
al Anarchy, it is necessary to observe that it does not now prevail nearly 
among the partisans of the critical philosophy, who have erected it into a 
fundamental dogma. It is manifested still more decisively, though in a less 
degree, by the partisans of the retrograde doctrine, among whom, being in 
contradiction with their tendencies, it constitutes an involuntary result of 
the general and irresistible progress of the human mind. In the first place, 
we may remark in that party a fundamental separation, which often dege-
rates into direct opposition, between the defenders of Catholicism and those 
of Feudalism. Moreover, considering the former only, whose opinions are 
necessarily more homogeneous, we perceive that while converging upon a 
sufficient number of points to be fairly regarded as forming a single school, 
they nevertheless diverge essentially on fundamental questions so widely 
that the practical results would be wholly incoherent if the state of society 
permitted any extended application of their doctrines. This is proved by an 
attentive examination of the theories of this school, advanced by its leading 
thinkers, M. de Maistre, M. de la Mennais, M. de Bonsald, and M. d’Estein. 
Their various opinions reveal at bottom a marked individuality on the most 
important points.  


Endly. The almost total absence of public morality. On one hand the 
social destination of each person, being no longer determined by any maxims 
generally respected, and our practical institutions of necessity conforming 
themselves to this intellectual situation, the growth of individual ambition 
is really no longer under any restraint but that of the irregular and fortuitous 
action of external circumstances. On the other hand since social sentiment 
vainly seeks, whether in private judgment or public prejudice, exact and 
fixed notions as to what constitutes the general good in each case, it ends 
by gradually degenerating into a vague philanthropic intention, incapable 
of exerting any real influence upon the conduct of life. Owing to this twofold 
influence in the chief relations of society each person is gradually led to 
make himself a centre, and the notion of private interest alone remaining 
clear in the midst of all this moral chaos, mere egoism naturally becomes 
the only moving power possessed of sufficient energy to guide active life. 

This result now so apparent in public morality extends itself, to a certain 
degree, even to private morality. Happily this depends on many conditions 
besides that of holding decided opinions. Natural instinct, which speaks 
much more clearly in the latter than in the former case; the ever increasing 
power of the habits of order and labour, which so strongly tend to basify 
the idea of vice; the general amelioration of conditions produced by the 
continual development of industry, which renders temptations less severe 
and less frequent; the general softening of manners, as the result of advanc-
ing civilisation; all these causes must, without doubt, greatly counterbalance 
the immorality which the absence of fixed principles of conduct tends to 
our day to produce. Nevertheless the want of organisation produces, even 
on this head, effects which are undeniable, though more difficult to disentangle. 
Let each person,—consulting his daily experience, and putting 
aside extreme cases, where the evil is so palpable as to cause its immediate 
suppression,—examine whether real life does not suffer from the fluctuating 

1 The most consistent philosopher of all who write in this way, M. de la 
Mennais has recently been led into a grave infraction of fundamental principles 
by formally invoking the liberty of worship.
condition that affects the larger portion of our ideas of duty, whether as regards the various domestic relations, or the ordinary mutual ties between superiors and inferiors, or the relations of producers and consumers, &c.

Besides, an indirect observation to some extent dispenses with immediate verification. I refer to the fact of the very general preponderance, in practice at least, of moral theories which pretend to explain all human sentiments by connecting them exclusively with self-interest. While in speculation the moral instinct repels such theories, they have become the standing source of explanation for the world in general, and maintain, even among philosophers, a credit which but too faithfully indicates the real state of society. This observation is corroborated by the view which predominates among them, that penal legislation furnishes, in the last resort, the only efficacious mode of assuring the morality of the lower classes.

3dly. The social preponderance which during the last three centuries has been, more and more, assigned to the purely material point of view, is another manifest result of the spiritual disorganisation of modern nations. The practical power having, from the sixteenth century downwards, annulled or subordinated to an ever-increasing extent the theoretical power, the same spirit has gradually penetrated all the elements of society. In every matter people have gradually come to consider, almost exclusively, immediate utility, or at least to place it in the first rank. Thus, for example, in the systematic estimate of the sciences, their philosophic value has been more and more overlooked; and they have only been appreciated according to their practical results.

This materialistic spirit is pre-eminently apparent in England, where, from a multitude of special causes, a provisional social organisation has since the sixteenth century acquired a greater degree of consistency than on the Continent. It predominates still more completely in the United States, where spiritual disorganisation has been pushed much farther than in any other country.

When the progress of events introduced the epoch of constitutions, the same characteristic strikingly revealed itself in this new sphere of action. Public attention was exclusively occupied with the material aspects of this great work. It aimed at recasting all practical institutions; at regulating, even to the smallest detail, the forms of deliberative assemblies, without giving a thought to the previous establishment of new social doctrines, without so much as attempting to determine precisely the spirit of the new political system. Even in our day when, thanks to acquired experience, society is entering upon better paths, to the extent at least of definitely renouncing metaphysical constitutions, it may be feared that the influence of the same habits will long impede a true reorganisation.

Doubtless it is by re-establishing moral order that this vast operation must commence, since mental reorganisation is at once more urgent and better prepared than the regulation of social relations. Nevertheless, it is probable that the popular disposition—still too pronounced—to demand new institutions; in other words, to reconstruct the temporal before the spiritual power, will at first present a powerful obstacle to the adoption of this, the natural and the only efficacious course.

4thly. I must point out, as the last general consequence of the dissolution of the spiritual power, the establishment of that modern autocracy without parallel in history, and which, for want of a more adequate expression, may be styled ministerialism or administrative despotism. Its peculiar organic
character is the centralisation of power, pushed further and further, beyond all reasonable bounds; and its usual mode of action is systematic corruption. Both inevitably result from the moral disorganisation of society.

A well-known natural law of political action distinctly establishes that the only way to avoid being governed by others is to govern oneself. It applies to the masses as well as to individuals, to things as well as to persons. In its most extended sense it signifies that, in proportion as moral government is weak, material government must be strong, in order to prevent the entire decomposition of the body politic. How, for example, can we imagine in the case of a population so extensive as that of France, whose various elements are no longer sufficiently combined by any moral bond, that the nation would be hindered from breaking up into separate communities, these again subdividing themselves, if, in the absence of a common spirit, the central temporal power did not maintain all the social elements in a state of immediate and continual dependence. Such a result would only represent the continuing influence of the same principle, which, as above pointed out, broke up the ancient European System into independent nationalities. Accordingly centralisation has increased in proportion as moral disorganisation has become more complete and obvious. The same cause which made this movement indispensable likewise tended to render it unavoidable, since the annulling of the spiritual power destroyed the one legal barrier to the encroachments of the temporal power.

Corruption, employed as the permanent means of government, follows still more clearly from the destruction of the spiritual power. It might be foreseen from the growth of this shameful régime in the country where the degradation of moral authority was most strongly constituted on a legal basis. But it is easy to obtain a direct proof of this proposition.

In a population where the indispensable cooperation of individuals is public order can no longer be produced by voluntary and moral ascent accorded to a common social doctrine, no other resource for maintaining harmony remains than the melancholy alternative between force and corruption. The first of these methods is incompatible with the nature of modern civilisation, since the temporal action of society, ceasing to be military, has become essentially industrial. Wealth which, through the institution of property, was the original measure of force, as being its permanent result, has in modern society more and more become its main and habitual source. In this respect it might be accurately described as virtual force. Hence the gradual substitution of corruption for force, as a means of maintaining order. The more the new state of society repelled the latter, the more did it favour the former, from the time that moral disorganisation began clearly to reveal itself.

Governments can only act on individuals by employing on a greater scale those means of influence which are recognised as most efficacious in daily intercourse. Thus, when personal interest is considered in private relations as the only energetic motive adequate to inspire habitual confidence, need we feel astonished that the central power is led to employ the same means of action? This sad result should not be imputed to the governed any more than to rulers, flowing, as it does, from their mutual faults. To speak more accurately, it is the painful, though transient, consequence of the state of anarchy into which society has been, of necessity, plunged during the transition from the theological and military system to the positive and industrial system.
GENERAL APPENDIX—FIFTH PART.

If the picture just sketched of the general effects gradually produced from the sixteenth century by the moral disorganisation of society, is considered to accord with observation, and if the facts are admitted to result from the cause to which I attribute them, it is manifest that the establishment of a new spiritual power is even more important Nationally than in a European point of view.

In order to prevent as far as possible any misapprehension of my conception, I now state my opinion that in the former as in the latter point of view this state of anarchy, of which I, with all true observers, deplore the melancholy results, was not merely an unavoidable result of the decline of the ancient social system, but an indispensable condition for establishing the new one. Examining under this aspect the four general facts above stated, I could prove that, though revolting monstrosities when regarded as permanent conditions (as the critical doctrine, understood in an organic sense, requires), they are by no means such when regarded in reference to a merely transitional state. I limit myself, as regards this new investigation, to the first fact, which is the basis of all the rest.

The profound Intellectual Anarchy which now prevails is not merely justified by the necessary decline of the ancient social system, but inevitable, and even indispensable, until the doctrines destined to found the new organisation have been sufficiently elaborated. On one hand, so long as this kind of moral interregnum lasts, it will be impossible to discipline minds. On the other hand, if, before this period arrived, a direct attempt were made to produce mental unity, which, in the absence of suitable doctrines, could only be accomplished by material and arbitrary measures, it would of necessity follow, that, the free development of thought being forbidden, both as regards the formation of new doctrines and their diffusion, the process of reorganisation must be arrested.

Thus I appreciate as fully as anyone all that is truly valuable in the Critical Philosophy; but I desire that all misapprehension as to its real character should henceforth cease. The period has arrived when we can give a rational account of the course which has been followed; mere routine is no longer indispensable. It is possible to maintain the just, though transitory, influence of negative doctrines without on that ground treating them as organic, and in this way allowing ourselves to be lulled into a factitious security in reference to the serious dangers with which the vicious prolongation of the existing anarchy threatens society. Such an intellectual attitude, though perhaps above average capacity, should at least become the habitual point of view of all thinkers who wish to devote their forces to the grand social operation of the nineteenth century.

By the ensemble of the views above submitted, I hope I have sufficiently prepared all reflecting readers for the direct treatment of this fundamental question of the Spiritual Power, which in our day excites so many puerile and chimerical fears, and, accordingly, to this I now proceed.

The existing state of opinion, in reference to the fundamental question of the necessity for a spiritual power, offers to the impartial observer a singular and even painful contrast. On one hand, those who take up the cause of true liberty, of civilisation, who, in a word, specially proclaim themselves progressive, and to a certain extent are so, dominated by the desire, legitimate but ill regulated, of avoiding at any price a theocracy, follow a course which, were it practicable, must, to avoid anarchy, inevitably lead to the most degrading of despotisms, that of force destitute of all moral authority.
On the other hand, those who are accused of a retrograde tendency, and do in truth, to some extent, deserve this reproach, in respect not of their philosophical aims, but of the inevitable consequences of their doctrines were these completely carried out, are at bottom the only persons whose theories adequately assert the dignity of human nature, since they make moral superiority the corrective and regulator of force or wealth.

By the considerations above pointed out, I have endeavoured to prove that the social condition of the most civilised nations imperiously demands the formation of a new spiritual order, as the first and chief mode of ending the revolutionary period, which began in the sixteenth century, and thirty years ago entered on its last stage. It remains to examine directly the nature of the Spiritual Organisation appropriate to modern societies. So fundamental a problem, and one intimately connected with all the deepest political questions, could only be properly treated in a special work exclusively addressed to the most serious thinkers. But, although the very brief indications to which I must here confine myself are assuredly inadequate for the complete treatment which such a question merits, they will perhaps call the attention of thoughtful minds to this subject, and this is my present aim.

In order to obtain a complete general view of the new moral order it is necessary to consider separately the Office which the spiritual power should fulfil, abstracted from its peculiar constitution, next the nature of the Organisation requisite for bringing it into harmony with modern civilisation. The following explanations are exclusively devoted to the former class of considerations, essentially reducible to an analysis of the main reasons that render a spiritual government necessary to society. On a subsequent occasion I shall examine the second part of the question. This division is determined by the natural course of public reason, which, doubtless, will attain to a clear perception of the need for a new moral power before it accurately comprehends its true organisation. After having thus pointed out the ensemble of the new spiritual order towards which modern societies tend, it is my purpose, in a concluding essay, to consider the general course by which this great work of reconstruction should naturally be effected, by taking its existing stage as our point of departure.

It would be easy to form empirically a clear idea of the functions of the modern spiritual power by a careful study of those which devolved upon the Catholic clergy at the period of their greatest vigour and complete independence, that is to say, from about the middle of the eleventh to nearly the end of the thirteenth century. Doubtless, the philosophical bases of these two powers, with the corresponding social relations, and, consequently, their respective modes of influence differ entirely in their nature and are, in many respects, even absolutely opposed. But as regards the extent and the intensity of action, which is here the essential point, it may be asserted that for every social relation which fell within the province of the Catholic clergy, an analogous attribute will be found in the new political system as to the modern spiritual power. Inasmuch as the new system will be founded more quietly than the ancient, and at a more enlightened period, when its nature can be more easily foreseen and therefore better understood, it is even probable that the intervention of the spiritual power will be more explicit and complete, because it will encounter less resistance in the corresponding temporal power. Nevertheless, although this comparison is invaluable as offering a degree of precision not easily attainable in
any other way, it can only profit minds able to put out of sight the extreme
difference of the two states of civilisation, or rather to make a just allowance
for it; and that have studied the past with a disposition sufficiently emanci-
pated from the pernicious prejudices generally inspired by the critical philo-
sophy towards the spiritual régime of the Middle Ages. Such a comparison
would therefore almost unavoidably lead most readers into erroneous appli-
cations, which would give a very mistaken idea of my view. Accordingly,
though I deem it advisable to signalise this point of similitude for the
benefit of those who can utilise it, I shall merely undertake, here, the direct
appreciation of the functions of the modern spiritual power.

Although it may be useful and, in certain cases, even necessary to con-
sider the idea of society, abstracted from that of government, it is universally
recognised that these ideas are in fact inseparable. In other words the
lasting existence of every real association necessarily supposes a constant
influence, at times directive, at times repressive, exercised, within certain
limits, by the whole on the parts, in order to make them converge towards
the general order from which they always naturally tend to deviate, more
or less, and from which they would deviate indefinitely could they be
entirely left to their own impulses. This influence embraces two kinds of
action, one Material the other Moral; which, though always coexisting, are
entirely heterogeneous both as regards their bases and their modes of action.
The first of these concerns actions, enforcing some, preventing others. In
the last resort it is founded upon force, or, what comes to the same thing,
upon wealth, which has become its equivalent among modern nations, in
proportion as the progress of civilisation has transferred to industrial pre-
eminence the civil power originally attached to military superiority. The
second consists in the regulation of opinion, sentiment, and will, in a word
of tendencies. Its basis is that moral authority which in the last resort
belongs to intellectual superiority and knowledge. In this way the two
great inequalities on which all society is based, concur to maintain social
order.

From the time when civilisation had advanced sufficiently to allow of
our assigning these two general branches of government to different
classes—as took place in the Middle Ages—the distinction between them
became apparent to everyone, and the terms 'temporal power' and 'spiritu-
al power' were created to denote it. For that reason alone it is
desirable to preserve these terms, at least provisionally, in the new social
state, although their structure still recalls the social state that gave them
birth.

The proper destination of the Spiritual Power is, then, the government of
opinion; that is to say the establishment and maintenance of those principles
which ought to preside over the various social relations. This general
function is divisible into as many parts as there are distinct classes of rela-
tions. In truth no social fact can escape the influence of the spiritual
power when this is well organised, that is to say, in exact harmony with the
corresponding state of civilisation. Its chief attribute, therefore, is the
supreme direction of education, whether general or special, of the former
especially, the word being taken in its most extended and just sense, so as
to embrace the entire system of ideas and habits necessary for initiating
individuals into the social order under which they must live, and for adapt-
ing, as far as possible each of them to the special office he ought to fulfil
in this great social function the action of the spiritual power is most clearly
marked, as constituting its exclusive attribute; while, in all other cases, its influence is, more or less, mixed up with that of the temporal power. In this way, it decisively manifests its power, and, at the same time, lays the solid foundation of its general authority. Education would even include the national functions of the spiritual power, if by an abusive extension of this expression, we included under it, as some philosophers have done, not only the preparation of youth, but also that important action exerted on adults, which is its necessary complement and inevitable consequence. The second class of functions appertaining to the spiritual power consists in putting forward unceasingly for the regulation of active life, both as regards individuals and the masses, the principles which they imbibed in youth, and enforcing their application, when neglected or violated, so far as moral means are efficacious for that purpose.

Such, briefly considered, are the general functions of the spiritual power viewed in reference to the nation alone. But International Relations assign to it a new class of functions, which, however, flow from the former, applied to a wider sphere. Abstractedly considered, the jurisdiction of the spiritual power should acknowledge no other territorial limits than those of the habitable globe, if all portions of the human race had nearly reached the same state of civilisation, since a spiritual association is by its nature, evidently capable of an indefinite extension. But it embraces, in fact, only the nations (for example those in Europe) whose social state is sufficiently similar to allow of their maintaining a certain degree of permanent community, and yet so different as to require temporal governments distinct from and independent of each other. For as soon as this similitude exists, continuous relations inevitably arise, whence result at once the possibility and the necessity for a certain common government, destined to regulate them by the influence of general and uniform principles.

We cannot wonder that Catholic philosophers should have made its European influence the main and characteristic attribute of the spiritual power since, belonging to it exclusively, this constituted its most obvious and decisive office. Without doubt at each social stage, the association of a certain number of men under a common spiritual régime always and necessarily precedes their union under the same temporal government. That is equally true for National as for European order. But this truth can be far more easily proved in the latter than in the former case, for in the two powers constantly coexist, while in the other, from the nature of things, spiritual association always subsists in full force long before any beginning of temporal association. So true is this that in the ancient political system,

1 Besides the above two kinds of functions, the spiritual power also evidently exercises, as a learned corporation, a consultative influence, direct or indirect, in all social operations. But this latter office, which our present incomplete and erroneous system of education dispose us to exaggerate and overestimate, would, in a well-ordered social state, fall within one or other of the two former. For this reason I have not expressly mentioned it in my present summary exposition. For when education is what it ought to be, individuals or the masses rarely require to practice any general principles but those under which they have been brought up. It is only necessary to remind them of these and to explain their application, because they naturally tend to forget and misunderstand them. When the general or special needs of society really require New Principles, the spiritual power, as the class on whom the cultivation of theoretical knowledge devolves, should supply the want and systematically introduce them into general education.
the spiritual union alone subsisted, and it is still doubtful, whether the temporal union will ever subsist under any system.

Such then, incontestably, is the second great object at which the spiritual power aims: the fusing of all European, and, generally speaking, of the greatest possible number of nations, into one moral community. This last office, which completes its attributions, is, like the preceding, reducible to the permanent foundation of a uniform system of education for the various populations, and of that regular influence which necessarily results therefrom. Thus it is that the spiritual power naturally becomes invested, in reference to the several nations and their temporal chiefs, with the sort of authority indispensable for inducing them, willingly or unwillingly, to submit their differences to its arbitration, and to receive from it a common impulse whenever a collective action is needed.

Thus, to resume, the life of individuals and that of nations is alternately composed of speculation and of action, in other words of tendencies and results. These two kinds of facts are intertwined in a thousand ways in real life. The proper and exclusive object of the spiritual power is to regulate the former, that of the temporal to regulate the latter. Each of the two powers acts legitimately so long as it confines itself strictly to its natural sphere of action, so far at least as this distinction is humanly possible. When either, passing this limit, usurps a function of the other, an abuse occurs; and though such usurpations, in both senses, have, undeniable, been, or may again become, momentarily inevitable and indispensable under certain circumstances, they do not, for that reason, constitute the normal state. Such is the typical order towards which political combinations should tend; although, unquestionably, it may be foreseen that the imperfection of the human organisation, whether as regards intelligence, or passion, in this as in every other case, forbids the hope of ever reaching complete success.1

Having thus, in order to fix our ideas, laid down this general definition of the spiritual power for every social state, it becomes easy, by applying the preceding considerations, to show that this power, once properly reorganised, should exert as great an influence in Modern Civilisation as in that of the Middle Ages. I need not specially concern myself with the latter, as to which I refer my readers to the works of the Catholic philosophers, and particularly to those of M. de Maistre, who in his treatise The Pope, has given the most systematic, profound, and exact exposition of the ancient spiritual organisation.2 We have here, essentially, to consider the spiritual

1 Philosophically considered, the spiritual and temporal influence will always remain, by their nature, perfectly distinct; but, considered politically, it is not always possible to make a distinction, even approximately, because there are a multitude of secondary offices—which this is not the place for pointing out—where the two powers must inevitably be united, pretty equally, in the same hands. The fundamental principle of the division of the two powers simply requires that no individual or body of men, should possess both in a high degree, and this is not only possible but has long since become inevitable, especially in the modern system of society.

2 The philosophers of the retrograde school, and particularly M. de Maistre, who may now be regarded as its head, while defending the Catholic system, have offered some general considerations of great importance on the Spiritual Power, as an element of every conceivable society. But these abstract conceptions, though capable of supplying useful hints to persons who desire to embrace this fundamental question from its true point of view, are deficient both in the precision and in the generality necessary to establish a methodical conviction. In them we may
power in the social state peculiar to modern nations, and which I regard as being characterised, under its temporal aspects, by the entire preponderance of industrial activity.

In the positive order of society, organisation, whether considered as a whole or in detail, is nothing but the regulation of the Division of Labour; this expression being understood not in the very narrow sense given to it by the economists, but in its most extended sense, that is to say, as embracing all the various kinds of coexisting labours, theoretical or practical, which cooperate to the same end, including distinct national as well as individual functions. The ever-increasing separation and specialisation of distinct organs of activity, as regards both individuals and nations, constitute, in fact, the general means of perfecting the human race, as, by a necessary and continuous reaction they are their permanent result. In this way society naturally tends to enlarge itself more and more, and must, sooner or later, comprehend the totality of mankind, if the duration which physical laws assign to the progressive activity of our race is sufficiently prolonged. All real steps in advance which have taken place, or can take place, in remark the radical inconsequence which consists in directly transferring to modern societies considerations exclusively drawn from the observation of medieval societies so essentially different. Associated, moreover, as they invariably are, with projects for restoring a system whose destruction, already almost completed, is henceforward irrevocable, they tend in the present state of men's minds rather to fortify than to uproot the general prejudices against every spiritual power. We may even remark that the sentiment, involuntary though incomplete, of total disaccord with their century inspires these philosophers with a hesitation and timidity which shows itself even in their judgments of the past.

Philosophically regarded, then, these works essentially possess only an historical utility, as being eminently adapted to place, in the clearest light, the true general character of the ancient social system, and to secure a just appreciation of the immense benefits which the human race owes to it. In this respect the exceptions of the retrograde school preserve all their value, as being fully and directly applicable to an order of facts for, or rather from, which they have been systematised. But in reference to the modern organisation of existing societies, the question must be regarded as one absolutely untouched.

It remains to point out that the political influence of the retrograde school is, nevertheless, in this point of view, very useful in our day, and even necessary, during a certain period, though only indirectly, and, so to speak, negatively useful. For it presents, on one hand, an indispensable impediment which preserves society from the total preponderance of critical doctrines that would hinder all real organisation. At the same time it acts as a stimulant, so less essential, to compel modern civilisation to produce the moral system fitted to itself, and adapted to give it the consistency which it needs in order to become capable of replacing the ancient one. In this sense the influence of the retrograde school is quite as necessary as that of the negative school, though in a different way; and one should naturally subsist as long as the other.

The Economists were led, by the imperfect nature of the investigations which the general progress of the human mind assigned to them, to consider the social state from a very imperfect point of view. It is, therefore, easy to understand that they could only embrace the narrowest and least important applications of the principle of the Division of Labour, of which they are, properly speaking, the inventors. To the credit of Adam Smith, it should be remarked, that not only was he the first to conceive this great principle in a clear and positive manner, but he presented it in a much broader manner than any of his successors.

The considerations submitted in this and the following paragraphs, are, naturally, as applicable to theoretical as to practical order. But I have thought it best to apply them to the latter, in order to place in a clearer light the necessity for the spiritual power, which is now my chief aim.
social organisation may be regarded, from this point of view, as producing or tending to produce a better Division of Labour. For social order would, manifestly, be perfect, whether as regards personal well-being or the harmony of the whole, if we could in all cases assign to every individual or nation that precise kind of activity for which they are respectively fitted by natural disposition, antecedents, or special circumstances. This, considered from another point of view, would simply constitute a complete division of labour. Doubtless such a social order could not at any period exist in perfection. But the human race continually tends to approach this limit, more and more, although we can never determine how far we shall fall short of it. In the social state which among modern nations establishes itself with increasing solidity, this tendency is most direct and apparent. For industrial activity, compared with military activity, is characterised by this admirable property; that its free and full development, in one individual or nation, does not necessarily involve its repression in other individuals or nations. On the contrary it not merely permits but, within certain limits, promotes universal cooperation; whence it naturally follows that men and nations are continually impelled to form associations more and more extended and pacific.

But if the Division of Labour, regarded in this light, be the general cause of human perfection,¹ and of the development of the social state; it presents under another aspect, no less natural, a continual tendency to deterioration and dissolution, which would, in the end, stop all progress, unless constantly checked by the ever-increasing action of government and, above all, of spiritual government. It necessarily results from this constantly progressive specialisation, that each individual, and each nation, habitually places itself at a point of view, more and more narrow, and is guided by interests increasingly special. If then, on the one hand, the intellect is sharpened, on the other it becomes narrower,² and so too what sociability gains in extent, it loses in energy. In this way, each individual and nation, is rendered more and more unfit to grasp, unsuited, the relation between his special action and the entirety of social activity, which, at the same time, becomes increasingly complicated. On the other hand, each feels more and more disposed to detach his particular cause from the common cause, every day less easily apprehensible. These disadvantages, incident to the Division of Labour, evidently tend, from the nature of things, to augment continually pari passu with its advantages. The former then would overbear the latter, if they could act unreservedly. Hence the absolute necessity for a continuous action, produced by two forces, one moral the other physical, specially destined to bring back to the general point of view

¹ The imperfection of language obliges me to employ these words—perfection and development—of which the former and even the latter, though more precise, usually recalls ideas of absolute excellence and indefinite amelioration, foreign to my meaning. These words are merely used by me with the scientific purpose of designating, in social physics, a certain succession of states which the human race reaches in accordance with fixed laws; analogous to their employment by physiologists in the study of the individual, to designate a series of transformations, which involve no necessary idea of continuous amelioration or deterioration.

² Some economists, and among others, M. Say, have perceived this inevitable result of the division of labour when carried very far, but only in reference to those subordinate cases which had formed the exclusive subject of their observations.
minds predisposed to diverge, and to impose the common interest upon individualities which constantly tend to deviate from it. While such an intervention is indispensable, it becomes possible, and even unavoidable, because the natural development of the various inequalities, which necessarily results from the division of labour, tends, of itself, to establish the hierarchy, spiritual and temporal, requisite for this general action. Such, from an elementary point of view, is the theory of government, the entire essence of which thus consists, at all times, in regulating the hierarchy which forms itself spontaneously in the interior of society so as to diminish, as much as possible, the evil, as compared with the beneficial, influence of the division of labour.

These considerations are specially applicable to the system of modern civilisation, as much as those very different ones previously pointed out. In our social state, where the division of labour is pushed farthest, and must, inevitably, more than in any previous state, continually augment, both as regards individuals and nations, the disadvantages attaching to this division, no less that its advantages, are necessarily more pronounced. Under one aspect it is as inferior to the social condition of the nations of antiquity, as it is superior under the other; and this furnishes ample matter for discussion to those who desire to praise or blame either absolutely, and can do so according to the point of view at which they place themselves. Who, in fact, has not remarked, that in mental grasp and political energy, the nations of antiquity were as superior to the modern as they were inferior in extent of knowledge and universality of social relations. From the foregoing remarks it is apparent that there is nothing accidental in this contrast, the source of which we should fathom in order to exclude vicious attempts to combine in the social order two mutually incompatible sorts of excellence.

Be this as it may, the last class of considerations above indicated which explain the general function of government, conceived in its largest scope, and especially as part of modern civilisation, evidently apply, in a special manner, to the Spiritual Power, proving that in the new social state the action of this power should be more extensive, and less intense, than in all the preceding states of society. Since in fact the general disadvantages incident to division of labour inevitably increase by the same necessity which produces the gradual development of civilisation, society needs, more and more, particularly among the modern nations, to feel the influence of a speculative corporation, which, specially and permanently devoting itself to the general point of view, is destined to recall this both to individuals and nations; and which, being at the same time, by its character and social independence, disinterested as regards the numerous causes that produce divergence and isolation, is eminently fitted to identify its particular interest with that common interest, whose peculiar organ it may be considered is the majority of cases. But in order to complete this general view it is indispensable to draw the distinction more precisely, as regards the continuous development of the total influence of government, between the spiritual direction and the temporal direction of society.

1 In studying the special social characteristics of the ancient nations we should only consider the classes that really constituted society; namely the freemen, slaves being generally regarded as a kind of domestic animal. With this limitation, which, besides, proves that the state of the human race, as a whole, has, since this period undergone a great improvement, the remark made in the text cannot be disputed.
Studying the mechanism of human societies profoundly, we may perceive, as above pointed out, that in every political system the formation of the Spiritual Power invariably and necessarily preceded the development of the Temporal Power, even where these two powers were united in the same hand. Thus, to take the most decisive example, the Roman constitution was originally as essentially theocratic as the Etruscan, and although it subsequently assumed so different a character, the patricians always considered their authority as a sacerdotal corporation the essential basis of their power. In truth, generally speaking, the spiritual association, founded on community of doctrine and the resulting harmony of sentiments, must, by the nature of things, precede the temporal association founded on a conformity of interests. The latter can never exist without the former; interests being never sufficiently homogeneous to dispense with a certain similitude of principles. Yet, it is possible to conceive an association existing by identity of principle alone, supposing the opposition of interests not to be excessive, although society cannot subsist, in a complete and stable sense, either between individuals or nations, unless both conditions are, to a certain extent, simultaneously fulfilled. In proportion as civilisation develops itself, each of the two kinds of association augments in extent, while diminishing in energy, as above explained. But the original difference flowing from their intimate nature always makes itself felt in one respect. The temporal association being incapable of supporting itself alone and without the cooperation of the spiritual power, while spiritual association can, to a certain extent, subsist by itself and without the help of the temporal power, the spiritual power enlarges its sphere amid the growing complication of society, whereas the temporal power sees its sphere contract. In fact, the temporal power only rules what cannot be governed spiritually; that is to say force governs what is inaccessible to opinion. Now in proportion as men become civilised, they become on one hand more easily affected by moral motives, on the other more disposed to a peaceful adjustment of their interests. For this reason the action of the temporal power continually decreases, and ought to diminish in the new state of society more than in the preceding states; while the action of the spiritual power augments and should become greater in the modern system of civilisation than in any other. Thus we see how profoundly vicious is that disposition with which the critical philosophy has imbued nearly all minds, and which disposes men to conceive the new social order as subsisting without any spiritual power. On the contrary, this power should now necessarily exert a much greater political influence within its natural sphere of action than can be exerted by the temporal power, which tends to become less and less important, and to reduce itself more and more, so long at least as civilisation continues to advance, to a purely civil hierarchy, although probably this last result is never absolutely attainable.

Having thus conceived the general action of the modern Spiritual Power, by contemplating its various offices, whether National or European, as a whole, it is necessary to complete this view by considering them in their main details.

The first subdivision of this ensemble of functions, to which I must here confine myself, consists, as above remarked, in distinguishing the Spiritual Power into two grand classes of offices; the one National, the other European. Let us first consider the former.

1 Obliged to employ one or other of two expressions, European or universal, in order to designate that part of the functions of the spiritual power which is
We have seen that, in this respect, the action of the spiritual power essentially consists in creating through education the opinions and habits which ought to guide men in active life, and afterwards in maintaining by regular and constant moral influence, exercised both over individuals and classes, the practical observation of these fundamental rules. We must, therefore, examine the chief grounds which, contrary to existing prejudices, necessitate in the new social state, a Moral Government bearing on ideas, dispositions, and conduct, both as regards individual and collective order.

Dogmatic belief is the normal condition of the human intellect, towards which it tends naturally, at all times and in every direction, even when seeming to deviate most from it. For Scepticism only constitutes a crisis: the inevitable result of the mental interregnum which necessarily arises whenever the human mind is obliged to change its doctrines, and, at the same time, the indispensable means employed, by individuals and the race, in order to allow of passing from one doctrine to another; such being the only essential utility of doubt. This principle, which may be verified in every class of ideas, is, a fortiori, applicable to Social Ideas as the most complicated and important of all. Modern populations have obeyed this imperative law of our nature, even in their revolutionary period, since, whenever it was really necessary for them to act, though for destruction only, they were unavoidably led to give a dogmatic form to ideas purely critical in their essence.

Neither individuals nor the human race are destined to consume their life in a course of sterile reasoning, continually disserting on the conduct they ought to observe. The mass of the human race is essentially called to action, except an imperceptible fraction only, who, by their nature, are chiefly devoted to contemplation. Nevertheless, every sort of action presupposes directing Principles already ascertained, which individuals and the masses have, in most cases, neither capacity nor time to establish, or even to verify, otherwise than by their results. Such, intellectually considered, is the fundamental consideration that decisively justifies the existence of a class absorbed by speculative labours, constantly and exclusively occupied in furnishing all the rest with the general rules of conduct, which they can no more dispense with than create; and which, once admitted, allow the masses to employ their faculties in applying them to practice, only asking for the assistance of the contemplative class, when deduction or interpretation presents too many difficulties.

This necessity for Spiritual Guidance manifests itself, no less clearly, if man is considered, not merely as an intelligent, but as a moral being. For, even admitting that each individual or collective being could by his unaided faculties form the plan of action best adapted to his own welfare, or to exerted over international relations, I prefer the former as being the most accurate and consecrated by past usage, although probably it is at once too large and too narrow. But I employ it without prejudice to the territorial extension which the spiritual power shall some time or other attain.

1 In order to simplify this summary examination as much as possible, I do not extend it to points not generally contested, although they might with advantage be presented in a more rational way than is habitually done. For this reason I continue here to regard education only on its social side, and not that theoretical instruction, general or special, which ought to preside over industrial activity. This last preparation evidently forms an essential attribute of the spiritual power, on the necessity of which I do not insist because it is, I think, doubted by no one.
the harmony of the *ensemble*, it is certain that this doctrine, being generally opposed, more or less, to the most energetic impulses of human nature, would, by itself, exert hardly any influence on real life. It therefore needs to be, so to speak, vivified by a moral force, regularly organised, which, continually recalling it to the remembrance of each in the interest of all, can impart the energy that results from such universal adhesion, and is alone capable of overcoming, or even adequately counterbalancing, the force of the anti-social dispositions naturally preponderant in human nature.

However great the progress of civilisation may be it must ever remain true that if the social state is, in certain respects, a continuous state of individual satisfaction, it is also, under other not less necessary aspects, a continuous state of sacrifice. To speak more precisely, each person, in every personal act, must experience a certain degree of satisfaction without which society could not exist; and a certain degree of sacrifice without which it could not maintain itself, having regard to the opposition of individual tendencies which is, in some degree, absolutely inevitable. The relative intensity of the former kind of feelings may doubtless increase, and, in fact, it does constantly increase, thus creating a progressive amelioration of the human condition. But the latter necessity also always exists and its absolute strength even augments continually, through that increasing warmth of desire which our organisation invariably connects with the augmentation of our enjoyments, as an inevitable compensation and an indispensable corrective.

The highest attainable state of social perfection would manifestly consist in the fulfilment by each person of the particular office for which he is best adapted in the general system. Now even in such a state of things— itself, purely ideal, though capable of being indefinitely approached—men would need a moral government, because no one could of his own accord confine his personal dispositions within limits suitable to his condition. For nature and society will, by common accord, ever assign to different persons, functions which afford satisfaction in very various degrees. Natural aptitudes and social positions present an infinite variety as regards both kind and intensity. On the contrary the instincts that habitually predominate are nearly the same under both aspects in all men, or at least they exist in all with sufficient energy to inspire a wish for the enjoyments that others have, let their positions differ as they may. Hence the necessity for developing, by a special influence, the natural morality of man, in order, as much as possible, to bring the impulses of all within the limits required for the general harmony, by habituating them from childhood to a voluntary subordination of their personal interest to the common interest, and by constantly reproducing in active life, with necessary emphasis, the consideration of the social point of view. Without this salutary influence, which extinguishe the evil in its source, society, being constantly obliged to act on individuals, either by violent means or by interest, in order to repress the results of tendencies allowed to develop themselves freely, the maintenance of order would become impossible, even did this temporal discipline reach its utmost limits. But happily, from the nature of things, the absolute notion of such a mode of government, at once barbarous and illusory, is, and can only be, a mere supposition. In truth temporal repress has been, and never will be, anything but the complement of spiritual repression, which, at no time, can wholly suffice for social necessities. If, by the
natural progress of civilisation, the former unceasingly diminishes, this
diminution unavoidably presupposes a proportional increase of the latter.

Thus, both under intellectual and moral aspects, it is proved that in
every established society, the notions of good or evil intended for the guidence
of each person in his various social relations (and even in his purely
individual life as far as it can influence these relations), are reducible to
prescriptions or prohibitions, founded and maintained by Spiritual Authority
properly organised, and which, as a whole, constitute the guiding social
d Doctrine. In this way, we can explain that ancient estimate of human
nature, systematised by Catholic philosophy, in accordance with the profound,
though necessarily empirical, knowledge of our nature, so eminently characteric of it. It directly sets forth as a fundamental virtue, the immutable
and necessary basis of private and public happiness, faith, that is to say the
disposition to place confidence, spontaneously and without previous demon-
stration, in doctrines proclaimed by a competent authority. This, in fact,
constitutes the general and indispensable condition on which depends the
establishment and maintenance of a true intellectual and moral communism.

In principle, the influence exerted by the Individual upon the regulating
d Doctrine is, normally, limited to deducing the Practical Rule applicable to
each special case; the spiritual organ being consulted in all doubtful cases.
But as regards the construction of the doctrine, under every possible aspect,
no one possesses any legitimate right beyond that of suggesting its partial
rectification, when experience has proved that it fails, in any respect, to
fulfil its practical end. To the spiritual power, thus warned, it naturally
belongs to make suitable changes in the doctrine, after verifying the neces-
sity for them. Such at least is the normal state of things. On any other
hypothesis society must be considered as being, more or less, in a truly revo-
mutionary state. This state, necessary also at certain determinate epochs,
although always transitional, is subjected to special rules of a wholly
different nature, with which I need not occupy myself in this place since I
am only prescribing for the normal state.  

1 In the preceding reasonings, I have specially considered Government as
exerting rather a repressive than a directing action, in order to make the demo-
stration harmonise with the habits which generally predominate in political
speculations. But the same motives evidently apply, with even greater force
when we consider government no longer as passive and merely designed to
maintain, order, but as possessing an active function and destined to make all
special activities work together for one general end. This last, in my judg-
ment constitutes its principal office, more particularly in the social system of
modern nations. Readers who have thoroughly understood the two kinds of
considerations above pointed out, will easily transfer them to this new aspect of
the question.

2 The gradual and inevitable tendency of the public reason to recognise the
need for reorganisation naturally presents a transitional stage, already reached
by a certain proportion of minds in which the need of a social doctrine is
admitted; while the necessity is not perceived for a class invested with proper
authority, destined in a special and permanent way to impart life to it. But
this half-conviction—which is politically sterile, since it amounts to desiring
the end without wishing for the means—cannot but attain completeness when it
shall prevail widely. For after the mental, moral, and political necessity for a
General Doctrine has been really understood, it must soon be felt, not only that
every doctrine presupposes Founders, but that, under each of these three aspects,
it imperatively demands Interpreters who, on the other hand, arise spontaneously:
so that the idea of function and that of organ are by the nature of things as
inseparable in social physics as they are in physiology.
The two classes of general considerations above pointed out have a special application to the social state towards which modern nations tend. For, in this new state, characterised as it is by a more complete and ever increasing separation of the various functions, each person, whatever may be his capacity, can, unaided, grasp, but a very small portion of the Doctrine which he needs for his guidance, either industrially or socially. On the other hand his personal interest, having been narrowed, naturally tends to deviate from the Common Interest more frequently, though to a less degree.

The evident tendency of modern societies towards an essentially industrial state, and, consequently towards a political order in which the Temporal Power shall regularly belong to the preponderating Industrial Forces, begins to be generally felt in our day, and the natural course of events will manifest it more and more. The way unavoidably exercised by the sentiment of a truth, so important though partial, disposes men to overlook or neglect the moral reorganisation of society. It tends to keep up the habit, engendered by the critical doctrine, and specially encouraged by political economy, of assigning the first place to a purely material point of view in social considerations. By looking too exclusively at the immense moral and political advantages which incontestably belong to the industrial state, these are exaggerated so far as to suppose that they dispense with a true Spiritual Reorganisation; or at least, that this will only possess a secondary importance, when social relations have become purely industrial and are no longer deteriorated as is still the case, by institutions and habits derived from the military antecedents of society.

We, who should consider this great fact not aesthetically, as artists attracted by its power over the human imagination, but as observers who, neither admiring nor reproving, admit its existence as a fundamental datum in all speculations on modern politics, ought, as much as possible, to study it under every aspect. In this attitude we can easily perceive that the regulating and directing influence of the Spiritual Power is not less necessary for industrial than for military relations, although not exactly in the same way. On this subject I limit myself to some general indications, reserving their complete development for another occasion should the question demand it.

On the supposition, which moreover is impossible, that the temporal order corresponding to this new state of society can establish itself completely, without the intervention of any spiritual power, it is certain that in the absence of this conservative influence, such a social order could not maintain itself. If, besides those general sources of disorder inherent in every society which render a moral government necessary, the military system presents some peculiar to itself, the same undoubtedly holds true for the purely industrial system; but the special causes are not the same for both and consequently do not attain the same degree of intensity.¹

It is no doubt much easier to reconcile individual interests in the modern than in the ancient mode of existence. But this happy characteristic which

¹ M. Dunoyer, in a work recently published, while proving by luminous remarks on the successive stages of civilisation, the tendency of existing societies under temporal aspects to a purely industrial state, has guarded himself against the vulgar exaggeration which represents this new mode of existence as absolutely perfect. He has devoted the last chapter of his book to a conscientious and severe analysis of the main defects peculiar to industrial society. Although this enumeration is framed with quite a different object from that suggested by my present reflections, and executed in an entirely different spirit, I refer the reader to it to supply the developments which I cannot give in this place.
renders the moral rule easier to establish, in no degree dispenses with it, since the antagonism, while less intense, has not disappeared; may have become more extensive, by reason of the multiplied points of contact. Thus, to choose the most important example, although hostility between the Chiefs of Industry and the Workmen is socially preferable to that which existed between the Warriors and the Slaves, it is no less real. We should hope in vain to destroy it by temporal institutions, which uniting the material interests of these two classes more intimately, might reduce the arbitrary power they mutually exercise. No stable social state can ever be firmly based on mere physical antagonism, the only sort which such institutions can regularize. Although useful, no doubt, these will always be inadequate; because they necessarily allow the chiefs to entertain the desire, and even to exercise the power, of abusing their position, in order to reduce wages and work, and permit the workmen to obtain by violence what a life of labour cannot procure them. The solution of this grave difficulty necessarily demands the continuing influence of a Moral Doctrine, which shall impose upon both chiefs and workmen mutual duties in conformity with their mutual relations. Now it is evident that this doctrine can only be founded and maintained by a Spiritual Authority, placed at a point of view sufficiently general to include the entire of these relations, and at the same time sufficiently disinterested in reference to the practical movement to be above suspicion of partiality from either of the two hostile classes between which it should intervene. Similar remarks may be made as to the other great industrial relations, such as those of agriculturalists and manufacturers, of either class with merchants, and of all with bankers. It is evident that in all these respects, interests if left completely to their own guidance, without any regulation but such as springs from their antagonism, must always end in direct opposition. Hence the absolute necessity for a moral rule, and, consequently, for a spiritual authority, indispensable for retaining interests within these limits, where, instead of being antagonistic, they converge, yet from which they constantly endeavour to escape. Moreover it would be easy to show that this moral action, considered under both its aspects, must play an indispensable and leading part in establishing temporal institutions destined to complete this regulation of social relations.

We should attach too great importance to the demonstrations of political economy which prove the necessary harmony of the various industrial interests, were we to hope that this conformity could ever suffice for their discipline. Allowing even, to these demonstrations the complete logical

1 The commercial and manufacturing crisis which at this moment afflicts the country where industrial activity is greatest, constituting a crisis which may at any moment assume a more or less serious political character, is well fitted to impress, on impartial observers, the necessity for a certain governmental action, exerted on industrial, as, in past times, on military relations. No doubt such disadvantages, are from their nature transitory. But social order and individual happiness alike demand guarantees more direct, explicit, and regular against the ever-imminent renewal of these injurious oscillations, such as would not leave each person judge in his own cause, or require the spontaneous and constant consideration of a general point of view, from minds habitually placed at a very special standpoint.

2 The essential vice of political economy, regarded as a social theory, consists in this. Having proved, as to certain matters, far from being the most important, the spontaneous and permanent tendency of human societies towards a certain necessary order, it infers that this tendency does not require to be regu-
extent, much exaggerated in truth, which economists assign to them, it is certain that man does not act only, or even mainly, from calculation, and secondly, that he is not always, or even generally, capable of calculating wisely. The physiology of the nineteenth century, confirming, or rather explaining universal experience, has demonstrated the worthlessness of the metaphysical theories which represent man in the light of a calculating machine, solely impelled by self-interest.

Morality, private or public, will therefore, of necessity, be fluctuating and feeble, so long as the exclusive consideration of personal utility is taken as the point of departure for each individual or class. Yet the industrial spirit naturally leads in that direction, as does every other kind of purely temporal influence, when this appears by itself, and without having undergone that regulative moral action, which can only proceed from a spiritual power rightly organised. Even could we conceive a society entirely and exclusively abandoned to the direct impulse of a purely temporal activity, the new political order, (if this name could be given to it) would have no other real advantage over the old one, (considered likewise under the same abstract hypothesis) than that of substituting monopoly for conquest, and a despotism founded on the right of the wealthiest for a despotism founded on the right of the strongest. Such would be the extreme, yet inevitable, consequences of a purely temporal organisation, could such an hypothesis ever be realised. Happily, however mistaken may be our political views, the nature of things preserves society from the unmitigated influence of its own aberrations, and the final order which arises spontaneously is always superior to that which human combinations had, by anticipation, constructed.

The necessity for a Spiritual Order in the new social state, manifests itself not alone as regards the relations of individuals or classes, but in reference to merely personal morality. In the first place a general consideration, derived from the study of human nature, and pointed out by nearly all philosophers in every age, shows that the most solid basis of the social virtues is to be found in the habit of the personal virtues, since in this way man can test most severely his power of resisting the vicious impulses of his natural dispositions. But, apart from this universal ground, the inevitable influence which a simply individual activity indirectly exerts over society in any system of social relations, reveals itself specially in the modern system, and, consequently, furnishes a new motive for the moral regulation of society. To cite only one example: since the appearance of Mr. Malthus’ works, it is generally admitted, that the continual tendency of population to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence, a tendency which is especially developed in industrial societies, demands a certain degree of permanent repression as regards the most energetic of human impulses. Now such repression, it is evident, cannot be adequately effected by any but a moral authority, whatever may be the incontestable influence of temporal measures in restraining this instinct within proper limits.

For the general reason above stated, I have hitherto considered only the Preventive or Repressive action of the spiritual power in the new system of social relations. Its importance becomes still more evident, when its Directive action is considered.
Even were it hypothetically admitted that in the new social state order could be spontaneously maintained without any special regulative influence, it is undeniably true that for collective action, such as the nature of the system would, in many cases, require, individuals and classes stand in need of a direction founded upon common dogtrines, established by the spiritual power for social education, and afterwards constantly enforced by it in real life. The necessity for such a doctrine is the greater in this respect, because the classification of individuals being under this system of necessity far more variable than in the ancient one, each person is thus naturally less prepared for the special function which he should fulfil. So long as employments were essentially hereditary domestic education might be considered a sufficient preparation. This is no longer the case, now that they tend to a distribution conformable to individual aptitude. Public education, general or special, then acquires far more importance, as supplying the only rational means of determining these aptitudes, at first so slightly marked in the majority of cases, and at the same time of properly developing them. The action of the spiritual power becomes then the more indispensable for establishing and maintaining a social classification in harmony with the spirit of the system. By considering the numbers of failures and false positions which now result from the absence of intellectual and moral guidance, and endeavouring to estimate their deplorable results for individuals and society, we shall comprehend the importance of the preceding reflection.

Such, speaking generally, are the principal grounds which assign a wide and fundamental influence to the spiritual power, regarded simply as to its national functions.

The same general considerations are equally applicable to the necessary action which the Spiritual Power ought to exert in regulating International Relations. I can therefore dispense with any distinct indication of this extension, which every attentive reader can easily make, by keeping to the fundamental point of view afforded by the preceding reasonings.

The only essential difference between the two cases consists in the greater generality of the second order of social relations. But if this distinction shows that the regulative action of the spiritual power is, of necessity, less intense in relation to European than to National order, it also proves that the spiritual power is even more indispensable (having due regard to the importance of the relations), and, especially, that it is still less susceptible of being replaced by any other influence.

International relations being at once more extended and more continuous in modern civilisation than in that of the Middle Ages, their regulation becomes still more needful. The collective action of European society which in the ancient system only arose at distant intervals, should become in the new one, if not strictly permanent, at least very frequent. It is demanded, either by operations of common utility, which call for the cooperation of two or more nations, or by the general influence, partly of a repressive character, which the most civilised nations ought to exert over those less civilised, in the common interest of all. These various motives may possibly prove sufficiently powerful to decide the formation of a certain sort of temporal sovereignty, embracing several of the most advanced populations. But on any hypothesis, they incontestably necessitate the establishment of a social doctrine, common to the various nations, and, consequently, of a spiritual sovereignty fitted to uphold this doctrine by
organising a European education, and to apply it properly to the actual relations. Until this takes place European order will always stand on the verge of disturbance, notwithstanding the action, alike despotic and inadequate (although provisionally indispensable) exerted by the imperfect coalition of the ancient temporal powers, but which can present no solid guarantee for security, since by its very nature it is always on the point of dissolution.¹

I must point out here, as in the preceding case, though more briefly, the false political conceptions which, in our day, tend to produce an incomplete view of the temporal future of society; representing international relations as sufficiently regulated by the mere circumstance of their having reached a purely industrial stage. Doubtless this new mode of existence possesses the happy property of facilitating the moral association of nations, as well as that of individuals or classes; but in the former as in the latter case it does not dispense with the spiritual power, rather by multiplying and extending relations renders it more necessary. Let us imagine for an instant that the temporal order of Europe could completely lose the military character and acquire a purely industrial character, without any spiritual reorganisation, preceding and determining the change; though this supposition is assuredly self-contradictory. Even on this abstract hypothesis, it is certain that the system would possess no solidity if the various nations were systematically abandoned to mere temporal impulses, without subordinating them to any common moral doctrine, established and maintained by a spiritual power. For individual interest, conceived as the only direct basis of a plan of action, can afford a solid foundation for the morality of nations in a less degree even than for that of individuals and classes. In truth, even supposing that action can be exclusively or mainly guided by calculation—a proposition as untrue for nations as for individuals—the relation between the well-being of each and that of all is both less pronounced and less perceptible in European than in National order. It is difficult, and, consequently, rare, for the real happiness of an individual to harmonise completely with conduct which is decidedly anti-social. Such harmony is much easier, and therefore more common, in the case of a nation, even under the industrial régime; as

¹ M. de la Mennais has clearly proved that, from its purely temporal character and the total disparity of its constituent elements—the latter being the necessary result of the former—the institution of the Holy Alliance can offer neither real fixity nor sufficient efficacy, even passively, and much more actively. This philosopher has convincingly proved that such an institution, from its very nature, cannot offer to modern Europe the true equivalent for the general action exerted in the Middle Ages by the ancient spiritual power, and that this can only be replaced by another spiritual influence.

But we should nevertheless consider the formation of the Holy Alliance as a forced result of the unavoidable disorganisation of the ancient social system, which has rendered necessary, especially as regards European order, the momentary absorption of the spiritual power by the temporal power; and, at the same time, as an indispensable, though very imperfect, instrument of preserving a certain state of provisional order in Europe, as long as the moral interregnum shall last. The revolutionary state should not be judged by the same rules as the normal state. We may even add that the establishment of the Holy Alliance regarded as replacing the Balance of Power in Europe, points to the sentiment, vague and imperfect indeed, but real, of the necessity for a European reorganisation, while it, to a certain extent, paves the way for this, by accustoming nations, contrary to critical prejudices, to consider this class of relations as being properly subject to the direct and permanent action of government.

r r 2
experience has too clearly proved since the foundation of the colonial and prohibitive system, still supported by the prevailing opinion. In like manner, an individual by ceasing to lead an active existence, might perhaps mentally place himself at the national point of view and to a certain extent grasp it, if he had sufficient capacity. But that is far more difficult when we must raise ourselves to the European point of view; and a social organisation which permanently demanded such an effort in many men, or even in the heads of the temporal order among nations, would be manifestly impossible.

Even if the exaggerated theories of the economists as to the necessary and invariable identity of the industrial interests common to the various nations were absolutely true, they would inevitably be still more incapable of regulating international relations, than those between individuals, by the mere conviction they could produce. In vain do the nations endeavour, in our day, more or less decidedly, to pass out of the prohibitive régime. Were this result completely attained, the spirit of industrial hostility could not fail to reproduce itself under new forms which it could readily create, if each nation continued indefinitely to admit no other rule of conduct than the satisfaction of its own interest, apart from any moral duty towards others. The only power really capable of restraining within proper limits this natural rivalry of the nations and of utilising it by limiting it, as a rule, to a legitimate emulation, is that furnished by a general doctrine concerning the actual relations of nations, established and habitually proclaimed by a Spiritual Authority, which speaking to each nation in the name of all, finds in such universal assent, the necessary support for asserting its decisions.

Thus, as the final result of all the preceding considerations, we verify in detail, this fundamental proposition above established on general grounds: the social state towards which Modern Nations tend, no less than that of the Middle Ages, both as to active and passive relations, and for general and special reasons, demands a spiritual (that is to say intellectual and moral) organisation, at once European and National.

I shall on another occasion, investigate, in the same spirit, under its chief aspects, the nature of this organisation, which, by a necessary abstraction, I have been obliged to leave unsettled, in order to facilitate a demonstration in itself so complicated. This new exposition, besides its great importance, will perhaps dispel the obscurity which, to a certain extent, unavoidably attaches itself for most minds to the abstract point of view: and especially it will destroy the false interpretations which existing habits generally dispose people to put upon the conception of a Spiritual Power. Such, at least, is my hope.
THE SIXTH AND LAST PART.

August 1828.

EXAMINATION OF BROUSSAIS’ TREATISE ON IRITATION.

Since the termination of the sixteenth century, the human intellect has undergone a general and continuous revolution, consisting in the gradual and complete recasting of the entire system of human knowledge, henceforward placed on its true bases, observation and reasoning. This fundamental revolution, prepared by the successive labours of all preceding centuries, especially from the commencement of Arabic influence, was definitively determined and directly commenced by the profound and new impulses simultaneously impressed upon the human reason by the conceptions of Descartes, the precepts of Bacon, and the discoveries of Galileo. Since this memorable epoch, the human mind, in every branch of knowledge, has tended, constantly and increasingly, towards its complete and final emancipation from the domination previously exerted by theology and metaphysics, by entirely subordinating imagination to observation. In a word man has endeavoured to constitute the definitive system of positive philosophy.

All the various branches of human knowledge have not undergone this important renovation with an equal degree of rapidity. It necessarily affected them in succession according to the complexity and mutual dependence of the phenomena which they embraced. Physiology, as the part of natural philosophy which studies the most complex and least independent phenomenon, of necessity, remained longer than any other science under the yoke of theological fictions and metaphysical abstractions. Accordingly, it was only in the second half of the last century, and after astronomy, physics, and chemistry had become positive sciences, that physiology began to experience, in its turn, this great and salutary transformation through the immortal works of Halley, Charles Bonnet, Daubenton, Spallanzani, Vieq’d’Azyr, Chausseier, Bichat, Cuvier, Pinel, Cabanis, &c.

But in order that this revolution might be complete and efficacious, its extension to the intellectual and moral phenomena became necessary; for these unavoidably underwent it later than the other animal phenomena, as being more complex and closely connected with theological and metaphysical theories of the constitution of society. Thus the memoirs published at the beginning of this century by Cabanis on the connection between the physical and moral nature, are the first great and direct effort to bring within the domain of positive physiology this study previously abandoned entirely to the theological and metaphysical methods. The impulse imparted to the human mind by these memorable investigations has...
not fallen off. The labours of M. Gall and his school have singularly strengthened it, and, especially, have impressed on this new and final portion of physiology a high degree of precision by supplying a definite basis of discussion and investigation. In our day it may be said, that, this revolution, though not yet become popular, is definitely terminated for all intellects really on a level with their age, who regard the study of the intellectual and moral functions as inseparably connected with that of all other physiological phenomena, and as properly investigated by the same methods and in the same spirit.

However, some, misconceiving in this respect the actual and unalterable direction of the human mind, have endeavoured during the last ten years to transplant among us German metaphysics and to found under the name of psychology a pretended science completely independent of Physiology, superior to it, and exclusively embracing the study of the phenomena specially termed moral. Although these retrograde efforts cannot stop the development of real knowledge, since the passing enthusiasm which they excite only results from foreign and accidental circumstances, they undoubtedly exert a mischievous influence, by retarding in many minds the development of a true philosophic spirit and wasting much intellectual activity.

This situation has been profoundly appreciated by M. Broussaia. Without exaggerating the mischief, he has worthily comprehended the importance of opposing the vague and chimerical pursuit in which it is sought to engage the young generation of France. Accordingly, he thought it right to interrupt his great works on general pathology in order to demonstrate the emptiness and nullity of psychology. Such is the general and essential aim of his new work, as he himself explicitly declares in a very remarkable preface, in which he is not afraid of showing himself superior to the pious accusations of materialism, which our psychologues, following the example of our theologians, their predecessors, have not ceased to heap on their adversaries. In this respect, independently of the eminent merit of his work, M. Broussaia by its publication has done a signal act of courage deserving the gratitude of all right minds. Its value can be fully estimated by those only who know to what an extent existing savants, though entertaining for metaphysical theories the profound disdain these inspire in all intellects reared in positive studies, carefully avoid combating the supremacy they assume in our day by public discussions.

The work of M. Broussaia completely attains the author's chief aim. Entering more profoundly into the subject than any physiologist has hitherto done, he has directly examined the pretended method of Internal Observation put forward by psychologues as the basis of the science of man.

The ascendency which the positive sciences have acquired since the time of Bacon is now such that the psychologues, in order to restore the discredited authority of metaphysics, felt themselves obliged to represent their labours as being also based upon observation. With this object they devised the distinction between external facts, forming the subject of ordinary science, and internal facts, or those of consciousness, peculiar to psychology. M. Broussaia shows the inanity of this pretended distinction. In the fifth chapter of the first part he institutes a physiological analysis, extremely remarkable for its depth and refinement, of the condition of a mind reflecting on its own acts. This analysis renders quite evident the imposi-
bility of arriving at any real discovery by a method so illusory. I regret that I can only cite a few passages.

'Let us now examine' he observes 'what physiologists can find in their consciousness by adopting this sort of research. They are sure to meet with sensations proceeding from viscera which invariably correspond with the brain, not only hunger, amorous desires, cold, heat, specific pains, or pleasures, localised in any part of the body. They will further remark a crowd of vague undetermined sensations, disposing sometimes to sorrow, sometimes to joy, at one time to action, at another to repose, one day to hope, the next to despair and even to a horror of existence. They will find all these without suspecting whence they come, for physiologists are the only persons who can inform them about this. If they take all these internal sensations for revelations of the divinity which they name consciousness, they can increase their treasures by taking, in Oriental fashion, a certain dose of opium combined with aromatics.'

Notwithstanding the masterly way in which M. Broussais has treated this question, he might, I think, have dealt with it more directly, and proved that such internal observation is necessarily impossible.

Man can observe what is external to him and also certain functions of his organs, other than the thinking organ. To a certain extent he can even observe himself as regards the different passions he feels, because the cerebral organs on which these depend, are distinct from the observing organ properly so called, though even this assumes that the emotional state is but slightly pronounced. It is, however, evidently impossible for him to observe his own intellectual acts, for the organ observed, and the observing organ being in this case identical, by whom could the observation be made? The illusion of psychologists on this head is analogous to that of the physicists of antiquity, who believed they could explain vision, by saying that the luminous rays painted images of external objects on the retina. Physiologists judiciously pointed out to them, that if luminous impressions acted as images on the retina, another eye would be needed to look at these. It is the same with the pretended internal observation of intelligence. To render this possible, the individual would have to divide himself into two persons, one thinking, the other observing the thoughts. Thus man cannot directly observe his intellectual operations; he can only observe his organs, and their results. The former class of observations are embraced by physiology. The great results of human intelligence, being the sciences, the latter class embraces their philosophy, which is inseparable from the sciences themselves. There is therefore no place for psychology, or the direct study of the soul independently of any external consideration.

In the parallel, otherwise so satisfactory and decisive, which M. Broussais establishes between Physiology and Psychology, we could have wished he had more clearly shown the inferiority of the latter, which, even admitting its pretended methods of exploration, only considers the adult and healthy man, making a complete abstraction of the animals and even of mankind in the condition of imperfect development or disordered organisation; while, in every physiological investigation, the point of view presented by normal man, is always admirably combined with that of the ensemble of the animal series, and the pathological state. This opposition which M. Broussais only partially notices, indicated with that clearness and vigor of exposition that distinguish him, would have presented a useful contrast to the depth and profundity on which our psychologists pride themselves.
A more serious omission made by M. Broussais is his not having clearly pointed out the immense difference which exists between the physiological doctrine of man, intellectual and moral, and the theories of the metaphysicians of the last century, who saw in our intelligence only the action of the external senses, disregarding every predisposition of the internal cerebral organs. The well founded objections to the ideology of Condillac and Helvetius alone give some justification to the influence of the existing psychology, which, moreover, merely popularises, by obscure and emphatic declamations, what physiologists such as Charles Bonnet, Cabanis and especially MM. Gall and Spurzheim, had long before put forward on this subject, much more clearly and precisely. M. Broussais will no doubt be anxious to remove this single resource from psychology or what he so judiciously calls ontology. I suggest to him with confidence this important amendment for a second edition, which cannot fail to be soon demanded for such a work. The omission which I point out assuredly proceeded only from the rapid way in which his book was manifestly composed, for psychologists cannot assert that he shows himself anywhere a declared adherent of the metaphysics of the eighteenth century.

A general review of the work of M. Broussais gives rise to a final philosophical reflexion of great importance; namely that the author has set circumscribed more accurately than his predecessors among physiologists the true domain of physiology.

When Cabanis, first among physiologists, directly claimed for physiology the study of moral phenomena, he did not sufficiently separate, or rather he confounded the study of individual man with that of the human race collectively regarded. Both of them, in his view, belonged to an indivisible science, philosophy. This confusion was maintained by MM. Gall and Spurzheim; it still subsists in the mind of nearly all the physiologists who seriously apply themselves to the portion of their science which concerns moral phenomena. M. Broussais has made no attempt to dissipate it, although from some passages of his work, he seems to have felt its chief defect.

It is clear, in fact, that the study of the individual and that of the race, although so intimately related that they must be regarded as constituting two parts of a single science, are nevertheless sufficiently distinct and, above all, sufficiently extensive, to admit of being separately cultivated, and, therefore, conceived as forming two sciences, Physiology properly so called and Social Physics. The latter is without doubt based on the former, which supplies it both with a positive point of departure, and guidance. But it forms no less a separate science, requiring special observations on the history of the development of human society, and special methods. It could not, by possibility, be treated simply as a direct deduction from the science of the individual; unless indeed as regards animals; since their social development is so limited as not to require a distinct study. If physiology is not yet completely and definitively constituted, if its scientific field is not exactly ascertained, this mainly springs from the circumstance that the division in question has not yet been regularly established and unanimously admitted. The transitional condition of the science, even as to the most distinguished intellects, is the only thing which, if it were prolonged, could justify the criticisms and pretensions of the psychologists; although it is evident that the study of social phenomena no more falls within their metaphysical methods than that of individual phenomena.
Such are the chief philosophical reflections suggested to me by the work of M. Broussais, regarded from the author's general point of view.

Notwithstanding the remarks I have thought it right to offer on this subject, the work is entirely worthy of its distinguished author. For the honour of the public, whose sympathies are now invoked in favour of the retrograde path of metaphysics, I hope that it will obtain a success proportioned to its importance. It ought powerfully to aid the natural progress of the human mind, by bringing into general discredit the vague and chimerial speculations which retard the progress of real knowledge. Since the essays of Cabanis and the works of MM. Gall and Spurzheim no work has appeared so well fitted to make clear the worthlessness of that illusory science of personified abstractions well described by M. Cuvier in his remark, that it employs metaphor for reasoning, and which M. Broussais himself has so happily defined as a work of imagination closely resembling poetry. It exhibits in its true light that assemblage of incoherent opinions, of necessity varying, not only from one individual to another, but even in the same person, with the varying dispositions of his organisation. It dissipates for ever that mystical spirit, so flattering to pretentious ignorance, which inspires an instinctive repugnance towards every special and positive study, by presenting empty abstractions as superior to all real knowledge, and replunges us into the state of infancy by reestablishing, in a new form, the empire of theological conceptions.

M. Broussais may be considered as the founder of Positive Pathology, that is to say of the science which connects the perturbations of vital phenomena with the lesions of organs or tissues. From the time when Physiology began to be a real science, towards the middle of the last century, several of the cooperators in this great movement of the human mind, especially Morgagni and Bonnet, directed their attention to the seats of disease. But these works did not change the general spirit of pathology, which persisted in representing the majority of important diseases as independent of any change in the normal state of the organs. Such researches could not even exert any marked influence on science, until the fundamental distinction between organs and tissues had been established by the genius of Bichat, because it is in the tissues more particularly and not in the organs that lesions should be studied. M. Broussais, starting from the general anatomy founded by Bichat, placed pathology on its true basis, presenting it as the investigation of deteriorations to which the tissues are liable and of the phenomena thence resulting. He first clearly recognised and formally proclaimed that almost all recognised diseases are only symptoms, and that functional derangements cannot subsist without the lesion of organs or rather of tissues.

Had M. Broussais confined his efforts to establishing this general principle he would, no doubt, have avoided the greater part of the criticisms that have been directed against his works; but he could not thus have effected the important scientific renovation which his school has accomplished, and which banishes metaphysics from their last asylum. For that it was indispensable, not only to represent every malady as dependent on some organic lesion—a proposition in itself hardly debatable—but to determine the precise seat of each of the maladies considered to have no special seat. This M. Broussais accomplished, mainly by reducing the six alleged essential fevers to inflammations of the mucous membrane of the stomach and intestine, theretofore neglected by physicians. I need not examine whether M. Broussais has subsequently exaggerated the influence
of the gastritis and gastro-enteritis on the production of the different morbid symptoms; though this was almost unavoidable. But impartial minds, if disposed to blame such exaggerations, should consider the philosophic necessity under which M. Broussais laboured of assigning an organ to each recognized affection, in order to place the discussion on a positive basis. We should reflect that, even if he has erred as to the real seat of a particular malady, it was better for pathology, and even for therapeutics, to propose a seat at variance with the true one than none. M. Broussais has thus definitely led thinkers to the true road of observation, where, even while combating his ideas, they can only serve the progress of science.

The first part of the work now published by M. Broussais is a treatise on Irritation. It may be considered as an exposition of the highest generalities of the doctrine of the author. No one has ever conceived in a direct and satisfactory manner the fundamental relation between physiology and pathology; and M. Broussais' deep appreciation of this relation best characterizes his intellect.

Setting out from the great general truth, partially seen by Brown, that 'Life is only sustained by Stimulation, and making it his own by important applications, M. Broussais represents all Diseases as essentially consisting in the excess or deficiency of stimulation of the different tissues, either rising above or falling below the degree which constitutes the normal condition. This conception throws a great light on the nature of diseases, by exhibiting them as results of more changes of intensity in the action of stimuli indispensable for maintaining health.

Having established that stimulation of the organs is more frequently in excess than in defect, and, even, that a diminution in the action of stimulants on one organ, generally produces irritation in other organs,—as between the stomach and brain,—M. Broussais distinguishes three degrees of anomalous excitement of organs,—surexcitation properly so called, subinflammation, and inflammation. He expounds the characters of these three states as affecting the chief organic systems, especially the nervous system which he, in accordance with the majority of living physiologists, represents as the general agent of the sympathies. M. Broussais even pushes the physiological analysis of the various tissues farther than has yet been done; for he considers the organic elements of which all the tissues are composed. These be reduces to three, fibrine, gelatine, and albumen, and examines the phenomena of irritation in each. This view must, hereafter, introduce a great and valuable simplicity into the first principles of physiology and pathology.

I must not omit to point out, as a marked progress in the physiological doctrine of M. Broussais, the disappearance of those Vital Properties admitted, or rather retained, by Bichat, and which maintained a certain metaphysical character in the fundamental conceptions of physiology. M. Broussais replaces these by the uniform property of Irritability that exists in all tissues, yet manifests itself in each by different phenomena. This conception tends to purify physiology from the residuum of metaphysics which Bichat felt it necessary to preserve. At the same time it definitively assigns to the physics of living bodies a character clearly distinct from that of the physics of inorganic bodies, for the notion of irritation comprises everything that belongs to the state of life. This condition was no less indispensable for constituting a truly positive physiology, but had not been sufficiently fulfilled by the physiologists who endeavoured to free their science completely from metaphysical conceptions.
This first part of the work of M. Broussais abounds in elevated and new views. I shall only blame him for a certain obscurity of language, and, especially, an almost complete absence of method in the arrangement of his ideas. The too frequent intermixture of physiological with pathological conceptions, introduces a sort of confusion which renders it difficult, even for an attentive and well informed reader to grasp the general spirit of this remarkable work. The imperfection may be remedied in a new edition, if M. Broussais, as I doubt not, feels the necessity for more fully maturing his chief conceptions, determining their character more precisely, and estimating the scope of each more exactly. We ought not to lose sight of the serious general motive which led to the publication of this work,—the necessity for combating ontology, which, once again, endeavours to lay hold of the mind of the existing generation. On this ground we may excuse a vice of method which the author would assuredly have avoided, if he could have devoted the necessary time to meditating his work. Nevertheless, M. Broussais should not forget that this work contains the leading ideas for a general treatise on life, considered either in its normal or its abnormal state. His celebrity will be advanced if he himself raises a monument, so necessary for the future progress of science.

M. Broussais, when revising his work, will, doubtless, feel that his treatment of the Nervous System does not adequately recognise the importance of the fundamental distinction between the two nervous systems,—cerebral and ganglionic. He has not paid sufficient attention to the latter, considered physiologically or pathologically. It would also have been better had M. Broussais taken more largely into consideration Comparative Anatomy, and avowedly sought to bring his views on human organisation into harmony with the entirety of the animal series, a condition now indispensable to every great physiological conception and which he has no doubt implicitly fulfilled.

I have little to say upon the second part of this work which treats of Madness. It is a natural application of the principles established in the first part to the special case of irritation in the brain. This well executed application throws a strong light on the principles themselves. The execution of this is much more satisfactory than that of the preceding part. It adds nothing of great importance to the existing state of that important branch of pathology. But the knowledge already gained on this subject is resumed with a clearness and a perfection of method very superior to what existing treatises offer; thus rendering an essential service to science. Its perusal is admirably fitted to avert or cure the contagion of psychology. As regards the personal contributions of the author to ideas, I observe that, while placing the seat of madness in the brain, in common with all living physiologists, M. Broussais characterises much more precisely than they do, the state of cerebral irritation which produces madness. He also offers some new and very judicious views as to the indications derivable from dissections. He shows that, since the state of inflammation which disorganises the tissues, and, in consequence, leaves, after death, the only visible traces commonly considered, is simply the highest degree of the state of irritation that deranges the normal functions, it is quite possible that this derangement may arise from an excessive stimulation, without leaving any inflammatory changes discoverable after death. M. Broussais thus indirectly destroys the only reasonable objection made to positive pathology by the metaphysical pathologists of the school of Montpellier, who, from the
absence, in certain cases, of lesions in the dead body, infer the reality of
diseases termed essential.

Persons who, on the faith of vulgar prejudices to which men of science
should be inaccessible, imagine that M. Broussais subordinates everything in
the animal economy to the stomach, must derive from the perusal of this
work a juster idea of the range and elevation of his intellect. He exhibits
in all its intensity the vast sympathetic influence exerted by the digestive
viscera on all the organs, and especially on the brain; an influence which
has not been always properly appreciated by physiologists specially devoted
to the study of the nervous system. But in his work no exaggerated idea
on this head is perceptible, he states nothing but what is well attested by
observation.

When treating of Monomanias M. Broussais profits by the opportunity
to render a deserved tribute to the important works of M.M. Gall and
Spurzheim and of the phrenological school on the brain. I must congratu-
late him on this act of justice which is, at the same time, an act of courage,
for it still requires courage in savants to declare publicly in favour of
doctrines so contrary to official opinions. In this doctrine, imperfect as it
still is, M. Broussais recognises the great light which it throws on the study
of human nature. He seems to have felt how much this important refor-
mation aids the general tendency of the human mind towards a completely
positive philosophy.

M. Broussais, however, offers some objections to the doctrine of M. Gall.
Of these the greater part appear to me to be without any solid foundation.
One only is really well founded, that is the reproach of not taking sufficiently
into account the great influence exerted on the brain by the digestive and
generative viscera. It is certain that this influence, though a good deal
exaggerated by physiologists before M.M. Gall and Spurzheim, has been far
too much neglected by the phrenological school, and that, in this respect,
the fundamental ideas of the new doctrine of the brain require to be sub-
mitted to a more complete investigation.

As regards the practical treatment of madness the considerations sub-
mitted by M. Broussais add little to the mass of acquired knowledge; but
the therapeutics of this affection are conceived and expounded in a much
more rational spirit than in any other treatise. The author considers the
ordinary treatment too passive. He thinks, with reason, that, severe bleed-
ing, judiciously applied at the outset of the disease, is calculated to cut short
incipient madness, as in the cases of peripneumonia and acute gastritis.
M. Broussais justly insists, as all writers since Pinel have done, on the
importance of moral treatment. But it is surprising that, while recom-
Mendings Asylums as an indispensable condition for that purpose, he omits to
point out the extreme negligence with which this essential element of treat-
ment is generally conducted in these institutions. No doubt M. Broussais
was not able to observe with sufficient care the mode in which the majority
of these establishments are kept; he believed them to be constituted and
administered as they might, and should be. Had he studied them him-
self he would have been convinced, that, despite of the promises of their
directors, the entire intellectual and moral portion of the treatment is, in
fact, abandoned to the arbitrary action of subordinates and rough agents,whose
conduct almost always aggravates the malady which they should assist to cure.

Such are the main considerations which I have to offer on M. Broussais'
new work. My aim has not been to make it known, but only to chara-
terise its spirit, and to show, to all who interest themselves in the progress of physiology, the necessity for studying it. I have endeavoured to draw public attention to this work, as calculated to aid the general development of human reason, and to oppose successfully the mystical direction which some writers, themselves strangers to the true spirit of their age, endeavour to impress on the study of man. The publication of this important work ought to confirm the fame of M. Broussais, and to make known the wide range of his conceptions. Hitherto he was only known as a reformer in pathology and therapeutics. Now he shows himself to be a physiologist and a philosopher. He proves his mental unity, inasmuch as his applications connect themselves with homogeneous theoretical conceptions. In a word, his works as a whole justify his title to appear before posterity as one of the men who, directly or indirectly, have most efficaciously contributed to the formation and triumph of Positive Philosophy as the general and definitive termination of the great revolution of the human intellect.
ERRATA AND CORRIGENDA.

In volumes i. ii. iii.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vol.</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Correction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>for fourteenth read fifteenth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>after ch. vi. add p. 362.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>for the benevolent instincts read Divine Grace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>for an entity read uniformly selfish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>for 563 read 583.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>6 &amp; 9</td>
<td>for Damnation read Reprobation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>for 'first' read fundamental.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>for App. 1 read App. 3, p. 563.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>xlv.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>for affective read active.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>lxxiv.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>for points read point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>for These read Thus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>for the first sentence, read But however powerful the stars are supposed to be, a time comes when men can no longer do without God, properly so called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>for of Order read of Order and Dignity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>for by narrowing read narrowing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>for were able to, read provided for them directly by the own labour, that they might.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

TO THE FOUR VOLUMES.

Notas.—The numerals in black type (iv. 333) refer to passages which contain a general estimate of the subject, or in which it is considered at length. When a topic is continued over many pages, these are indicated thus (li. 73–79).

ABD

ABDERRAHMAN the Third, iii. 404
Abelard, iv. 408
Abraham, iv. 128
Absolute method, i. 6–10, 355, 369–373, 456; ii. 311. See Subjective
— synthesis, i. 331; ii. 73–79; iii. 15–33. See Relative
— history of, iii. 68, 132, 218, 365, 423–425, 483, 503
Absolution, Catholic, iii. 388
Abstract and Concrete Laws, i. 30–32, 343–354
— — — Science, i. 32–35; iv. 151
— — — Method, i. 348, 373, 397, 405, 474, 580; ii. 21, 282; iii. 68, 124
Academies, i. 270, 362; iv. 517. See Colleges, University
— suppression of, i. 97, 342; ii. 514; iv. 338–340
Accumulation, ii. 213. See Capital
Acadian League, iii. 232
Acoustics, i. 425, 429. See Ear
Action and Expression, ii. 204; iv. 82. See Language
Actium, battle of, iii. 329
Active faculties, i. 584–596; ii. 222–230; iv. 208–211
— existence, ii. 318–336; iv. 285
Activity, i. 257, 551;
— 38, 61, 73, 84, 146, 322
— relation with Structure, i. 521–525; ii. 277; iii. 73
— — with Feeling, i. 7, 258, 325, 588–597; ii. 58–69, 123; iv. 50–56
— — with Life, iii. 73, 129; iv. 221
— three stages of, i. 37, 607;
— iii. 46–55; iv. 157
Admission, Sacrament of, iv. 111
Adoption, ii. 166, 331;
— 235, 279, 407
— history of, iii. 119, 204

ALI

Ænoid, iii. 392
Æschylus, iii. 236–239;
— iv. 59, 127, 483
Aetius, iii. 392
Affection, preponderance of, i. 10–15, 554. See Feeling
— centre of Positive synthesis, i. 11, 518; ii. 13, 62; iii. 66; iv. 17
Affective functions, i. 557–571; ii. 12–17; iii. 9–11
— — law of progress of, iii. 55–58
Africa, i. 315; ii. 377; iii. 83, 126; iv. 451
Age, Normal, iv. 110–115, 223–235
Agriculture, ii. 236–238;
— iv. 71, 133, 209
— history of, iii. 97, 95, 191, 316
Air, analysis of, i. 450; iii. 506
Albategnus, iii. 404
Albanius Magnus, iii. 411, 613
Albigenses, iii. 386
Alchemy, iii. 458; iv. 240
D’Alembert, i. 400; ii. 361; iii. 499
Alexander, ii. 380; iii. 230–232, 321, 325; iv. 128, 485
— Severus, ii. 335
— III., Pope, iii. 408, 414
— VI., Pope, iv. 623
Alexandria, iii. 264, 287; iv. 641, 611
Altieri, iv. 483
Alfred, iii. 401; iv. 129
Algibra, i. 379–395, 423; ii. 197; iv. 182
— history of, iii. 147, 182, 251, 277, 482
Algol, ii. 379; iv. 364, 410
Alienation, Mental, the term, ii. 374; iv. 321. See Insanity
Alimentation, i. 488–490;
— ii. 122, 129–132. See Nutrition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX.</th>
<th>657</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ART</strong></td>
<td><strong>BIO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic, Future of, i. 177, 235</td>
<td>Attila, ii. 380; iii. 394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armies, standing, iii. 455, 490; iv. 361, 520</td>
<td>Augurs, art of the, iii. 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms. <em>See Fire-arms</em></td>
<td>August 16th, iv. 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrangement, order meaning, ii. 384</td>
<td>Augustine, i. 209; iv. 485, 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, the term, i. 280</td>
<td>Augustus, Emperor, iii. 112, 353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— general theory of, i. 227-234</td>
<td>Aurelius, Marcus, iii. 333; iv. 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Feticist, iii. 109-114</td>
<td>Authors, literary, iv. 340. <em>See</em> Literates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Theocratic, iii. 187-190</td>
<td>Automatism, i. 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Greek, iii. 238-277</td>
<td>Avarice, iv. 289. <em>See</em> Thrift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Roman, iii. 301</td>
<td>Avignon, Papacy at, iii. 453, 466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Medieval, i. 238, 280; iii. 372-374, 411</td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Modern, i. 239; iii. 442, 494-498</td>
<td>Bacon, scheme of, i. 158, 383, 539; iv. 154, 160, 161, 165, 485, 596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of Expression, ii. 192-198, 211</td>
<td>— estimate of, ii. 262; iii. 483; iv. 350, 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— its relation to Life, ii. 123, 260; iv. 45</td>
<td>— Roger, iii. 411; iv. 501, 613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— — — — Religion, i. 243; iv. 48, 132</td>
<td>Bankers, iv. 72, 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— — — — Politics, i. 254-256</td>
<td>Banking, iii. 509; iv. 72, 133, 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, its true place, iv. 45, 64, 104. <em>See</em> Artists</td>
<td>Baptistical Names, i. 277; iv. 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— relation of Positivism to, i. 220, 240; iv. 45, 84, 138</td>
<td>Barbarians, Greek view of, iii. 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— education in, i. 246; ii. 212; iv. 48</td>
<td>— Teutonic, ii. 96; iii. 350, 393, 402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur, legend of King, iii. 395</td>
<td>Barolage, i. 423, 428; ii. 306; iv. 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery, iv. 361</td>
<td>Barthéz, i. 469, 490; iv. 484, 491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists, i. 247, 279; iii. 189, 236; iv. 139, 224</td>
<td>Bastille, the, iii. 512; iv. 347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asceticism, i. 207; ii. 59; iii. 383; iv. 250</td>
<td>Bathilde, St., iii. 394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation of human existences, iv. 90</td>
<td>Bayard, iii. 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association, theory of, i. 223-235</td>
<td>Beatrix, i. 192; ii. 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— three types of, ii. 259, 279</td>
<td>Beauty, sense of, ii. 222; ii. 67, 125; iii. 38, 45, 77-82, 149, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrology, iii. 96-107, 126, 139, 147, 416; iv. 20, 127, 186</td>
<td>Becher, i. 452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astronomy, i. 373, 403-435; iv. 184</td>
<td>Being, analysis of, ii. 276, 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— arithmetical (history of), iii. 105, 126, 146</td>
<td>— meaning of, i. 365, 475; iv. 151, 164, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— geometrical (history of), iii. 147, 249, 270</td>
<td>Beings, and Events, i. 580, 595; iv. 183, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— modern (history of), iii. 482, 505</td>
<td>Benedict, St., iii. 396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— future, iv. 136-138</td>
<td>Benevolence, i. 566; ii. 15, 123, 159; iv. 17, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— solar, i. 411; iii. 505; iv. 186</td>
<td>— growth of, ii. 47, 314, 417, 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— sidereal, i. 412; iii. 273, 506; iv. 187</td>
<td>Béranger, iii. 521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athanasius, St., iii. 350</td>
<td>Bergmann, i. 441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheism, i. 36, 370; iii. 61, 75; iv. 180, 337</td>
<td>Bernard, St., i. 228; iii. 408, 419; iv. 139, 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— history of modern, iii. 431-436, 497, 515</td>
<td>Berthollet, i. 441, 442, 444, 450, 453; iii. 499; iv. 484, 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens, place of, in history, i. 230-231, 238-241, 319; iv. 128. <em>See</em> Salamis</td>
<td>Bible, the, ii. 286; iii. 190, 235, 379, 465, 467; iv. 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic theory, i. 421, 449; ii. 149, 238</td>
<td>Bichat, i. 265, 335, 481, 484, 491, 518, 535, 541; ii. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment, i. 566; ii. 15, 156; iii. 47; iv. 287</td>
<td>— estimate of, i. 459-473, 524; iii. 507, 528; iv. 196, 484, 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— growth of, iii. 47, 156, 188, 196, 293, 398</td>
<td>Binary combinations, i. 446, 449, 467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VOL. IV.</strong></td>
<td>Biocracy, i. 500, 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U</strong></td>
<td>Biocratic League, i. 408; iii. 115; iv. 128, 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U</strong></td>
<td>Biology, i. 355, 452; ii. 239-242, 352-357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U</strong></td>
<td>— summary of, i. 456-495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U</strong></td>
<td>— history of, iii. 148, 185, 256, 411, 506, 507, 528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cau</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Cautious'</td>
<td>See <em>Prudence</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavendish, i. 411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellabry, i. 176, 192; ii. 158; iv. 251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of Priesthood, iii. 381, 389, 466; iv. 64, 224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callini, Benvenuto, iv. 485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellular tissue, i. 524; ii. 234, 241; iii. 628; iv. 197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation, i. 98; ii. 243-249, 261; iv. 267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerebral functions. See <em>Brain, Psychology, and Table</em>, i. 595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cervantes, i. 514, 575; ii. 264, 373; iv. 12, 483</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— estimate of, iii. 465, 486</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaide, ii. 287; iii. 203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance, ii. 89-90; iii. 362; iv. 169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chances, calculus of, i. 20, 381; ii. 508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapel, private, ii. 68; iv. 229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character, the term, i. 551-553, 584; iii. 314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— analysis of, i. 580-586</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity, i. 566; ii. 62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlemagne, i. 63, 88, 81, 311; ii. 105, 264, 380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— estimate of, iii. 401; iv. 120, 129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— representation of, i. 311; iv. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles VII., iii. 456; iv. 520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles X., i. 92, 305; iii. 525</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chateaubriand, iii. 518, 527; iv. 483</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charms, i. 77, 190, 207; iii. 379; iv. 69, 242-253, 279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chausin, iv. 645</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry, i. 416, 430-456; iv. 190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— purpose of, i. 436</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— logic of, i. 432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— scheme of, i. 450-454</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— history of, i. 440; iii. 255, 411, 458, 506; iv. 240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, education of, i. 193; ii. 156, 165; iv. 229-230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, i. 315; iv. 11, 448. See <em>Fetichism</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chivalry, i. 238-293; ii. 103, 170; iv. 133, 293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— history of, 205-208; iii. 388-393, 407, 419</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— poetry of, i. 125; iii. 374, 395</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of future, iv. 133, 293, 416</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ, i. 533; iii. 383-389, 387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity, the term, iii. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— rise of, iii. 340-350. See <em>Catholicism</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian theology, i. 176, 205; iii. 350, 364, 376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— poetry, iii. 373, 374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysostom, St., iii. 350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church, the, i. 250-272, 278-300; iv. 63-67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— See <em>Anglican</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— National, iii. 453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church and State, ii. 277-286; iii. 443, 464-469, 518; iv. 335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cicer, iii. 334; iv. 485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen, the term, ii. 278, 305; iii. 308</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City, the term, ii. 240; iv. 67, 268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— analysis of, ii. 240-242, 261, 291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— function of, ii. 230-235, 277-278, 291-294, 304-308; iv. 272-274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— history of the, ii. 92, 122, 158-161, 172, 177, 213, 305-309, 322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— normal, iv. 270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic duty, ii. 235-239, 291, 304, 326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service, iv. 303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilisation, the term, iii. 56. See <em>Progress</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civism, ii. 304; iii. 306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claimant, iii. 499; iv. 484</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification, Law of, i. 26-35, 342-354; ii. 352; iii. 33-34; iv. 129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of the Sciences, i. 315-336, 383, 466-474; ii. 352-357; iii. 481; iv. 161-166, 549, 597</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— cosmological, 339-373, 415-420, 428</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— biological, i. 356-374, 529-540; iii. 358, 507; iv. 193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— sociological, i. 222-272, 336-357; iv. 54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of cerebral functions, table, i. 591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of social forces, ii. 226-234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of social criteria, i. 336-348; iv. 59-68, 64-73, 269-276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of the arts, i. 234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of laws of thought, iv. 154-160, 551</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks, iv. 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate, ii. 364, 368, 377; iv. 569</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, institution of, iii. 117, 196. See <em>Dress</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clotilde, St., iii. 394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clotilde de Vaux, i. 175, 211, 214-215; ii. 306, 382; iii. 234, 530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— — commemoration of, iv. 45, 96, 391, 460, 472-481</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clubs, workmen's, i. 114, 158; iv. 277, 333, 617</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colben, Richard, iv. 430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cœur, Jacques, iii. 462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coinage, International, i. 311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colbert, i. 278, 453; iv. 340, 503</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges, i. 137, 141; iii. 472; iv. 337. See <em>Academies, School</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial system, i. 491, 525; iv. 364, 423, 431, 452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonies, i. 313; iv. 404, 425</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, iii. 463; iv. 134, 559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column of Place Vendôme, iv. 345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination. See <em>Dualism</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— chemical, i. 444-454; iii. 506; iv. 190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of efforts, ii. 243; iv. 540, 632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— industrial, i. 133; 365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX.

Combustion, i. 441; iii. 508
Command, iii. 48, 234, 323-330, 342; iv. 53
— order in sense of, ii. 384
Commedia, iii. 486; iv. 3, 42, 352, 481. See Dante
Commemoration of the Dead, i. 276; iv. 136. See Dead
— of great men, i. 81; iv. 125-130, See Worship
Commune, Philippe de, iv. 485
Commercial, i. 310; iv. 71, 183
— history of, iii. 191, 233, 462-3, 509
Commercial system, iii. 463, 509
Committee, Postire, i. 309, 319; iv. 416
Common, the. See Middle Class
Communication, by Language, ii. 209
— by missive, iv. 415
Communism, i. 128-136, 184;
— iii. 319; iv. 284, 413
— history of, iii. 322-325
— in ancient philosophy, i. 125;
— ii. 228; iv. 266
— of modern governments, i. 130
Comparative Method, i. 432, 528;
iii. 507, 528; iv. 193
Compass, mariners', iii. 483
Competition, i. 159; ii. 304;
— iv. 285, 570
Composition. See Expression
— of motions, i. 398
Compound, chemical. See Combination
Conception, analysis of, i. 576-582;
— ii. 209, 228
Conceptions, ii. 310-312; iii. 15;
iv. 156
Concorde, Place de la, iv. 345
Concrete and abstract laws.
— i. 29-32, 343-354; iii. 69; iv. 216
— — science, i. 32-35, 349-352;
— iv. 151
Concrete synthesis, i. 349;
— iv. 151, 214-215
Condillac, iv. 648
Condorcet, cited, i. 383;
— ii. 146, 231, 385; iv. 262, 404
— criticized, i. 50, 55, 202, 588;
— iii. 262; iv. 262, 571-577
— estimate of, i. 305
— iii. 498, 510, 527; iv. 27, 484, 570
— predecessor of Comte, i. 589;
— ii. 151, 369; iii. 11; iv. 2, 262
Confession, iii. 388; iv. 60, 108
Conflation, i. 129-124; ii. 311, 341;
— iii. 310, 406; iv. 408
Confucius, iii. 283. See China
Conic sections, i. 389, 414; ii. 385;
— iii. 369
Conjugal love, i. 189; ii. 168;
— iv. 69, 97, 112. See Marriage
— relation, iii. 357-365, 370-380
Conjugal relation, history of, iii. 91,
— 118, 196, 227, 301, 379, 361, 465,
— 522
— — future of, iv. 112, 122, 263-269
Conquest, ii. 133;
— iii. 49, 89, 322-323, 402
Consanguinity in marriage, ii. 303;
— iii. 196
Conscience, iv. 283
Consensus, social, i. 20; iv. 50-54
— intellectual, i. 586; ii. 315; iii. 18;
— iv. 44-50
— active, i. 584; iv. 50-54
— general, i. 586; ii. 299, 317;
— iv. 37-40
Constabulary, iv. 361
Constancy, i. 192; ii. 157; iii. 409;
— iv. 113
Constant, Benjamin, ii. 371
Constantine, ii. 386; iii. 390; iv. 326
Constantinople, iii. 331, 390; iv. 441
Construction, Instinct of, i. 482;
— ii. 130; iv. 251. See Industry
Consumption, of products, ii. 130
Contemplation, the term, i. 579
— analysis of, i. 580; ii. 310-315;
— iii. 16, 124; iv. 282-286, 351
—— life of, i. 13; ii. 376; iv. 235
Continence, i. 207; ii. 158;
— iii. 379-381; iv. 251. See Chastity
Continuity, the term, i. 292; ii. 63
— analysis of, ii. 293-296, 379-382;
—— ii. 9-17
—— breach in, ii. 274, 386;
— iii. 215, 361, 446-451, 510
— culture of, ii. 370-378, 308, 527
— iv. 31-32, 128-131
Contractility, i. 484
Contrat Social, iii. 511. See Rousseau
Convention, the, i. 87-105, 144-163,
— 304-309
— — history of, iii. 510-516; iv. 399
Cook, Captain, iv. 452, 484
Cooperation, ii. 223, 283, 285, 293;
— iii. 8; iv. 282-286
Copernicus, ii. 276; iv. 345
Copyright, iv. 640
Cordova, iii. 404; iv. 501
Corneille cited, i. 177; iii. 325; iii. 377;
— iv. 122
— estimate of, i. 222, 232, 244;
— iv. 27, 468; iv. 483
Corpus Juris, the, iii. 211; iv. 370
Corpuscular Theory, i. 281, 449;
— iii. 150, 255
Cortes, ii. 379; iv. 410
Cosmology, the term, i. 355; ii. 353;
— iv. 166-175
— scheme of, i. 359-455;
— iv. 376-391
Councils, ecclesiastical, iii. 388, 483;
— iv. 226
INDEX.

COU

Counsel and Command, ii. 342; iv. 66, 284
Country, ii. 237, 366; iii. 120, 293, 307. See Patriotism and Town
Courage, i. 536; ii. 348; iv. 64, 466
Creation, iii. 371
Crimean War, iv. 345
Cromwell, iii. 468, 494, 513; iv. 429, 485
Crusades, ii. 98, 106, 111;
iii. 410, 418, 485
Cupidity, ii. 138; iv. 289
Curtius, iii. 349
Cuvier, i. 460; iv. 645, 649

DAMNATION, doctrine of, ii. 281;
iii. 382-388
Dancing, art of, i. 583; ii. 192; iii. 113
Dante cited, i. 561;
ii. 106, 267, 286, 319, 327;
ii. 322, 374, 376, 391, 396, 454;
iv. 26, 56, 289
— estimate of, i. 223, 239; ii. 306;
 iii. 460, 463;
 iv. 120, 130, 352, 420, 437, 483
— and Beatrice, i. 192; ii. 306; iii. 485
Danton, i. 58;
iv. 45, 329, 333, 338-343, 406
— estimate of, i. 610, 513-516
Dowbenton, iv. 645
Daughter, the, ii. 67, 164, 171-174;
iv. 97
Day. See Calendar, Dead, New Year's Day
Dead, the, i. 333; ii. 54-55, 294-296, 366, 379-382; iv. 31, 89-95
— commemoration of, i. 276; ii. 372;
i. 427-137
— worship of, iii. 92, 196, 228, 384;
iv. 95
— judgment of, ii. 269; iii. 200;
iv. 116, 353
— Festival of, i. 279; iv. 136
— day of, i. 276
— transfer of great, to Paris, iv. 436
Death, i. 476-482; ii. 54, 382;
iii. 60, 125; iv. 105
— punishment of, ii. 341;
iv. 66, 199, 406
Decimal Notation, iii. 181, 464
Decius, iii. 349
Decomposition, Chemical, i. 444;
iii. 506
— of States, iv. 268, 366
Deduction, i. 380-382, 390, 404, 419, 430, 526
— theory of, i. 581; iv. 177-184
Defence, ii. 55-98; iii. 51-55
— history of, iii. 375, 387, 390, 403, 418
Defoe, iv. 483

Deism, i. 149, 273, 316, 320, 331;
iv. 337
— history of, iii. 429, 450, 496, 501, 518
Delambre, iii. 270
Demagogy, iii. 228; iv. 394
De Maistre, i. 50, 70, 305; ii. 151;
iii. 52
— estimate of, iii. 519, 527;
iv. 455, 604, 622, 632
Democrates, iii. 255
Derangement. See Insanity
Descartes referred to, i. 8, 153, 539, 591;
iv. 50, 93, 217, 320
— estimate of, ii. 202; iii. 682-686;
iv. 120, 130, 181
— philosophy of, i. 472; ii. 290;
iii. 483; iv. 485
— mathematics, i. 378, 380, 389-393;
i. 462; iv. 484
Despots in Greece, iii. 227
— Feudal, iii. 418, 444, 457
Destination, Sacrament of, iv. 111
Destiny, ii. 89; iii. 132-137, 302, 418
— iv. 170
Destruction, Instinct of, i. 563;
iii. 47, 86; iv. 252
— of animals, iii. 116
Development, general theory of, i. 674-682; ii. 350-382; iii. 8-9
Dervil, the, iii. 200, 364-367
Dictatorship, normal, i. 92, 160-163, 307;
iv. 300-302, 329, 342, 388-405
— Roman, iii. 327-336
— Feudal, ii. 115;
iii. 398, 407, 410, 419
— modern, iii. 454, 473, 493, 498, 518-516, 526
Diderot, estimate of, i. 249; iii. 498-506, 513-516; iv. 350, 485
— cited, i. 374; iii. 426;
iv. 184, 217, 410
Diet, i. 488-490; ii. 610, 639, 561;
i. 489-491
— history of, iii. 195, 283, 314, 379
— Differentiation, i. 480-485, 517-521, 529; iii. 35-37; iv. 156, 199
— of function, ii. 282-288;
iv. 193-198
— of sex, i. 198; ii. 302-307;
i. 55, 63
— of orders, iii. 326-346; iv. 55-59
Diophantus, iii. 277
Diplomacy, iv. 370, 409
Directness of Mind, i. 448; ii. 373;
iii. 226; iv. 154
Discipline, i. 73-80;
i. 88-90, 225-233, 300-306
— ancient, ii. 85; iii. 161, 194, 293
— medieval, ii. 91-104;
iii. 338, 356, 378
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIS</th>
<th>ENC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discipline, modern, iii. 469-500</td>
<td>Earth, the, motions of, iii. 185, 276, 479, 505; iv. 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— normal, ii. 336-346; iv. 245-256</td>
<td>Eclectic, the, iii. 525; iv. 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease, i. 326-328, 592; ii. 350, 359-366, 372; iv. 198, 371-383</td>
<td>Economists, i. 124; ii. 134, 230, 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disestablishment of Churches, iv. 335</td>
<td>— history of, iii. 500; iv. 399, 633, 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissention, iv. 66, 199, 380.</td>
<td>Economy, political, i. 123-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Anatomy</td>
<td>— normal, ii. 239-248, 230; iv. 280-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Distribution of functions, ii. 262-285</td>
<td>Education, the term, iv. 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of labour, ii. 135, 310-336; iv. 269-276</td>
<td>— theory of, i. 281-311; ii. 308, 318; iv. 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of Wealth, ii. 326-336; iv. 290</td>
<td>— normal, i. 136-148, 311; ii. 317, 339; iv. 61-67, 227-229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labor. See Distribution</td>
<td>— domestic, i. 138; ii. 170-177, 302; iv. 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— arithmetical, iii. 146, 182</td>
<td>— of children, i. 193; iv. 229-230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce, i. 190-191; iii. 469</td>
<td>— of women, i. 201; iv. 61-66, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodona, iii. 228</td>
<td>— moral, i. 79-82; iv. 63, 66, 228-231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog, the, i. 495, 510, 512, 513; ii. 14; iii. 87; iv. 126, 382</td>
<td>— intellectual, i. 32-36, 140; iv. 145, 231-238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism, i. 546; iii. 21</td>
<td>— ancien, ii. 80-85; iii. 139-168, 168, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of Domestic Life, i. 75-78, 127-200, 495; ii. 185-190; iv. 122, 255-257</td>
<td>— mediaval, i. 136; iii. 356, 364-374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Morality, i. 77; iv. 263</td>
<td>— scheme of, iv. 226-239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— relation of, i. 169-171; iv. 123, 257</td>
<td>Egoism, i. 73-80, 177, 620-634; ii. 175, 303, 317; iii. 377; iv. 84, 246, 253. See Altruism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestication of animals, i. 495, 513; iii. 86; iv. 126, 312</td>
<td>— Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominicans, the, iii. 417, 473</td>
<td>Encrypt, ii. 287; iii. 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Quixote, iii. 465, 466; iv. 483. See Cervantes</td>
<td>Election, system of, ii. 247, 375; iv. 32, 342, 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama, the, i. 246; iii. 236, 486, 508; iv. 376, 384</td>
<td>— history of, iii. 217, 224, 388, 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreams, i. 490, 575; iii. 17, 144; iv. 49, 211</td>
<td>— of the just, ii. 281; iii. 382. See Damnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dress, iv. 225</td>
<td>Electricity, i. 435, 441, 446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eulamias, Philosophical, i. 355-365, 594; ii. 16, 34; iii. 135; iv. 192</td>
<td>— sense of, iv. 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Cosmological, i. 371</td>
<td>Electrolysis, i. 426-430; iv. 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Chemical, i. 446-453</td>
<td>Elements, four, i. 451; iii. 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Biological, i. 494</td>
<td>— of religion, ii. 17-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Sociological, ii. 1-4, 11-17; iii. 52-55, 211; iv. 55</td>
<td>— of sociocracy, iv. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duclos, iv. 485</td>
<td>— Biological, iv. 240; iv. 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duel, the, iii. 385, 394; iv. 115, 202</td>
<td>Elixir Vites, iii. 439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunoyer, i. 127; ii. 261, 330, 332; iii. 51; iv. 408, 639</td>
<td>Emancipetel, the, iv. 467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties and Rights, i. 52, 289; ii. 91; iii. 515</td>
<td>Emotion. See Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty, spirit of, ii. 381-382, 385; iv. 24, 283</td>
<td>Emperor, the Roman, iii. 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics, theory of, i. 395, 402; ii. 1-4; iii. 1-10</td>
<td>Medieval, i. 311; ii. 261; iii. 402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARTH, the, i. 426; ii. 194-195; iv. 208</td>
<td>Empire, the Medieval, iii. 309-403, 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth, the, i. 357, 410-418, 499; iv. 185</td>
<td>Empiricism, i. 365-368, 419, 572; ii. 258, 363; iii. 21; iv. 152. See Dogmatism, Mysticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— social influence of, ii. 299, 335-338; iv. 196, 188</td>
<td>Employers, the, i. 127, 297; ii. 310; iv. 71, 269, 288. See Capital, Patriciate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— sphericity of, iii. 260, 273</td>
<td>— history of, iii. 413, 440, 462, 490, 528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopaedia, the, iii. 499; iv. 399, 604</td>
<td>See People, Proletariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Capital, Patriciate</td>
<td>— history of, iii. 413, 440, 462, 490, 528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Employment, the, i. 127, 297</td>
<td>See People, Proletariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Emancipation, the, iv. 467</td>
<td>— history of, iii. 413, 440, 462, 490, 528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Emancipation, the, iv. 467</td>
<td>Encyclopedia, the, iii. 499; iv. 399, 604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX.

FIC

Pietistous system, i., 17, 19, 320; ii. 767–774; iii. 24–30, 58–66.
         See Synthesis, Theological.

Fies, iii. 406.

Fielding, iv. 483.

Filiation, ii. 156, 158; iv. 123, 261. See Daughter.

Fire, iii. 118; iv. 125.

Fire-arms, iii. 463; iv. 361.

Firmness. See Perseverance.

Flag of the West, i. 311; iv. 368.

Fleury, iv. 485.

Fontenelle, i., 383; iii. 498, 504; iv. 187, 487, 484.

Force, the term, ii. 534. See Power.

Formula, Cerebral, i. 555, 595; iii. 65.
         — Religious, ii. 286.
         — Moral, i. 566; ii. 243.
         — Political, ii. 328; iv. 344.
         — of transition, iv. 343, 400. See Motto.

Foundling hospitals, i. 130.

Fourier, i. 424.

Fox, the, i. 579.

Fractions, iii. 182.

France, i. 65–68, 309; ii. 404, 475, 495.
         — Monarchy of, i. 53; iii. 464, 475, 492, 612.
         — Revolution of, i. 47; iii. 599–531. See Convention.
         — Constitution of, i. 54, 94, 129; iii. 613.

Francis I., i. 496.

Francis, St., iii. 408; iv. 136.

Franciscans, iii. 408, 473.

Franklin, ii. 296; iv. 69, 607.

Fraternal relation, ii. 156, 167, 330; iv. 123. See Sister.

Fraternity, i. 300; ii. 169; iii. 524; iv. 313.


Free Inquiry, i. 98; iii. 445, 467.
         — Speech, i. 96, 307; iv. 332.
         — Thought, ii. 82; iii. 451, 478, 496, 510; iv. 507, 532.

Function, the term, i. 520–525; ii. 277.

Future of mankind, i. 316; ii. 220, 266; iv. 10, 576.
         — of industry, iv. 51–75, 206–211.
         — of language, ii. 220; iv. 185.

Future Life. See Immortality.

GALLEN, i. 515.

Galileo, referred to, i. 399, 400, 417.

Galileo, estimate of, iii. 479, 482; iv. 158, 505.

Gall referred to, i. 50, 129, 458, 464, 503; ii. 15; iv. 207.
         — cited, i. 53, 235, 485, 559, 562; ii. 313, 556; iv. 207.
         — estimate of, i. 542–552, 555–580; iii. 528; iv. 486.

Ganglion, cerebral, i. 546; iv. 208.

Gaul, conquest of, iii. 317, 320–327, 332.

Generality of philosophy, i. 363–352.
         ii. 285–272; iii. 102; iv. 216–218.

Genièvre, St., i. 44.

Geoffroy, i. 44.

Geography, rise of, iii. 273.

Geology, i. 350; ii. 360.

Geometry, ii. 376–398; iv. 184.
         — Theocratic, iii. 147, 182.

— Greek, iii. 245–250, 265–268, 481.
         — modern, iii. 481–482, 505.

Germain, Sophie, i. 577.

Germany, i. 67, 461; ii. 449, 465, 494.
         — conquest of, iii. 332, 402.
         — future of, i. 309; iv. 225, 324, 427, 432.

Germans, ii. 95, 304; iv. 427.

Gerson, iii. 460.

Gesture, i. 231, 235, 583; ii. 192, 202; iii. 109–111, 188.

Gibbon, iii. 361; iv. 485.

Gibraltars, iv. 430.

Gift, ii. 133, 333; iii. 201, 406; iv. 69.

Gil Blas, iv. 483.

Gipsy, ii. 327.

Gironde, i. 162; iii. 513; iv. 404.

God, idea of, i. 280–285, 320, 381; ii. 307; iv. 26, 34, 188. See Monotheism.
         — — decline of, iii. 431, 438, 496, 503.

God, origin of idea of, iii. 125, 236–239. See Polytheism.
         — household, iii. 216; iv. 101.

Godfrey de Bouillon, iv. 129. See Crusades.

Goethe, i. 239, 249, 274; iv. 484.

Goldsmith, iv. 483.

Goodness, the term, i. 566. See Benevolence.

Governing classes, i. 102; ii. 225, 244–250, 323, 329; iv. 281.

Government, theory of, i. 228–233.
         — material, ii. 223–230, 246, 255, 326.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
<th>HUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>Heeren, iv. 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heloise, iii. 408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helvetius, iii. 499; iv. 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Henry IV. of France, iv. 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herbivorous animals, i. 481, 489, 510, 563, 579; iv. 241, 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herder, iv. 603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hereditary principle, iii. 171-175, 192-200. See Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— wealth, i. 300; ii. 238-231; iv. 280, 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heredity, i. 480, 493; ii. 366-369; iv. 194, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hermits, iii. 383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herodotus, iii. 262; iv. 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hetaerinae, iii. 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hieroglyphics, i. 233; ii. 197, 293; iii. 187, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Priest, iv. 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hildebrand, iii. 408, 410; iv. 129, 499, 613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hipparchus, i. 386; iii. 261, 263, 276-277, 437; iv. 128, 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hippocrates, i. 469, 465, 486; ii. 364; iii. 257; iv. 128, 484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Histology, i. 532; iv. 193, 197. See Tissue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical method, i. 68; ii. 70-78; iii. 1-7, 627; iv. 1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— poetry, i. 244; iv. 46, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History, rise of, iii. 262, 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hobbes, ii. 186, 199, 209, 214, 246; iii. 483, 496; iv. 320, 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holland, i. 67, 309; iv. 267, 404, 432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— history of, iii. 448, 466, 485, 491, 494, 502, 511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holy Alliance, iii. 522; iv. 529, 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home, the, i. 77, 187; ii. 178; iii. 305; iv. 258, 295. See Domestic Life, Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homer, referred to, i. 223, 237, 245, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— estimate of, iii. 233-238; iv. 93, 120, 127, 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horace, iv. 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horse, the, iii. 87; iv. 126, 213, 382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hospitals, iv. 372, 380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House, the term, ii. 238; iv. 268. See Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hufeland, i. 207; iv. 484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huguenots, iii. 476, 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Nature. See Problem, Synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— science of, i. 316-318; iv. 142-148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanity, i. 243-276, 317-321, 333; ii. 61-68; iv. 22-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— idea of, i. 273; ii. 383-387, 394; iii. 285, 415, 458, 503, 516, 523, 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— defined, iv. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— poem of, iv. 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See Goodness, Organism, Religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| HABIT, i. 486, 491; ii. 175; iv. 21, 194 |
| Hadrian, iii. 333 |
| Hallam, iii. 462; iv. 485 |
| Haller, i. 458; iii. 507; iv. 645 |
| Hannibal, iii. 323 |
| Happiness, i. 317-321; ii. 382; iv. 283 |
| Hartespiers, iii. 148 |
| Harvey, i. 470; iv. 59 |
| Hayti, i. 516; iv. 453 |
| Health, i. 488, 492, 494; ii. 8, 372; iii. 195, 379; iv. 209, 246-253. See Diet, Disease, Hygiene |
| Heart, the term, i. 86, 213, 552 |
| — influence on Intellect, i. 177-181, 228, 554. See Affection, Character, Feeling, Synthesis |
| Heat, i. 246-253, 435; iv. 190 |
| Heaven, the term, i. 141; iv. 188. See Astrology |
| Hebrew Theocracy, ii. 286; iii. 202-205, 257; iv. 128. See Judaism, Moses |
| — Poetry, iii. 190, 235. See Bible |
LOGIC

Logic of Chemistry, i. 432; iv. 191
— of Biology, i. 624, 593; iv. 194, 201, 562
— of Sociology, i. 325–330;
   ii. 1–6, 222, 353; iv. 201, 562
— of Morals, ii. 354–368;
   iv. 201–206, 213
Logicians, ii. 214; iii. 100
Longevity, ii. 363; iv. 282
Louis IX., iii. 410
— XL., i. 212; iii. 456, 513
— XIV., i. 55; iii. 458, 493, 512;
   iv. 503
— XVI., iii. 512; iv. 399
— XVIII., iii. 512, 520; iv. 399
— Philippe, iv. 333, 345, 364. See
   Orleanist
— Napoléon. See Bonaparte
Love, of God, i. 176, 182, 281; iii. 378
— of Humanity, i. 281; iv. 40, 80–89
— of Power, i. 564; ii. 245. See
   Ambition, Pride
— of Praise, i. 564. See Vanity
— universal, i. 566; iv. 40. See
   Benevolence
Loyola, Ignatius, iii. 370. See Jesuits
Loyalty, i. 205; iii. 385
Lucan, iv. 471, 483
Luther, i. 217; iii. 465, 566, 469;
   iv. 506, 529
Luxury, iii. 327, 333; iv. 289
Lycurgus, i. 232
Lyons, iii. 523; iv. 366

MACHIAVELLI, iii. 457
Machinery, iii. 376, 461, 491, 508;
   iv. 133, 134, 307, 312, 367. See
   Industry, Instruments, Inventions
Madness. See Insanity
Mahomet, ii. 93, 294; iv. 388, 397;
   iv. 101, 129, 441
Mahometan system, ii. 93, 294;
   iii. 397, 477; iv. 129, 440, 443
   — culture, iii. 406; iv. 441. See
   Arabia
   — invasions, ii. 98; iii. 409. See
   Crusades
   — countries, i. 315; iii. 98, 253;
   iv. 440–443
Maintenon, Madame de, iii. 403
Maistre. See De Maistre
Maladies, the term, ii. 350. See
   Pathology
Malaria, i. 315; iii. 114, 131; iv. 127
Malthus, i. 113; ii. 167; iv. 278, 641
Manicheism, ii. 88; iii. 365
Manufactures, iii. 376, 461, 491, 508;
   iv. 74, 133, 296, 301, 307. See
   Industry, Machinery
Manzoni, i. 245; iii. 527; iv. 483
Marathon, iii. 232, 238
INDEX.

OBJ
Objective Generality, ii. 271; iii. 103; iv. 156. See Generality
— basis of Positivism, i. 16;
ii. 23-24; iv. 160-167
Objects, i. 560; iv. 161, 164, 178
Observation. See Contemplation
Occidentalism. See West
Oceania, i. 310; ii. 88, 133; iv. 452
Ochiltree, Edie, iv. 136. See
Mendicancy
Odyssey, iii. 237-239; iv. 483. See
Homer
OEdipus, iii. 226, 239; iv. 483
Oken, i. 460
Old Age, iii. 91, 169, 196, 190, 228, 302; iv. 97, 114, 132, 262-264
Omnipotence, i. 351; ii. 100;
iii. 365, 376, 409; iv. 34
One, the number, iii. 107; iv. 89
Ontology, i. 36; ii. 100; iii. 32, 181,
278, 431. See Causality, Cause
Opera, the, iii. 505; iv. 384
Optics, i. 425, 438; iv. 190
Optimism, i. 43, 284; iii. 79-81, 135;
iv. 33-35
Oracles, Greek, ii. 362; iii. 235
Oral language, ii. 198; iii. 109
— prayer, iv. 102
— instruction, iv. 232-239
Oratory, ii. 68; iv. 259. See Prayer
Order, the term, ii. 1-6, 22-62,
286-287
— Cosmological, i. 16-25, 337, 406-410; ii. 352; iv. 160
— Social, i. 56-58, 83;
ii. 2, 244, 266, 290, 380; iv. 8
— Universal, ii. 346-350;
iv. 40, 75, 216, 310-314
Orestes, iii. 227; iv. 59
Organ, biological, i. 817-822, 533,
588-691; ii. 240; iv. 207
— social, i. 116, 126;
ii. 223, 240, 264
Organic Chemistry, i. 444
Organisation. See Social
Organism, i. 355-360, 517-522;
iv. 194
— Human, i. 267-270, 284, 291. See
Humanity
— Social, ii. 221-275
— Individual, ii. 239-262
Origen, iii. 350
Orleanist Monarchy, i. 54, 94, 305;
iii. 325. See Louis Philippe
Ostracism, iii. 229
Otho, Emperor, iii. 401
Ovid, iv. 483
Ox, the, iv. 126, 312

Painters, profession of, i. 250;
iv. 65, 139, 224
Painting, i. 236; ii. 192
— history of, iii. 115, 190, 240, 437
Paix, Rue de la, iv. 345
Pamphlets, iv. 333
Pantheism, i. 357, 461; ii. 186;
iii. 75; iv. 38, 337
Papacy, the, iii. 391, 398, 453, 466;
iv. 226, 541
Paris, history of, ii. 103;
iii. 403, 475, 512, 523
— future of, iv. 130, 224, 270, 323,
345, 403, 437, 439
— workmen of, i. 105, 149, 181;
iii. 523
Parliamentary system, i. 58, 162;
iv. 342
— history of, iii. 475, 494, 512, 520,
525
Pascal, i. 270, 462; ii. 355;
iv. 27, 181, 485
Past, the, i. 66, 71, 81, 274;
ii. 70-76, 283-286, 378-382;
iii. 1-7; iv. 6-14, 663-688
Paternal relation, i. 76; ii. 159, 306;
iv. 123
Pathology, i. 529; ii. 350, 360; iii. 529;
iv. 66, 198, 247, 373-383, 468
Patricians, class of, i. 127, 297; ii. 328,
335-340; iv. 57, 71, 258, 290
— history of, iii. 192, 198, 201, 217,
223, 229, 309, 316, 406, 439, 465,
475
Patriotism, the term, ii. 238; iv. 262,
267, 402. See City, Country
— ii. 84, 179, 237, 301, 304;
iv. 271, 287, 402
— history of, iii. 119-122, 158, 166,
230, 257, 293, 305
Patronage, the term, iv. 97
Paul, Saint, i. 81, 268; ii. 94, 100
— estimate of, iii. 343, 362-366;
iv. 120, 129, 441
Pavia, battle of, iii. 475
Peace, system of, i. 306; ii. 116; iii.
66-65, 422, 489, 521; iv. 256, 286
Pedantocracy, i. 150, 234; ii. 282, 342;
iii. 173, 176, 614, 624
Penates, the, iii. 216; iv. 101
Pensioners, iv. 65, 224, 359
People, the, i. 102-112, 152-163;
ii. 107, 318; iii. 462, 623;
iv. 72, 136-136, 619
— function of, i. 172;
ii. 226, 292, 337; iii. 57, 306
— sovereignty of, i. 106-110;
iii. 448, 488; iv. 284, 531
Pepin, King, iii. 399
Perception, i. 355; ii. 12; iii. 16; iv. 156. See Contemplation, Environment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
<th>673</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Primary instruction, i. 139; iv. 338. See Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primogeniture, ii. 168, 330; iii. 406</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing, invention of, iii. 465; iv. 134, 505</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem of Human Nature, i. 592; ii. 122, 148; iv. 49, 142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prodigality, iv. 289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, ii. 130; iv. 62, 282-288, 306-316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products, iv. 314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress, i. 67-56; ii. 35, 147; iii. 1-8. See Animals, Intellect, Material, Moral, Physical — development of order, i. 83; ii. 2, 350; iii. 3; iv. 1-9 — laws of social, iii. 22-26; iv. 137-159, 314, 355, 581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariate. See People</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensities, i. 640. See Feelings, Instincts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property, origin of, i. 123, 130; ii. 213, 329; iii. 85, 201 — moral effect of, ii. 236, 238, 326-340; iii. 201; iv. 52-56 — duties of, i. 125; ii. 213, 230; iv. 289-293. See Capital, Industry — compared with Language, ii. 213 — tribal, ii. 236; iii. 121 — in the soil, ii. 236; iii. 121; iv. 295-296 — literary, i. 133; iv. 340 — future of, i. 123-132; iv. 411-415</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prose, origin of, i. 233; ii. 106; iii. 111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism, i. 216; iii. 450, 644-475, 485; iv. 337</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence, Divine, i. 520; ii. 77-79; iii. 340, 376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Human, i. 317-321; ii. 215, 292, 376-383; iv. 35, 311-316 — — analysis of, iv. 291-293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions, ii. 332; iv. 294, 298</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional institutions, ii. 87, 160, 306; iv. 347, 361, 416</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudence, i. 385; ii. 343; iii. 66; iv. 64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psalm XIX, iv. 188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology, i. 310; iii. 30; iv. 644-652. See Brain, Intellect, Logic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychologist, i. 58, 673; iv. 616</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polemies, iii. 288-294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion, i. 80, 110-120; iv. 148, 292, 305 — rewards, ii. 341; iv. 69, 408</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity, i. 111; iv. 273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment, Theological, iii. 165, 383. See Damnation — Capital, ii. 250; iv. 66, 199, 262 — Purgatory, iii. 388 — Purity, i. 207; iii. 379, 384; iv. 247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| BEV | Pythagoras, ii. 40, 298; iii. 182, 252, 437; iv. 576 — estimate of, iii. 281-286; iv. 126 |
| QUAKERS, iv. 266 |
| Quality, ii. 363 |
| Quixote, Don, iii. 465, 486; iv. 483. See Cervantes |
| RACE, influence of, ii. 377-378; iv. 447-456. See Black, White, Yellow |
| Racine, i. 232; iv. 483 |
| Reaction, law of, ii. 367-372; iv. 168 — against Revolution, i. 83; iii. 816-820 |
| Reading, iv. 236. See Library |
| Realism in philosophy, iii. 32, 279, 412, 459 |
| — in art, i. 231 |
| Reformation, doctrine of, iii. 387 |
| Reflection. See Meditation |
| Redemption, doctrine of, iii. 387 |
| Religion, the term, ii. 7-9 — analysis of, ii. 8-20 — history of, ii. 70-119 — of Humanity, i. 287-279; iii. 53-70; iv. 26-37 — compared with Language, ii. 153, 219. See Language — correlations of, i. 316-323 |
| Renovation, i. 475; iv. 194 |
| Reproduction, Theological, ii. 281; iii. 388 — positivist, i. 82; iv. 351 |
| Reproduction, physical, i. 476-481; iv. 194, 261, 277-280 |
| Republic, i. 80-99; iv. 267-274 — of the West, i. 308; iv. 300. See West |
| Republican, the term, i. 122 |
| Republicanism, i. 56, 93, 153-163. See People |
| Retirement, sacrament of, iv. 114 |
| Retrogression, iii. 60-64; iv. 656 |
| Revelation, ii. 92, 102; iii. 363, 380, 387 |
| Revolution, the term, ii. 360, 374 — of the West, ii. 312-313, 374; iii. 328-338; iv. 402 — French, i. 67-58; iii. 509-521 |

**VOL. IV.**

**X X**
Rev

Revolutionary government, i, 307; iv. 341-345
— schools, i; 58; ii. 375;
iii. 510, 624; iv. 328-328
Rewards, theological, iii. 165, 372, 382.
See Salvation
— public, ii. 341; iv. 69, 408
Rhyme, origin of, iii. 374
Rich, duties of, i. 123, 302;
ii. 230, 319, 331, 335; iv. 288-293
— the selfish, ii. 319, 327, 335; iv. 63, 289
Richelieu, iii. 493, 513; iv. 485, 503
Rights, doctrine of, i. 62, 289; ii. 91;
iii. 516
— of women, i. 196; ii. 163; iv. 66-61
Ritter, i. 434
Robertson, i. 174; iii. 505; iv. 485
Robespierre, i. 53, 59, 149, 306; iii. 516
Robin, Charles, i. 538
Rome, city, ii. 105;
iii. 316-323, 391, 403; iv. 323
— history of, ii. 26-36;
iii. 316-330
— place of, iii. 391, 316
— Modern. See Catholicism, Papacy
Rousseau, i. 59; iii. 497, 499, 521, 514;
iv. 653
Rousseauists, i. 59; iii. 511
Russia, i. 315; iii. 522; iv. 410, 443

Sacraments, Catholic. See Eucharist, Mass
— Positivist, iv. 109-116
Sacred Numbers, Signs, &c. See Numbers, Signs, &c.
Saints. See euch numm.
— worship of, iii. 384, 388, 400
Salamis, ii. 82; iii. 231, 319
Salon, the, i. 185; iv. 275-277
Salvation, personal, i. 281, 287;
iii. 372, 382
Sanction, Moral, ii. 248. See Public Opinion
Savants, i. 168, 270, 341, 386; ii. 350;
iii. 507; iv. 321, 337-340, 647, 614
Saving-banks, i. 156
Saxons, the, iii. 402
Say, J. B., iv. 633
Scale of Being, i. 517, 529; iv. 198.
See Biology, Biotax
— of Thought, iv. 160-165
— of the Sciences. See Classification
Scepticism, i. 38, 239; iii. 428;
iv. 385, 636
School system, i. 141; iii. 472; iv. 327
— Positive, i. 141; iv. 223, 368, 373.
See Education
Schwan, i. 525
Science, i. 16-26, 326-328;
iv. 142-154

800

Science, Classification of. See Classification
— synthesis of. See Synthesis
— sacredness of, ii. 22-33; iv. 48, 149
— degeneration of, i. 340, 375, 386, 460;
iv. 173. See Savants
Seipio, ii. 386; iii. 323, 330; iv. 128
Scott, Walter, i. 245; iii. 235, 527;
iv. 136, 484
Sculpture, i. 236; ii. 197; iv. 138-140
— history of, i. 113, 190, 240, 467
Secondary education, i. 140; iv. 229
Segond, Dr., i. 638; iv. 484
Self-love, i. 73, 283; ii. 178
Selfishness. See Egoism
Self-preservation, i. 496, 561; ii. 128;
iv. 299
Senate, Roman, iii. 296
Sensation, i. 484, 546; ii. 185, 311;
iii. 15; iv. 207-212
Senses, the, iv. 207
Sensibility, animal, i. 484; iv. 193, 197
Separation of the Powers, i. 69, 292-306; ii. 282-293, 301; iv. 618-619
— — — history of, ii. 92, 110;
iii. 362, 356, 370, 387
Serfage, i. 110; ii. 95
— history of, ii. 107;
iii. 380, 395, 413
Servant, ii. 169, 170; iv. 124
Service, i. 407; iv. 257
Seven, the Number, iii. 108; iv. 117
Seville, iii. 404
Sex, i. 475, 494, 502; iv. 56, 210
Sexual instinct, i. 189; ii. 158;
iv. 59, 211, 251
— — history of,
iii. 91, 118, 196, 227, 301, 379, 469
Shakespeare, i. 486; iv. 483
Sidereal Astronomy. See Astronomy
Sign, the term, ii. 155
— nature of, i. 582; ii. 185-193, 201;
iv. 80, 155
— sacred, iv. 89
— Logic of. See Logic
Simultaneous action, law of, i. 400;
iv. 158
Sister, the, ii. 156; iv. 98
Slavery, ii. 81, 169; iii. 119
— ancient, iii. 155, 217, 303
— mediaval, iii. 340, 350, 395, 414
— modern, iii. 491; iv. 483
Sleep, i. 490, 585; iv. 212
Smith, Adam, iv. 486, 591, 632
Sobriety, i. 77; iii. 108; iv. 250, 466.
See Nutriente instinct
Sociability, i. 12, 29, 74, 340; ii. 315;
iii. 169; iv. 17-24
Social instincts, i. 496-570;
i. 313-318
— life, i. 495, 589-586
INDEX.

SOC

Social life in animals, i. 495, 501, 508, 564; ii. 14; iv. 311
— existence, ii. 276-285; iv. 55
— forces, ii. 233-235, 388
— organisation, ii. 289-300, 336-346; iv. 219-234, 557, 559
— organism, ii. 233-235; iv. 8-78
— nature of force, ii. 313-317, 332
— — wealth, ii. 327-330
— sympathy. See Sociability
— philosophy. See Sociology
— statics. See Statics
— variations. See Variations
— progress. See Progress
— classification. See Classification

Socialism, i. 122; ii. 319, 327; iii. 522; iv. 284

Socinus, iii. 465. See Deism

Sociocracy, i. 327, 500, 608; ii. 104, 386; iv. 58

Sociology, i. 274, 327; iv. 80-145
— scheme of, iv. 141

Sociology, the term, i. 326, 383
— i. 27, 326, 506; ii. 358; iii. 8-15; iv. 175, 201, 558, 605
— history of, iii. 258, 428, 483, 503, 537, 539; iv. 506, 508

Socrates, iii. 288

Solar system, i. 421; ii. 28; iii. 505; iv. 186

Solidarity, i. 105, 293; ii. 63, 293, 329; iii. 218-219; iv. 27-31

Solomon, iv. 128

Sophocles, iii. 239; iv. 483

Soul, i. 476, 566, 580-585; ii. 356; iv. 93-95. See Brain

Sovereignty of the People. See People

Space, i. 397; iv. 47

Spain, ancient, iii. 320, 402
— modern, i. 67; iii. 449, 465, 486
— future, i. 309, 313; iv. 226, 422-427

Spallanzani, iv. 645

Sparta, iii. 252

Specialism, i. 270, 339, 386; ii. 550, 568; iv. 170-176, 337
— progress of, i. 375, 457-463; iii. 484, 507

Species, i. 470; iii. 103, 138. See Permanence

Speech, i. 233, 514; ii. 192-197; iii. 109; iv. 229. See Language

Spinal cord, iv. 209

Spiritual power, i. 269;
ii. 252-262, 288-300; iv. 63-67, 620
— need of, i. 60, 293; iv. 41, 623
— history of, ii. 91, 96, 165-178, 342-356, 360-370, 458; iv. 522

Spiritualism, i. 24, 281; ii. 29;
iii. 433; iv. 464

Sponsors, iv. 110

Sperner, i. 653, 657, 582, 685, 591; iv. 648

Squire, ii. 170. See Knight, Page

Staël, Madame de, iv. 44, 559

Stag, the, i. 495

Stages of intellectual progress, i. 25, 505; iii. 23-33; iv. 157, 547, 572, 590
— of Active Progress, i. 27, 507;
iii. 44-55; iv. 157, 572
— of Moral Progress, i. 273-275;
iii. 55-58; iv. 157

Stahl, i. 441, 459

State, the, i. 241, 277-280; iv. 126, 285. See City
— history of, i. 168, 166, 216, 292, 299, 306, 403, 443

Statism, the term, i. 396;
— Social, i. 10-15, 200, 276; iv. 1

Stipends, public, ii. 333; iv. 303

Stoics, i. 288-289, 341, 360

Strokes, i. 133; iv. 291, 365

Structure, the term, i. 523; ii. 277. See Activity, Function

Style, i. 228-235; ii. 210; iv. 103

Subjective Principle, i. 16, 258;
ii. 11-37, 43-53; iv. 18
— Method, i. 29, 339, 361; iv. 17, 149
— Synthesis, i. 265, 384;
ii. 58-66, 316-318
— Life, i. 276-278;
ii. 54, 103, 294-300; iii. 152, 372; iv. 89-95. See Immortality
— and objective, i. 355-368;
ii. 2-3; iv. 200-206
— beings, iv. 47, 153
— of theology, iii. 136-162, 365, 370, 400
— media, iv. 153
— generality, ii. 271; iv. 156, 181

Subjectivity, i. 361; iii. 20, 103; iv. 17-23

Submission, i. 21, 335, 343;
ii. 29-31, 381; iv. 34. See Obedience, Order

Suffrage, ii. 375; iv. 342. See Election

Suicide, iii. 381; iv. 115, 292

Supreme Being. See Humanity

Surgeons, ii. 355; iv. 66. See Medicine, Pathology, Veterinary

Sweden, i. 87, 309; iv. 432

Sympathy, instincts of, i. 73-80, 566-570; ii. 14-17; iv. 42-68
— social, i. 74; iv. 46, 316; iv. 49. See Benevolence
— training of, i. 79; ii. 300-306;
iv. 81, 254, 267
INDEX.

Symmetry. See Logic of Feeling. 228-235; i. 62, 30, 32, 33, 34;
ii. 79, 100; iv. 149.

Synergy. i. 588; ii. 66, 316, 380;
iv. 35, 50-51.

Synthesis, nature of. i. 6, 256, 257; ii. 5-11. See Religion.

— Positive. ii. 28-29;
ii. 58, 68, 38, 300; iv. 1-26.

— Subjective. i. 361. See Subjective.

— Objective, i. 369. See Objective.

— Absolute. i. 383. See Absolute.

— Relative, i. 306; iv. 358-359.

See Relativity.

— of Science. i. 266, 263-265.

— of concrete sciences. i. 349; iv. 151.

See Concrete.

— of human nature. i. 580, 585, 592.

See Problem.

— Primitive. ii. 76-76; ii. 72-81; iv. 36-41.

— Theological. i. 7; ii. 76-80;
ii. 24-30.

— Catholic. i. 68; ii. 89-94;
ii. 353-355.

— Metaphysical. i. 434, 444, 459;

— Partial. iii. 424, 424, 425; iv. 12-14, 464.

System, the term. i. 23; ii. 241. See Synthesis.

T A B L E of Cerebral Functions. i. 595.

— Sociological, i. 141.

— the Calendar, iv. 348.

— Library, iv. 483.

Taboo. iii. 201.

Tactus. iii. 335, 347; iv. 485.

Tartar. i. 315; iv. 444.

Tasso. i. 406; iv. 483.

Taverns. i. 156; iv. 277.

Taxation. i. 128; iii. 466; iv. 301-306.

Taxonomy. i. 483, 529; iv. 178, 193.

See Classification.

Telegraph, the. iv. 415.

Temperance. See Continence, Sobriety.

Templars, Knights, iii. 439, 486.

Temples of Humanity, iv. 138, 223.

Temporal Power, i. 297; ii. 284, 285, 277; iv. 367-376.


— or genius of. i. 248-249.

— of the Popes, i. 599, 453; ii. 419.

Tenancy. i. 237, 334; ii. 122; iv. 295.

TRA.

Tenderness. i. 189, 205, 206;
ii. 97, 106, 172; iii. 381; iv. 247.

Ternary Series. i. 467; ii. 353.


Testamentary Liberty. i. 168, 380;
iv. 291, 407.

Thales referred to. i. 465, 471;
ii. 49, 298; iii. 437; iv. 181.

— Estimate of. i. 288-288, 281;
iv. 138.

Theatre, the. i. 244; iii. 236, 244, 246;
iv. 376, 284.

Theism, i. 321; iii. 67, 75; iv. 247.

See Deism, God, Theology.

— History of. i. 341, 359, 465, 496.

Themistocles. i. 230-232; iii. 128.

See Salamis.

Theocracy, meaning of. ii. 81;
iii. 131, 165.

— History of. ii. 87, 292, 293;
iii. 179-179, 292-293.

— Relation to Positivism. iv. 11, 177, 607.

Theocritus. iv. 483.

Theodic, iii. 394.

Theodosius, iii. 391; iv. 326.

Theological stage. i. 26; ii. 24-30.

— synthesis, i. 7, 320; ii. 87;


Theologian, the term. ii. 76-80;
iii. 30-32, 38-38; iv. 37.

Theology, i. 13; 320; ii. 70-80;
iv. 20, 483. See God.

— history of. See God, idea of.

Theory and Practice. i. 259.

— iii. 1-4, 45, 174; iv. 122, 637. See Generality.

Theresa, Saint. iii. 461.

Thermology, i. 424, 428. See Heat.

Thermopile, i. 332; iii. 28; See Salamis.

Thought. See Brain, Intellect, Logic.

Three, the number. iii. 107; iv. 15.

— stages. See Stages.

— squares, law of. iii. 262.

Thrift, i. 156; ii. 134-145;
iv. 290-296.

Thucydides, iii. 262; iv. 485.

Thursday, Festival of. i. 124, 133.

Tiberius. iii. 333.

Tithes, iv. 483.

Tides, theory of. i. 416; iii. 480-483.

— use of. iii. 313.

Tissue, biological. i. 523-525;
ii. 234, 240; iv. 193. See Cellular.

Town, and Country. ii. 266; iii. 439;
iv. 295, 297, 213.

Trade-Unions. i. 134; ii. 523;
iv. 291, 365.
INDEX.

TRA
Trajan, ii. 386; iii. 333, 347, 396; iv. 128
Transcendental Analysis, i. 392, 482
Transformation of Nature, ii. 311
Trinity, the, iii. 366, 387; iv. 446
Triumvirate, the future, iv. 301, 388-405
Tronbadours, i. 187, 238; ii. 125; iii. 374, 395
Tudor dynasty, iii. 474
Turgot, iii. 599-603; iv. 399
Turkey, i. 316; iv. 410, 442
Turks, the, iii. 477
Type, the complete, ii. 282-289, 377; iv. 10, 29
— use of, ii. 366, 385; iv. 28, 193, 201

UGOLINO, i. 561
Ulysses, iii. 226
United States, i. 67, 313; iii. 502; iv. 403, 430, 452
Unity, ii. 11-17, 24-34. See Humanity, Synthesis
— the end, i. 257, 316-321
— iv. 376-382; iii. 8; iv. 309-314
Universal Education, i. 137; iii. 173; iv. 229
— Language, ii. 220, 382; iv. 66, 85, 230, 419
— Religion, i. 313-321; iv. 458-459
University, the term, i. 355, 409; ii. 483; iv. 187
Universities, rise of, iii. 412
— suppression of, i. 97, 342; iii. 514; iv. 338-340
University system, i. 137; iii. 412, 617; iv. 337
Uranus, i. 414
Urge, See Town
Utopians, use of, iv. 239-245, 266. See Hypothesis.

VANITY, i. 566; ii. 138, 247, 342; iii. 380; iv. 282, 290
Variation, philosophical, i. 23, 268, 357; ii. 33-42; iv. 143, 155

WES
Variation, cosmological, i. 372; ii. 360; iv. 164
— biological, i. 479; 501-518; iv. 194-199
— social, ii. 346-350; iii. 8-14
— theory of, ii. 350-366; iii. 35-58
— limits of, ii. 366-376; iii. 58-64
— course of, ii. 376-382
Vasco da Gama, iii. 463; iv. 405
Vaucouleurs, iv. 134
Vauvenargues, iii. 504; iv. 483
Vegetal life, i. 474-482; iv. 193, 210
Veneracion, i. 566; ii. 14, 156, 316; iv. 260
— growth of, iii. 47, 160, 197, 212, 298, 378
Venice, iii. 455
Venus, planet, iii. 96
Verification, i. 406; ii. 310; iii. 21; iv. 185. See Hypothesis
Veterinary surgeons, ii. 356; iv. 381
Vieus, iv. 192, 223
Vico, i. 512; iii. 504
Vico-d’Asyr, iii. 507; iv. 445
Virgil, i. 236; iv. 60, 315, 392; iv. 483
Virgin Mary, i. 285; ii. 106
— worship of, iii. 408, 470; iv. 129, 367
— mother, iv. 60, 122, 240, 245
Vital influence, on Society, ii. 367. See Biology
— on Mind, ii. 313
Vitality, i. 475; ii. 313; iii. 73, 191, 297; iv. 192, 446
Vocal organs, i. 512; ii. 192-197. See Speech
Volney, iv. 685
Voltaire, referred to, i. 58, 213; ii. 514
— estimate of, ii. 496, 505, 608, 611; iv. 483, 485, 507

WAGES, i. 153; ii. 332, 355; iv. 297
Wallis, i. 393
War. See Military
Water, analysis of, i. 450; iii. 506
Waterloo, ii. 521; iv. 345
Watt, iii. 509; iv. 134
Wealth, theory of, i. 320-338; iv. 69. See Capital
— power of, i. 228. See Material
— abuses of, ii. 319; iv. 289. See Property, Rich
Week, the, ii. 108; iv. 116, 120
Weight, i. 423-428; iii. 505; iv. 190
West, the term, iv. 23, 312
— the, nature of, i. 63-68, 310
— formation of, ii. 109; iii. 403-409; iv. 281
WORKS ON
MENTAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.


VOL. I. GENERAL VIEW of POSITIVISM and INTRODUCTORY PRINCIPLES. Translated by J. H. Barnes, M.B. formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 8vo. price 21s.

VOL. II. The SOCIAL STATICS, or the ABSTRACT LAWS of HUMAN ORDER. Translated by FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A. 8vo. price 14s.

VOL. III. The SOCIAL DYNAMICS, or the GENERAL LAWS of HUMAN PROGRESS (the Philosophy of History). Translated by Professor BARNBY, M.A. 8vo. price 21s.

VOL. IV. The THEORY of the FUTURE of MAN. Translated by RICHARD CONGREVE, M.D. with an Appendix, containing Comte's Early Essays, translated by H. D. Hutton, B.A. 8vo. price 24s.

ORDER and PROGRESS. Part I. Thoughts on Government; Part II. Studies of Political Crisis. By FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A. of Lincoln's Inn. 8vo. price 14s.

"We find from this book—a large part, and by far the more valuable part, of which is new—that Mr. Harrison has devoted careful attention to what we shall call the constructive problems of political science. Whoever has mistaken him for a commonplace Radical, either of the Chartist or Trades Unionist type, has been wrong.... The best political thinkers for a quarter of a century or upwards have more or less vaguely felt that one grand problem they had to solve was how our governing apparatus may be made to yield good government; but we are not aware that any writer has looked it more fully in the face, or more carefully scanned it with a view to solution, than Mr. Harrison." LITERARY WORLD.

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. By ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE. Translated by HENRY REYNES, Esq. Two vols. crown 8vo. 16s.

On REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. By JOHN STUART MILL. Crown 8vo. 2s.

On LIBERTY. By JOHN STUART MILL. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. Crown 8vo. 1s. 4d.

PRINCIPLES of POLITICAL ECONOMY. By JOHN STUART MILL. 2 vols. 8vo. 32s. Or in One volume, crown 8vo. 6s.

ESSAYS on SOME UNSETTLED QUESTIONS of POLITICAL ECONOMY. By JOHN STUART MILL. 8vo. 6s. 6d.

UTILITARIANISM. By JOHN STUART MILL. 8vo. 5s.

A SYSTEM of LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE and INDUCTIVE. By JOHN STUART MILL. 2 vols. 8vo. 25s.

EXAMINATION of SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By JOHN STUART MILL. 8vo. 16s.

DISSERTATIONS and DISCUSSIONS. By JOHN STUART MILL. 4 vols. 8vo. price £2. 6s. 6d.

ANALYSIS of the PHENOMENA of the HUMAN MIND. By JAMES MILL. With Notes, Illustrative and Critical. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s.

CHURCH and STATE; their Relations Historically Developed. By H. GERFFKEN, Prof. of International Law in the University of Strasburgh. Translated, with the Author's assistance, by E. F. TAYLOR. 2 vols. 8vo. 42s.
OUTLINES of CIVIL PROCEDURE; a General View of the Supreme Court of Judicature and of the whole Practice in the Common Law and Chancery Divisions. By E. S. Roscón, Barrister-at-Law. 12mo. 3s. 6d.

The INSTITUTES of JUSTINIAN; with English Introduction, Translation, and Notes. By T. C. Sandars, M.A. 8vo. 18s.

LORD BACON’S WORKS, Collected and Edited by R. L. Ellis, M.A. J. Spedding, M.A. and D. D. Heath. 7 vols. 8vo. £3. 13s. 6d.

LETTERS and LIFE of FRANCIS BACON, including all his Occasional Works. Collected and edited, with a Commentary, by J. Spedding, M.A. 7 vols. 8vo. £4. 4s.

BACON’S ESSAYS, with Annotations. By R. Whately, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

ELEMENTS of LOGIC. By R. Whately, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

ELEMENTS of RHETORIC. By R. Whately, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS. By the Rev. T. P. Kirkman, F.R.S. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

The SENSES and the INTELLECT. By A. Bain, LL.D. 8vo. 15s.

The EMOTIONS and the WILL. By A. Bain, LL.D. 8vo. 15s.

MENTAL and MORAL SCIENCE; a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics. By A. Bain, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. Or separately, Part I. Mental Science, 6s. 6d. Part II. Moral Science, 4s. 6d.

On the INFLUENCE of AUTHORITY in MATTERS of OPINION. By the late Sir G. C. Lewis, Bart. 8vo. 14s.

HUME’S TREATISE on HUMAN NATURE. Edited, with Notes, &c. by T. H. Green, M.A. and the Rev. T. H. Grose, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s.

HUME’S ESSAYS, MORAL POLITICAL, and LITERARY. By the same Editors. 2 vols 8vo. 28s.

* * * The above form a complete and uniform Edition of Hume’s Philosophical Works.

MISCELLANEOUS and POSTHUMOUS WORKS of the late Henry Thomas Buckle. Edited, with a Biographical Notice, by Helen Taylor. 3 vols. 8vo. £2. 12s. 6d.

SHORT STUDIES on GREAT SUBJECTS. By J. A. Froude, M.A. formerly Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford.

Cabinet Edition, 3 vols, crown 8vo. 12s.
Third Series, demy 8vo. 12s.

London, LONGMANS & CO.
MARCH 1877

CLASSIFIED LISTS OF BOOKS

(NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS)

IN

MISCELLANEOUS

AND

GENERAL LITERATURE

FOLLOWED BY

AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX UNDER AUTHORS' NAMES

London
Longmans, Green & Co.
Paternoster Row
1877.
ANCIENT HISTORICAL EPOCHS.

Now in course of publication, uniform with Epochs of Modern History, each volume complete in itself,

EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY:

A Series of Books Narrating the History of Greece and Rome and of their Relations to other Countries at Successive Epochs.


'The special purpose for which these manuals are intended, they will, we should think, admirably serve. Their clearness as narratives will make them acceptable to the schoolboy as well as to the teacher; and their critical acumen will commend them to the use of the more advanced student who is not only getting up, but trying to understand and appreciate, his Herodorus and Tzucy-

dras. As for the general plan of the series of which they form part, we must confess, without wishing to draw comparisons for which we should be sorry to have to examine all the materials, that it strikes us as decidedly sensible. For the beginner, at all events, the most instructive, as it is the easiest and most natural, way of studying history is to study it by periods; and with regard to earlier Greek and Roman history at all events, there is no serious obstacle in the way of his being enabled to do so, since here period and what has come to be quasi-technically called subject frequently coincide, and form what may fairly be called an Epoch of Ancient History.'

SUNDAY REVIEW.

The GREEKS and the PERSIANS. By the Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A. late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford; Joint-Editor of the Series. With 4 Coloured Maps. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

The EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE. From the Assassination of Julius Caesar to the Assassination of Domitian. By the Rev. W. WOLFE CALVE, M.A. Reader of Ancient History in the University of Oxford. With 2 Coloured Maps. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

ROME to its CAPTURE by the GAULS. By Wilhelm Ihne. 'Author of History of Rome.' With a Coloured Map. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

The ATHENIAN EMPIRE from the FLIGHT of XERXES to the FALL of ATHENS. By the Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A. late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford; Joint-Editor of the Series. With 4 Maps. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

The ROMAN TRIKUVIRATES. By the Very Rev. Charles Merivale, D.D. Dean of Ely; Author of 'History of the Romans under the Empire.' With a Coloured Map. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

The ROMAN EMPIRE of the SECOND CENTURY, or the AGE of the ANTONINES. By the Rev. W. WOLFE CALVE, M.A. Reader of Ancient History in the University of Oxford. With 3 Coloured Maps. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

The RISE of the MACEDONIAN EMPIRE. By Arthur M. Curtis, M.A. formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, and late Assistant-Master in Sherborne School. With 8 Maps. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

The GRACCHI, MARIUS, and SULLA. By A. H. Beesly, M.A. Assistant-Master, Marlborough College. With 2 Maps. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

ROME and CARTHAGE, the PUNIC WARS. By E. Bosworth Smith, M.A. Assistant-Master, Harrow School. [In the press.

SPARTAN and THRACIAN SUPREMACY. By Charles Sankey, M.A. late Scholar of Queen's College, Oxford; Assistant-Master, Marlborough College; Joint-Editor of the Series. [In the press.

London, LONGMANS & CO.
GENERAL LIST OF WORKS

PUBLISHED BY

MESSRS. LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ArTs, Manufactures, &amp;c.</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AstronomY &amp; Meteorology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biographical Works.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry &amp; Physiology</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictionaries &amp; other Books of Reference</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts &amp; Illustrated Editions.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History, Politics, Historical Memoirs, &amp;c.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>25 to 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental &amp; Political Philosophy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous &amp; Critical Works</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural History &amp; Physical Science</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poetry &amp; the Drama</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious &amp; Moral Works</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Sports, Horse &amp; Cattle Management, &amp;c.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travels, Voyages, &amp;c.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works of Fiction</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works of Utility &amp; General Information</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HISTORY, POLITICS, HISTORICAL MEMOIRS, &c.

Sketches of Ottoman History. By the Very Rev. R. W. Church, Dean of St. Paul’s. 1 vol. crown 8vo. [Nearly ready.]


The History of England from the Accession of James II. By the Right Hon. Lord Macaulay.

Student’s Edition, 2 vols. cr. 8vo. 12s.
People’s Edition, 4 vols. cr. 8vo. 16s.
Cabinet Edition, 8 vols. post 8vo. 48s.

Critical and Historical Essays contributed to the Edinburgh Review. By the Right Hon. Lord Macaulay.

Cheap Edition, crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.
Student’s Edition, crown 8vo. 6s.
People’s Edition, 2 vols. crown 8vo. 8s.

Lord Macaulay’s Works. Complete and uniform Library Edition. Edited by his Sister, Lady Trevelyan. 8 vols. 8vo. with Portrait, £5. 5s.

The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century. By J. A. Froude, M.A. 3 vols. 8vo. £2. 3s.


Introductory Lectures on Modern History delivered in Lent Term 1842; with the Inaugural Lecture delivered in December 1841. By the late Rev. T. Arnold, D.D. 8vo. price 7s. 6d.


Lectures on the History of England from the Earliest Time to the Death of King Edward II. By W. Longman, F.S.A. Maps and Illustrations. 8vo. 15s.


The Personal Government of Charles I. from the Death of Buckingham to the Declaration of the Judges in favour of Ship Money, 1623-1637. By S. R. Gardiner, late Student of Ch. Ch. 2 vols. 8vo. [In the press.]

Popular History of France, from the Earliest Times to the Death of Louis XIV. By Elizabeth M. Sewell. With 8 Maps. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.


Indian Polity; a View of the System of Administration in India. By Lieut.-Col. G. Chesney. 2nd Edition, revised, with Map. 8vo. 21s.

Essays in Modern Military Biography. By Col. C. C. Chesney, R.E. 8vo. 12s. 6d.


General Hist. of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great; with a Sketch of the Subsequent History to the Present Time. By the Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A. Crown 8vo. with Maps, 7s. 6d.

General History of Rome from the Foundation of the City to the Fall of Augustus, B.C. 753–A.D. 476. By Dean Merivale, D.D. Crown 8vo. Maps, 7s. 6d.

History of the Romans under the Empire. By Dean Merivale, D.D. 8 vols. post 8vo. 48s.

The Fall of the Roman Republic; a Short History of the Last Century of the Commonwealth. By Dean Merivale, D.D. 12mo. 7s. 6d.


The Sixth Oriental Monarchy; or, the Geography, History, and Antiquities of Parthia. By G. Rawlinson, M.A. With Maps and Illustrations. 8vo. 16s.

The Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy; or, a History of the Sasanians. By G. Rawlinson, M.A. With Map and 95 Illustrations. 8vo. 28s.

Encyclopaedia of Chronology, Historical and Biographical; comprising the Dates of all the Great Events of History, including Treaties, Alliances, Wars, Battles, &c. By B. B. Woodward, B.A. and W. L. R. Cates. 8vo. 42s.


The Native Races of the Pacific States of North America. By H. H. Bancroft. 5 vols. 8vo. £6. 5s.

Introduction to the Science of Religion. Four Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution; with Two Essays on False Analogies and the Philosophy of Mythology. By Max Müller, M.A. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Zeller’s Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Translated by the Rev. O. J. Reichen, M.A. Cr. 8vo. 14s.


Zeller’s Plato & the Older Academy. Translated by S. Frances Alleyn and Alfred Goodwin, B.A. Crown 8vo. 18s.


The Childhood of the English Nation; or, the Beginnings of English History. By Ella S. Armitage. Fcp. Svo. 21. 6d.

Epochs of Modern History. Edited by E. E. Morris, M.A. J. S. Phillipotts, B.C.L. and C. Colbeck, M.A. Eleven volumes now published, each complete in itself, in fcp. Svo. with Maps & Index:—
Cox’s Crusades, 21. 6d.
Creighton’s Age of Elizabeth, 21. 6d.
Gairdner’s Houses of Lancaster and York, 21. 6d.
Gardiner’s Puritan Revolution, 21. 6d.
Gardiner’s Thirty Years’ War, 21. 6d.
Hale’s Fall of the Stuarts, 21. 6d.
Ludlow’s War of American Independence, 21. 6d.
Morris’s Age of Anne, 21. 6d.
Seebohm’s Protestant Revolution, price 21. 6d.
Stubb’s Early Plantagenets, 21. 6d.
Warburton’s Edward III. 21. 6d.
*a* Other Epochs in preparation, in continuation of the Series.

The Student’s Manual of Modern History; containing the Rise and Progress of the Principal European Nations. By W. Cooke Taylor, LL.D. Crown Svo. 7s. 6d.

The Student’s Manual of Ancient History; containing the Political, Historical, Geographical Position, and Social State of the Principal Nations of Antiquity. By W. Cooke Taylor, LL.D. Crown Svo. 7s. 6d.

Epochs of Ancient History. Edited by the Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A. and by C. Sankey, M.A. Ten volumes, each complete in itself, in fcp. Svo. with Maps & Index:—
Beesly’s Gracchi, Marius & Sulla, 21. 6d.
Cape’s Age of the Antonines, 21. 6d.
Cape’s Early Roman Empire, 21. 6d.
Cox’s Athenian Empire, 21. 6d.
Cox’s Greeks & Persians, 21. 6d.
Currie’s Macedonian Empire, 21. 6d.
Ihne’s Rome to its Capture by the Gauls, 21. 6d.
Merivale’s Roman Triumvirates, 21. 6d.
Sankey’s Spartan & Theban Supremacy. [In the press.
Smith’s Rome & Carthage, the Punic Wars. [In the press.

BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS.


The Life of Sir William Fairbairn, Bart. F.R.S. Partly written by himself; edited and completed by W. Pole, F.R.S. 8vo. Portrait, 18s.

Arthur Schopenhauer, his Life and his Philosophy. By Helen Zimmern. Post 8vo. Portrait, 7s. 6d.


The Life and Letters of Mozart. Translated from the German Biography of Dr. Ludwig Nohl by Lady Wallace. 2 vols. post 8vo. with Two Portraits. [Nearly ready.

Felix Mendelssohn’s Letters from Italy and Switzerland, and Letters from 1833 to 1847. Translated by Lady Wallace. With Portrait. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 5s. each.

Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Isaac Casaubon, 1559-1614. By MARK PATTISON, Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. 8vo. 15s.


Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland; Swift, Flood, Grattan, O'Connell. By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography. By the Right Hon. Sir J. STEPHEN, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Dictionary of General Biography; containing Concise Memoirs and Notices of the most Eminent Persons of all Ages and Countries. By W. L. R. CATES. 8vo. 25s.


Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B. By JOHN CLARK MARSHMAN. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.


Maunder's Biographical Treasury. Latest Edition, reconstructed and partly re-written, with above 1,600 additional Memoirs, by W. L. R. CATES. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

MENTAL and POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Comte's System of Positive Polity, or Treatise upon Sociology. Translated from the Paris Edition of 1851-1854, and furnished with Analytical Tables of Contents:—


Vol. II. The Social Statics, or the Abstract Laws of Human Order. Translated by FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A. 8vo. price 14s.

Vol. III. The Social Dynamics, or the General Laws of Human Progress (the Philosophy of History). Translated by Professor BEESLY, M.A. 8vo. 21s.


Democracy in America. By ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. Translated by HENRY REEVES, Esq. Two vols. crown 8vo. 16s.


Essays on some Theological Controversies of the Time. By HENRY ROGERS. Crown 8vo. 6s.

On Representative Government. By JOHN STUART MILL. Crown 8vo. 2s.

On Liberty. By JOHN STUART MILL. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. crown 8vo. 1s. 4d.

Principles of Political Economy. By JOHN STUART MILL. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s. or 1 vol. crown 8vo. 5s.

Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy. By JOHN STUART MILL. 8vo. 6s. 6d.

Utilitarianism. By JOHN STUART MILL. 8vo. 5s.
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. By John Stuart Mill. 2 vols. 8vo. 25s.

Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. 16s.

Dissertations and Discussions. By John Stuart Mill. 4 vols. 8vo. price £2. 6s. 6d.


The Law of Nations considered as Independent Political Communities; the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War. By Sir Travers Twiss, D.C.L. 8vo. 21s.

Church and State; their Relations Historically Developed. By H. Gerecke, Prof. of International Law in the Univ. of Strasburg. Translated, with the Author's assistance, by E. F. Taylor. 2 vols. 8vo. 42s.


A Primer of the English Constitution and Government. By S. Amos, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Outlines of Civil Procedure; a General View of the Supreme Court of Judicature and of the whole Practice in the Common Law and Chancery Divisions. By E. S. Roscoe, Barrister-at-Law. 12mo. 5s. 6d.


The Institutes of Justinian; with English Introduction, Translation, and Notes. By T. C. Sandars, M.A. 8vo. 18s.


Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, including all his Occasional Works. Collected and edited, with a Commentary, by J. Speeding. 7 vol. 8vo. £4. 4s.

The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, newly translated into English by R. Williams, B.A. Second Edition, thoroughly revised. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Aristotle's Politics, Books I. III. IV. (VII.) the Greek Text of Bekker, with an English Translation by W. E. Bolland, M.A. and Short Introductory Essays by A. Lang, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

The Politics of Aristotle; Greek Text, with English Notes. By Richard Congreve, M.A. 8vo. 18s.

The Ethics of Aristotle; with Essays and Notes. By Sir A. Grant, Bart. M.A. LL.D. 2 vols. 8vo. 32s.

Bacon's Essays, with Annotations. By R. Whately, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Picture Logic; an Attempt to Popularise the Science of Reasoning. By A. Swinburne, B.A. Fep. 8vo. price 5s.

Elements of Logic. By R. Whately, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Crown 8vo. 4½. 6d.

Elements of Rhetoric. By R. Whately, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Crown 8vo. 4½. 6d.
An Introduction to Mental Philosophy, on the Inductive Method. By J. D. Morell, LL.D. 8vo. 12s.

Philosophy without Assumptions. By the Rev. T. P. Kirkman, F.R.S. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

The Senses and the Intellect. By A. Bain, LL.D. 8vo. 15s.

The Emotions and the Will. By A. Bain, LL.D. 8vo. 15s.

Mental and Moral Science: a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics. By A. Bain, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. Or separately, Part I. Mental Science, 6s. 6d. Part II. Moral Science, 4s. 6d.


On the Influence in Matters of Authority. By the late Sir. G. C. Lewis, Bart. 8vo. 14s.


Hume's Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. By the same Editors. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s.

"*" The above form a complete and uniform Edition of Hume's Philosophical Works.

Miscellaneous and Critical Works.

Selections from the Writings of Lord Macaulay. Edited, with occasional explanatory Notes, by G. O. Trevelyan, M.P. Cr. 8vo. 6s.


Speeches of the Right Hon. Lord Macaulay, corrected by Himself. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

The Rev. Sydney Smith's Essays contributed to the Edinburgh Review. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. sewed, 3s. 6d. cloth.

The Wit and Wisdom of the Rev. Sydney Smith. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works of the late Henry Thomas Buckle. Edited, with a Biographical Notice, by Helen Taylor. 3 vols. 8vo. £2. 12s. 6d.

Short Studies on Great Subjects. By J. A. Froude, M.A.


Manual of English Literature, Historical and Critical. By T. Arnold, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

German Home Life; a Series of Essays on the Domestic Life of Germany. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Miscellaneous Works of Thomas Arnold, D.D. late Head Master of Rugby School. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Realities of Irish Life. By W. Stewart Trench. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. sewed, or 3s. 6d. cloth.
Lectures on the Science of Language. By F. Max Müller, M.A. &c. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 16s.

Chips from a German Workshop; Essays on the Science of Religion, and on Mythology, Traditions & Customs. By F. Max Müller, M.A. 4 vols. 8vo. £2. 15s.


Families of Speech. Four Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution. By F. W. Farrar, D.D. Crown 8vo. 3l. 6d.

Apparitions; a Narrative of Facts. By the Rev. B. W. Savile, M.A. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Miscellaneous Writings of John Conington, M.A. Edited by J. A. Symonds, M.A. With a Memoir by H. J. S. Smith, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s.


Recreations of a Country Parson, Two Series. 3l. 6d. each.

Landscapes, Churches, and Morals, price 3l. 6d.

Seaside Musings, 3l. 6d.

Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths, 3l. 6d.

Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit, 3l. 6d.

Lessons of Middle Age, 3l. 6d.

Leisure Hours in Town, 3l. 6d.

Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson, price 3l. 6d.

Sunday Afternoons at the Parish Church of a University City, 3l. 6d.

The Commonplace Philosopher in Town and Country, 3l. 6d.

Present-Day Thoughts, 3l. 6d.

Critical Essays of a Country Parson, price 3l. 6d.

The Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson, Three Series, 3l. 6d. each.

**DICTIONARIES and OTHER BOOKS of REFERENCE.**


Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases, classified and arranged so as to facilitate the expression of Ideas, and assist in Literary Composition. By P. M. Roget, M.D. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

English Synonymes. By E. J. Whately. Edited by R. Whately, D.D. Fcp. 8vo. 3l.

Handbook of the English Language. For the Use of Students of the Universities and the Higher Classes in Schools. By R. G. Latham, M.A. M.D. Crown 8vo. 6s.

A Practical Dictionary of the French and English Languages. By Léon Contanseau, many years French Examiner for Military and Civil Appointments, &c. Post 8vo. price 7l. 6d.

Contanseau’s Pocket Dictionary, French and English, abridged from the Practical Dictionary by the Author. Square 18mo. 3l. 6d.
NEW WORKS published by LONGMANS & CO. 9

A New Pocket Dictionary of the German and English Languages. By F. W. Longman,
Balliol College, Oxford. Square 18mo. price 5½.

A Practical Dictionary of the German Language; German-English and English-German. By
Rev. W. L. Blackley, M.A. and Dr. C. M. Friedländer. Post 8vo. 7½. 6d.

A Dictionary of Roman and Greek Antiquities. With 2,000 Woodcuts illustrative of the Arts

Dean of Rochester. Crown 4to. 3½.

A Lexicon, Greek and English, abridged for Schools from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English
Lexicon. Square 12mo. 7½.

An English-Greek Lexicon, containing all the Greek Words used by Writers of good authority. By
C. D. Yonge, M.A. 4to. 2½.

Mr. Yonge's Lexicon, English and Greek, abridged from his larger Lexicon. Square 12mo. 8½.


price 12½.

Separately: English-Latin, 5½. 6d.
Latin-English, 7½.

M'Culloch's Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navi-
gation. Edited and corrected to 1876 by H. G. Reid. 8vo. 63½. Second Supplement, price 3½.

A General Dictionary of Geography, Descriptive, Physical, Statistical, and Historical; forming a
8vo. 42½.

Mauder's Treasury of Knowledge and Library of Reference; comprising an English Dictionary
and Grammar, Universal Gazetteer, Classical Dictionary, Chronology, Law Dictionary, Synopsis of the Peerage,
Useful Tables, &c. Fcp. 8vo. 6½.

The Treasury of Bible Knowledge; being a Dictionary of the Books, Persons, Places, Events,
and other Matters of which mention is made in Holy Scripture. By the Rev.
J. Ayre, M.A. With Maps, Plates,
and many Woodcuts. Fcp. 8vo. 6½.

The Public Schools Atlas of Modern Geography, in 31 entirely new Coloured Maps. Edited with an
Introduction by Rev. G. Butler, M.A. In imperial 8vo. or imperial 4to. price 5½. cloth.

The Public Schools Atlas of Ancient Geography, in 28 entirely new Coloured Maps. Edited with an
Introduction by the Rev. G. Butler, M.A. In imperial 8vo. or imperial 4to. price 7½. 6d. cloth.
ASTRONOMY and METEOROLOGY.

The Universe and the Coming Transits; Researches into and New Views respecting the Constitution of the Heavens. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With 22 Charts and 22 Diagrams. 8vo. 16s.


The Transits of Venus; A Popular Account of Past and Coming Transits. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. 20 Plates (12 Coloured) and 27 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d.


The Orbs Around Us; a Series of Essays on the Moon & Planets, Meteors & Comets, the Sun & Coloured Pairs of Suns. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With Chart and Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Other Worlds than Ours; The Plurality of Worlds Studied under the Light of Recent Scientific Researches. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With 14 Illustrations. Cr. 8vo. 10s. 6d.


Dove’s Law of Storms, considered in connexion with the Ordinary Movements of the Atmosphere. Translated by R. H. Scott, M.A. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Air and Rain; the Beginnings of a Chemical Climatology. By R. A. Smith, F.R.S. 8vo. 24s.

Air and its Relations to Life, 1774–1874; a Course of Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain. By W. N. Hartley, F.C.S. With 66 Woodcuts. Small 8vo. 6s.

Schellen’s Spectrum Analysis, in its Application to Terrestrial Substances and the Physical Constitution of the Heavenly Bodies. Translated by Jane and C. Lassell, with Notes by W. Huggins, LL.D. F.R.S. 8vo. Plates and Woodcuts, 52s.
NATURAL HISTORY and PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Professor Helmholtz' Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects. Translated by E. Atkinson, F.C.S. With numerous Wood Engravings. 8vo. 12s. 6d.

On the Sensations of Tone, as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music. By H. Helmholtz, Professor of Physiology in the University of Berlin. Translated by A. J. Ellis, F.R.S. 8vo. 3s.


Weinhold's Introduction to Experimental Physics; including Directions for Constructing Physical Apparatus and for Making Experiments. Translated by B. Loewy, F.R.A.S. With a Preface by G. C. Foster, F.R.S. 8vo. Plates & Woodcuts 311. 6d.


Researches on Diamagnetism and Magne-Crystallic Action; including Diamagnetic Polarity. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. With 6 Plates and many Woodcuts. 8vo. 14s.

Contributions to Molecular Physics in the domain of Radiant Heat. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. With 2 Plates and 31 Woodcuts. 8vo. 16s.


Notes of a Course of Nine Lectures on Light, delivered at the Royal Institution. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Crown 8vo. 12. sewed, or 12. 6d. cloth.

Notes of a Course of Seven Lectures on Electrical Phenomena and Theories, delivered at the Royal Institution. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Crown 8vo. 12. sewed, or 12. 6d. cloth.


Text-Books of Science,
Mechanical and Physical, adapted for the use of Artisans and of Students in Public and Science Schools. Small 8vo. with Woodcuts, &c.

Anderson's Strength of Materials, 3r. 6d.
Armstrong's Organic Chemistry, 3r. 6d.
Barry's Railway Appliances, 3r. 6d.
Bloxam's Metals, 3r. 6d.
Goodacre's Mechanics, 3r. 6d.

— Mechanism, 3r. 6d.
Griffin's Algebra & Trigonometry, 3/6.
Jenkins's Electricity & Magnetism, 3/6.
Maxwell's Theory of Heat, 3r. 6d.
Merrifield's Technical Arithmetic, 3r. 6d.
Miller's Inorganic Chemistry, 3r. 6d.
Preece & Sivewright's Telegraphy, 3/6.
Shelley's Workshop Appliances, 3r. 6d.
Tomé's Structural and Physiological Botany, 6r.

Thorpe's Quantitative Analysis, 4s. 6d.
Thorpe & Muir's Qualitative Analysis, price 3r. 6d.
Tilden's Systematic Chemistry, 3r. 6d.
Unwin's Machine Design, 3r. 6d.

* * Other Text-Books, in continuation of this Series, in active preparation.

The Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of the Vertebrate Animals. By Richard Owen, F.R.S. With 1,472 Woodcuts. 3 vols. 8vo. £3. 13s. 6d.

Kirby and Spence's Introduction to Entomology, or Elements of the Natural History of Insects. Crown 8vo. 5r.

Light Science for Leisure Hours; Familiar Essays on Scientific Subjects, Natural Phenomena, &c. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 7r. 6d. each.

Homes without Hands; a Description of the Habitations of Animals, classed according to their Principle of Construction. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. With about 140 Vignettes on Wood. 8vo. 14r.

Strange Dwellings; a Description of the Habitations of Animals, abridged from 'Homes without Hands.' By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. With Frontispiece and 60 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 7r. 6d.


Insects Abroad; being a Popular Account of Foreign Insects, their Structure, Habits, and Transformations. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. With upwards of 700 Woodcuts. 8vo. 14r.

Out of Doors; a Selection of Original Articles on Practical Natural History. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. With 6 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 7r. 6d.

Bible Animals; a Description of every Living Creature mentioned in the Scriptures, from the Ape to the Coral. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. With 112 Vignettes. 8vo. 14r.

The Polar World: a Popular Description of Man and Nature in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions of the Globe. By Dr. G. Hartwig. With Chromoxylographs, Maps, and Woodcuts. 8vo. 10r. 6d.

The Sea and its Living Wonders. By Dr. G. Hartwig. Fourth Edition, enlarged. 8vo. with numerous Illustrations. 10r. 6d.

The Tropical World. By Dr. G. Hartwig. With about 200 Illustrations. 8vo. 10r. 6d.

The Subterranean World. By Dr. G. Hartwig. With Maps and Woodcuts. 8vo. 10r. 6d.

The Aerial World; a Popular Account of the Phenomena and Life of the Atmosphere. By Dr. G. Hartwig. With Map, 8 Chromoxylographs & 60 Woodcuts. 8vo. 21r.
Maunder’s Treasury of Natural History, or Popular Dictionary of Animated Nature; in which the Zoological Characteristics that distinguish the different Classes, Genera and Species, are combined with a variety of interesting Information illustrative of the Habits, Instincts, and General Economy of the Animal Kingdom. Fcp. 8vo. with 900 Woodcuts, 6r.

A Familiar History of Birds. By E. Stanley, D.D. late Bishop of Norwich. Fcp. 8vo. with Woodcuts, 3r. 6d.


The Primitive World of Switzerland. By Professor Osval Heer, of the University of Zurich. Edited by James Heywood, M.A. F.R.S. President of the Statistical Society. With Map, 19 Plates, & 372 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 8vo. 28r.

The Puzzle of Life and How it Has Been Put Together; a Short History of Vegetable and Animal Life upon the Earth from the Earliest Times; including an Account of Prehistoric Man, his Weapons, Tools, and Works. By A. Nicols, F.R.G.S. With 12 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 5r.


The Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain. By John Evans, F.R.S. With 2 Plates and 476 Woodcuts. 8vo. 28r.

The Elements of Botany for Families and Schools. Eleventh Edition, revised by Thomas Moore, F.L.S. Fcp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 2r. 6d.


A Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art. Re-edited by the late W. T. Brande (the Author), and the Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A. 3 vols. medium 8vo. 63r.


Mr. Hullah’s 2nd Course of Lectures on the Transition Period of Musical History, from the Beginning of the Seventeenth to the Middle of the Eighteenth Century. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. 10r. 6d.

Structural and Physiological Botany. By Otto W. Thomé, Professor of Botany at the School of Science and Art, Cologne. Translated and edited by A. W. Bennett, M.A. B.Sc. F.L.S. Lecturer on Botany at St. Thomas’s Hospital. With about 600 Woodcuts and a Coloured Map. Small 8vo. 6r.

The Treasury of Botany, or Popular Dictionary of the Vegetable Kingdom; with which is incorporated a Glossary of Botanical Terms. Edited by J. Lindley, F.R.S. and T. Moore, F.L.S. With 274 Woodcuts and 20 Steel Plates. Two Parts, fcp. 8vo. 12r.

Loudon’s Encyclopædia of Plants; comprising the Specific Character, Description, Culture, History, &c. of all the Plants found in Great Britain. With upwards of 12,000 Woodcuts. 8vo. 42r.
CHEMISTRY and PHYSIOLOGY.


PART II. INORGANIC CHEMISTRY, 215.


An Introduction to the Study of Chemical Philosophy; or, the Principles of Theoretical and Systematic Chemistry. By W. A. Tilden, F.C.S. Small 8vo. 5s. 6d.

Select Methods in Chemical Analysis, chiefly Inorganic. By Wm. Crookes, F.R.S. With 22 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 12s. 6d.

A Dictionary of Chemistry and the Allied Branches of other Sciences. By Henry Watts, F.C.S. assisted by eminent Scientific and Practical Chemists. 7 vols. medium 8vo. £10. 16s. 6d.

Supplementary Volume, completing the Record of Chemical Discovery to the year 1876. [In preparation.

The FINE ARTS and ILLUSTRATED EDITIONS.


Half-hour Lectures on the History and Practice of the Fine and Ornamental Arts. By W. B. Scott. Cr. 8vo. Woodcuts, 8s. 6d.

A Dictionary of Artists of the English School: Painters, Sculptors, Architects, Engravers, and Ornamentists. By S. Redgrave. 8vo. 16s.


Lord Macaulay’s Lays of Ancient Rome. With 90 Illustrations on Wood from Drawings by G. Scharf. Fcp. 4to. 21s.

Miniature Edition, with G. Scharf’s 90 Illustrations reduced in Lithography. Imp. 16mo. 10s. 6d.
Moore's Lalla Rookh, 
TENNIEL's Edition, with 68 Wood Engravings from Original Drawings. Fcp. 4to. 21s.

Moore's Irish Melodies, 

The New Testament, 
Illustrated with Wood Engravings after the Early Masters, chiefly of the Italian School. Crown 4to. 63s.

Sacred and Legendary 
Art. By MRS. JAMESON. 6 vols. square crown 8vo. price £5. 15s. 6d.

Legends of the Saints and Martyrs. With 19 Etchings and 187 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 31s. 6d.

Legends of the Monastic Orders. With 11 Etchings and 88 Woodcuts. 1 vol. 21s.

Legends of the Madonna. 
With 27 Etchings and 165 Woodcuts. 1 vol. 21s.

The History of our Lord, 
with that of his Types and Precursors. Completed by Lady EASTLAKE. With 13 Etchings and 281 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 42s.

The Three Cathedrals 
dedicated to St. Paul in London; their History from the Foundation of the First Building in the Sixth Century to the Proposals for the Adornment of the Present Cathedral. By W. LONGMAN, F.S.A. With numerous Illustrations. Square crown 8vo. 21s.

The USEFUL ARTS, MANUFACTURES, &c,

The Amateur Mechanics' Practical Handbook; describing the different Tools required in the Workshop, the uses of them, and how to use them. By A. H. G. HOBSON. With 33 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

The Engineer's Valuing Assistant. By H. D. HOUSKOLD, Civil and Mining Engineer, 16 years Mining Engineer to the Dean Forest Iron Company. 8vo. [In the press.


Industrial Chemistry; a Manual for Manufacturers and for Colleges or Technical Schools; a Translation of Stohmann and Engler's German Edition of PAYSÉN'S 'Précis de Chimie Industrielle,' by Dr. J. D. BARRY. With Chapters on the Chemistry of the Metals, by B. H. PAUL, Ph.D. 8vo. Plates & Woodcuts. [In the press.

Gwilt's Encyclopædia of Architecture, with above 1,600 Woodcuts. Revised and extended by W. PAPWORTH. 8vo. 52s. 6d.


Hints on Household Taste in Furniture, Upholstery, and other Details. By C. L. EASTLAKE. With about 90 Illustrations. Square crown 8vo. 14s.


Recent Improvements in the Steam Engine. By J. BOURNE, C.E. Fcp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 6s.
Catechism of the Steam Engine, in its various Applications. By John Bourne, C.E. Fcp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 6s.

Handbook of the Steam Engine. By J. Bourne, C.E. forming a Key to the Author’s Catechism of the Steam Engine. Fcp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 9s.

Encyclopædia of Civil Engineering. Historical, Theoretical, and Practical. By E. Crevy, C.E. With above 3,000 Woodcuts. 8vo. 42s.

Ure’s Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, and Mines. Seventh Edition, re-written and enlarged by R. Hunt, F.R.S. assisted by numerous contributors. With 2,100 Woodcuts. 3 vols. medium 8vo. £3. 5s.

VOL. IV. Supplementary, completing all the Departments of the Dictionary to the beginning of the year 1877, is preparing for publication.

Practical Treatise on Metallurgy. Adapted from the last German Edition of Professor Kerl’s Metallurgy by W. Crookes, F.R.S. &c. and E. Röhrig, Ph.D. 3 vols. 8vo. with 625 Woodcuts. £4. 19s.


Treatise on Mills and Millwork. By Sir W. Fairbairn, Bt. With 18 Plates and 322 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 8vo. 52s.

Useful Information for Engineers. By Sir W. Fairbairn, Bt. With many Plates and Woodcuts. 3 vols. crown 8vo. 31s. 6d.

The Application of Cast and Wrought Iron to Building Purposes. By Sir W. Fairbairn, Bt. With 6 Plates and 118 Woodcuts. 8vo. 16s.


Anthracene; its Constitution, Properties, Manufacture, and Derivatives, including Artificial Alizarin, Anthracopurpur, &c., with their Applications in Dyeing and Printing. By G. Auergach. Translated by W. Crookes, F.R.S. 8vo. 12s.


Loudon’s Encyclopædia of Gardening; comprising the Theory and Practice of Horticulture, Floriculture, Arboriculture, and Landscape Gardening. With 1,000 Woodcuts. 8vo. 21s.

Loudon’s Encyclopædia of Agriculture; comprising the Laying-out, Improvement, and Management of Landed Property, and the Cultivation and Economy of the Productions of Agriculture. With 1,100 Woodcuts. 8vo. 21s.

RELIGIOUS and MORAL WORKS.


An Introduction to the Theology of the Church of England, in an Exposition of the 39 Articles. By T. P. Boulthbee, LL.D. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

Sermons Chiefly on the Interpretation of Scripture. By the late Rev. Thomas Arnold, D.D. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Sermons preached in the Chapel of Rugby School; with an Address before Confirmation. By Thomas Arnold, D.D. Fcp. 8vo. price 3s. 6d.

Christian Life, its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps; Sermons preached mostly in the Chapel of Rugby School. By Thomas Arnold, D.D. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Christian Life, its Hopes, its Fears, and its Close; Sermons preached mostly in the Chapel of Rugby School. By Thomas Arnold, D.D. 8vo. 7s. 6d.


The Primitive and Catholic Faith in Relation to the Church of England. By the Rev. B. W. Savile, M.A. 8vo. 7s.

The Eclipse of Faith; or a Visit to a Religious Sceptic. By Henry Rogers. Latest Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 5s.


Three Essays on Religion: Nature; the Utility of Religion; Theism. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles. By C. J. Ellicott, D.D. 8vo. Galatians, 8s. 6d. Ephesians, 8s. 6d. Pastoral Epistles, 10s. 6d. Philippians, Colossians, & Philémon, 10s. 6d. Thessalonians, 7s. 6d.


Library Edition, with all the Original Illustrations, Maps, Landscapes on Steel, Woodcuts, &c. 2 vols. 4to. 42s.


Student's Edition, revised and condensed, with 46 Illustrations and Maps. 1 vol. crown 8vo. 9s.


The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel; an Historical and Critical Inquiry. By Dr. A. Kuenen, Prof. of Theol. in the Univ. of Leyden. Translated from the Dutch by the Rev. A. Milroy, M.A. with an Introduction by J. Muir, D.C.L. 8vo. 21s.

Mythology among the Hebrews and its Historical Development. By Ignaz Goldziher, Ph.D. Translated by Russell Martineau, M.A. 8vo. 15s.

Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament; with a New Translation. By M. M. Kalisch, Ph.D. Vol. I. Genesis, 8vo. 18s. or adapted for the General Reader, 12s. Vol. II. Exodus, 15s. or adapted for the General Reader, 12s. Vol. III. Leviticus, Part I. 15s. or adapted for the General Reader, 8s. Vol. IV. Leviticus, Part II. 15s. or adapted for the General Reader, 8s.
The History and Literature of the Israelites, according to the Old Testament and the Apocrypha. By C. DE ROTHSCILD & A. DE ROTHSCILD. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 12s. 6d. Abridged Edition, 1 vol. fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Ewald’s History of Israel. Translated from the German by J. E. CARPENTER, M.A. with Preface by R. MARTINEAU, M.A. 5 vols. 8vo. 63s.

Ewald’s Antiquities of Israel. Translated from the German by H. S. SOLLY, M.A. 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Behind the Veil; an Outline of Bible Metaphysics compared with Ancient and Modern Thought. By the Rev. T. GRIFFITH, M.A. Prebendary of St. Paul’s. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

The Trident, the Crescent & the Cross; a View of the Religious History of India during the Hindu, Buddhist, Mohammedan, and Christian Periods. By the Rev. J. VAUGHAN, Nineteen Years Missionary in India. 8vo. 9s. 6d.

The Types of Genesis, briefly considered as revealing the Development of Human Nature. By ANDREW JUKES. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

The Second Death and the Restitution of all Things; with some Preliminary Remarks on the Nature and Inspiration of Holy Scripture. By A. JUKES. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.


Supernatural Religion; an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s.

Commentaries, by the Rev. W. A. O’CONOR, B.A. Rector of St. Simon and St. Jude, Manchester. Epistle to the Romans, crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. Epistle to the Hebrews, 4s. 6d. St. John’s Gospel, 10s. 6d.


Passing Thoughts on Religion. By ELIZABETH M. SEWELL Fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Thoughts for the Age by ELIZABETH M. SEWELL New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Some Questions of the Day. By ELIZABETH M. SEWELL Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Self-examination before Confirmation. By ELIZABETH M. SEWELL. 32mo. 1s. 6d.

Preparation for the Holy Communion; the Devotions chiefly from the works of Jeremy Taylor. By ELIZABETH M. SEWELL. 32mo. 3s.

Bishop Jeremy Taylor’s Entire Works; with Life by Bishop Heber. Revised and corrected by the Rev. C. F. EDEN. 10 vols. £5. 5s.

Hymns of Praise and Prayer. Corrected and edited by Rev. JOHN MARTINEAU, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. 32mo. 1s. 6d.

Spiritual Songs for the Sundays and Holidays throughout the Year. By J. S. B. MONSELL, LL.D. Fcp. 8vo. 5½. 18mo. 2s.

Lyra Germanica; Hymns translated from the German by Miss C. WINKWORTH. Fcp. 8vo. 5½.
TRAVELs, VOYAGES, &c.

A Year in Western France. By M. Betham-Edwards. Crown 8vo. Frontispiece, 10s. 6d.

Journal of a Residence in Vienna and Berlin during the eventful Winter 1805–6. By the late Henry Reeve, M.D. Published by his Son. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.

One Thousand Miles up the Nile; a Journey through Egypt and Nubia to the Second Cataract. By Amelia B. Edwards. With Facsimiles of Inscriptions, Ground Plans, Two Coloured Maps, and 80 Illustrations engraved on Wood from Drawings by the Author. Imperial 8vo. 42s.

The Indian Alps, and How we Crossed Them: a Narrative of Two Years' Residence in the Eastern Himalayas, and Two Months' Tour into the Interior. By a Lady Pioneer. With Illustrations from Original Drawings by the Author. Imperial 8vo. 42s.


Italian Alps; Sketches in the Mountains of Ticeino, Lombardy, the Trentino, and Venetia. By Douglas W. Freshfield. Square crown 8vo. Illustrations, 15s.

Over the Sea and Far Away; a Narrative of a Ramble round the World. By T. W. Hinchliff, M.A. F.R.G.S. President of the Alpine Club. With 14 full-page Illustrations engraved on Wood. Medium 8vo. 21s.


Tyrol and the Tyrolese; an Account of the People and the Land, in their Social, Sporting, and Mountaineering Aspects. By W. A. BAILIE GROHMAN. Crown 8vo. with Illustrations, 14s.

Two Years in Fiji, a Descriptive Narrative of a Residence in the Fijian Group of Islands. By Litton Forbes, M.D. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.

Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas or Somers Islands, from 1615 to 1685. By Major-General J. H. Lefroy, R.A. C.B. F.R.S. &c. Governor of the Bermudas. 8vo, with Map. [In the press.]

Eight Years in Ceylon. By Sir Samuel W. Baker, M.A. Crown 8vo. Woodcuts, 7s. 6d.

The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon. By Sir Samuel W. Baker, M.A. Crown 8vo. Woodcuts, 7s. 6d.

The Alpine Club Map of the Chain of Mont Blanc, from an actual Survey in 1863–1864. By A. Adams-Reilly, F.R.G.S. In Chromolithography, on extra stout drawing paper 10s. or mounted on canvas in a folding case 12s. 6d.

The Alpine Club Map of the Valpelline, the Val Tournanche, and the Southern Valleys of the Chain of Monte Rosa, from actual Survey. By A. Adams-Reilly, F.R.G.S. Price 6s. on extra stout drawing paper, or 7s. 6d. mounted in a folding case.


Guide to the Pyrenees, for the use of Mountaineers. By Charles Packe. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

The Alpine Club Map of Switzerland, with parts of the Neighbouring Countries, on the scale of Four Miles to an Inch. Edited by R. C. Nichols, F.R.G.S. In Four Sheets in Portfolio, price 42s. coloured, or 34s. uncoloured.


The Eastern Alps, 10s. 6d.

Central Alps, including all the Oberland District, 7s. 6d.

Western Alps, including Mont Blanc, Monte Rosa, Zermatt, &c. Price 6s. 6d.

Introduction on Alpine Travelling in general, and on the Geology of the Alps. Price 1s. Either of the Three Volumes or Parts of the *Alpine Guide* may be had with this Introduction prefixed, 1s. extra. The *Alpine Guide* may also be had in Ten separate Parts, or districts, price 2s. 6d. each.

How to see Norway. By J. R. Campbell. Fcp. 8vo. Map & Woodcuts, 5s.

WORKS of FICTION.

The Atelier du Lys; or an Art-Student in the Reign of Terror. By the author of 'Mademoiselle Mori.' Third Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Novels and Tales. By the Right Hon. the Earl of Beaconsfield. Cabinet Editions, complete in Ten Volumes, crown 8vo. 6s. each.

| Lothair, 6s. | Venetia, 6s. |
| Coningsby, 6s. | Alroy, Ixion, &c. 6s. |
| Sybil, 6s. | Young Duke &c. 6s. |
| Tancred, 6s. | Vivian Grey, 6s. |
| Henrietta Temple, 6s. | Contarini Fleming, &c. 6s. |


Higgledy-Piggledy; or, Stories for Everybody and Everybody's Children. By the Right Hon. E. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, M.P. With 9 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Becker's Gallus; or Roman Scenes of the Time of Augustus. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Becker's Charicles: Illustrative of Private Life of the Ancient Greeks. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d.
The Modern Novelist's Library.

Lothair. By the Rt. Hon. the EARL of BEACONSFIELD. Price 2s. boards; or 2s. 6d. cloth.

Atherstone Priory, 2s. boards; 2s. 6d. cloth.

Mile. Mori, 2s. boards; 2s. 6d. cloth.

The Burgomaster's Family, 2s. & 2s. 6d.

MELVILLE'S DIGBY GRAND, 2s. and 2s. 6d.

General Bounce, 2s. & 2s. 6d.

Gladiators, 2s. and 2s. 6d.

Good for Nothing, 2s. & 2s. 6d.

Holmby House, 2s. & 2s. 6d.

Interpreter, 2s. and 2s. 6d.

KATE COVENTRY, 2s. and 2s. 6d.

QUEEN'S MARIES, 2s. & 2s. 6d.

Trollope's Warden, 2s. and 2s. 6d.

Barchester Towers, 2s. & 2s. 6d.

Bramley-Moore's Six Sisters of the Valleys, 2s. boards; 2s. 6d. cloth.

Elsa, a Tale of the Tyrolean Alps. Price 2s. boards; 2s. 6d. cloth.

Unawares, a Story of an old French Town. Price 2s. boards; 2s. 6d. cloth.

The Modern Novelist's Library.

Stories and Tales. By

ELIZABETH M. SEWELL. Cabinet Edition, in Ten Volumes, each containing a complete Tale or Story:—

Amy Herbert, 2s. 6d.

Gertrude, 2s. 6d.

The Earl's Daughter, 2s. 6d.

Experience of Life, 2s. 6d.

Cleve Hall, 2s. 6d.

Ivors, 2s. 6d.

Katharine Ashton, 2s. 6d.

Margaret Percival, 3s. 6d.

Lanett Parsonage, 3s. 6d.

Ursula, 3s. 6d.

Tales of Ancient Greece.

By the REV. G. W. COX, M.A. late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d.

POETRY and

Milton's Lycidas. Edited, with Notes and Introduction, by C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Lays of Ancient Rome;

with Ivy and the Armada. By LORD MACAULAY. 16mo. 3s. 6d.

Lord Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome. With 90 Illustrations on Wood from Drawings by G. SCHARF. Fcp. 4to. 21s.

Miniature Edition of Lord Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome. With G. Scharf's 90 Illustrations reduced in Lithography. Imp. 16mo. 1os. 6d.


Southey's Poetical Works, with the Author's last Corrections and Additions. Medium 8vo. with Portrait, 14s.

THE DRAMA.

Beowulf, a Heroic Poem of the Eighth Century (Anglo-Saxon Text and English Translation), with Introduction, Notes, and Appendix. By THOMAS ARNOLD, M.A. 8vo. 12s.

Poems by Jean Ingelow.

2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 10s.

FIRST SERIES, containing 'Divided,' 'The Star's Monument,' &c. Fcp. 8vo. 5s.

SECOND SERIES, 'A Story of Doom,' 'Glaiys and her Island,' &c. 5s.

Poems by Jean Ingelow.

First Series, with nearly 100 Woodcut Illustrations. Fcp. 4to. 21s.

The Iliad of Homer, Homometrically translated by C. B. CAYLEY, Translator of Dante's Comedy, &c. 8vo. 12s. 6d.

The Æneid of Virgil.

Translated into English Verse. By J. CONINGTON, M.A. Crown 8vo. 9s.

Bowdler's Family Shakspeare.

Cheaper Genuine Edition, complete in 1 vol. medium 8vo. large type, with 36 Woodcut Illustrations, 14s. or in 6 vols. fcp. 8vo. 21s.
Annals of the Road; or, Notes on Mail and Stage-Coaching in Great Britain. By Captain MALET, 18th Hussars. To which are added Essays on the Road, by NIMKOD. With 3 Woodcuts and 10 Coloured Illustrations. Medium 8vo. 212.


Blaine's Encyclopaedia of Rural Sports; Complete Accounts, Historical, Practical, and Descriptive, of Hunting, Shooting, Fishing, Racing, &c. With above 600 Woodcuts (20 from Designs by J. LEECH). 8vo. 212.

A Book on Angling; or, Treatise on the Art of Fishing in every branch; including full Illustrated Lists of Salmon Flies. By FRANCIS FRANCIS. Post 8vo. Portrait and Plates, 152.

Wilcox's Sea-Fishermen: comprising the Chief Methods of Hook and Line Fishing, a glance at Nets, and remarks on Boats and Boating. Post 8vo. Woodcuts, 122 6d.


Horses and Stables. By Colonel F. FITZWGRAM, XV. the King's Hussars. With 24 Plates of Illustrations. 8vo. 10r. 6d.

Youatt on the Horse. Revised and enlarged by W. WATSON, M.R.C.V.S. 8vo. Woodcuts, 12s. 6d.

Youatt's Work on the Dog. Revised and enlarged. 8vo. Woodcuts, 6s.

The Dog in Health and Disease. By STONEHENGE. With 73 Wood Engravings. Square crown 8vo. 71. 6d.


Stables and Stable Fittings. By W. MILES. Imp. 8vo. with 13 Plates, 15s.

The Horse's Foot, and How to keep it Sound. By W. MILES. Imp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 12s. 6d.

A Plain Treatise on Horse-shoeing. By W. MILES. Post 8vo. Woodcuts, 2s. 6d.

Remarks on Horses' Teeth, addressed to Purchasers. By W. MILES. Post 8vo. 12s. 6d.

The Ox, his Diseases and their Treatment; with an Essay on Parturition in the Cow. By J. R. DOBSON, M.R.C.V.S. Crown 8vo. Illustrations, 7s. 6d.
WORKS of UTILITY and GENERAL INFORMATION.


Maundover's Biographical Treasury. Latest Edition, reconstructed and partly re-written, with above 1,600 additional Memoirs, by W. L. R. CATES. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

Maundover's Scientific and Literary Treasury; a Popular Encyclopedia of Science, Literature, and Art. Latest Edition, in part re-written, with above 1,000 new articles, by J. Y. JOHNSON. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

Maundover's Treasury of Geography, Physical, Historical, Descriptive, and Political. Edited by W. HUGHES, F.R.G.S. With 7 Maps and 16 Plates. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

Maundover's Historical Treasury; General Introductory Outlines of Universal History, and a Series of Separate Histories. Revised by the REV. G. W. COX, M.A. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

Maundover's Treasury of Natural History; or, Popular Dictionary of Zoology. Revised and corrected Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with 900 Woodcuts, 6s.

The Treasury of Knowledge; being a Dictionary of the Books, Persons, Places, Events, and other Matters of which mention is made in Holy Scripture. By the REV. J. AYRE, M.A. With Maps, Plates, and many Woodcuts. Fcp. 8vo. 6s.

A Practical Treatise on Brewing; with Formule for Public Brewers & Instructions for Private Families. By W. BLACK. 8vo. 10s. 6d.


The Correct Card; or, How to Play at Whist; a Whist Catechism. By Captain A. CAMPBELL-WALKER, F.R.G.S. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d.


Hints to Mothers on the Management of their Health during the Period of Pregnancy and in the Lying-in Room. By THOMAS BULL, M.D. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

The Maternal Management of Children in Health and Disease. By THOMAS BULL, M.D. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

The Treasury of Botany, or Popular Dictionary of the Vegetable Kingdom; with which is incorporated a Glossary of Botanical Terms. Edited by J. LINDLEY, F.R.S. and T. MOORE, F.L.S. With 274 Woodcuts and 20 Steel Plates. Two Parts, fcp. 8vo. 12s.
Modern Cookery for Private Families, reduced to a System of Easy Practice in a Series of carefully-tested Receipts. By Eliza Acton. With 8 Plates and 150 Woodcuts. Fcp. Svo. 6s.

The Elements of Banking. By H. D. MacLeod, M.A. Second Edition. Crown Svo. 7s. 6d.


Our New Judicial System and Civil Procedure as Reconstructed under the Judicature Acts, including the Act of 1876; with Comments on their Effect and Operation. By F. Finlason, Barrister-at-Law. Cr Svo. 10s. 6d.

Willich’s Popular Table for ascertaining, according to the Car Table of Mortality, the value of Leases, Leaseshold, and Church Proprietors’ Renewal Fines, Reversions, &c. Intestacy, Inheritance, Succession Duty, various other useful tables. Eq Edition. Post Svo. 10s.
INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acton's Modern Cookery</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpine Club Map of Switzerland</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpine Guide (The)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amou's Jurisprudence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson's History of the Countries</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armittage's Childhood of the English Nation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armstrong's Organic Chemistry</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold's [Dr.] Christian Life</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold's Lectures on Modern History</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>———— Miscellaneous Works</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>———— School Sermons</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>———— (T.) Manual of English Literature</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>———— Beowulf</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold's Elements of Physics</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atelier (The) du Lys</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atherstone Priory</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayre's Treasury of Bible Knowledge</td>
<td>9, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon's Essays, by Whately</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>———— Life and Letters, by Spedding</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>———— Works</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bain's Mental and Moral Science</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— on the Senses and Intellect</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Emotions and Will</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker's Two Works on Ceylon</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker's Guide to the Central Alps</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Guide to the Western Alps</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Guide to the Eastern Alps</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancks on Native Races of the British Isles</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry on Railway Appliances</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaconfield's (Lord) Novels and Tales</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becker's Chariots and Gallus</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beestly's Graeci, Marius, and Nulla</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black's Treatise on Brewing</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackley's German-English Dictionary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blain's Rural Sports</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blassin's Metals</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolland and Lang's Aristotle's Politics</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowles on 39 Articles</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourne's Catechism of the Steam Engine</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Handbook of Steam Engine</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Treatise on the Steam Engine</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Improvements in the same</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowley's Family Shakespeare</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bramley-Moore's Six Nizoms of the Valleys</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandt's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brinkley's Astronomy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown's Exposition of the 39 Articles</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckle's History of Civilisation</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Posthumous Remains</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckton's Health in the House</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull's Hints to Mothers</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Maternal Management of Children</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgomaster's Family (The)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke's Vicissitudes of Families</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Lawyer</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell's Norway</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capel's Age of the Antonines</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Early Roman Empire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cates's Biographical Dictionary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— and Woodward's Encyclopedia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayley's Illiad of Homer</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney's Indian Polity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Modern Military Biography</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Waterloo Campaign</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church's Sketches of Ottoman History</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colenso on Moabit Stone &amp;c.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Boutheon and Hooven's Life and Epistles of St. Paul</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonplace Philosopher in Town and Country</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comte's Positive Polity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congreve's Politics of Aristotle</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conington's Translation of Virgil's Aeneid</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Miscellaneous Writings</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contantem's History of the Greeks</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coa's (G. W.) Aryan Mythology</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Athenian Empire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Crusades</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— General History of Greece</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Greeks and Persians</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— History of Greece</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Tales of Ancient Greece</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creighton's Age of Elizabeth</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cressy's Encyclopedia of Civil Engineering</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Essays of a Country Parson</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crooke's Anthracene</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Chemical Analyses</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Dyeing and Calico-printing</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culley's Handbook of Telegraphy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtice's Macedonian Empire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'Aubigné's Reformation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Cuisine and Le Mauret's Botany</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW WORKS published by LONGMANS &amp; CO.</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Toqueville’s Democracy in America</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobson on the Ox</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dome’s Law of Storms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowell’s History of Taxes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doyle’s (R.) Fairyland</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastlake’s Hints on Household Taste</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards’ Rambles among the Dolomites</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Year in Western France</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of Botany</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellicott’s Commentary on Ephesians</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Galatians</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Pastoral Epistles</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Philippians, &amp;c.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Thessalonians</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Lectures on Life of Christ</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsa, a Tale of the Tyrolean Alps</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epochs of Ancient History ——— Modern History</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evans’ (J.) Ancient Stone Implements</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Religion in Egypt</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewald’s History of Israel</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Antiquities of Israel</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairbairn’s Application of Cast and Wrought Iron to Building</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Information for Engineers</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Life</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Treatise on Mills and Millwork</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farrar’s Chapters on Language</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families of Speech</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finlayson’s Judicial System</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitch’s System of Chess</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbes’s Two Years in Fiji</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frampton’s (Bishop) Life</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France’s Fishing Book</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshfield’s Italian Alps</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Froude’s English in Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— History of England</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Short Studies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gairdner’s Houses of Lancaster and York</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gans’s Elementary Physics</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Natural Philosophy</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardiner’s Buckingham and Charles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Personal Government of Charles I</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Thirty Years’ War</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giffen’s Church and State</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Home Life</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert &amp; Churchill’s Dictionaries</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilderslee’s Bible Synonyms</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldziher’s Hebrew Mythology</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gooden’s Mechanics</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Mechanism</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant’s Ethics of Aristotle</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greville’s Journal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffin’s Algebra and Trigonometry</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffin’s Behind the Veil</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grohman’s Tyrol and the Tyrolean</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grove (Sir W. R.) on Correlation of Physical Forces</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— (F. C.) The Frosty Causus</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelf’s Encyclopedia of Architecture</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale’s Fall of the Stuarts</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartley on the Air</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartung’s Aerial World</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Polar World</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Sea and its Living Wonders</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Subterranean World</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Tropical World</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haughton’s Animal Mechanics</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haywood’s Biographical and Critical Essays</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heer’s Primoval World of Switzerland</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heine’s Life and Works, by Stiigand</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmholz on Tone</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmholz’s Scientific Lectures</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemley’s Trees and Shrubs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herschel’s Outlines of Astronomy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinchliffe’s Over the Sea and Far Away</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobson’s Amateur Mechanic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoekloid’s Engineer’s Valuing Assistant</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howorth’s Mongols</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huilk’s History of Modern Music</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Transition Period</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hume’s Essays</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Treatise on Human Nature</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibane’s Rome to its Capture</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— History of Rome</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Alps</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglese’s Poems</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jameson’s Legends of the Saints &amp; Martyrs</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Legends of the Madonna</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Legends of the Monastic Orders</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Legends of the Saviour</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Jenkins’ Electricity and Magnetism</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Jerrold’s Lycidas of Milton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Jerrold’s Life of Napoleon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Johnston’s Geographical Dictionary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Johnstone’s Geographical Dictionary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Jukes’ Types of Gensis</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— on Second Death</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallick’s Commentary on the Bible</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith’s Evidence of Prophecy</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Keith’s Metallurgy, by Crooke and Read</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirby and Spee’s Entomology</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkman’s Philosophy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knatchbull-Hugessen’s Whispers from Fairy-Land</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Higgedly-Piggledy</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuenen’s Prophets and Prophecy in Israel</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Landscapes, Churches, &amp;c</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Latham’s English Dictionaries</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Handbook of English Language</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence on Rocks</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecky’s History of European Morals</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Leaders of Public Opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lefroy’s Bermudas</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Hours in Town</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons of Middle Age</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>——— Lemer’s Biographical History of Philosophy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis on Authority</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsey and Moore's Treasury of Botany ...</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd's Magnetism</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave-Theory of Light</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longman's (F. W.) Chess Openings</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Dictionary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W.) Edward the Third</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures on History of England</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old and New St. Paul's</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London's Encyclopedia of Agriculture</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardening</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plants</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubbock's Origin of Civilization</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludlow's American War</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyra Germanica</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macaulay's (Lord) Essays</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of England</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lays of Ancient Rome</td>
<td>14, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Letters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Writings</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writings, Selections from</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacCulloch's Eastern Question</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCulloch's Dictionary of Commerce</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macleod's Economical Philosophy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory and Practice of Banking</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of Banking</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mademoiselle Moris</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malet's Annals of the Road</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall's Physiology</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshman's Life of Havelock</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martineson's Christian Life</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours of Thought</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psalms</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maunder's Biographical Treasury</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical Treasury</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Treasury</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific and Literary Treasury</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury of Knowledge</td>
<td>9, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxwell's Theory of Heat</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May's History of Democracy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of England</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melville's Digby Grand</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melville's Digby Grand Havana</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Boniface</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gladiators</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good for Nothing</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmby House</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreter</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate Coventry</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's Maries</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendelssohn's Letters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merivale's Fall of the Roman Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General History of Rome</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Triumvirates</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romans under the Empire</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrifield's Arithmetic and Mensuration</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles on Horse's Foot and Horse Shoeing</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on Horse's Teeth and Stables</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill (J.) on the Mind</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissertations &amp; Disquisitions &amp; Essays on Religion</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton's Philosophy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(J. S.) Liberty</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Economy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill (J. S.) Representative Government</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of Logic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsettled Questions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarianism</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autobiography</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miller's Elements of Chemistry</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inorganic Chemistry</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell's Manual of Assaying</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Novelist's Library</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monelle's Spiritual Songs</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore's Irish Melodies, Illustrated Edition</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalla Rookh, Illustrated Edition</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morell's Mental Philosophy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray's Life and Letters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muller's Chips from a German Workshop</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science of Language</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science of Religion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nesson on the Moon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicols's Puzzle of Life</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northcote's Lathes &amp; Turning</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Connor's Commentary on Hebrews</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romans</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osborn's Islam</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen's Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of Vertebrate Animals</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packe's Guide to the Pyrenees</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterson's Casuistation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payen's Industrial Chemistry</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaslow's Comprehensive Specifier</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierce's Chess Problems</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polc's Game of Whist</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price's &amp; Sivewright's Telegraphy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-Day Thoughts</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frodor's Astronomical Essays</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orbs around Us</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Worlds than Ours</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Essays (Two Series)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transits of Venus</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Star Atlases</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universe</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prothero's De Montfort</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Schools Atlas of Ancient Geography</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlas of Modern Geography</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawlinson's Parthia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasanians</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreations of a Country Parson</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redgrave's Dictionary of Artists</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocca's Residence in Vienna and Berlin</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly's Map of Mont Blanc</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Monte Rosa</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repsby's Memoirs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynardson's Down the Road</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick's Dictionary of Antiquities</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rover's Rose Amateur's Guide</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger's Defence of Eclipse of Faith</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essays</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royce's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald's Fly-Fisher's Entomology</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roscoe's Outlines of Civil Procedure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rothchild's Israelites</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanders' Justinian's Institutes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sankey's Sparta and Thebes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saville on Apparitions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on Primitive Faith</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schellen's Spectrum Analysis</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott's Lectures on the Fine Arts</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poems</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaside Musing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedgwick's Oxford Reformers of 1498</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Revolution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewell's History of France</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing Thoughts on Religion</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for Communion</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions of the Day</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Examination for Confirmation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories and Tales</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoughts for the Age</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelley's Workshop Appliances</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short's Church History</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith's (Sydney) Essays</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wit and Wisdom</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith's (Dr. R. A.) Air and Rain</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R. B.) Rome and Carthage</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southey's Poetical Works</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley's History of British Birds</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen's Ecclesiastical Biography</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonehouse on the Dog</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on the Greyhound</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone on Strains</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stukeley's Early Plantagenet</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Afternoons at the Parish Church of a University City</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supernatural Religion</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susinbourne's Picture Logic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Taylor's History of India                                           | 2    |
| Manual of Ancient History                                           | 4    |
| Manual of Modern History                                            | 4    |
| (Jeremy) Works, edited by Eden                                      | 18   |
| Text-Books of Science                                               | 12   |
| Thomson's Structural and Physiological Botany                        | 12, 13|
| Thomson's Laws of Thought                                           | 7    |
| Thorpe's Quantitative Analysis                                      | 12   |
| Thorpe and Mair's Qualitative Analysis                              | 12   |
| Tilden's Chemical Philosophy                                        | 12, 14|
| Todd on Parliamentary Government                                    | 3    |
| Trench's Realities of Irish Life                                    | 7    |
| Trollope's Barchester Towers                                        | 21   |
| Warden                                                              | 21   |
| Twiss's Law of Nations                                              | 1    |
| Tyndall's American Lectures on Light                               | 11   |
| Diamagnetism                                                        | 11   |
| Heat a Mode of Motion                                               | 11   |
| Lectures on Electricity                                             | 11   |
| Lectures on Light                                                   | 11   |
| Lectures on Sound                                                   | 11   |
| Molecular Physics                                                   | 11   |
| Unaware                                                             | 21   |
| Ure's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, and Mines                   | 1f   |
| Vaughan's Trident, Crescent, and Cross                              | 12   |
| Walker on Whist                                                     | 21   |
| Warburton's Edward the Third                                       | 1    |
| Watson's Geometry                                                   | 12   |
| Watt's Dictionary of Chemistry                                     | 14   |
| Webb's Objects for Common Telescopes                                | 10   |
| Weinhold's Experimental Physics                                    | 11   |
| Wellington's Life, by Gleig                                        | 11   |
| Whately's English Synonymies                                       | 1    |
| Whately's Logic                                                     | 1    |
| Rhetoric                                                            | 1    |
| White and Redgate's Latin Dictionaries                             | 1    |
| Whitworth's Measuring Machine                                      | 1    |
| Wilcock's Sea-Fisherman                                             | 21   |
| Williams's Aristotle's Ethics                                      | 11   |
| Willich's Popular Tables                                           | 21   |
| Wood's (J. G.) Bible Animals                                       | 11   |
| Homes without Hands                                                 | 11   |
| Insects at Home                                                     | 11   |
| Insects Abroad                                                      | 11   |
| Out of Doors                                                        | 11   |
| Strange Dwellings                                                   | 11   |
| (J. T.) Ephesus                                                     | 15   |
| Woodward's Geology                                                  | 13   |
| Wyatt's History of Prussia                                          | 22   |
| Yonge's English-Greek Lexicons                                      | 9    |
| Horace                                                              | 21   |
| Youatt on the Dog                                                   | 22   |
| on the Horse                                                        | 22   |
| Zeller's Plato                                                      | 3    |
| Socrates                                                            | 3    |
| - Stoles, Epicureans, and Sceptics                                 | 3    |
| Zimmern's Life of Schopenhauer                                     | 4    |
MODERN HISTORICAL EPOCHS.

In course of publication, each volume in fcp. 8vo. complete in itself,

EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY:

A SERIES OF BOOKS NARRATING THE

HISTORY of ENGLAND and EUROPE

At SUCCESSIVE EPOCHS SUBSEQUENT to the CHRISTIAN ERA.

EDITED BY

E. E. MORRIS, M.A. Lincoln Coll. Oxford;
J. S. PHILLPOTTS, B.C.L. New Coll. Oxford; and

"This striking collection of little volumes is a valuable contribution to the literature of the day, whether for youthful or more mature readers. As an abridgment of several important phases of modern history it has great merit, and some of its parts display powers and qualities of a high order. Such writers, indeed, as Professor Stubs, Messrs. WARBURTON, GAINEN, CREATON, and others, could not fail to give us excellent work. . . . The style of the series is, as a general rule, correct and pure; in the case of Mr. Seeborn it more than once rises into genuine, simple, and manly eloquence; and the composition of some of the volumes displays no ordinary historical skill. . . . The Series is and deserves to be popular."

The Times, Jan. 2, 1877.

Eleven Volumes Now Published:—

The ERA of the PROTESTANT REVOLUTION. By F. SEEBORN, Author of "The Oxford Reformers—Coke, Erasmus, More." With 4 Coloured Maps and 13 Diagrams on Wood. Price 2s. 6d.

"Mr. Seeborn's Era of the Protestant Revolution shows an admirable mastery of a complex subject; it abounds in sound and philosophic thought, and as a composition it is very well ordered. . . . This volume, in short, is of the greatest merit."

The Times, Jan. 2.

The CRUSADES. By the Rev. G. W. COX, M.A. late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford; Author of the "Aryan Mythology" &c. With a Coloured Map. Price 2s. 6d.

"The earliest period, in point of time, is that of the Crusades, of which we have a summary from the accomplished pen of the well-known Author of one of the best and latest histories of Greece. Mr. Cox's narrative is flowing and easy, and parts of his work are extremely good."

The Times, Jan. 2.


"The narrative—a singularly perplexing task—is on the whole remarkably clear, and the Author gives us a well-written summary of the causes that led to the great contest, and of the most striking incidents that marked its progress. Mr. Gardner's judgments, too, are usually just. . . . The Author, we should add, is very skilful in his delineation of historical characters."

The Times, Jan. 2.

The HOUSES of LANCASTER and YORK; with the CONQUEST and LOSS of FRANCE. By JAMES GARDNER, of the Public Record Office; Editor of "The Ptolemy Letters" &c. With 5 Coloured Maps. Price 2s. 6d.

"Mr. Gardner's Epoch, 'Lancaster and York, is usually correct and sensible, and the conclusions of the Author are just and accurate."

The Times, Jan. 2.

London, LONGMANS & CO. [Continued.]